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ABSTRACT 
The active process of cognitive cafegorlastion, as opposed to "obIoctivo reality" Is Introducod as 
a fundamental determinant of human perception. It I. argued that what mental retardation Is 
understood to be and consequently, who Is mentally retarded, Is hot solely a matter of 
intraorganiamic pathology. Rather, it is influenced by the normative beliefs that evolve In 
transaction with the Interests and purposes of social systems. Cross-cultural and historical 
examples are given and apparent conflicts In the empirical literature resolved, since differences 
need not imply contradictions, Ignorance or experimental failure, but can simply reflect 
operations of different norms. Study 1 predicts and finds differences In beliefs about 
retardates that are attributed to subjects' group memberships. 
Chapter 3 Identifies the deductive aspect of Tajfel'a social categorisation theory as a mechanistic 
psychological pathway whereby macrosyatem level normative beliefs influence the perception of 
labelled retardates, and by extrapolation, their treatment and development. Tajfel's paradigm 
brings form and sense to apparently contradictory labelling studies, and Study 2 predicts and 
finds enhanced perceived Intragroup similarity and Intergroup dia-similarity of 4 normal and 4 
subnormal children as a function of the labels "mentally retarded" and "normal", the children's 
characteristics and the dimensions along which Judgements are made. 
In Chapter 4, the pathway Is made social psychological. Turner's social Identification model Is 
described and referent informational influence identified as the mechanism whereby Individuals 
enact their group memberships and hence, conform In mediating shared normative beliefs. 
Thus, beliefs about and perceptions of retardates In any social system are seen as depending 
on members' shared social Identification and not on an amalgamation of Individual beliefs. 
Study 3, provides preliminary support, since lay subjects seem able to mimic doctors', 
teachers' and "personally acquainted people's" beliefs about retardates, which demonstrates that 
cultural expectations are sufficient to generate typical attitudinal patterns, Independent of real 
doctors' teachers' and acquainted people's experiences. In Study 4 characteristic clinical 
Influences on the conception and diagnosis of retardates Is shown to depend on a salient 
medical social Identification and not on being a "medic". 
In Chapter 5, referent informational Influence is reintroduced as a transactional mechanism 
whereby the Individual might shape the development of his own retardation. Rather than a 
pathological condition, mental retardation is seen primarily as a handicap, not only externally 
imposed by the expectations of others, but internally fulfilled by a salient retardate social 
identification. A possible ontology of a retarded self-image, together with Its role In mediating 
retarded behaviour and reconciling apparently Inconsistent empirical studies Is sketched. 
Subsequently, In Study 5 preliminary empirical support Is derived In the form of changes In 
special school-children's self images according to situational emphasis on personal or social 
Identity. 
The optimistic implication of social categorisation and social Identification theories Is that 
amelioration of retardation need not wait for medical breakthrough, but can begin with 
perceivers' beliefs and the personalisation of retardates' self-concepts. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction and overview 
In 1972, Henri Tajfel wrote, 
The segmentation of the environment in terms of 
groupings consisting of items which are equivalent 
to one another for given purposes and differ, with 
regard to the same purposes, from other groups of 
items, is a sine qua non condition of survival. 
Without this process, adequate reaction to 
whatever happens in the environment or adequate 
action upon it would not be possible. 
He continues, 
The principal function of categorising resides in 
its role as a tool in the systemisation of the 
environment for the purposes of action. 
1972, p. 4 
These words form the cornerstone of the present social 
approach to the development of mental retardation, not only 
because Tajfel's notion of categorisation, it will be seen, 
appears as its principal mechanism, but also because 
categorisation may be linked to Kuhn's (1974) fascinating 
analysis of scientific paradigms, in which sense, it 
underpins the theoretical orientation and hence, the 
direction and content of the following work. 
To enlarge upon this, Kuhn (1974) defines "paradigm" as the 
constellation of beliefs, values, rules and techniques 
shared by a scientific community. In a narrower sense, he 
also defines it as an agreed example illustrating such a 
constellation, which may serve as a template for future 
research. Without a paradigm, he continues, scientific 
endeavour is directionless: all data appear equally 
-I 
relevant and are uninterpretable or else interpretable in 
many ways, because there is no theoretical framework to give 
them shape. Scientific progress, it follows, is not a 
steady accumulation of fact. Rather, it is a matter of 
assimilating data into pre-existing paradigms. Thus, 
knowledge is not dictated by objective reality, but by the 
conceptual fit into the prevailing world view. 
Clearly, in this sense, Kuhn's notion of scientific research 
is analogous to Tajfel's notion of categorisation. 
Kuhn continues to argue that scientific research can often 
be regarded as puzzle solving, that is, as a search for ways 
to apply accepted rules to arrive at the predicted answer. 
Paradoxically, this often results in the discovery of novel 
facts, or the invention of novel theories, although the 
search-directed nature of the scientific method reduces the 
likelihood of such events. If novelties are both anomolous 
- that is, cannot be assimilated by the existing paradigm - 
and persistent, a crisis might arise. This corresponds to a 
period of theoretical flux and a proliferation of 
adjustments to the paradigm until eventually, a new one that 
better fits the unexplained phenomena arises to clash with 
the old, and ultimately, to supplant it in what Kuhn terms a 
"scientific revolution". 
The primary orientation of the present work is social 
psychological and the paradigms on which it is based will be 
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made explicit as it progresses. Before embarking, however, 
it seems appropriate to make brief mention of the 
developmental paradigm into which the social psychological 
influences are to be assimilated. 
According to Lerner and Busch-Rossnagel (1981), 
developmental theory itself undergoes developmental change, 
although in the light of Kuhn's opinions, their comment 
might suggest a smoother progression than was actually the 
case. Bearing this in mind, Mussen, Conger and Kagan,, 
(1974) point out that children were simply regarded as. 
immature adults until the seventeenth century, when for 
reasons not properly understood, they were conceptually 
separated from adults. During this period, a seminal 
interest in child development, enforced by a belief that 
early events affected adult life, grew. The earliest 
writers, Mussen et al continue, were philosophers, some 
conceptualising the child's mind as innately determined, 
like Rousseau, for example, who believed children to be 
endowed with a natural moral sense that was likely to be 
marred by society. Others like John Locke, on the other 
hand, viewed the infant mind as a tabula rasa, and 
experience and education as the fundamental determinants of 
development. 
In the nineteenth century, scientists began to see the child 
as worthy of study, since Darwinian theory suggested man 
-3- 
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ti,; , ý, couýd ., beý,,, understooä ; 
through 
,. examination 
of his phylogenic 
.. and ontogen icy sources, -although, ,, _as 
Kuhn! s_,, analys fs ;y, ý 
predicts, early researchers concerned themselves with the 
collection of age related data, not theoretical synthesis. 
A theoretical legacy from the philosophers might however be 
discerned in the dichotomy between later behaviourists like 
Watson and Skinner, who maintained that psychological 
development was entirely determined by environmental 
Influences, and others, like Freud, who viewed it as the 
result of internal processes. The logical absurdity of both 
.,,.,,,. approaches was condemned by Hebb. (1958) who argued that no 
genetic material can produce behaviour without first 
developing in a nutritious environment and that no amount of 
,. envir. onmental intervention can ever shape a man from an 
animal. 
Sameroff., and Chandler., (1975) identify three models which 
.,. they, argue, underlie developmental research. Only the 
last, 
; r, . 
the.. transact tonal model, has been made explicit. 
_Thea,. f first, -the main -effect model, held 
that genetic and 
....,.., _, environmental --influences 
have independent- additive. effects, 
_. 
as. evinced, - 




. with_. low intelligence will -show consistent,,,. 
deficfts 
. 
in performance across all environments- -. 
Similarly, 
. ýBowlby, .. 
(1969) believed that maternal deprivation would, have 




Sameroff and Chandler next identify an interactive model, 
which it might be hypothesised, resulted from the discovery 
of data that could not be assimilated by the main effect 
model. For example, many children who had undergone severe 
deprivation during infancy but were subsequently adopted 
into superior environments, showed no deficits. Thus, 
biological and environmental influences were held to 
interact: deficits could be greater than those predicted by 
the sum of each disadvantage, or alternatively, the effects 
of disadvantage might be "washed-out". 
The transactional model grew as a result of the realisation 
that neither environment nor child remained constant during 
interactions. For example, in a classic study, Thomas, 
Chess and Birch (1968) found developmental outcomes were 
not predicted by infants' characteristics so much as by 
parents' adjustments to them. Thus, the infant influenced 
his caregivers and so modified his own developmental 
environment and a progression of such mutual transactions 
was visualised. Similarly, Lerner and Busch-Rossnagel 
(1981) add that it became clear that developmental change, 
unrelated to childhood events or age, ocurred throughout 
life. 
Within the transactional model, development is potentially 
multi-directional and multidimensional, influenced by all 
-5- 
levels of the context in which the individual is embedded. 
Thus, plasticity and the possibility of development 
throughout the entire lifespan is stressed, together with 
the dialectic relationship - passive, active or even 
intentional - between individual and context. As Lerner and 
Busch-Rossnagel put it: 
individuals are products and producers of the 
context that provides a basis for their 
development. As such, individuals may be seen as 
producers of their own development. 
1981, p. 6 
This view of development is implicit throughout the 
following work, which although primarily social 
psychological in orientation, can therefore also be seen as 
an attempt to apply aspects of the transactional paradigm. 
Recently, Bronfenbrenner (1979) has made a searching and 
comprehensive attempt to articulate more fully a 
transactional view of development, providing several 
concepts that are extremely useful for present purposes. 
Most useful, Bronfenbrenner's definition of development 
explicitly visualises the individual as embedded in his 
context, as he perceives it. 
Development is the process through which the 
growing person acquires a more extended 
differentiated and valid conception of the 
ecological environment, and becomes motivated and 
able to engage in activities that reveal the 
properties of, sustain, or restructure that 
environment at levels of similar or greater 
complexity in form and content. 
1979, p. 27 
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The environment, Bronfenbrenner envisages as a set of nested 
structures, like Russian dolls. The innermost contains the 
developing person and the objects and people he responds to 
on a face-to-face basis, as he experiences them, together with 
the links between these people and objects. This nexus of 
direct and indirect interrelations in the person's immediate 
setting, Bronfenbrenner calls "the microsystem". 
At the second level, "the mesosystem" consists of the 
interconnections between settings like home and school or 
place of work. For example, what is known in one setting 
about another, the number of joint participants or 
conflicting role demands all influence the individual's 
development within each. 
Similarly, at the third level, Bronfenbrenner visualises 
"exosystems", that is the relationship between settings in 
which the individual never participates, and his immediate 
environment, for example, between parents' place of work and 
the child's home. 
Finally, at the fourth level, Bronfenbrenner recognises that 
given settings and their relationships are similar within 
and different between subcultures, as if, he continues, 
there existed a series of blueprints on which they are 
based. Such over-arching general patterns, together with 
their underpinning ideologies, he names "macrosystems". 
-? - 
Bronfenbrenner's approach, it will be seen, provides an 
overall perspective that helps emphasise the underlying 
continuity of the present work, which essentially consists 
of a series of social psychological experiments linked to 
existing research into mental retardation. In keeping with 
Bronfenbrenner's ecological emphasis, however, empirical 
work will be designed to explore and generate hypotheses and 
not always to confirm them. Thus, in the spirit of Everitt 
and Dunn (1983), analyses are intended to be exploratory as 
well as confirmatory. 
Chapter 2 concerns the macrosystem - the area, 
Bronfenbrenner complains, is most often neglected: 
classification is first identified as reflecting the 
interests and purposes of the classifiers, rather than 
objective features of what is being classified. Thus, what 
mental retardation is believed to be, it is argued, is not 
only a function of retardates, but also of cultural 
histories. Similarly, between group differences in the 
conception of retardation can be related to the different 
norms held by group members. 
in chapter 3, social classification is identified as a 
mechanism whereby elements of the macrosystem, specifically 
normative beliefs, can affect directly the perception of 
people labelled retarded. it therefore describes one 
pathway through which macro, meso and micro systems 
-g- 
interact. 
In chapter 4, social identification theory provides a more 
realistic human perspective in identifying how conformity to 
normative beliefs (about retardates) is not automatic and 
inevitable, but dependent on the perceiver's 
self-definitions rather than experiential or dispositional 
factors. 
Finally, in chapter 5 an attempt is made to include the 
retardate as an active participant in these processes. 
Social identity theory is reintroduced as a vehicle leading 
directly to conformity with normative beliefs and hence, to 
retarded behaviour that is role, not intrinsically 
determined. More important, social identity theory provides 
the retardate a means to fight back - to resist or avoid 
self-definitions that mediate retardation. In this way, the 
individual is seen as an active determinant in the 
development of his own mental retardation. 
-4- 
CHAPTER 2 
What is mental retardation? Who is mentally retarded? 
The first umpire said, "I calls It as It Is'. The second said, 
'I calls It as I sees lt', while the third umpire said, It ain't 
nothing until I calls ! t'. 
Richardson (1975), p. 93 
1. Introduction 
The previous chapter mentioned the fundamental importance of 
categorisation which brings order and meaning to the buzzing 
confusion of stimuli that would otherwise impinge upon us. 
In keeping with this notion, Mercer (1973), calls the 
questions "what is mental retardation, really? " and "who is 
mentally retarded, really? " nonsense questions, because: - 
Persons (objects and events) have no names and 
belong to no class until we put them in one. Whom 
we call mentally retarded, and where we draw the 
line between the mentally retarded and the normal, 
depend upon our interest and the purpose of our 
classification. The intellectual problem of 
mental retardation in the community is, 
ultimately, a problem of classification and 
nomenclature. 
1973, p. 1 
In other words, the definition of mental retardation, like 
other definitions, is not an absolute, but a matter of 
social consensus, the evolution of which is embedded in 
cultural heritage. Similarly, she argues, what mental 
retardation signifies and how it is understood, depends on 
the underlying paradigm. Mercer then identifies two 
paradigms relevant to mental retardation, that are medical 
and social in orientation. 
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2. The medical model of retardation 
It is widely agreed that the medical perspective is the 
paradigm underpinning professional and academic involvement 
with mental retardation. (e. g. Mercer, 1973; Booth, 1978; 
Wolfensberger, 1965). Because of its pervasiveness, Mercer 
argues, its assumptions are seldom examined - it is self 
evident that something is wrong with an adult who cannot 
read. 
Medical concern is aroused when pathological symptoms (that 
is, those that tend to damage the organism) become apparent, 
and from patterns of these, the presence of various disease 
entities is abstracted, although the disease takes its 
course whether or not it is diagnosed. Because humans are 
similar, biologically speaking, the medical model is 
universal, in the sense that specific constellations of 
symptoms always signify the same disease. Similarly, the 
disease, not the person in whom it is lodged, is the object 
of interest. 
From this perspective, "normal" is a residual category 
consisting of those free from pathology. Thus the medical 
model is bipolar and clearly evaluative. At one end stands 
normality which is equated with health, and at the other, 
abnormality, associated with sickness and disease. 
Co-existent with this, Mercer argues, is a second definition 
of "normal", based on Gauss's normal curve, which describes 
frequency distributions of characteristics within 
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populations. In this case, abnormality is. defined in terms 
of the extent of deviation from the mean, the range within 
one standard deviation, which comprises 68% of the 
population, usually being designated normal; between one and 
two standard deviations from the mean, low or high vormals, 
(each comprising 13.6%) and those beyond two standard 
deviations from the mean, abnormally low or high (2.3% 
each). 
By definition, therefore, there are always two zones of 
abnormality delineated by a normal curve. Whether the tail 
above or below the mean, or both or neither is considered 
"bad", depends entirely on the characteristic in question. 
For this approach to operate meaningfully, several 
conditions must be met. First, it is essential that the 
characteristic be normally distributed. For example, a 
distribution of the heights of men and women would be 
bimodal. The mean would be uninterpretable and most men and 
women would be designated abnormally tall or short, 
respectively. Second, each criterion of normal is only 
applicable to members of the population from whom it was 
derived. Thus, a member of any group whose mean differs 
from that of the population, will be found abnormal, like a 
woman whose height is judged against the heights of men. In 
this sense, minority groups are abnormal, by definition. 
The statistical model applied to IQ scores is the mainstay 
of the American Association on Mental Deficiency's (1961) 
- 12 - 
widely used definition of mental retardation (Heber, 1961). 
Scores are standardised to have mean 100 and standard 
deviation 15 and individuals falling within the IQ range 85 
to 115 are normal. Those one to two standard deviations 
below the mean are "borderline", (70 to 85), *and those two 
to three standard deviations below (55 to 69), "mildly 
retarded. " Similarly, three to four (IQ 40 to 54), four to 
five, (25 to 39) and more than five standard deviations 
below the mean are designated moderately, severely and 
profoundly retarded, respectively. 
The crucial point, Mercer points out, is that the dominance 
of the medical model of mental retardation has lead to a 
tendency to evaluate statistically defined abnormality in 
pathological terms. As Mercer puts it: - 
IQ which is not a biological manifestation but is 
a behavioural score based on responses to a series 
of questions, becomes conceptually transposed into 
a pathological sign carrying all the implications 
of the pathological model. Statistical 
abnormality is equated with biological pathology 
without any evidence based on functional analysis 
that this statistical sign is related to the 
biology of the organism or that it has any 
functional relationship to system maintenance. 
1973, p. 6 
I 
This is particularly serious, because pathological 
conditions identified by characteristic patterns of 
symptoms, as, for example, in Down's syndrome, can only be 
distinguished in one third of cases at best (e. g. Malin, 
Race and Jones, 1980; Kushlick and Blunden, 1974), and 
indeed, Hughes (1975) puts the figure as low as 15%. In 
the rest, the major "symptom" is a low score on an IQ test 
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from which, the undetectable condition, "minimal brain 
dysfunction" is abstracted, although the logical basis for 
assuming its presence is non-existent. Thus, the medical 
model is inappropriate for up to 85% of the subnormal 
population. As Brooks and Baumeister, (1977) put it, 
retardation in these cases, results from a theory of 
intelligence. 
The medical perspective determines a constellation of 
questions and assumptions about retardation, which are 
essentially the same as those asked about diseases. For 
instance, efforts are made to determine its etiology, and 
taxonomies of possible'genetic and environmental factors 
have been constructed in the hope that the causal chain may 
be broken and retardation prevented or cured. It is 
interesting to note, however, that environmental factors. 
like social disadvantage, are only relevant because they are 
assumed to cause organic damage that leads to pathology. 
Similarly, Mercer points out, pervasiveness of the medical 
perspective has led to an emphasis on diagnostic tools, like 
IQ tests and research that is biological or mechanistically 
psychological in orientation. According to Brooks and 
Baumeister (1977), and certainly in keeping with 
Bronfenbrenner (1979) and the present approach, these make 
a science of missing the point, since, in ignoring the 
context of behaviour, they lack ecological validity. 
Examples include Zeaman and House's (1963) theory that 
retardation is an impairment of attention-directing 
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mechanisms, Ellis's (1963) famous hypothesis that it is lack 
of persistence of the stimulus trace and Spitz's (1963) 
theory that it is inadequate neural satiation. 
Such biological based research, Mercer continues, has led to 
the proliferation of complex nomenclature and an associated, 
mutually supportive professionalisation of those trained to 
deal with it. 
Finally, Mercer describes a fundamental code that it is 
worse for a physician to dismiss an ill patient than for him 
to retain a well one, since the former error might threaten 
life, while the latter does little harm. In the case of 
mental retardation, however, this may cause conflict when 
tempered against the risk of the social consequences of 
mislabelling. 
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3. Mercer's social model of retardation 
During her community based research, Mercer states, it 
quickly became apparent that the medical model was 
inadequate for conceptualising mental retardation. 
Consequently, developing a wider perspective became a major 
priority. The resultant model is based on a view of society 
as a network of interlocking social systems, each of which 
consists of social statuses, roles and norms which she later., 
adds, (Mercer, 1977) are pervaded by the cultural values of 
the most dominant political group. From this perspective, 
mental retardation is a role associated with the achieved 
status "mental retardate". 
In more detail, social statuses are positions in society 
which people occupy by virtue of certain behaviours or 
unchangeable characteristics, like age or sex. Many have 
titles by which the occupants are known., like "doctor" or 
"woman". 
A social role is the behaviour associated with a particular 
social status, and the common expectations which delineate 
roles within a society are known as the social norms. This 
introduces a third meaning for "normal", as behaviour that 
fulfills a prevailing social norm. Once again, therefore, 
"normal" is non-evaluative. Its meaning depends on the norm 
in question. 
Clearly, in order for a social system to survive, 
individuals will be socialised into behaving normally, that 
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is, into performing the roles associated with their social 
statuses. Strategies to deal with deviance include 
punishment or ultimately, banishment from the system 
altogether. Alternatively, a devalued status might be 
created, to which the deviant individual is assigned. In 
Mercer's opinion, mental retardate is one such devalued 
social status. For example, schools may be considered as 
social systems that create special classes for children 
0 
whose behaviour deviates in certain ways from that expected 
of (middle-class white) pupils. Redefined as retardates, 
however, their behaviour becomes normal. Precise 
expectations vary between schools, thus the same child may 
be a retardate at one, but a pupil at another. Similarly, 
an individual's status might also change according to the 
succession of roles he holds through life. Thus, one who 
was retarded at school might excel in other fields. 
The important point is that an individual who does not 
occupy the retardate social status in any of his sphere of 
social systems, is not mentally retarded. Whatever 
pathologies lie hidden within him, if he does not play the 
mentally retarded role, his behaviour does not reflect 
mental retardation. 
A brief resume of the thrust of Mercer's (1973) work, 
summarises the major differences between medical and social 
perspectives: 
in America's Riverside community, Mexican-American and to a 
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lesser extent, black children, seemed over-represented in 
the population of retardates. However, it quickly grew 
clear that many were functioning perfectly at home and in 
the community, despite being labelled mentally retarded at 
school. In other words, their retardation was a function of 
where they were, which cannot be explained within the 
medical model. 
A social system epidemiology was therefore conducted in 
order to discover not only the characteristics of 
retardates, but also the normative structures that 
influenced the numbers achieving the status. 
Mercer focussed on the school system where, it transpired, 
children were given cognitive tests that had been 
standardised on middle class Anglo-whites, and which 
reflected mainstream cultural values like English verbal 
skills, arithmetic and abstract conceptual reasoning. 
Judged against these, Mexican-Americans and blacks were 
minority groups, and hence, scored abnormally low. Low 1 
scores were interpreted to indicate something wrong with the 
children, as Jones (1972) would say, they were assumed to 
be missing something. Since for the most part, no pathology 
could be found, it was assumed they must suffer from minimal 
brain dysfunction. Thus, they achieved the status mental 
retardate within the school system. In this light, it is 
not surprising that Wolfensberger (1965) goes so far as to 
advise parents of children who are probably near IQ 60 to 
"avoid by all means available" school testing and evaluation 
i 
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of their children. 
More recently, Tomlinson (1982) has similarly examined why 
West Indians are over-represented among British children 
receiving special education, and although she does not 
mention the medical model directly, she criticises the 
assumption that retardation is intrinsically determined. 
Apart from culturally biassed cognitive tests, she 
implicates the stereotypic beliefs of referring Head 
Teachers, who, she found, tended to assume West Indian 
children "naturally" less likely to benefit from normal 
teaching. Interestingly, she also notes that Asian children 
are under-represented, which she attributed to her finding 
that teachers believed them hard working, docile, obedient 
and eager to learn. 
To go one step further, it is easy to see how the medical 
model facilitates racist thinking:. since a high proportion 
of ethnic minorities have been diagnosed to have minimal 
brain dysfunction, as races, they must be biologically 
inferior. Indeed, there must be'many retarded immigrants 
walking round unidentified and hordes waiting to migrate or 
mismanaging affairs in their countries of origin - the 
implications for attitudes and policies need not be 
elaborated. 
The social point of view can encompass the medical model, 
which then becomes the normative structures of the medical 
social system, with pathologies or symptoms simply 
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representing deviance. A powerful analysis of the case 
histories of 46 severely retarded babies, (Booth, 1978) 
serves as illustration, since in all but two cases, the 
babies were normal into their second year and beyond, in 
that they fulfilled normal expectations. Even when they 
fell behind at developmental milestones, parents and doctors 
explained away deviance by laziness, for example. Indeed, 
when some physical problem, like a hare-lip could be envoked 
as an excuse, tolerance was excessive. Eventually, when the 
babies lagged far, far behind, their normal status could no 
longer be justified, and parents began a painful series of 
negotiations with professionals to define new subnormal 
statuses for their children. 
Although as Booth intended, this clearly illustrates that 
retardation emerges as a social state, it is simultaneously 
possible to play devil's advocate and argue that the medical 
model is the better fit, because the children's fate was 
determined by the unfolding of pathologies lodged within 
them and that it was only the inadequacies of diagnostic 
tools, incompetence or reluctance that slowed recognition of 
this fact. 
When clinical pathology is present, it seems, it is possible 
to argue for both models. Thus an approach explicitly 
combining medical and social aspects might be more 
appropriate. Wood and Badley (1980), offer a likely 
candidate. 
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4. Wood and Badley's model of disablement 
Wood and Badley (1980), like Mercer, find the medical model 
of disease inadequate. Its preoccupation with biological 
dysfunction, they argue, leaves little room for the social, 
psychological and behavioural dimensions of illness, which 
may be the planes on which most difficulty is experienced. 
Their model begins with impairments which are defined as 
abnormalities of body structure, appearance or system 
function (including mental systems), and which represent a 
deviation from some biological norm. They can be temporary 
or permanent, perceived or not perceived by the individual 
and they include congenital or traumatic losses and 
disfigurements together with the pathologies central to the 
medical model of disease. 
Second, disability is the expression of impairments in 
compound integrated activities, characterised by deviation 
from performance norms in physical, psychological, or social 
tasks, skills and behaviours. In other words, disability 
refers to a permanent or temporary restriction or inability 
to perform. an activity in the customarily expected manner. 
Finally, handicap is a "disadvantage for a given individual, 
resulting from an impairment or disability that limits or 
prevents fulfillment of a role that is normal for that 
individual. " (1980, p. 16). In the light of the previous 
discussion of social statuses, roles and norms, Wood and 
Badley's terminology is unfortunate, and a "role that is 
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normal" is taken to mean roles that are valued or customary. 
Thus; handicap refers to the disadvantage attached to 
behaviour that is not normal i. e. not adequately fulfilling 
a role. 
Since normative expectations that define roles and hence, 
deviant behaviour, reflect current features of the relevant 
social system, handicap, it follows, is a social phenomenon. 
A couple of examples clarify these terms: - 
First, a facial disfigurement is an impairment but is 
unlikely to result in disability. In our society, however, 
it is likely to be a handicap for a woman, since normative 
expectations associated with that role, despite feminist 
influences, entail a fashionable face. For a man, on the 
other hand, this is less likely. Indeed, certain scars can 
even be socially advantageous. In other societies where 
women are veiled, the range of situations in which this 
entails handicap, clearly, are likely to be fewer. 
In contrast, loss of. a leg is an impairment likely to result 
I 
in a range of disabilities, yet no handicap need follow. To 
i 
illustrate, a colleague involved in a door-to-door census to 1 
ascertain the need for social services, found to his 
surprise, that several amputees were simply unable to think 
of any spheres in which they were disadvantaged. 
Interestingly, this means that the individual can determine 
to some extent whether his disability entails handicap, by 
choosing the social systems in which he moves. 
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Although the concepts 
promised to be enligh- 
they seem to generate 
however, problems may 
only looming large in 
perspective. 
impairment, disability and handicap 
tening, when they are closely examined, 
more heat than light. To be fair, 
be minimal within a medical context, 
the present social psychological 
The major difficulty seems to be distinguishing logically 
between disability and handicap. The former was defined as 
a restriction of "customarily expected behaviour or 
activity", (1980, p. 15). However, expected behaviour, it 
will be remembered, defines a role. 'Hence the definition of 'I' 
disability is synonymous with that of handicap. For 
example, being unable to walk is a disability, but since 
human beings (over a certain age) are expected to walk, this 
disability is also a handicap. 
A second problem is that Wood and Badley envisage an orderly 
progression from impairment through disability to handicap, 
each stage resulting directly from the former, (except that 
disability may be jumped in'some cases, and secondary 
impairments like bed sores may sometimes be caused by 
disabilities like lack of movement. ) Following Mercer's 
lead, however, a different model of normal, it can be 
argued, underpins each stage. 
Impairment seems primarily based on the medical model of 
normal as an absence of pathology. Hence mental impairment 
would be a clinical state, like Down's syndrome. 
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(Confusingly, impairment is also described as a deviation 
from a biological norm, a terminology that implies both 
frequency distributions and normative expectations and 
hence, two other models of normal). 
Disability, on the other hand, seems predicated on 
statistical models that define the normal range of various 
activities. Indeed, this has been exploited in order to 
operationalise it with reference to frequency distributions 
of skills within a national cohort of nearly 14,000 ten year 
olds (Haslum, St. Claire and Morris in prep). Thus mental 
disability would refer to a subnormal score on an IQ test. 
Finally, handicap rests on the definition of normal as 
behaviour that adequately fulfills a role. Thus, mental 
handicap would be the disadvantages attached to inability to 
meet'expectations associated with the pupil role, for 
example. 
Hence, Wood and Badley's model straddles three paradigms, 
which implies a degree of logical independence between 
impairment, disability and handicap, at odds with the 
continuous progression they describe. Indeed, the hiatus 
between statistical and pathological abnormality has already 
been discussed - although to be fair, the fact that all 
mental disability is not necessarily underpinned by mental 
impairment does not mean that all impairment does not lead 
to disability. Nevertheless, in its 1980 form, Wood and 
Badley's model, seems at best to have only the same range of 
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application as the medical model, that is, to approximately 
one third of mental retardates. 
Commonsense suggests that the link from disability to 
handicap is likely to be even more tenuous. 
This introduces a final, personal difficulty. To me, 
handicap implies more than an inability to fulfill a role. 
Intuitively, it seems to cover being debarred from roles that 
might easily be accomplished because of assumptions about 
disability or reactions to it. Support for this idea may be 
gleaned from a colourfully unusual paper (Lax and Foley. 
1977) which stages a lawsuit between retardates and "the 
people" who are, amongst other flagrant abuses, charged with 
"anticipatory breach of contract", that is, refusing 
retardates opportunities to perform. Again, to be fair, Wood 
and Hadley might intend this interpretation, but if they do, 
their phraseology is ambiguous. 
In conclusion, Wood and Badley's (1980) model of disablement 
does not, after all provide a way explicitly to link medical 
and social aspects of retardation that is useful for present 
purposes. It seems beset with conceptual difficulties and 
applies only to the minority of cases where pathologies are 
present. However, it has introduced several useful 
concepts. From now on, mental impairment will be used to 
refer to pathological conditions; mental disability, to 
behaviour below the normal range in frequency distributions 
of relevant activities, and mental handicap will be used to 
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refer to behaviour that deviates from customary roles, not t 
only because of mental impairment or disability, but 
particularly because of responses and expectations 
associated with perceived mental impairment and disability. 
This means that Mercer's social model of retardation remains 
the most useful. What makes a retardate different, 
therefore, is not simply capacity of mind, but the framework 
within which his behaviours are interpreted. Thus, mental 
retardate is a social status and impairments or disabilities, 
merely increase the likelihood that it will be attained. 
Similarly, retardation is the role delineated by normative 
expectations into which retardates will be socialised. 
The important implication is succinctly expressed by Kurtz 
(1981) : 
At any given time for any given individual it may 
not be possible to differentiate between behaviour 
that is a consequence of the retardation 
(for which term, I would substitute "disability") 
and behaviour that is a consequence of behaving as 
one thinks the expectations of others define 
proper behaviour. 
p. 14 
Thus, although a change in belief structures will alter the 
incidence of retardation since as Rutter et al (1970) 
pointed out, the numbers of handicapped depend on the 
criterion of handicap adopted, such changes might also 
reshape the behaviour of retardates and the severity of 
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their handicaps. In short, within a social framework, the 
beliefs of others provide a locus of intervention. 
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S. Some social sources of mental retardation 
To recap, from the present point of view, normative 
expectations define the mental retardate role and hence, 
mental retardation within social systems, and the underlying 
assumptions elaborate its meaning. This means that the 
primary source of mental retardation is in normative 
beliefs, not in its victims. 
Clearly, the process by which expectations become associated 
with retardation or indeed what amounts to the same thing - 
how a particular range of stimuli comes to be categorised as 
mental retardation - must be remarkably complex. Eiser 
(1979) suggests historical, sociological and psychological 
factors are all involved. Both Tajfel (1972) and Mercer 
(1973) suggested an heuristic key: - that categories reflect 
the interests and purpose of each social system within its 
context. Indeed, Tajfel futher suggests that the conceptual 
content of categories might serve to facilitate 
understanding of complex situations, or to justify actions. 
Exploring this hypothesis from cross cultural and historical 
perspectives is a task far too wide to attempt here, and 
therefore, a few favourite sketches must suffice to 
illustrate something of the influences likely to determine 
mental retardation in other places and at other times. 
Peters_ (1980) bemoans the dearth of cross cultural data on 
mental retardation and goes some way towards remedying the 
situation with a fascinating study of the Taurang of Nepal. 
Contrary to the popular assumption that mental retardation - 
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at least in its milder forms - is unlikely to be noticed in 
non-technical, rural societies where education is 
unemphasised, Tamang peasants have evolved a complex 
classification system based on linguistic competence. 
The most severe category, Peters translates as "dumb" with 
Its connotations of both mute and stupid. People with Downs 
syndrome fall into this class, but interestingly, primarily 
-- .. because of speech dysfunction. Indeed,.. Peters met an - 
individual with no stigmata but a severe impediment who was 
"dumb". "Half-dumb" is the Taurang analague to moderate 
retardation, which encompasses individuals with less severe 
impediments, said to be slow learners but good workers, 
often earning more than "normal" people. For the most part, 
however. lack of self-sufficiency was associated with being 
"dumb". 
In Taurang society, male heads of households are believed to 
require great intelligence. As farmers, their duties 
include bartering to buy necessities and sell produce, which 
is clearly dependent on verbal adroitness. In addition, 
recital of mantras is believed vital to ensure prosperity, 
freedom from bandit attack, success in household tasks, 
farming and so on. Thus, it is easy to see how speech 
evolved as the criterion of skill and self-sufficiency. 
Interestingly, Peters confirms Mercer's prediction that the 
ýdividualls 
status is a function of the social system in 
which he moves, since those with normal intelligence but a 
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speech impediment would be "dumb" among the Tamang but not 
retarded here, whereas, retardates with unimpaired speech 
would not be "dumb" there. 
As an aside, practical results of current cultural 
differences are exemplified (Upadhyaya, 1977) in adjustments 
made to American adaptive behaviour scales for use in India. 
For example, use of a knife and fork is not generally 
expected, but is confined to Westernised houses. Similarly, 
females are never expected to undergo long journeys alone 
and "children" are deemed incapable of managing their own 
affairs until marriage. Thus, a number of skills considered 
indicative of adaptive functioning in America, simply do not 
have the same meaning in India. 
Finally, -to return to the Temang, "dumb" and "half dumb" 
males are not permitted to inherit land when they come of 
age. Hence, it might be that the underlying ecological 
function of the classification is to ensure the efficient 
management of resources. 
Relatively uncomplex societies like the Taurang, isolated 
naturally by the Himalayas and artificially by Chinese 
policy, provide some of the few remaining opportunities to 
relate cultural beliefs to definitions of retardation, 
facilitated, no doubt, by a perceived simplicity conferred 
by its distance from ourselves. To try such an exercise for 
our own culture is complicated not only by problems of 
self-reference, but also by its greater (perceived) 
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complexity, and because of its size, cannot be attempted 
here. Time, however, provides a perspective from which a 
few salient and interesting themes become discernable. 
Muir (1982), argues that retarded babies were thought to be 
changelings "until recently" in European folklore, and in an 
absorbing paper, Haffter (1968) examines the idea in greater 
detail: - 
Changelings were believed to be children of demons or other 
spirits, who had surrepticiously exchanged them for human 
babies, because a changeling, suckled by a human, would 
acquire a soul and interbreeding would ennoble the fairy 
stock. 
Changelings were attributed greed, strength and abnormal 
appearance, especially an oversized head. In addition, they 
were believed to cry incessantly, but to have no speech. 
Clearly, mentally retarded children, particularly those with 
hydrocephalus or cretinism would achieve the status. Their 
lack of responsiveness was then seen as a sign of obstinacy 
and malice. In this form, the changeling myth provided a 
causal explanation for mental retardation which exonerated 
the parents. It also determined (and was determined by) 
subsequent actions, although Haff ter points out that norms 
varied between communities, reflecting the ambivalence 
parents felt. Good treatment was coupled with the belief 
that the changeling brought luck and that the human baby 
might be returned along with fairy treasures. In contrast, 
barbarous treatment, often ending in infanticide sometimes 
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occurred in an. cattempt to force the fairy parents to rescue 
it. 
I 
The Christian church adopted the changeling myth to fit its 
own normative structures. The devil now performed the 
theft, and the blame was laid squarely on the parents who 
were presumed to have cursed the baby - or each other - to 
have been unchaste or otherwise ungodly. Treatment of the 
child was similarly merciless.. Furthermore, the changeling 
status was extended to include offspring from copulations 
between women and devils. Bearing an abnormal child 
therefore could condemn a woman to the stake. Hence fear, 
dismay, guilt, secrecy, - even infanticide at the birth of 
an abnormal child increased. Despite attacks from 
independent thinkers, Haffter continues, cases of child 
burning continued to the turn of this century, and while 
such extremes (hopefully) have ceased, it seems likely that 
this uncharitable Christian influence not only caused untold 
misery throughout the ages but may still contribute to guilt 
felt by some parents today. 
Although he makes no attempt to trace its origins, Kurtz 
(1981), argues that an image of retardates as subhuman 
organisms underpins legal denial of citizenship, human 
rights and privileges. Haffter adds that this idea is 
widespread in its attenuated form which views retardates as 
the descendents of more primitive peoples. He lists many 
examples, including Down's "mongols", and interestingly his 
lesser known Ethiopian, Malayan and Indian types of idiot. 
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Similarly, an image of retardates as eternal children leads 
to the belief that they should be cared for, protected and 
supervised, while the view that they are Holy Innocents is 
associated with the belief that they are incapable of 
voluntarily commiting evil. 
According to Clarke and Clarke (1974), the first statutory 
mention of the mentally subnormal, which ocurred in the 
thirteenth century, came to fruition in the Statute of 
Prerogatives in 1325, under Edward H. This drew a division 
between born fools and lunatics, possessions of the former 
reverting permanently to the. Crown, while those of the 
latter were reclaimable during periods of lucidity. Thus, 
as Lax and Foley (1977) suggest, it seems fair to comment 
that early lay norme concerned causal attributions and 
emotional responses, wheteae legal systems functioned to 
define rights and facilitate the disposal of property. 
Interestingly, in defining what roles the retardate is 
permitted to occupy, the legal framework represents a 
formalisation of handicap. 
Malin, Race and Jones (1980) quote Locke (1689) as 
distinguishing between madmen, who "put wrong ideas 
together" to reach bizarre conclusions, and idiots, who 
seemed to have few ideas and to make little attempt at 
reasoning: just as Freud's patients are said to be 
distinguished by Freudian dreams, so Locke's retardates were 
noted for their appalling lack of logic! In other words, 
his categories seem to reflect the norme of a philosophers' 
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social system. 
Tomlinson (1982) emphasises the role of vested interests in 
shaping treatment of the retarded and she attributes the 
seeds of special education in the mid nineteenth century 
almost to a conspiracy between (1) political leaders, who 
used it to control a potential troublesome group; (2) 
medical men, who assumed care and control of defectives in 
order to promote their claim to professional status; (3) 
educationalists, who achieved both smoother running of 
regular classes and more employment for themselves. and (4) 
industrialists, who removed the non-productive from work 
houses and better still, ensured further supplies of docile 
workers for a small investment in special training. 
Tomlinson's approach, however, does not fit into the present 
approach because it seems to see the collective interests 
and purposes of social groups as nothing but the sum of 
selfish individual motives. 
This criticism is not intended to imply that individuals 
played no part in shaping social policies and opinion. 
Indeed, Goddard (1912) quoted by Clarke and Clarke (1974) 
is hypothesised to have awakened the public to the social 
and economic burdens of the feebleminded. - Women, 
in 
particular, he condemms as immoral carriers of venereal 
disease and prolific procreators of defective children. His 
interests as a breeder of livestock probably coloured his 
view, but the currency of Darwinian theory, the new science 
of genetics together with the development of IQ testing and 
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the notion of intelligence as an inherited characteristic, 
coupled with the financial hardships of the day must have 
provided a climate in which such eugenic attitudes 
flourished. 
Then current legislation seemed to reflect these beliefs. 
Malin, Race and Jones (1980), point out that the 1913 
British Mental Deficiency Act centred not on intelligence 
but on the wider concept, "mind", which included moral sense 
and social conformity. It distinguished between idiots, who 
ft 
were so defective as to be unable to guard themselves 
against common physical dangers, and imbeciles, who though 
less defective, remained incapable of managing their 
affairs.. The feebleminded though still less defective, 
required supervision and finally, moral defectives were 
those whose mental deficiency was coupled with criminal 
tendencies or immoral behaviour. Great emphasis was laid on 
the institutionalisation of defectives and on the basis of 
subjective evidence, individuals suffered unending 
incarceration in order to "protect" society, which, 
Tomlinson adds, was seen as an act of charity. Increased 
vigilance and the fact that certification was likely to be 
permanent, meant that isolated institutions grew in number 
and size, typically to accommodate upwards of 2,000 inmates. 
Workhouses and lunatic asylums frequently had to be 
commandeered. 
It is a reasonable assumption that an attitude survey at 
that time would have revealed beliefs relating to 
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threateningness, sexual implusiveness and a reluctance to 
work. Such beliefs, however, have prevailed into the 
present time. According to Lax and Foley (1977) the 
Nebraska Supreme Court in 1968 was of the opinion that "it 
is an established fact that mental deficiency accelerates 
sexual impulses and any tendencies toward crime", with the 
result that compulsory sterilisation for some retardates was 
upheld. Biklen (1977) argues that these myths have led to 
the erosion of retardates' right to be assumed innocent 
unless proven guilty and many other mistreatments in 
America's Criminal Justice System. In Britain, as late as 
1952, the eighth edition of Tredgold's book suggested the 
"painless termination" of the 80,000 imbeciles in the 
country. 
More recent British legislation relevant to retardates is 
immensely complex, being intertwined in political and 
beaurocratic manoeuvring (Malin, Race and Jones 1980) and a 
nexus of policies relating to health, education and social 
services. Farley, (1983) comments on the piecemeal 
development of special education, which Tomlinson, (1982) 
suggests, is because it was shaped by professional conflicts 
rather than progressive humanitarianism. Plainly there is 
no simple isomorphism between legislation and community 
beliefs: nevertheless, a few broad trends might be 
identified. 
The 1944 Education Act, for example, excluded children 
thought unable to benefit from education. These were to be 
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dealt with under the Mental Deficiency Acts and given 
treatment in training centres and other places overseen by 
local health and welfare authorities. The 1946 National 
Health Service Act, on the other hand, passed control of 
institutions to newly appointed Regional Hospital Boards, 
making "colonies" "hospitals" overnight and it seems likely 
that these two changes would have increased the sway of 
medical perspectives on retardation. 
In their review of the provision of services in Britain, 
Malin, Race and Jones (1980) argue that new research during 
the 1950's and 60's showed many retardates benefitted from 
training and could do valuable work in the community, yet 
failed to influence government policy. New mental retardate 
roles, it is hypothesised, may nevertheless have been 
defined within a few social systems, since a few hospitals 
undertook to train inmates, having adjusted their 
expectations, and hence, the behaviour of retardates, as a 
result of the new ideas. Such initiatives, Malin et al 
note, came from outside the caring professions, within which 
earlier attitudes prevailed. This is important, because 
9 
many of those entering training then are the policy makers 
of today. 
It was a new interest in Civil Liberties together with the 
publication of cases of cruelty, neglect and wrongful 
detention rather than scientific research that led to a 
change in the legal definition of retardates, and the 1959 
Mental Health Act, which remains current today, was designed 
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to be protective and to avoid compulsory detention except as 
a last resort. It designated severely subnormal people as 
those incapable of leading independent lives and protecting 
themselves from exploitation. Subnormal people were those 
requiring or susceptible to medical treatment and finally, 
psychopaths were defined as abnormally aggressive. It was 
specified however, that immoral behaviour per se should not 
be taken to indicate any of these conditions. Nevertheless, 
Malin et al point out, the act remained concerned with 
specifying the machinery of detention and the 
responsibilities of administering authorities. It mentioned 
community care, but proposed no specific guidelines, so very 
few authorities set up hostels and essentially, the status 
quo, that is, hospitalisation of retardates who were not 
cared for at home, was maintained. 
The Seebohm Report (1968), led to the setting up of Social 
Services Departments to provide community care, although 
lack of resources, objections from the medical world, -fear 
of public reaction and sheer inertia meant that 
hospitalisation endured for most. It also led to the 
Education (Handicapped Children) Act of 1970 which abolished 
the idea of ineducability and required Local Education 
Authorities to educate all children. At the same time, the 
Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act (1970) was 
intended to enable handicapped people, including retardates, 
to live in the community, and more recently, the Warnock 
Report (1978) which reviewed educational provision for 
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handicapped children, and the Education Act (1981) have 
attempted to abolish categories of handicap and to move that 
all children with learning difficulties receive educational 
provision which should be in ordinary schools wherever 
possible. Finally, there is a growing current interest in 
further education for retarded school leavers (Farley, 
1983). 
To summarise, a longitudinal study of beliefs about 
retardates might have shown early superstitions were 
superceded by a preoccupation with morality and economic 
sufficiency. Then might have followed a waxing of the 
medical model which probably remains normative in the caring 
professions today. More recently, a relatively pitying 
attitude and an outspokenness against cruelty and neglect, 
might be evolving, and while it would be foolish to imagine 
widespread familiarity with each new piece of legislation, 
an emphasis on education and integration as opposed to 
medical pathology might also be evolving. However, since 
Kurtz, (1981) insists that old beliefs die hard, each of 
these threads probably remains. 
Hospital boards, social services departments and education 
authorities together with the legal network and less 
officially, the general lay public or any other community, 
in the present view, represent social systems, each with its 
own definition of retardation. In Bronfenbrenner's 
terminology, they also represent the macrosystem and at a 
lower level, elements of the exosystem. Since social 
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6. Empirical studies of beliefs about retardates: a review 
Even a brief examination of the literature confirms the 
complaint that research into beliefs about retardates is 
almost entirely American, and perhaps not directly relevant 
to Britain, (Pushkin, 1976). Such an examination also 
suggests that the body of literature has grown little in 
recent years. Whereas in 1970, Latimer wrote that attitudes 
towards mental retardation had become the "In Thing", in 
1983, it seems fair to comment that they are rather "Out". 
Perhaps the earlier growth was nourished by the initiation 
of integrative policies, only to starve when, as Malin, Race 
and Jones (1980) argue, they were not widely enacted. 
Nevertheless, the literature is large and varied enough to 
be intimidating. Harth, (1973) for example, remarks that 
studies are scattered without a consistent theoretical base 
while Gottlieb (1975a) writes that they are confusing and 
contradictory. In the present opinion, this reflects a 
preparadigm stage and the social systems approach provides a 
much needed paradigm which brings structure and meaning to 
the literature: the previous section showed, different 
social systems are likely to evolve different beliefs about 
retardates for different purposes. Thus, even apparently 
contradictory beliefs may become logically consistent when 
their contexts and functions are considered. The task will 
be attempted in two stages, according to a natural division 
between lay and professional beliefs - loosely defined as 
people who do not work with retardates and those who do. 
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6a. Lay concepts of retardation 
In a famous chapter, Guskin (1963) presents two brief 
studies. In the first, 50* subjects from Nashville, 
Tennessee rated a hypothetical 18. year old boy (1) from high 
school and (2) from special school, on a series of 
adjectives. Results showed the latter was considered less 
assertive, capable and normal, which, from the present point 
of view, represent some of the deviant behaviours that 
define the retardate role. Interestingly, traits like 
friendly, likeable, happy and good natured distinguished him 
least. On these, he received a marginally positive rating 
not far below that of the average 18 year old. 
In his second study, Guakin asked 35 students to rate the 
similarity of 10 hypothetical boys to each other. They 
judged "mentally subnormal" most like "mentally ill", 
followed by "emotionally disturbed" and "delinquent" and 
least like "average" followed by "athlete" then "Doctor's 
son". Since "mentally subnormal", was the role that 
deviated most from average, it might be predicted, it would 
have been associated with the most negative evaluation. 
In 1963, Guskin pointed out that his two preliminary studies 
seemed all that were available. Ten years later, the 
position had not changed much, and Pushkin (1976), (who 
seems to have missed Guskin), complains that only 2 American 
studies (Latimer, 1970; Hollinger and Jones, 1970) had been 
carried out in the 20 years preceding hers. 
Pushkin begins by asking 49 Mancunians what it means to say 
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someone is mentally retarded. Thus, her study is 
particularly valuable because subjects were free to use 
their own descriptors, eliminating the fear that measures 
were not the most relevant. Approximately half referred to 
"intellectual impairment" and "social incompetence" in their 
definitions. Five confused mental retardation and mental 
illness from the onset, with a further 12 going on to make 
"contradictory remarks". 
Subjects were then asked to list characteristics of people 
they knew to be retarded. Abnormal appearance was mentioned 
most often, followed by abnormal behaviour, verbal 
interaction and movement. In more detail, a woman was 
defined as subnormal because she always stared at the floor 
when she walked, occasionally stamping or stopping to pick 
up bits of paper. Such attributes, from a social system 
, perspective, define retardation. In Pushkin's view, 
however, they seem to indicate that Mancunians are wrong. 
This woman's behaviour as described in the 
interview can hardly be taken as an indication of 
mental subnormality. 
p. 6 
This condemnation can be criticised because it is self 
contradictory - the behaviour having just been described 
precisely because it was taken as an indication of 
subnormality. More important, however, it leads Pushkin to 
conclude that lay people and researchers have different 
concepts of retardation and to imply that this means the 
former are wrong. 
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Similarly, Latimer (1970) concludes that "ignorance and 
misunderstanding" about retardation is widespread in 
America. A random sample of 1113 was interviewed across 
three States (although it is worth warning that the random 
technique involved daytime household visits, with the result 
that 78% were female). Eighteen per cent gave "vague, 
confused or unconventional" definitions of retardation. 
Thirty per cent had no idea of its etiology, 55% did not 
know it could be prevented and 31% "ignorantly" believed. it 
could be cured. Finally, 6% confused mental retardation and 
mental illness. 
Latimer makes no reference to the model she measures their 
responses against, but her interest in etiology, prevention 
and cure, her consultation with "professionals" together 
with Mercer's (1973) argument that the medical perspective 
is so pervasive that it is seldom made explicit, are 
strongly suggestive. Like Pushkin, she finds differences 
between professional and lay beliefs represent a 
contradiction which implies that the latter must be wrong. 
Within the present perspective, however, differences do not 
mean someone is mistaken, but on the contrary, that 
different interests and purposes are being served. 
Retardate, it will be remembered, is conceptualised as a 
devalued social status created to deal with deviance and at 
the most superficial level, it may be hypothesised a priori, 
that the uninvolved layman needs to deal with deviance that 
might casually be encountered in the community. In other 
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words, his view of retardation is likely to include odd 
appearance, gait or behaviour and perhaps the occasional 
embarrassment of a deviant conversation. This idea is 
supported by the writings of Richardson (1975) who lists 
ugliness, bizarre clothing and clumsiness together with 
inappropriate behaviour and slow oversimple or incorrect 
speech among the key characteristics of retardates in lay 
systems. It also suggests that the widely reported 
confusion between mental retardation and mental illness 
might be because either explains the type of deviance likely 
to concern the layman. 
To take the argument further, Latimer also investigated 
knowledge of community services for the retarded. She 
describes as "woeful ignorance" the fact that 60 - 75% of 
subjects not living near institutions could not name them 
correctly or give an account of their facilities. However, 
only 2 per cent of her sample were involved in caring for a 
retarded person. For the remainder, information regarding 
community services was likely to be of no interest or 
purpose as would a professional-type view of retardation 
held by a layman. Thus Gottlieb's (1975a) comment that the 
general public might not even be aware that mild retardation 
even exists, does not necessarily mean that they are 
uninformed, but that they have no need of the information. 
From this point, it is easy to predict, as Guskin (1963) 
does, that the concepts parents hold about retardates will 
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reflect an interest in protection, caregiving and control, 
but unfortunately, I have been unable to discover any 
directly relevant data, since the few studies seem to focus 
on the effects of variables like religion, psychological 
adjustment and severity of child's impairment on parental 
adjustment (see Harth (1973), for example). Nevertheless, 
two are worth mentioning, although they do not describe 
parents concepts of retardation per se. First, Hoffman 
(1965) found Catholic parents to be most accepting of their 
retarded child, which he attributed to their belief in the 
dogma that suffering is a part of life. Christian 
Scientists on the other hand, tended to deny the diagnosis 
and seek magical cures, whereas Fundamental Protestants were 
characterised by guilt, believing their child's retardation 
to be a punishment for their shortcomings. Thus, like the 
folklore described in the previous section, current beliefs 
still seem to reflect various religious norms. In the 
second study, Meyer (1980) found parents of 
institutionalised retardates, somewhat contrary to 
expectations, were not in favour of deinstitutionalisation. 
This suggests that their belief structures accommodated the 
practical problems of caregiving rather than a fashionable 
notion of what is best for retardates. 
Like Pushkin and Latimer, Hollinger and Jones (1970) also 
found "little understanding" of "mental retardate" and "slow 
learner". The latter term had been adopted 23 years 
previously at the start of Ohio State's special education 
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program, because it was believed more acceptable, and using 
a sample of 114 subjects, a representative cross-section of 
a small city, the authors vindicated the decision. 
Hollinger and Jones went on to ask for definitions of 
"mental retardate". Thirty four subjects mentioned neither 
subaverage intellect nor social incompetence, thus 
completely "misunderstanding" the term. Seventy per-cent 
"misunderstood" "slow learner" on the other hand, and 72% 
"mistakenly" thought slow learners and retardates were 
different. In other words, the terms differed in meaning as 
well as acceptability, but because "slow learner" had been 
substituted for "mental retardate", Hollinger and Jones seem 
to assume it should differ only in acceptability. They 
agonise whether the public should be educated to this 
"fact", which is likely to result in the "pessimism and 
denegration" commonly attributed to "mental retardate" being 
transferred to "Slow learner". Their position seems 
precarious for two reasons. 
Two later studies illustrate the first. Gottlieb (1975) 
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found,, "mentally retarded children" was more favourably rated 
than "mental retardates" and Gottlieb and Corman (1975) 
found that 86% of their subjects defined a mentally retarded 
child as a slow learner. Thus, although Hollinger and Jones 
cannot be blamed for lack of clairvoyance, it seems 
self-evident that "slow learner" involves connotations of 
school, education and children, and unlike "mental 
retardate", to be confined to the least threatening cases 
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. with the best prognoses. Most probably, the Ohian 
authorities were well aware of these differences and viewed 
them as advantages, not mistakes. Second, and even more 
precarious, Hollinger and Jones seem to be in what Mercer 
might call a nonsense position, since they seem to have 
decided in a vacuum what mental retadates and slow learners 
"really" are. 
To summarise the first theme suggested by the present 
paradigm, beliefs about retardates are hypothesised to 
define retardation within social systems, in ways that 
reflect normative interests and purposes. Thus, beliefs of 
professionals - and researchers - simply reflect norms, most 
probably predicated on the medical model, and not absolute 
truth. Beliefs of laymen, parents and other groups that 
differ from these, it follows, are neither wrong, confusing 
nor contradictory, but merely different. 
To begin a new theme, Hollinger and Jones go on to make the 
important point that public beliefs can determine the 
success of programs designed to help retardates. Clearly, 
if "slow learner" had been offensive, it is unlikely that 
Ohian special education would have seen its twenty-third 
year. Similarly, Gottlieb and Corman (1975) argue that 
integrating retardates into the community cannot succeed 
without public acceptance, the underlying assumption being 
that more enlightened treatment occurs when beliefs are 
positive. This philosophy implicity underpins the lay 
studies already reviewed, and in the same vein, Lax and 
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Foley (1977) write: 
much of the difficulty faced by the retarded in 
employment situations is attitudinal. 
p. 7 
A well known study by Greenbaum and Wang (1965) supports 
(indirectly) their claim, since 68 executives drawn from 
business clubs had a more negative view of retardates than 
paraprofessionals, parents of retarded children and 
professionals. Interestingly, their lowest rating was on a 
scale relating to reliability, which might be expected to be 
of relatively more concern to potential employers. More 
recently, Butt and Signori. (1976) studied the social images 
of 8 groups, (average adults, women, mental retardates, 
ex-mental patients and criminals, hippies, blacks and North 
American Indians) on 67 variables known to be important in 
hiring situations. Factor analyses yielded six dimensions 
relating to appearance, sincerity, ability, outspokenness, 
fortitude and security. Retardates were most handicapped on 
ability but did well on sincerity and security. However, 
since subjects were members of a university community and 
not employers, these results most probably simply reflect 
lay beliefs. 
Similarly, the beliefs school children hold about retardates 
are hypothesised to determine the success of classroom 
integration, but despite their importance Gottlieb and 
Gottlieb, (1977) complain, little reliable data are 
available that describe their nature. 
In their study, 56 junior high school pupils, predominantly 
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from low socio-economic backgrounds, rated hypothetical 
mentally retarded and physically handicapped children on 14 
positive and 15 negative adjectives. Unfortunately, a full 
summary of results is not given, but "smart" and "bright" 
distinguished most between targets: only 3 and 9 subjects 
applying the terms to the retarded child whereas the 
relevant figures for the physically handicapped target were 
34 and 31. Less than 10% rated the retarded target dirty, 
healthy, alert, greedy and selfish and the physically 
handicaped target crazy, dirty, dumb, greedy, selfish, 
stupid and ugly. This is difficult to interpret, but 
perhaps Gottlieb and Gottlieb intend to suggest that 
non-alert, unhealthy, crazy, dumb, stupid and ugly 
distinguished the retarded target further. Results 
unequivocably demonstrated, however, that the mentally 
retarded child was given a significantly more negative 
evaluation, replicating what the authors called the major 
point of agreement, which is supported by other studies like 
Strauch (1970); Willey and McCandless (1973) and 
Reese-Dukes and Stokes (1978) to name just three. 
In a less formal study, Clark (1964) asked 214 14 year old 
school children to tell about the mentally retarded child 
whom they knew best out of the 13 in their school. 
Interestingly, descriptions concerned appearance and 
athletic ability, not academic skills. Similarly, Gottlieb 
(1975) points out that retarded children are earmarked by 
their normal peers because of anti-social behaviour and 
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unusual appearance. Analgous to lay beliefs, therefore, it 
seems that school-children do not have a model of 
retardation like that of professionals, but are probably 
more interested in what interaction with a retardate is 
likely to mean for them. Only a quarter of responses, Clark 
continues, were evaluations, 2.25% being unfavourable. This 
finding has serious implications because many studies seem 
simply to assess whether beliefs about retardates are "good" 
or "bad", and clearly, this unidimensional approach might 
overlook much relevant and valuable information. 
Clark's study, however, might not be pertinent to the 
present approach because it is possible that subjects 
described a particular retarded child rather than 
characteristics of retarded children. In other words, 
results might represent personal pictures rather than the 
shared norms defining retardation in the school's social 
system. Unfortunately for the present approach, this 
problem is widespread since few studies seem to concern 
children's beliefs about retardates per se. Instead, they 
seem to focus on evaluations and sociometric ratings of 
specific retarded children (e. g. Goodman, Gottlieb and 
Harrison (1972); Gottlieb and Budoff (1973)). 
The idea that concepts of retardates determine whether they 
will be accepted, seems to have motivated a great deal of 
research effort directed at identifying individual 
differences that correlate with beliefs. Unless these are 
discovered, Gottlieb (1975a) writes, attempts to improve 
- 51 - 
attitudes are likely to be largely unsuccessful. 
Jordan (1971) for example, lists age, sex contact and 
values as important, and one or more such variables are 
frequently included in experimental designs as a matter of 
course. 
A study by Gottlieb and Corman (1975) on the impact of 
subjects' age, sex, education and contact with retardates on 
beliefs, is typical. Four hundred and thirty adults 
completed 48 statements about retarded children. Results 
were factor analysed and 4 dimensions emerged. First a 
positive stereotype loaded highly on health, morality and 
appearance; second segregation in the community loaded on 
beliefs that retarded children lower property values and 
should be kept apart. Third segregation in the classroom 
posited that they hold back other children and should be 
taught separately, and fourth, perceived physical and 
intellectual handicap reflected the belief that retarded 
children look different and are inferior. 
ANOVA revealed that younger subjects (aged 20 - 30) were 
less likely to accept the positive stereotype, but also less 
likely to favour segregation in the community and classroom. 
Females tended to hold the positive stereotype more strongly 
and subjects with a medium education were less likely than 
poorly or highly educated others to view retarded children 
as different and inferior. Finally, those'with contact were 
less in favour of community segregation. 
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In broad terms, these findings are consistent with many 
others. 
Harasymiw (1971) and Carroll and Reppucci, (1978) for 
example, found women to be more positive towards the 
handicapped in general, whereas Parish, Dyke and Kappes 
(1979); Greenbaum and Wang (1965) and Siperstein and 
Gottlieb. (1977) together with Voeltz. (1980) found women 
teachers, women and schoolgirls, respectively, more positive 
towards retardates. 
The positive effect of contact was replicated by Hollinger 
and Jones (1970), who also found subjects with the closest 
contact -a retarded family member - were most accepting. 
Similarly, Jaffe (1966) and Efron and Efron. (1967) found 
adolescents and college students reporting social contact 
with retardates assigned more favourable attributes to them 
than those who had none. 
Findings with respect to education seem less consistent. 
Greenbaum and Wang (1965), found subjects who had not 
completed high school were more favourable towards 
retardates than those with more education. Hollinger and 
Jones (1970), on the other hand, found subjects who had had 
more education about slow learners were more positive. 
Just a few studies have examined the effect of social class. 
Gottwald. (1970) found it had no impact on attitudes to, the 
retarded, whereas Greenbaum and Wang (1965); Goodman, 
Gottlieb and Harrison (1972) and Gottlieb and Budoff 
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(1973) found low class subjects were more favourable than 
their middle or high class counterparts. 
Finally, Hollinger and Jones (1970) found younger subjects 
consistently more positive in their beliefs, whereas 
Greenbaum and Wang, (1965) reported no significant age 
effects, but a trend for younger and older Subjets (under 40 
or over 56) to be more positive and negative, respectively. 
Voeltz. (1980) on the other hand, found accepting attitudes 
increased steadily with (school) age. More recently, 
Gottlieb and Switzky: (1982) factor analysed ratings of 585 
American schoolchildren (aged 9 to 12) on 30 stereotypic 
traits. Older children scored less on a negative 
stereotypic factor but failed to score more on a positive 
one, whereas on the remaining two factors, which related to 
likeability and unhappiness, they scored more positively and 
less negatively respectively. In other words, there was no 
smooth age-related trend. 
Such research seems underpinned by an assumption that intra- 
or inter- individual factors determine beliefs and that 
beliefs within demographic groups are an average of those of 
individual members. To borrow some computer jargon, it 
seems largely predicated on a bottom-up approach with the 
individual as the unit of analysis. This is at odds with 
the present view in which beliefs evolve in 
interaction with the normative interests and purposes of 
social systems. For example, it will be remembered that 
institutionalisation was not represented as the result of a 
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widespread belief that retardates are dangerous. Rather, 
both policy and belief were seen as co-evolving, influenced 
by scientific developments, economic pressure and the like 
and, each other. In the present opinion, therefore, females 
tend to be more positive than males not because they are 
inherently different, but because they conform to different 
social norms. Similarly individuals with contact are viewed 
as members of different social systems to those without. 
The less consistent effects of age, education and class 
become easier to understand in this light. They might be 
due to a failure to control for sex and contact effects, but 
more likely, they interact with professional social systems. 
By now, it'should be clear that beliefs are seen as unlikely 
to be an immutable block to integration. On the contrary, 
integration is likely to result in an accommodating change 
of normative structures and therefore, probably offers a 
mechanism to facilitate the development of accepting 
attitudes. 
This reasoning is supported by the so-called Machiavellian 
approach, (Willms, 1981) in which public resistance to 
community integration is overcome by keeping plans secret 
until they are accomplished. Indeed, Willms went on to 
demonstrate that lay attitudes improved with proximity to 
such homes. A second source of support is to be found in an 
interesting study in which Voeltz (1980) examined the 
attitudes of 2,392 Hawiian school children. Schools were 
selected to represent 3 categories: low contact, where 
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severely handicapped children had been enrolled for a term; 
high contact, where they had been admitted for over a year 
and a systematic program promoting integration had been 
implemented and finally, no contact, where handicapped 
children were not accepted. 
Dependent measures were 21 items relating to the acceptance 
of retarded and physically handicapped children. These were 
factor analysed, yielding 4 dimensions: social contact 
willingness; deviance consequation, which was defined as 
rejection of the idea that handicapped children should be 
isolated and actual contact Type A, with retarded and Type 
B, with physically handicapped children. ANOVA then showed 
that children in the high contact group showed significantly 
greater contact willingness, greater deviance consequation 
and (obviously) greater actual contact. A follow-up study, 
(Voeltz, 1982) yielded essentially the same results. 
The most plausible explanation of Voeltz's results in the 
present opinion is that the different types of school 
represent different social systems with different norms that 
pupils were socialised into holding. 
An alternative explanation, reflecting the bottom-up 
approach, that contact changes each individual, seems to 
underpin the literature. In this light, it is not 
surprising that contact seems to be regarded as a treatment 
variable that improves beliefs. Strauch (1970) seems to 
express the underlying hope, that if only enough normal 
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people could get to know the handicapped, they would accept 
them. In other words, he implies that the way to improve 
community attitudes is through personal contact for the 
majority of its members. In a different context, Guskin 
(1981) suggests this philosophy is underpinned by an 
assumption that attitudes towards retardates are irrational 
(i. e. wrong) and that contact provides individuals with 
enlightening truths. 
In the present opinion, of course, matters are unlikely to 
be so simple, because differences in beliefs between those 
with contact and those without are attributed to conformity 
to different social norms, rather than to contact per se. 
This, I think, predicts that contact as a treatment variable 
is unlikely to have the same impact as contact as a 
pre-existing characteristic and therefore, might explain 
otherwise contradictory research outcomes. 
Hersh, Carlson and Lossino, (1977), for example, examined 
the attitudes of 20 graduates in a school of social work, 
who completed a 19 item semantic differential giving beliefs 
about normal and retarded people. Variables distinguishing 
most between them were dependence, having a physical 
handicap, being unpredictable, aimless, useless and untidy. 
In the positive direction, however, mentally retarded people 
were consistently rated as more kind, good and not dangerous 
than normals. At random, half the subjects were assigned to 
spend the day with a family including a retarded member. 
For this group, the differences between normals and 
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retardates were "almost nonexistent" on retesting. 
While it is possible that the students receiving visits 
forged a new social system, it seems more likely that 
changes reflected personal assessments based on experiences 
with specific individuals, which do not reflect - and which 
are unlikely to affect norms and hence, which are unlikely 
to persist. 
Other attempts to use contact to promote attitude change 
rely on an institutional tour to provide it and Gottlieb 
(1975a) reviews the three studies that comprise the brief 
literature. All showed an improvement in attitudes towards 
the institutions, two showed no change in attitudes towards 
retardates, and one showed they had grown more negative. 
Clearly, the effect of contact was neither positive nor 
consistent, perhaps because measures reflected normative 
beliefs in the former cases and personal beliefs after 
seeing institutionalised retardates, who are likely to be 
severely afflicted, in the third. 
Finally, Strauch (1970) examined the beliefs of one hundred 
and twenty four children aged between 13 and 14. All 
attended schools which enrolled retarded children, but 62 
subjects were integrated with retardates for 4 non-academic 
lessons weekly. The dependent measure was a 20 item 
semantic differential on which six concepts: "me", "the 
mentally retarded", "regular class pupils", "special class 
pupils" and "normal people" were rated. There was an 
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overall contact effect, but when each concept was 
individually tested, only "normal people" varied 
significantly between groups. The trend for "mentally 
retarded" and "special class pupils" to receive less 
negative scores from subjects with contact was 
insignificant 
As Strauch concluded, his much quoted failure to find a 
significant contact effect indicates that contact per se 
does not promote positive attitudes, and it is interesting 
to speculate that the schools had similar normative beliefs 
about retardates which outweighed the "treatment effect" of 
contact. Alternatively, unlike Voeltz's study, there is no 
indication that the retarded children were severely 
handicapped, thus, instead of providing "contact with a 
retarded person", integration might have been more complete, 
thus retarded children might have been rated against 
"normal" criteria. 
To summarise, hypotheses derived from the present paradigm 
which offer some form to the existing literature, are that 
normative beliefs define retardation. Hence, differences in 
definitions indicate simply that the interests and purposes 
of different social systems are being served, and are not 
necessarily confusing and contradictory. While individual 
beliefs most probably help shape normative structures, the 
individual is not the focus of analysis in the social 
approach, and changes in individual beliefs are therefore 
unlikely to be the road to changing the norms that define 
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retardation. Indeed, individual change, for the most part, 
is unlikely to be long-lasting, because it should be subject 
to normalising social influence. However, the optimistic 
conclusion is that rather than being blocked by negative 
beliefs, integration is likely to improve them. 
As a discontinuous footnote, it is worth wondering whether 
retarded people have normative expectations about 
"retardates" that are similar to other groups. Gibbons 
(1981) complains that research with retarded subjects has 
been almost completely ignored, and although there are a few 
studies that concern labelling effects or self-concepts, 
only one (Gan, Tymchuck and Nisihara, 1977) seems to have 
elicited their opini'ons about retardates in general. 
Results simply indicated that subjects from a sheltered 
workshop evinced favourable attitudes. However, the 
question will be explored in much more detail in chapter S. 
., 
- 60 - 
6b. Professionals' beliefs about retardates 
Tomlinson (1982) believes that professionals compete. each 
group being anxious to establish the dominance of its 
particular ideology. Contrastingly, in their unconventional 
paper that stages a trial with retardates as the plaintiffs 
and "the people" as the accused, Lax and Foley (1977) 
write: 
the creation of a semantic mystogogy acts as a 
sheepskin curtain to shield from public view, 
inadequate understanding and that professionals, 
lawyers and psychologists each claim the 
determination of status to be In the realm of the 
other. 
p. 4 
Their accusation seems to imply that there is a single truth 
about retardation towards which understanding will bring 
convergence and that professional differences not only 
reflect the lack of such understanding, but also deliberate 
attempts to conceal it. 
From the present point of view, the'irresistably named 
semantic mystogogy - or different professional ideologies 
and "languages" - is neither the result of attempting to 
establish dominance or concealing ignorance. Rather it is 
seen as the outcome of different evolutionary paths, that is 
to say, different purposes combined with historical, 
cultural and psychological variables are hypothesised to 
have shaped differently the normative structures of 
professional social systems. 
To illustrate, in a brief study Carroll and Reppucci. (1978) 
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examined differences in meaning attached by 40 teachers and 
32 mental health workers in Connecticut to "mentally 
retarded", "emotionally disturbed" and "juvenile 
delinquent". Subjects received a case study of a 13 year 
old boy bearing one of the labels, or unlabelled, and then 
they completed 9 questions covering their expectations for 
his success in school and work, their suggestions for 
placement and treatment and their motivation to work with 
him. 
Teachers rated all labelled children as less likely to 
succeed in school than the unlabelled control, and 
themselves as less willing and able to work with them. 
Mental health workers, on the other hand, rated themselves 
as less knowledgeable and willing to work with the mentally 
retarded target only. A direct comparison between 
professional groups showed that mental health workers were 
significantly less approving of special class placement 
across all labels. Carroll and Reppucci concluded that 
professionals attach different relative meanings to clinical 
labels and that this might disrupt interdisciplinary 
communication. It is interesting to go further and try to 
relate such differences to hypothesised differences between 
normative structures. For example, teachers' approval of 
special class placement seems consistent with a social 
system predicated on education, whereas the mental health 
workers' specific rejection of the retarded child is 
6 
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consistent with the suggestion of writers like Mercer 
(1973) and Booth. (1978) that retardates are an anathema in 
medical systems, since they cannot be cured. 
In a widely known study, Greenbaum and Wang (1965) compared 
the beliefs of (a) 100 parents with retarded children, (b) 
professional experts, including 12 special teachers, 155 
counsellors, 12 psychologists and 13 physicians, (c) 63 
paraprofessionals who helped care for retarded children at 
special schools and (d) 68 employers. The dependent measure 
was a 21 item semantic differential including evaluation, 
social stimulus value, health and psychological attributes, 
on which the terms "idiot", "imbecile", "moron", "mentally 
retarded", "mentally ill", "emotionally disturbed", and 
"neurotic" were evaluated. For analysis, however, these 
were collapsed into mentally retarded and mentally ill 
clusters. Most relevant for present purposes, results 
showed that the mentally retarded cluster was significantly 
negative for all subject groups, but that paraprofessionals 
were significantly less negative than the other three groups 
- they alone rated retardates as relaxed, easy to get on 
with and clean. 
Greenbaum and Wang suggest several explanations for this 
result, including intimate daily contact. However, on this 
basis, parents might be expected to have the most positive 
view. A more systematic rationale, they argue, is offered 
by dissonance theory, since paraprofessionals are likely to 
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justify their involvement with a negatively valued group by 
changing their evaluations, but this also seems 
unsatisfactory to me, because by this token, professionals 
should also have a more positive view. The same fault can 
be found with their final suggestion that paraprofessionals 
might be more dedicated and sympathetic people. In the 
present opinion, a better explanation is that the 
paraprofessionals' relatively positive beliefs reflect the 
norms of a social system geared to voluntary caregiving. 
Professionals and employers did not differ but shared the 
most negative view, but since the former include teachers 
and clinicians, it probably represents more than one social 
system. Nevertheless, it is interesting that the item on 
which professionals are most negative and which 
distinguishes them most from the other groups is 
"unintelligent" which might be pertinent to all professional 
social systems. 
Unlike Carroll and Reppucci (1978) and Greenbaum and Wang 
(1965), other researchers seem to deal with beliefs within a 
single profession. 
Studies of beliefs among individuals who care for retardates 
seem rare and I have been unable to find any recent 
examples. However, Bartlett, Quay and Wrightsman (1960) 
administered 175 statements, including 22 about retardates 
to 99 attendants at an institute for defectives. There was 
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consensus on 5 items: subjects agreed that retardates are 
"not crazy", "able to learn right from wrong", and they 
disagreed with the suggestion that those who are not locked 
up are "dangerous", "no better than criminals" or "like 
animals". 
Babow and Johnson. (1969) on the other hand, found 91% of 
760 institutional employees were high on authoritarianism 
and oriented towards bodily care. 
Gottlieb, (1975a) writes that studies of medical 
professionals' beliefs about retardates are extremely rare 
and that he was unable to find any. Harth (1973) however, 
reviews three studies carried out during the 1960's which 
concerned paediatricians' opinions of institutionalisation 
and their interest in retardation. All results indicated 
little knowledge, training or interest in the area. 
In contrast, attitudes and opinions of teachers seem to 
receive the lion's share of research interest. 
A number of studies elicit teachers' reactions to different 
types of children. Ashman (1982) found mentally retarded 
children received worse ratings than children with other 
handicaps. This was largely accounted for by items like 
"impolite" and "aggressive" which, he argued, reflected 
teachers' concern with disruptive classroom behaviour. 
Parish, Dyck and Kappes, (1979) on the other hand, used The 
Personal Attribute Inventory to assess the attitudes of 65 
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teachers (arbitrarily selected in Kansas) to normal, gifted, 
physically handicapped, mentally retarded, learning disabled 
and emotionally disturbed children. The dependent measure 
was the number of negative adjectives rated appropriate. 
Results showed that attitudes towards the last three labels 
were significantly more negative than those towards the 
first three. 
A second study replicated these findings using 95 delegates 
at a conference on learning disabilities and the authors 
concluded that mentally retarded children are unlikely to 
experience equal educational opportunity, because "what we 
expect is probably what we will get". Indeed, the fear that 
negative teacher attitudes towards retardates form the basis 
for self-fulfilling prophecies and are a cause rather than 
an effect of pupil behaviour, seems to motivate much 
research. 
According to Larsen and Ehly (1978) for example, teachers 
are satisfied with a minimal performance, give less 
instruction and fewer opportunities to respond to children 
of whom they have low expectancies. Foster, Ysseldyke and 
Reese (1975) add that test scoring can be bias, »ed against 
such pupils and that even normal behaviour can be 
misinterpreted as subnormal. 
. 
To illustrate, Foster and Keech (1977) asked 50 elementary 
grade teachers to complete a teacher referral device for a 
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hypothetical 9 year old boy who was normal or mildly 
retarded. The device consisted of a 35 item personality 
questionnaire, to be completed as subjects thought the 
target would complete it, and a 23 item inventory on which 
academic skills, development and adjustment were to be 
rated. Results showed that teachers had significantly more 
negative beliefs about the retarded than the normal child. 
Subjects then saw a videotape of a normal child, but as 
before, were told that he was normal or retarded and then 
they completed a second teacher referral device for him. 
Although they were interpreting the same evidence, the 
relatively negative responses of those in the retarded 
condition were maintained and the authors concluded that 
beliefs persist even when confronted with incongruous 
evidence. In other words, the self-fulfilling prophecy 
hypothesis depends on an assumption that contact for 
teachers as opposed to laymen, does not change beliefs. 
Other research, however seems to contradict this position: 
In their classic article, Efron and Efron (1967), for 
example, set out to explore the dimensionality of 235 
educators' attitudes towards the mildly retarded, which they 
hypothesised would differ acording to subjects' involvement. 
The dependent measure was a Likert format questionnaire, 
consisting of 59 items especially written to be relevant to 
the education of retardates, and a further eleven designed 
to measure authoritarianism and factual knowledge. 
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Data were factor analysed and a six factor solution chosen. 
Factor 1, segregation via institutionalisation projected the 
view that retardates should be removed from society and 
loaded highly on beliefs that they are dangerous, better off 
together and incurably different to normals. Factor 2 
embodied the belief that cultural impoverishment is a 
significant contributor to retardation. Factor 3, non 
condemnatory etiology loaded highly on items suggesting 
retardation is not a punishment from God for parental sins. 
Factor 4, personal exclusion reflected a desire to avoid 
intimate contact and Factor 5 measured autoritarianism. 
Finally, Factor 6, hopelessness projected a pessimistic view 
of the prospects in store for retardates. 
Subjects were classified into 4 categories: 22 teachers of 
the mentally retarded, 125 teachers or student teachers not 
involved with special education, 41 graduate and 
undergraduates in retardation and 23 persons not employed in 
education. Means for each group on the six factors were 
then compared using ANOVA. Throughout, students in 
retardation and teachers of retardates formed a cluster and 
did not differ from each other. Similarly, those in general 
education and non-educational occupations formed a second 
group. On factors 1 and 2 there was a neat bifurcation with 
the former group favouring integration and believing in the 
role of cultural deprivation to a greater extent. In 
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addition, they possessed more factual knowledge. There were 
no differences at all on Factor 3, non-condemnatory etiology 
and the relevant comparisons on factors 4,5 and 6 showed 
teachers of retardates were more willing to have intimate 
contact and were less authoritarian than teachers not 
connected with special education, but they did not differ in 
their view of retardates' prospects. 
Efron and Efron do not discuss their results beyond 
concluding that personal contact is probably the only way of 
changing the more personal facet of attitudes. 
In contrast, Warren, Turner and Brody (1964) found direct 
experience-of teaching blind children brought a positive 
change in attitude while similar experience with retardates 
had the opposite effect. Similarly, Alper and Retish 
(1972) failed to find an improvement in the attitudes of 
special education students after teaching experiences with 
retarded children, while Panda and Bartel (1972) 
administered a semantic differential to 40 teachers who had 
taught retarded children and contrary to expectations, found 
the 20 who had had training in special education, were not 
more positive in their evaluations. 
It is not surprising therefore that writers like Kennon and 
Sandoval (1978) argue that studies of teachers are ambiguous 
and cite further apparently contradictory studies to add to 
the present list. Indeed, they sit on the fence, and 
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suggest that beliefs of regular and special teachers 
probably do not differ and this accounts for the 
distribution of studies identifying first one and then the 
other as more positive. 
The present paradigm can offer a more satisfying 
explanation. First, it does not assume that teachers of 
normal children differ essentially from laymen in their 
beliefs about retardates, because they have no professional 
involvement. Thus, although they might have a general 
interest in matters educational, they are likely to share 
normative beliefs that deal with deviant appearance and 
social behaviour, perhaps to explain or avoid embarrassing 
interactions. Teachers trained to deal with retarded 
children, on the other hand, are seen as members of another 
social system with normative structures focussing more on 
professional type knowledge, special education and training 
although at the onset of their courses, student teachers, as 
yet unsocialised, might not show significant differences 
(Green and Retish, 1973). 
More important, different effects of contact are predicted. 
For the special class teacher, it is likely to represent 
"experience" and to confirm or leave beliefs essentially 
unchanged. For regular teachers, on the other hand, a 
number of possibilities arise. First, those reporting 
contact are hypothesised to be analogous to lay subjects 
with contact,, that is, members of a social system which has 
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more positive, accepting norms, perhaps geared to personal 
relationships. When regular teachers are given contact in 
the form of teaching experience, on the other hand, it seems 
reasonable to suppose that changes will bring them into line 
with special teachers, (being professional rather than 
personal), and will initiate a change of emphasis from 
appearance and behaviour to education and training, rather 
than a positive shift. This provides an alternative to 
Gottlieb and Siperstein's (1976) "bottom-up" suggestion, 
that positive changes do not occur because trying to teach 
retarded children is frustrating. 
Kennon and Sandoval (1978) support indirectly these ideas. 
They asked 35 regular and 25 special class teachers to 
complete a multi-dimensional attitude scale on mental 
retardation, which consisted of items grouped into 5 
categories: (1) educational integration-segregation policy, 
(2) over-favourableness - the idea that retarded children 
are more virtuous than normale, (3) social distance - 
reflecting a willingness to interact with retarded children 
in public places, (4) private rights -a measure of the 
extent to which civil rights of retarded children, 
particularly with regard to education, are considered more 
important than those of others and (5) subtle derogatory 
beliefs - the notion that retarded chldren's morals and 
skills are substandard. 
Although ANOVA failed to yield significant differences, 
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scrutiny of group means is consistent with the present 
argument, since special class teachers tended to prefer 
special class placement, were marginally more open to social 
interaction and more likely to support retardates' civil 
rights to education and free association. These findings 
are given more weight, since using the same instruments, 
Harth (1-973) found significant differences on the latter 
two scales. 
More interesting, however, the authors also examined the 
effect of contact among the regular teachers. In this case, 
results were significant and those with contact were more in 
favour of integration, more open to social contact and held 
fewer derogatory beliefs. In other words, they seem to show 
the relatively positive beliefs of lay people with contact. 
To summarise, the key premise, that differences in beliefs 
about retardation relate to the interests and purposes of 
different'social systems, can be extended to professionals' 
beliefs about retardates. Thus, differences do not indicate 
professional incompetence, or worse, a deliberate attempt to 
conceal it, but simply, that different purposes are being 
served. Furthermore, previously irreconcilable results can 
be understood, if it is hypothesised that conformity to 
norms of a professional system geared to dealing with 
retardates is unlikely to be changed by formal contact. 
Overall therefore, the present social paradigm has proved 
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useful a posteriori. Clearly, the next step is an a priori 
test. 
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STUDY 1 
7. AN EMPIRICAL. INVESTIGATION OF BELIEFS ABOUT RETARDATES 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
What follows is an attempt to explore the social model of 
retardation, using a representative sample of laymen in 
Bristol, 1980 and, in subsidiary investigations, small 
samples of psychologists and teachers. 
1. The primary hypothesis is that lay people who are 
acquainted with a retardate, conceptualise them 
I 
differently to those who are not, and that these 
differences arise because they are members of different 
social systems rather 
than because of individual variation. In more detail, 
beliefs of unacquainted lay people are expected to show 
a preoccupation with social stimulus characteristics 
like appearance, gait, speech and other items relevant 
to unusual or embarrassing interactions and are 
expected to be evaluatively negative. Those of lay 
people personally acquainted with a retardate, on the 
other hand, are expected to reflect an interest in 
caregiving, protection and control, and in comparison 
to unacquainted subjects, to be relatively positive. 
Put another way, a) intelligence, abnormality and 
social incompetence per se are expected to play little 
part, b) beliefs of unacquainted subjects are expected 
to reflect self-interest, and c) those of acquainted 
subjects, the interests of retardates. 
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to these predictions: 
Beliefs of psychologists are hypothesised to reflect 
statistical and medical models. Relative to laymen, 
therefore, they are expected to focus on abnormality, 
intelligence and pathology, and hence, to be 
evaluatively negative. Contact with a retardate for 
them is hypothesised not to be associated with marked 
positive changes. 
Teachers of normal children are not expected to have 
special interest in retardates and therefore are 
hypothesised not to differ from lay people. 
Finally, and for completeness, sex, class and age main 
effects will be briefly examined. Females are expected 
to evaluate retardates more positively than males. No 
predictions are made regarding class and age, although 
a hypothesised relationship with profession is expected 
to throw light on previous inconsistencies. 
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7.2. METHOD 
This involved three stages: items relevant to the concept 
"retardates" were collected, an instrument was constructed 
and third, subjects rated the concept on it. 
7.2.1. The pilot study and derivation of an item pool 
Within the social framework it is clear that items taken 
from previous studies or selected a priori might not be 
relevant for present subject groups. In a pilot study, 
based on Kuhn and McPartland's (1954) Who Am I Test, a pool 
of items from actual laymen, psychologists, doctors and 
teachers was therefore collected. Subjects were simply 
asked to complete 6 phrases beginning "Retardates are 
...... " and were assured there were no right or wrong 
answers and that their responses would be anonymous. 
Because this was entirely exploratory, there was no planned 
number of subjects, but new items ceased being added to the 
list after relatively few, although in case this was due to 
chance, 150 were interviewed, including 15 teachers, 2 
special teachers, 20 psychologists, 20 medical students and 
doctors and 93 lay people from a wide variety of 
occupations. Ages ranged from 13 to 65 and numbers of males 
and females were approximately equal. 
Only 6 subjects failed to produce 6 definitions, but a 
number, whose imagination failed, ended with nonsense 
responses or apologies, which were ignored. Similarly, 
other jokes or idiosyncratic (as opposed to normative) 
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beliefs were eliminated by including only items given by at 
least 2 subjects. Without exact, but with near duplicates, 
over 350 items were thus generated, ranging from one word to 
substantial sentences in length. Each was typed onto a 
card, and the whole set formed the item pool, (given in 
Appendix 2.1). 
7.2.2. The instrument 
Six judges (an actor aged 29; a female psychologist, aged 
24; an electronics stores technician (approximately 50); a 
housewife, (32); a waitress about to start a university 
course in Social Administration, (25) and an upholsterer, 
(64)) undertook to perform an inductive content analysis to 
sort the item pool into categories, but this method of 
determining basic dimensions for an instrument was 
abandoned, since no two judges agreed on the number of 
classes, which varied from 5 to 25. Furthermore, the task 
took up to 3 hours. 
A second look through the pool revealed that groups of items 
frequently suggested one dimension, like "happy", "always 
happy", "usually sad", "never sad", and many more. Coupled 
with this insight, a literature search suggested a semantic 
differential format would be ideal, because, apart from 
exploiting such clear unidimensionality, it demanded no 
other classification. Before constructing scales, however, 
one restriction wad imposed: because the present interest 
is in defining the behaviours and characteristics associated 
with retardates, a substantial set of "should" items, mostly 
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relating to facilities (e. g. '"should have more hostels") 
was set on one side. Otherwise, no items were omitted, 
despite some cYose similarities, and with the help of 5 of 
the judges (not the stores technician), the pool was grouped 
into 81 scales to form the instrument (given in Appendix 
2 . 2). 
Surprisingly, an opposite for virtually every pole was 
present, and it was interesting to speculate whether 
subjects defining retardates as graceful, good-looking, 
intelligent and so on, had been expressing their values, 
rather than what they genuinely believed. Thus, it was 
necessary only to supply "will find a job easily", "rich 
family background" and "fine facial features" together with 
"controlled by self" (as an opposite for "controlled by 
others or Fate"). Poles and items were randomised, and an 
informal pilot on 18 subjects clarified wording. 
The final semantic differential, it is important to note, 
differs marginally from The semantic differential of Osgood, 
Suci and Tannenbaum (1957) which has been widely applied 
with children, adults, mental retardates, juvenile 
delinquents, schizophrenics and many other groups, and which 
has been used to differentiate any concept, including the 
self, (Osgood et al, 1957), and is economic, simple, 
reliable and valid (Heise, 1971). Over the 25 years since 
its development, it has been used and adapted by many 
researchers, so it is wise to refer to the original to 
evaluate the present useage. 
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As a result of research into synesthesia, Osgood et al 
(1957) realised that stimuli perceived through different 
modalities could, at least in part, share the same meaning, 
a phenomenon which they hypothesised, was intimately tied to 
language. Since the function of language is to communicate 
meaning, they went on to assume that it should be useable to 
differentiate between concepts and to measure meaning. The 
semantic differential is the fruit of this assumption. 
In order to use the semantic differential, Osgood et al 
point out, it is not necessary to be familiar with or to 
agree with their theory of meaning, particularly as they 
freely admit, it was developed post hoc as a teleological 
justification for the instrument. For this reason, only 
enough to understand the present adaptation will be 
sketched. 
Essentially, Osgood et al argue that objects elicit stable 
responses, and that signs (i. e. words) come to represent 
them because they elicit parts of these responses. To 
Osgood et al, therefore, the meaning of a word can be 
defined in terms of its distinctive cognitive response. The 
"representational mediating process" they visualise as 
excitations within a semantic space of multiple dimensions 
passing through an origin. Semantic differentiation, it 
follows, is the allocation of a concept to a point in this 
space. For practical purposes, dimensions are represented 
by semantic differentiatial scales and semantic 
differentiation corresponds to selection among the 
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alternatives presented by the bipolar scales. Thus, meaning 
can be defined theoretically as a point in semantic space, 
with direction and intensity according to position and 
distance from the neutral origin. Practically, it can be 
defined in terms of responses on a semantic differential. 
Osgood et al argued that semantic space is most efficiently 
defined by the minimum number of orthogonal dimensions and 
accordingly, they set out to discover empirically what these 
might be. A battery of factor. analyses processed data from 
large samples of subjects differentiating many concepts, 
against many scales. To gain wide representativeness, even 
a Thesaurus study was included. Full details are given by 
Osgood et al, but for present, it is enough to note that 
three factors consistently emerged: evaluation accounted 
for approximately 35% of variance and comprised scales like 
"good/bad", "beautiful/ugly", "clean/dirty" and 
"sweet/bitter". The second factor, potency, which accounted 
for about 8% of variance, comprised scales like 
"large/small", "strong/weak" and "thick/thin". Finally, 
activity accounted for approximately 6% and scales like 
"fast/slow", "hot/cold" and "sharp/dull" loaded most highly 
on it. Consequently, the semantic differential consists of 
scales, usually between 4 and 10, selected to load on each 
of these`three factors. Because the present interest is in 
mental retardation, rather than Osgood et al's theory of 
meaning, scales have been chosen for their relevance to 
retardates, not to the EPA structure, a departure further 
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justified for at least two reasons: first, the methologicai 
status of the EPA structure seems unaccountably high and 
researchers seem to ignore the fact that it accounts 
typically for only half the total variance, and that other 
factors, a further five in the Thesaurus study, emerge. 
Second, and intuitively, it simply does not ring true that 
three dimensions are sufficient to encompass all meanings in 
human experience, and it is interesting to wonder whether 
the EPA structure emerged because data across many concepts 
were combined, so that it is roughly appropriate for 
everything but exactly relevant to nothing. 
To conclude, like that of Greenbaum and Wang (1965), the 
present semantic differential reflects an interest in 
retardates, but, treatment and scoring of data follow 
essentially the traditional pattern. 
7.2.3. Subjects 
In all, 494 subjects were tested. These comprised a) 395 
lay people, defined as those with no professional interest 
in retardates. 134 were personally acquainted with a 
retardate, 260 were not and one did not say. 
b) 52 psychologists, 28 with and 23 without personal 
acquaintance and 1 who did not say. 
c) 40 teachers, 22 with and 18 without personal 
acquaintance. 
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d) and 7 subjects who gave no occupation. 
The varied sample sizes require some explanation. They 
reflect the primary aim of defining retardation and 
examining the effect of contact within contemporary lay 
systems, in which context, psychologists and teachers merely 
provide contrast groups. Although ideas subsequently 
developed in the literature review initiated an interest in 
professionals' beliefs in their own right, a fuller 
investigation must wait: at present, there are some 40,000 
data points, each invidually collected, scored, checked, 
coded and rechecked -a task that took many months, and time 
simply does not permit increasing professional samples to 
achieve a more balanced design. 
Subjects were tested in the Bristol area during 1980. An 
attempt was made to recruit the lay sample at random by 
approaching all comers at different times and places on the 
streets. Experience showed this to be an inefficient 
method, because minutes frequently elapsed before subjects 
appeared. For this reason, recruitment tended to be in 
areas where people congregate. Thus, one subject could be 
approached while others were completing their 
questionnaires. Locations included the city centre and 
shopping centres, the unemployment exchange, the bus 
station, the coffee area in the outpatients' Department at 
Bristol Royal Infirmary, an upholstery factory and a block 
of flats for pensioners in Westbury-on-Trym, a class of 
schoolboys at Clifton College and staff at an office block 
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near the centre of town. In addition, people in the 
vicinity of the University and E's home were approached, 
together with those encountered on journeys between testing 
locations. Psychologists were recruited at a conference and 
although a few teachers were recruited by chance, the 
majority were attending short in service courses at Bristol 
University's School of Education. 
7.2.4. Procedure 
Subjects were simply approached and asked if they would help 
E with some research by giving their beliefs about 
"retardates - that is mentally subnormal people" on the 
provided semantic differentials. Testing was either single 
or multiple, depending on whether subjects were alone or in 
groups. It was stressed that responses were anonymous, but 
subjects were asked to indicate their age, sex, occupation 
and whether they knew a retarded person. Only one refused, 
who it transpired, was hurrying to catch a bus. Roughly 
thirty grumbled that it was impossible to generalise, but 
all nevertheless completed the task, although three of these 
(who were personally acquainted) gave all neutral responses. 
Instructions were taken from Osgood et al, and are given in 
Appendix 2.3. 
N 
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7.3. TREATMENT OF DATA AND RESULTS 
Semantic differential "boxes" were scored from 1 to 7. with 
1 always allotted to the positive pole, which had been 
identified by the 5 judges. For the most part, this was 
straight forward, but several scales were not immediately 
obvious: - "underestimated" and "misunderstood" were rated 
positive together with "unpredictable personality" and 
"complicated". Bearing these difficulties in mind, raw 
scores may nevertheless be taken as a rough indication of 
evaluation, but since scales are unlikely to load equally on 
it, evaluation per se cannot be parametrically analysed. On 
the other hand, Osgood et al (1957) and Heise, (1971) 
present research that shows semantic differential "boxes" 
are equally spaced according to intensity, which justifies 
the use of ANOVA to examine differences in beliefs on each 
scale. 
Since the data base and the number of independent variable s 
are so large, an enormous number of analyses are possible 
and only those most relevant to hypotheses have been 
undertaken. 
Table 2.1 gives mean scores for lay subjects with and 
without contact with retardates. The latter were more 
positive on 71/81 scales, (p <. 0001, Sign Test). Univariate 
ANOVA (BMDP7D) on each scale showed that contact had 43 
significant effects which have been marked with a cross (p 
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<. 05) or an asterisk, (p<. 01). Appendix 2.4 contains 
justifications for and examples of analyses. 
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able to cope/unable to cope 
good/bad at concentrating 
not lonely/lonely 
even-tempered/moody 
easy/difficult to relate to 
family's pride/family's shame 
employable/unemployable 
predictable/unpredictable behaviour 
self-content/wants to be different 
well-dressed/badly-dressed 
mature/childlike 














d'ment shaped by environment/birth 
unalike/(like other retardates). 
asset to society/burden to society 
confident/hesitant 
high intelligence/low intelligence 
sexually restrained/permissive 
sensitive/insensitive to others 
calm/excitable 
Acquainted Unacquainted 
mean s. d. mean s. d. 
2.72 1.55 3.07 1.62+ 
5.41 1.29 5.52 1.22 
3.58 1.63 4.01 1.65+ 
4.17 1.95 4.78 1.69* 
4.63 1.57 4.72 1.48 
2.37 1.35 2.47 1.26 
3.52 1.71 4.07 1.48* 
3.23 1.52 3.56 1.50+ 
4.53 1.49 5.02 1.39* 
2.21 1.34 2.52 1.32+ 
2.88 1.55 3.15 1.44 
4.31 1.16 4.67 1.06* 
5.19 1.39 5.28 1.35 
5.49 1.70 5.38 1.74 
4.40 1.87 4.60 1.63 
3.20 1.76 3.60 1.61+ 
4.51 1.62 4.88 1.41+ 
4.96 1.70 5.27 1.52 
4.13 1.96 4.64 1.64* 
4.90 1.88 5.04 1.48 
4.37 1.74 4.92 1.58* 
4.01 1.48 4.35 1.39+ 
3.93 1.78 4.01 1.74 
4.80 1.71 5.07 1.52 
3.46 1.73 3.93 1.80* 
3.72 1.49 4.28 1.36* 
5.59 1.40 5.59 1.33 
4.18 1.33 4.48 1.20+ 
4.98 1.61 5.33 1.34+ 
3.28 1.69 3.25 1.44 
3.01 2.03 2.68 1.45 
4.58 1.26 4.89 . 1.19+ 
3.00 1.63 3.58 1.65* 
4.66 1.75 5.03 1.56+ 
3.16 1.56 3.51 1.49+ 
4.14 1.35 4.64 1.29* 
3.86 1.63 4.16 1.46 
6.08 1.23 6.26 1.20 
5.18 1.47 5.04 1.53 
3.29 1.49 3.57 1.41 
4.27 1.35 4.69 1.22* 
4.16 2.25 4.20 1.90 
3.60 1; 80 4.58 1.63* 
4.31 1.52 4.77 1.32* 
4.57 1.67 4.97 1.33* 
4.98 1.47 4.94 1.43 
3.90 1.79 3.58 1.42+ 
2.87 1.56 3.42 1.75* 
5.85 1.37 5.58 1.34 
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high self-esteem/low self-esteem 4.14 1.54 4.48 1.30+ 
lovable/repulsive 3.18 1.44 3.61 1.38* 
cheering/depressing 3.80 1.67 4.51 1.56* 
clear thinker/confused thinker 5.31 1.42 5.23 1.40 
rich/poor family background 4.04 1.18 4.10 0.73 
knowing/not knowing right from wrong 3.81 1.80 4.30 1.63* 
complicated/simple 4.19 1.62 4.37 1.71 
not aggressive/aggressive 4.19 1.62 4.42 1.42 
good at concentrating/(distractible) 5.43 1.46. 5.64 1.32 
nice/nasty 3.12 1.42 3.60 1.07* 
always careful/accident prone 5.04 1.46 5.30 1.18 
wanted/unwanted 3.84 1.74 4.47 1.59* 
tough/vulnerable 5.20 1.68 5.21 1.53 
wide/limited general knowledge 5.61 1.35 5.65 
1.23 
acceptable/unacceptable neighbour 3.52 1.91 3.74 1.73 
well treated/hard done by 3.67 2.03 4.14 1.68+ 
tidy/untidy 4.31 1.67 4.45 1.40 
socially skilled/socially inept 5.14 1.40 5.32 . 
1.22 
normal/unusual appearance 4.46 1.65 4.95 1.51* 
wanting to join in/preferring (not) 2.81 1.72 3.22 1.60+ 
stable/neurotic 4.32 1.32 4.52 1.25 
trustworthy/deceitful 3.21 1.52 3.30 1.29 
fine/coarse facial features 4.49 1.46 4.85 1.26* 
controlled by self/others or Fate 5.38 1.42 5.23 1.47 
popular/friendless 3.75 1.56 4.30 1.32* 
safe/dangerous 3.22 1.49 3.80 
1.36* 
tonic/strain for family 5.54 1.36 5.67 1.29 
nice/nasty to live with 3.79 1.29 4.14 
1.00* 
unpredictable/predictable personality 3.54 1.78 3.33 1.66 
capable/helpless 4.38 1.45 4.48 
1.47 
helpful/unhelpful 3.10 1.56 3.45 1.47+ 
undemanding/demanding 5.18 1.74 5.68 1.40* 
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Separate factor analyses for acquainted and unacquainted 
subjects were undertaken. Preliminary results yielded 24 
factor solutions. In each case, the first 15 factors 
accounted for the majority of variation (60 and 56%, 
respectively), so data were reanalysed with eigenvalues set 
at 1.5 and a maximum of 15 factors specified. This yielded 
the 14 and 11 factor solutions given in : able 2.1a, which 
appears at the relevant point in the text. 
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 similarly give psychologists' and 
teachers' beliefs according to personal acquaintance., There 
was no overall difference in evaluation for the former 
(43/81, N. S), but acquainted teachers were more positive on 
74/81 items, (p < . 001, Sign Test). 
ANOVA yielded 4 significant contact effects for the 
psychologists and 17 for the teachers, which have been 
indicated as before. 
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TABLE 2.2 

















able to cope/unable to cope 
good/bad at concentrating 
not lonely/lonely 
even-tempered/moody 
easy/difficult to relate to 
family's pride/family's shame 
employable/unemployable 
predictable/unpredictable behaviour 
self-content/wants to be different 
well-dressed/badly-dressed 
mature/childlike 














d'ment shaped by environment/birth 
unalike/(like other retardates) 
asset to society/burden to society 
confident/hesitant 
high intelligence/low intelligence 
sexually restrained/permissive 
sensitive/insensitive to others 
calm/excitable 
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cheering/depressing 4.65 1.00 4.61 1.42 
clear thinker/confused thinker 5.65 0.76 5.54 0.98 
rich/poor family background 4.65 0.76 4.36 0.72 
knowing/not knowing right from wrong 4.26 1.19 4.68 1.47 
complicated/simple 4.91 1.32 3.93 1.85+ 
not aggressive/aggressive 3.74 1.26 4.43 1.35 
good at concentrating/(distractible) 5.43 1.38 5.46 1.27 
nice/nasty 3.61 0.92 3.43 0.90 
always careful/accident prone 5.30 0.91 5.32 0.97 
wanted/unwanted 4.96 1.30 5.43 1.27 
tough/vulnerable 5.35 1.00 5.86 1.09 
wide/limited general knowledge 5.96 1.08 6.11 1.05 
acceptable/unacceptable neighbour 3.13 1.36 3.46 1.35 
well treated/hard done by 4.48 1.44 5.25 1.43 
tidy/untidy 4.61 0.82 4.68 1.44 
socially skilled/socially inept 5.83 0.82 5.64 1.29 
normal/unusual appearance 4.78 1.53 5.14 1.16 
wanting to join in/preferring (not) 2.96 1.12 2.93 1.28 
stable/neurotic 4.00 0.83 4.11 0.90 
trustworthy/deceitful 3.52 0.88 3.25 0.95 
fine/coarse facial features 4.78 1.02 5.07 1.28 
controlled by self/others or Fate 4.96 0.86 5.14 1.68 
popular/friendless 4.57 0.97 4.89 1.08 
safe/dangerous 3.57 1.10 3.39 0.94 
tonic/strain for family 5.83 1.09 5.82 1.28 
nice/nasty to live with 3.96 1.04 4.21 0.94 
unpredictable/predictable personality 4.30 1.20 3.21 1.18* 
capable/helpless 5.22 0.72 4.93 1.39 
helpful/unhelpful 3.43 1.10 3.39 1.14 
undemanding/demanding 5.26 1.26 5.71 0.92 
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TABLE 2.3 






fr iendly/unf r iendly 
healthy/unhealthy 
valuable/worthless 












easy/difficult to relate to 
family's pride/family's shame 
employable/unemployable 
predictable/unpredictable behaviour 
self-content/wants to be different 
well-dressed/badly-dressed 
mature/childlike 














d'ment shaped by environment/birth 
unalike/(like other retardates) 
asset to society/burden to society 
confident/hesitant 
high intelligence/low intelligence 
sexually restrained/permissive 




Mean s. d. Mean s. d. 
2.23 1.00 2.89 1.56 
5.41 1.15 5.39 1.16 
3.73 1.54 4.39 1.67 
4.00 1.76 5.22 1.55+ 
4.41 1.78 4.61 0.89 
1.82 0.94 3.06 1.43* 
2.95 1.33 4.17 1.50* 
2.59 1.37 3.67 1.11* 
3.95 1.49 5.50 0.96* 
1.82 0.94 2.67 1.45+ 
2.95 1.82 2.56 1.17 
3.95 0.77 4.39 1.06 
5.05 1.55 5.28 1.10 
5.59 1.03 6.11 0.99 
4.18 1.77 4.89 1.37 
3.36 1.46 3.89 1.37 
5.09 1.28 5.17 1.07 
5.55 1.34 5.89 1.45 
4.14 1.29 4.56 1.50 
4.14 1.39 4.94 1.08 
4.77 1.31 5.44 1.34 
4.23 1.35 5.22 1.03+ 
3.68 1.26 3.83 1.86 
4.27 1.68 5.22 1.40 
3.41 1.07 4.28 1.33+ 
3.77 1.59 4.06 0.97 
5.45 0.94 5.67 1.00 
4.05 1.46 4.67 1.29 
5.36 1.19 5.72 1.04 
3.55 0.84 3.56 1.30 
3.00 1.86 2.50 0.96 
4.45 1.16 5.28 1.04+ 
3.50 1.23 4.28 1.56 
5.27 1.79 5.67 1.49 
3.14 1.32 3.61 1.21 
4.14 1.10 4.78 1.08 
3.64 1.11 4.28 1.28 
6.41 0.94 6.39 1.11 
4.50 1.12 5.17 1.30 
3.50 1.56 3.72 1.04 
4.41 0.72 4.94 0.85+ 
4.00 2.11 4.22 1.75 
4.00 1.83 4.17 1.89 
3.73 1.35 5.06 1.13* 
4.55 1.59 4.94 1.22 
5.00 1.31 5.67 1.33 
4.23 0.90 4.33 1.20 
2.91 1.38 3.56 1.34 
5.41 1.11 4.72 1.04 
.+ 
high self-esteem/low self-esteem 4.50 1.27 5.06 1.03 
lovable/repulsive 3.00 1.31 3.83 1.21+ 
cheering/depressing 3.82 1.43 4.56 1.21 
clear thinker/confused thinker 5.27 0.86 5.44 1.07 
rich/poor family background 3.95 1.26 4.17 0.50 
knowing/not knowing right from wrong 4.05 1.52 4.50 1.50 
complicated/simple 4.00 1.62 3.94 1.54 
not aggressive/aggressive 4.00 1.45 4.39 1.11 
good at concentrating/(distractible) 5.32 1.82 5.72 1.10 
nice/nasty 3.18 1.27 3.83 0.90 
always careful/accident prone 5.23 1.04 5.22 1.03 
wanted/unwanted 4.14 1.63 4.50 1.42 
tough/vulnerable 5.32 1.33 5.39 1.53 
wide/limited general knowledge 5.32 1.66 5.78 1.08 
acceptable/unacceptable neighbour 2.91 1.56 3.83 1.54 
well treated/hard done by 4.27 1.79 4.89 0.94 
tidy/untidy 3.68 1.29 4.17 1.01 
socially skilled/socially inept 5.36 0.88 5.44 1.01 
normal/unusual appearance 3.86 1.60 4.44 1.26 
wanting to join in/preferring (not) 2.59 1.47 3.83 1.42* 
stable/neurotic 4.05 1.11 4.28 0.93 
trustworthy/deceitful 3.05 1.15 3.89 1.20+ 
fine/coarse facial features 4.23 0.90 4.78 0.71+ 
controlled by self/others or Fate 4.95 1.02 5.50 1.01 
popular/friendless 3.91 1.04 4.28 1.15 
safe/dangerous 3.18 1.27 4.17 1.30+ 
tonic/strain for family 5.50 0.84 5.28 1.37 
nice/nasty to live with 3.41 1.03 4.39 1.11* 
unpredictable/predictable personality 3.86 1.42 3.61 1.30 
capable/helpless 4.45 1.23 4.72 1.19 
helpful/unhelpful 3.14 1.14 3.39 1.38 
undemanding/demanding 5.27 1.09 5.56 1.38 
P 
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Two factor ANOVA (BMDP2V) compared directly the effect of 
occupation and contact. Occupation had 24 significant 
effects and there were 8 significant interactions, all of 
which are indicated on Table-2.4. Finally, T tests were 
computed (BMDP3D) to examine the nature of such differences, 
and these are described in the text. 
TABLE 2.4 
lean occupational effects on beliefs about retardates 
lay psych' teach 
trusting/wary 2.95 2.46 2.53 
graceful/unco-ordinated 5.49 5.83 5.40 
talkative/uncommunicative 3.86 4.33 4.02 
secure/insecure 4.58 4.17 4.55 
quiet/noisy 4.70 4.71 4.50 
friendly/unfriendly 2.43 2.56 2.38 
healthy/unhealthy 3.87 4.79 3.50 
valuable/worthless 3.43 3.63 3.07 
relaxing/upsetting to be with 4.84 4.92 4.65 
loving/cold 2.40 2.48 2.20 
under-estimated/over-estimated 3.06 2.71 2.78 
good-looking/ugly 4.55 4.79 4.15 
speech clear/speech unclear 5.24 5.65 5.15 
independent/dependent 5.43 5.88 5.82 
contented/frustrated 4.54 5.08 4.50 
active/passive 3.46 3.62 3.60 
able to cope/unable to cope 4.76 5.44 5.13 
good/bad at concentrating 5.17 5.40 5.70 
not lonely/lonely 4.45 4.40 4.32 
even-tempered/moody 4.99 4.58 4.50 
easy/difficult to relate to 4.73 5.06 5.07 
family's pride/family's shame 4.24 5.29 4.68 
employable/unemployable 3.99 4.19 3.75 
predictable/unpredictable behaviour 4.98 4.69 4.70 
self-content/wants to be different 3.76 3.87 3.80 
well-dressed/badly-dressed 4.09 4.46 3.90 
mature/childlike 5.59 5.67 5.55 
resistant to illness/frequently ill 4.36 4.83 4.32 
quick/slow 5.21 6.04 5.52 
over-protected/under-protected 3.27 3.15 3.55 
misunderstood/understood 2.79 2.42 2.78 
soothing/embarrassing 4.77 4.96 4.82 
strong/weak 3.39 4.29 3.85 
good/bad at expressing meaning 4.91 5.67 5.45 
happy/sad 3.39 3.75 3.35 
attractive/unattractive friend 4.45 4.92 4.43 
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will find a job easily/will not 6.20 6.65 6.40 + 
normal/abnormal 5.08 5.54 4.80 
clean/dirty 3.47 4.23 3.60 * 
reassuring/frightening 4.55 4.50 4.65 
d'ment shaped by environment/birth 4.20 3.87 4.10 
unalike/(like other retardates) 4.24 4.15 4.07 
asset to society/burden to society 4.61 4.65 4.32 + 
confident/hesitant 4.83 4.62 4.73 
high intelligence/low intelligence 4.96 5.92 5.30 * 
sexually restrained/permissive 3.71 3.90 4.27 
sensitive/insensitive to others 3.24 4.04 3.20 * 
calm/excitable 5.68 5.12 5.10 * 
high self-esteem/low self-esteem . 4.36 4.88 4.75 * lovable/repulsive 3.46 3.77 3.38 
cheering/depressing 4.25 4.62 4.15 
clear thinker/confused thinker 5.26 5.60 5.35 
rich/poor family background 4.08 4.48 4.05 
knowing/not knowing right from wrong 4.13 4.54 4.25 
complicated/simple 4.29 4.42 3.97 
not aggressive/aggressive 4.34 4.15 4.18 
good at concentrating/(distractible) 5.57 5.42 5.50 
nice/nasty 3.43 3.48 3.47 
always careful/accident prone 5.21 5.33 5.23 
wanted/unwanted 4.25 5.25 4.30 *+ 
tough/vulnerable 5.21 5.63 5.35 
wide/limited general knowledge 5.64 6.00 5.52 
acceptable/unacceptable neighbour 3.67 3.33 3.32 
well treated/hard'done by 3.98 4.87 4.55 *+ 
tidy/untidy 4.39 4.63 3.90 
socially skilled/socially inept 5.27 5.71 5.40 
normal/unusual appearance 4.79 5.00 4.13 + 
wanting to join in/preferring (not) 3.10 2.92 3.15 
stable/neurotic 4.44 4.06 4.15 
trustworthy/deceitful 3.27 3.38 3.43 
fine/coarse facial features 4.72 4.96 4.48 
controlled by self/others or Fate 5.28 5.08 5.20 
popular/friendless 4.11 4.73 4.07 
safe/dangerous 3.59 3.48 3.63 
tonic/strain for family 5.62 5.83 5.40 
nice/nasty to live with 4.02 4.12 3.85 + 
unpredictable/predictable personality 3.41 3.71 3.75 + 
capable/helpless 4.43 5.04 4.57 + 
helpful/unhelpful 3.32 3.42 3.25 
undemanding/demanding 5.52 5.52 5.40 
(N. B. p(x) represents the probability of the occupation x contact 
interaction) 
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Subsidiary analyses 
Table 2.5 shows mean semantic differential scores for 260 
males and 234 females. 
ANOVA revealed 19 significant sex differences, which are 
indicated as before. 
TABLE 2.5 

















able to cope/unable to cope 
good/bad at concentrating 
not lonely/lonely 
even-tempered/moody 
easy/difficult to relate to 
family's pride/family's shame 
employable/unemployable 
predictable/unpredictable behaviour 
self-content/wants to be different 
well-dressed/badly-dressed 
mature/childlike 











Mean s. d. Mean s. d. 
2.86 1.57 2.89 1.57 
5.43 1.27 5.55 1.18 
3.86 1.59 3.98 1.67 
4.31 1.80 4.80 1.68* 
4.65 1.50 4.72 1.48 
2.42 1.31 2.45 1.21 
3.85 1.60 4.00 1.56 
3.17 1.45 3.53 1.53* 
4.65 1.46 4.92 1.43+ 
2.27 1.31 2.51 1.27+ 
3.00 1.49 3.10 1.54 
4.40 1.03 4.67 1.12* 
5.32 1.29 5.23 1.38 
5.58 1.56 5.42 1.70 
4.49 1.73 4.71 1.63 
3.56 1.61 3.42 1.63 
4.78 1.52 4.90 1.38 
5.34 1.49 5.16 1.59 
4.24 1.79 4.65 1.65* 
4.86 1.63 4.97 1.52 
4.61 1.65 4.85 1.64 
4.21 1.35 4.51 1.47+ 
3.85 1.68 4.08 1.82 
4.98 1.67 4.88 1.47 
3.50 1.67 4.04 1.68* 
3.97 1.42 4.24 1.35+ 
5.78 1.17 5.40 1.38* 
4.45 1.35 4.36 . 1.22 
5.37 1.37 5.24 1.45 
3.21 1.46 3.29 1.51 
2.74 1.61 2.85 1.74 
4.62 1.20 4.92 1.19* 
3.33 1.71 3.65 1.60+ 
4.96 1.67 5.09 1.55 
3.12 1.42 3.68 1.50* 
4.40 1.30 4.52 1.32 
3.97 1.50 3.97 1.45 
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will find a job easily/will not 6.30 1.13 6.21 1.21 
normal/abnormal 5.00 1.43 5.12 1.55 
clean/dirty 3.56 1.43 3.56 1.44 
reassuring/frightening 4.57 1.26 4.48 1.19 
d'ment shaped by environment/birth 4.00 2.03 4.28 1.91 
unalike/(like other retardates) 4.16 1.76 4.31 1.70 
asset to society/burden to society 4.50 1.35 4.62 1.47 
confident/hesitant 4.79 1.37 4.81 1.48 
high intelligence/low intelligence 5.16 1.35 4.99 1.53 
sexually restrained/permissive 3.88 1.58 3.65 1.47 
sensitive/insensitive to others 3.32 1.70 3.30 1.63 
calm/excitable 5.63 1.31 5.52 1.35 
high self-esteem/low self-esteem 4.47 1.37 4.43 1.39 
lovable/repulsive 3.18 1.38 3.69 1.39* 
cheering/depressing 4.09 1.63 4.36 1.56 
clear thinker/confused thinker 5.22 1.44 5.34 1.24 
rich/poor family background 4.04 0.84 4.20 0.95+ 
knowing/not knowing right from wrong 4.24 1.72 4.10 1.62 
complicated/simple 4.26 1.72 4.29 1.66 
not aggressive/aggressive 4.34 1.46 4.27 1.44 
good at concentrating/(distractible) 5.66 1.39 -5.47 1.37 
nice/nasty 3.28 1.20 3.56 1.16* 
always careful/accident prone 5.22 1.28 5.21 1.22 
wanted/unwanted 4.25 1.66 4.47 1.63 
tough/vulnerable 5.24 1.64 5.28 1.43 
wide/limited general knowledge 5.83 1.19 5.55 1.33* 
acceptable/unacceptable neighbour 3.50 1.75 3.68 1.73 
well treated/hard done by 4.16 1.86 4.14 1.73 
tidy/untidy 4.37 1.51 4.36 1.42 
socially skilled/socially inept 5.35 1.21 5.27 1.28 
normal/unusual appearance 4.71 1.53 4.80 1.56 
wanting to join in/preferring (not) 2.98 1.61 3.18 1.59 
stable/neurotic 4.30 1.26 ' 4.45 1.19 
trustworthy/deceitful 3.35 1.31 3.25 1.33 
fine/coarse facial features 4.76 1.23 4.68 1.34 
controlled by self/others or Fate 5.40 1.33 5.12 1.47+ 
popular/friendless 4.15 1.37 4.17 1.39 
safe/dangerous 3.59 1.38 3.56 1.41 
tonic/strain for family - 5.75 
1.23 5.51 1.33 
nice/nasty to live with 3.94 1.09 4.05 1.13 
unpredictable/predictable personality3.29 1.65 3.62 1.60 
capable/helpless 4.41 1.48 4.52 1.37 
helpful/unhelpful 3.14 1.42 3.50 1.46* 
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high intelligence/low intelligence 4.70 5.11 5.38 4.73 5.52 5.28 
sexually restrained/permissive 3.22 3.72 3.98 4.18 3.97 4.56 
sensitive/insensitive to others 2.85 3.28 3.57 3.29 3.70 3.96 
calm/excitable 5.62 5.46 5.60 5.40 5.97 5.88 
high self-esteem/low self-esteem 4.37 4.48 4.67 4.38 4.15 4.48 
lovable/repulsive 3.35 3.49 3.76 3.73 2.61 3.36 
cheering/depressing 4.21 4.21 4.27 4.16 4.09 4.60 
clear thinker/confused thinker 5.04 5.25 5.55 5.04 5.85 5.36 
rich/poor family background 3.96 4.20 4.17 4.04 4.12 4.24 
knowing/not knowing right from wrong 4.13 4.10 4.31 4.20 4.15 4.48 
complicated/simple 4.29 4.07 4.32 4.58 4.88 4.28 
not aggressive/aggressive 4.21 4.28 4.51 4.40 4.18 4.16 
good at concentrating/(distractible) 5.48 5.34 5.70 5.71 5.85 6.28 
nice/nasty 3.26 3.43 3.65 3.44 3.18 3.68 
always careful/accident prone 5.17 5.21 5.33 4.84 5.55 5.08 
wanted/unwanted 4.26 4.57 4.74 3.96 3.52 3.72 
tough/vulnerable 5.12 5.16 5.51 5.44 5.24 5.44 
wide/limited general knowledge 5.56 5.54 5.80 5.78 6.42 5.92 
acceptable/unacceptable neighbour 3.50 3.51 3.74 3.82 4.18 3.28 
well treated/hard done by 3.98 4.38 4.63 3.47 3.85 3.12 
tidy/untidy 4.38 4.37 4.68 4.27 3.88 4.16 
socially skilled/socially inept 5.20 5.18 5.56 5.16 5.67 5.60 
normal/unusual appearance 4.89 4.70 4.82 4.78 4.21- 5.16 
wanting to join in/preferring (not) 3.02 3.01 3.49 3.07 2.73 3.20 
stable/neurotic ' 4.47 4.19 4.61 4.31 4.42 4.64 
trustworthy/deceitful 3.17 3.20 3.52 3.33 3.67 3.28 
fine/coarse facial features 4.85 4.60 4.81 4.78 4.70 4.60 
controlled by self/others or Fate 4.93 5.20 5.33 5.49 5.61 5.76 
popular/friendless 4.09 4.11 4.52 4.00 3.91 4.24 
safe/dangerous 3.54 3.55 3.87 3.64 3.15 3.52 
tonic/strain for family 5.55 5.49 5.83 5.38 6.03 6.00 
nice/nasty to live with 3.94 4.03 4.18 3.98 3.91 3.60 
unpredictable/predictable personality3.44 3.58 3.12 3.73 3.82 3.04 
capable/helpless 4.55 4.36 4.67 4.49 4.64 4.16 
helpful/unhelpful 3.40 3.19 3.29 3.36 3.42 3.96 
undemanding/demanding 5.48 5.52 5.56 5.47 5.33 5.64 
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Finally, Table 2.7 gives mean 
according to social class. 
semantic differential scores 
TABLE 2.7 
Man beliefs about retardates, according to social class 
Social class I II III IV V 
trusting/wary 2.59 2.66 2.81 3.53 2.72* 
graceful/unco-ordinated 5.73 5.52 5.45 5.41 5.27 
talkative/uncommunicative 4.16 4.08 3.46 4.03 3.78+ 
secure/insecure 4.33 4.47 4.37 5.02 4.57+ 
quiet/noisy 4.58 4.44 5.00 4.83 4.45+ 
friendly/unfriendly 2.48 2.37 2.34 2.66 2.20 
healthy/unhealthy 4.33 4.02 3.71 3.92 3.47+ 
valuable/worthless 3.45 3.11 3.46 3.66 3.35 
relaxing/upsetting to be with 4.95 4.63 4.76 5.04 4.48 
loving/cold 2.39 2.33 2.40 2.55 2.20 
under-estimated/over-estimated 2.80 3.29 3.05 3.03 3.28 
good-looking/ugly 4.81 4.49 4.47 4.47 4.27+ 
speech clear/speech unclear 5.49 5.18 5.26 5.27 5.20 
independent/dependent 5.71 5.50 5.44 5.37 5.23 
contented/frustrated 4.83 4.46 4.45 4.81 4.18 
active/passive 3.56 3.58 3.32 3.54 3.35 
able to cope/unable to cope 5.11 4.83 4.72 4.85 4.57 
good/bad at concentrating 5.14 5.20 5.42 5.27 4.95 
not lonely/lonely 4.51 4.42 4.26 4.69 4.15 
even-tempered/moody 4.85 4.65 5.06 5.13 4.52 
easy/difficult to relate to 4.96 4.47 4.79 4.95 4.60 
family's pride/family's shame 4.79 4.54 4.21 4.23 3.53* 
employable/unemployable 4.12 4.02 3.82 3.91 3.93 
predictable/unpredictable behaviour 4.74 4.63 5.09 5.26 4.93+ 
self-content/wants to be different 4.04 3.82 3.40 3.96 3.57+ 
well-dressed/badly-dressed 4.44 4.09 4.04 4.15 3.32* 
mature/childlike 5.48 5.63 5.78 5.43 5.57 
resistant to illness/frequently ill 4.61 4.43 4.40 4.20 4.45 
quick/slow 5.54 5.22 5.39 5.14 5.18 
over-protected/under-protected 3.37 3.09 3.38 3.21 3.10 
misunderstood/understood 2.65 3.08 2.76 2.67 3.03 
soothing/embarrassing 4.98 4.76 4.71 4.73 4.75 
strong/weak 4.00 3.71 3.26 3.05 3.18* 
good/bad at expressing meaning 5.26 5.09 4.92 4.88 4.93 
happy/sad 3.68 3.45 3.19 3.47 3.03 
attractive/unattractive friend 4.69 4.22 4.62 4.57 4.05+ 
extrovert/introvert 3.94 3.96 3.96 4.08 3.88 
will find a job easily/will not 6.39 6.31 6.19 6.22 6.02 
normal/abnormal 5.35 4.86 5.18 4.95 4.88 
clean/dirty 3.86 3.64 3.28 3.58 3.05* 
reassuring/frightening 4.56 4.52 4.49 4.62 4.35 
d'ment shaped by environment/birth 4.26 3.94 4.20 4.28 4.45 
unlike/(like other retardates) 4.12 4.21 4.18 4.34 4.55 
asset to society/burden to society 4.57 4.32 4.87 4.57 4.50 
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confident/hesitant 4.66 4.69 4.71 5.00 4.93* 
high intelligence/low intelligence 5.36 5.14 4.97 4.69 5.18 
sexually restrained/permissive 3.81 3.92 3.76 3.55 3.70 
sensitive/insensitive to others 3.53 3.21 3.42 3.14 2.82* 
calm/excitable 5.32 5.29 5.75 5.93 5.48 
high self-esteem/low self-esteem 4.69 4.44 4.45 4.41 4.20 
lovable/repulsive 3.76 3.24 3.50 3.52 3.13+ 
cheering/depressing 4.54 3.86 4.35 4.44 3.88 
clear thinker/confused thinker 5.30 5.29 5.25 5.26 5.27 
rich/poor family background 4.30 4.12 4.04 4.06 4.07 
knowing/not knowing right from wrong 4.16 4.06 4.19 4.39 3.85 
complicated/simple 4.38 4.15 4.29 4.25 4.40 
not aggressive/aggressive 4.12 4.08 4.25 4.80 4.25* 
good at concentrating/(distractible) 5.34 5.49 5.61 5.70 5.63 
nice/nasty 3.42 3.31 3.46 3.65 3.18 
always careful/accident prone 5.26 5.17 5.19 5.33 4.80 
wanted/unwanted 4.86 4.43 4.11 4.26 3.60* 
tough/vulnerable 5.46 5.30 5.18 5.06 5.25 
wide/limited general knowledge 5.60 5.72 5.60 5.67 5.82 
acceptable/unacceptable neighbour 3.61 3.54 3.47 3.85 3.40 
well treated/hard done by 4.59 4.43 3.60 4.07 3.35* 
tidy/untidy 4.55 4.29 4.50 4.40 3.75 
socially skilled/socially inept 5.50 5.27 5.37 5.19 5.10 
normal/unusual appearance 4.98 4.67 4.63 4.67 4.73 
wanting to join in/preferring (not) 2.94 3.10 3.21 3.07 3.13 
stable/neurotic 4.28 4.19 4.39 4.68 4.40 
trustworthy/deceitful 3.23 3.34 3.31 3.41 2.88 
fine/coarse facial features 4.88 4.72 4.58 4.74 4.40 
controlled by self/others or rate 5.01 5.21 5.20 5.42 5.25 
popular/friendless 4.54 4.20 3.96 4.04 3.95* 
safe/dangerous 3.50 3.46 3.62 3.83 3.35 
tonic/strain for family 5.76 5.48 5.55 5.71 5.63 
nice/nasty to live with 4.16 "3.80 4.02 4.10 3.85 
unpredictable/predictable personality 3.63 3.71 3.31 3.28 3.47 
capable/helpless 4.95 4.42 4.09 4.53 4.27* 
helpful/unhelpful 3.50 3.29 3.11 3.29 3.57 
undemanding/demanding 5.43 5.29 5.53 5.70, 5.52 
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7.4. DISCUSSION 
Table 2.1 gives mean semantic differential scores for lay 
subjects according to their personal acquaintance with 
retardates. Since scoring was arranged so that a mean <4 
and >4 are positive and negative, respectively, it can be 
seen that retardätes received 47 and 59/81 negative ratings 
from acquainted and unacquainted lay subjects, respectively, 
(p a N. S. and <. 0001, Sign Test), which means that the 
acquainted group is evaluatively neutral. Thus, as 
predicted, beliefs of acquainted subjects are positive 
compared with those of the unacquainted group and, contrary 
to what Gottlieb and Gottlieb (1977) call the "major point 
of agreement", concepts held by Bristolian laymen in 1980 
are not overwhelmingly negative. While it is possible that 
attitudes on this side of the Atlantic are more positive, it 
is more in keeping with the present framework to hypothesise 
that this is a result of current integrative policies and 
sympathetic publicity. Alternatively, evaluations typically 
reported in the literature might be misleadingly low, since 
items seem to be selected because they distinguish 
retardates negatively. For example, Butt and Signori 
(1976) it will be remembered, gathered traits shown to be 
important in hiring situations in which discrimination was 
shown, then found retardates most handicapped on rated 
ability. Similarly, Kennon and Sandoval (1978) and many 
others, reveal particularly negative attitudes on dimensions 
related to academic skills. The present items, on the other 
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hand, were chosen empirically for their relevance to 
retardates and perhaps reflect overall evaluation more 
accurately, in including the diluting effect of positive 
evaluations that emerge when the whole spectrum of relevant 
beliefs is examined. Indeed, some studies might be trivial, 
since it seems self-evident that retardates will receive 
negative evaluations on scales relating to intelligence. 
This idea suggests an interesting series of experiments for 
future research, in which extremely positive or negative 
outcomes would be predicted according to the choice of 
questionnaire scales. Taken a stage further, it also 
contributes to an explanation of why beliefs and behaviours 
might not co-incide, since negative (ability) or positive 
(personal) attributions, for example, might not be relevant 
to social rejection or acceptance. 
It should however, be mentioned that many subjects repeated 
instructions aloud to check they had grassed them correctly, 
and in doing so, frequently translated "retardates" into 
"retarded children", (in which case they were reminded that 
the label was unqualified). Since Gottlieb and Siperstein, 
(1976) found "retarded children" more favourably evaluated 
than "retardates", this mistranslation, if general, might 
artefactually account for the relatively positive opinions. 
Third, Sigall, Aronson and Van Hoose (1970) demonstrated 
that subjects strive to present themselves in the best 
possible light, contrary to Orne's (1962) famous maxim that 
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they co-operate with experimenters. It is therefore 
possible that attempts to appear warm and sympathetic 
produced artefactually positive ratings, although anonymity 
and privacy during testing makes this unlikely. 
Table 2.1 shows that on 71/81 scales, acquainted subjects 
had the smaller score, (p <. 0001, Sign Test), which 
indicates directly that they had the more positive opinion, 
overall. In the negative direction they rated ratardates 
marginally more "dependent" (item 14), "under-protected" 
(item 30) and "controlled by others or Fate" (item 73) but 
commonsense suggests these are unlikely simply to reflect 
evaluation. Rather, they seem also to concern caregiving. 
Taken together, lay subjects rated retardates somewhat 
sexually restrained, which contrasts intuitively with 
results that might have been found nearer the beginning of 
the century, when concern at the moral and financial burdens 
imposed by the sexual proclivities of the feebleminded was 
widespread. Interestingly, present acquainted lay subjects 
rated retardates significantly less "sexually restrained", 
(item 47), which might be the result of practical experience 
or simply indicative that the dimension is less relevant for 
them. 
Also in the negative direction, acquainted subjects rated 
retardates marginally less "misunderstood" (item 31) with 
less "unpredictable personality" (item 78), which makes 
perfect sense in terms of their greater experience, and 
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which is-unlikely to reflect negative evaluation per se. 
Finally, their beliefs were slightly more intense on 
"excitable " (item 49), "abnormal" (item 39) "confused 
thinker" (item 53) and "low intelligence" (item 46), which 
at first sight, seem to suggest they find retardates "worse" 
on 4 salient dimensions. Alternatively, it could reflect a 
greater concern with their problems, or from another angle, 
it is consistent with the. hypothesis that abnormality per se 
is of little relevance to the unacquainted layman. 
On each of the remaining 71 scales, acquainted subjects gave 
more positive ratings, and one factor ANOVA revealed a 
significant difference on 42 of these, (which are marked 
with a cross (p <. 05) or asterisk (p<. 0l) on Table 2.1). 
Some instances where the direction of beliefs differed, 
stand out because they seem to relate most clearly to 
caregiving and personal acceptance. For example, 
unacquainted subjects rated retardates "nasty to live with" 
(item 77), "depressing" (item 52) "friendless" (item 74), 
"unwanted" (fitem ; 61) and "hard done by" (item 65) whereas 
acquainted subjects rated them "nice to live with", 
"cheering", "popular", "wanted" and "well treated". 
Other significant differences are too numerous to detail 
individually, but reference to Table 2.1 shows the 
acquainted group consider retardates more "trusting" (item 
1), "loving" (item 10), "sensitive to others" (item 48), 
"lovable " (item 51), "nice" (item 59), "wanting to join in" 
(item 69), "safe" (item 75) and "helpful" (item 80), again 
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suggesting greater acceptance and social interaction. On 
the other side of the coin, unacquainted subjects found them 
significantly more "upsetting to be with" (item 9), "ugly" 
(item 12), "lonely" (item 19), "difficult to relate to" 
(item 21), "unattractive friend" (item 36) and attributed 
them a more "unusual appearance" (item 68), and "coarse 
facial features", (item 72), showing, as hypothesised, 
consistently greater emphasis on characteristics relating to 
bizarre appearance and social rejection. Interestingly, 
"friendly/unfriendly" (item 6), although in the same 
direction, failed to distinguish significantly between 
groups, and perhaps the difference in significance between 
this and "loving/cold" (item 10) reflects greater 
involvement and intimacy among the acquainted group. 
Finally, unacquainted subjects rated retardates "like others 
in the same social group" (item 43), while the acquainted 
group rated them "not at all like others in the same social 
group", (p < . 0001). This is of special theoretical 
interest, because for reasons tobe unfolded in the next 
chapter, it might indicate that the former are more inclined 
to stereotype. Alternatively, it is. possible that 
acquainted subjects were basing responses on comparisons 
between real individuals, not abstract beliefs. 
In summary, the first hypothesis is strongly supported: lay 
subjects with contact have significantly different and more 
positive beliefs to those without. Furthermore, they 
emphasise caregiving and acceptance while those without 
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contact emphasise deviant appearance and rejection. 
(Although, in fairness, differences were so extensive that 
these aspects did not stand out specifically. ) 
Related to the discussion of the previous section (and to 
anticipate, the results of Study 4) these consistent 
differences are not hypothesised to indicate that acquainted 
subjects are kinder on average, or enlightened by 
experience, but that they are members of a different social 
system. 
In this light, Table 2.1 summarises the retardate role and 
defines retardation within acquainted and unacquainted 
social systems. A number of means, however, hover round 4 
which means they are irrelevant to subjects as a group. 
Futhermore, some scales show marked variability, and since 
the retardate role is viewed as shared normative structures 
rather than an average of individual beliefs, they are 
unlikely to be role characteristics. From this position, it 
is reasonable to adopt mean semantic differential scores <3 
and >5 as measures of relevance and intensity together with 
standard deviation <1.45 as a measure of consensus, in order 
operationally to define retardate roles. 
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upsetting to be with 
loving 
speech unclear or impeded 
childlike 
slow 






limited general knowledge 
socially inept 






speech unclear or impeded 
childlike 




limited general knowledge 
socially inept 
controlled by others or Fate 
strain for family 
Results further support the hypothesis that the retardate 
role for uninvolved laymen is evaluatively negative and 
focusses on characteristics that are important for social 
interacton. Because of "upsetting to be with" and 
"demanding", it seems tinged with self interest -a concern 
with the embarrassment or effort social interaction might 
involve. Notably, practical aspects relating to confused 
thought and limited general knowledge appear, but references 
to abnormality and intelligence per se are missing, which it 
goes without saying, is not taken to mean that the lay 
public misunderstand the term. it is also worth pointing 
out that on 71/81 scales, variance is smaller for 
unacquainted subjects, which although possibly an artefact 
of the uneven sample sizes, probably means the retardate 
role is, firmly defined for them. 
.f 
- -. 107 
A 
Although the retardate role within the social system of 
personally acquainted subjects is similar, the few 
differences are interesting. Gone are "upsetting to be 
with" (item 9) and "demanding" (item 81) and with them, the 
element of self-interest, so that the remaining negative 
characteristics seem more an objective account of the 
problems retardates pose. Second, "slow" (item 29), "easily 
distracted" (item 58) and "accident prone" (item 60) are 
missing and third, an addition, "controlled by others or 
Fate" (item 73) seems both to reflect the responsiblity of 
caregiving and an awareness of retardates' lack of personal 
freedom. Finally, the item relating to difficulty in 
finding a job almost certainly reflects general current 
interests. 
So far, only the unidimensional aspect of data has been 
exploited, and scales have been treated as separate and 
independent, despite the hint that they might have different 
qualitative meanings according to their relationships with 
underlying dimensions. In order to examine possible 
multi-dimensional differences, data were factor analysed, 
but unlike Gottlieb and Corman (1975) who performed a 
single analysis, then looked for differences along factor 
scores, separate analyses for acquainted and unacquainted 
subjects were preferred, in order to avoid assuming the 
existence of a single shared factor structure. Results are 
given below, but for clarity, only items loading >. 4 have 
been included and scales have been identified by the 
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relevant pole only. In the few cases where a mean differed 
in direction from the others in a factor, this was 
problematic. For example, all subjects agreed that 
retardates are "lovable" not "repulsive", however, in Factor 
1 for unacquainted subjects, the former is unacceptable, 
because it is "repulsive" not "lovable" that increases in 
intensity with the other items, but this is also 
inappropriate, because it misrepresents beliefs. In order 
to cope with such situations, a convention, "(-lovable)" 
will be adopted. 
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TABLE .i2. la 
Multidimensional meaning of 'retardates' for lay subjects 
Unacquainted Acquainted 
FACTOR 1(17.2% variance) FACTOR 1(17.0% variance) 
embarrassing . 64 socially inept . 
69 
frightening . 62 bad at concentrating . 
66 
depressing . 61 childlike . 
65 
upsetting to be with . 58 limited general knowledge . 
60 
(-lovable ) . 58 easily distracted . 
54 
unattractive friend . 55 slow . 
53 
ugly . 52 burden to society . 
51 
(-valuable ) . 45 low intelligence . 
49 
burden to society . 45 unable to cope . 
49 
family's shame . 44 abnormal . 
45 
difficult to relate to . 43 will have trouble finding 
a job . 44 
unusual appearance . 42 helpless . 
42 
confused thinker . 40 
FACTOR 2(5.8% variance) FACTOR 2(6.8% variance) 
bad at concentrating . 69 trustworthy . 
75 
slow . 60 sensitive to others . 
63 
limited general knowledge . 60 nice to live with . 
62 
bad at expressing meaning nice . 57 
or desires . 57 
easily distracted . 56 safe . 
55 
abnormal . 52 (-frightening) . 
54 
low intelligence . 49 helpful . 
52 
confused thinker . 49 clean . 
48 
childlike . 45 popular . 
48 
socially inept . 44 (-aggressive) . 
46 
burden to society . 43 sexually restrained . 
45 
accident prone . 42 lovable . 
45 
FACTOR 3(3.8% variance) FACTOR 3(5.1% variance) 
coarse facial features . 52 wanted . 
controlled controlled by others or strong . 66 
Fate . 50 
unusual appearance . 46 well treated . 
58 
unwanted . 46 misunderstood . 
55 
not knowing right from (-family's shame) . 54 
wrong . 43 
socially inept . 42' well-dressed . 
neurotic neurotic . 41 (-unusual appearance) . 
44 
FACTOR 4(3.6% variance) FACTOR 4(4.5% variance) 
dependent . 56 upsetting 
to be with . 74 
unable to cope . 55 embarrassing . 
67 
lonely . 44 (-valuable 
) . 61 
ugly . 44 (-cheering) . 
59 
vulnerable . 43 unattractive 
friend . 59 
untidy . 41 family's shame . 
46 
(-lovable ) . 43 
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0 
FACTOR 5(3.0% variance) 
loving 
. 66 friendly 
. 64 trusting 
. 60 nice . 42 
FACTOR 6(2.7% variance) 
low self-esteem . 65 insecure 
. 50 frustrated 
. 49 hesitant 
. 48 introvert 
. 46 lonely . 45 happy . 42 (-self -content) . 42 
FACTOR 7(2.4% variance) 
aggressive . 64 noisy . 60 strong -. 59 
(-safe) 
. 45 
excitable . 45 
FACTOR 8(2.3% variance) 
sensitive to others . 61 
wanting to join in . 55 helpful 
. 50 
speech unclear or impeded -. 43 
FACTOR 9(2.1% variance) 




like others in the same 
social group 
clean 
FACTOR 10(2.0% variance) 
FACTOR 5(3.6% variance) 
excitable . 75 
noisy . 64 
accident prone . 55 
active -. 50 
moody . 49 
unpredictable behaviour . 40 
FACTOR 6(3.1% variance) 
happy . 66 (-frustrated) . 61 (-lonely) . 57 healthy . 51 talkative . 50 
(-frequently ill) . 50 
(-aggressive) . 46 
self content . 49 
(-moody) . 41 
FACTOR 7(3.0% variance) 
ugly . 69 
(-employable ) . 65 
coarse facial features . 62 
untidy . 42 
FACTOR 8(2.8% variance) 
trusting . 69 
acceptable neighbour -. 49 
development determined 
by birth -. 49 
(-insecure) . 44 
(-poor family background) '"44 
friendly . 44 
loving . 40 
FACTOR 9(2.4% variance) 
. 60 unlike others in 
the same 
social group . 68 
(-simple) . 54 
-. 57 
. 51 (-abnormal) . 
43 
unpredictable personality '' i 
-. 47 
. 43 (-low intelligence) . 
41 
misunderstood . 53 (-simple) 
. 44 
clean . 40 
FACTOR 11(2.0% variance) 
unpredictable personality -. 55 
(-frequently ill) . 51 trustworthy . 42 
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FACTOR 10(2.3% variance) 
hesitant . 71 
low self-esteem . 60 
(-extrovert) . 50 
FACTOR 11(2.2% variance) 
strain for family . 73 helpless '. 42 
I 
FACTOR 12 (2.1% variance) 
dependent . 68 
FACTOR 13(2.0% variance) 
under-protected -. 55 
bad at expressing meaning 
or desires . 42 
FACTOR 14(2.0% variance) 
neurotic . 48 
Factor 1, which accounts for almost a fifth of overall 
variance, offers the clearest evidence that beliefs of 
unacquainted lay subjects primarily concern difficulties and 
embarrassments posed by social interactions, together with 
an interest in deviant appearance. 
For acquainted subjects, Factor 1 is entirely different. 
Indeed, only one item is common to both, which confirms that 
factor structure, differs between the groups. Its content, 
however, is surprising at first: although social 
incompetence carries most weight, low intelligence and 
abnormality are included, suggesting a clinical orientation. 
This might mean that personal acquaintance leads to contact 
with professionals and services that influences beliefs. 
Factor 1 also refers to coping, job prospects and so on, 
which seem to shift the emphasis a little from 
intra-organismic pathology and suggest a concern with care 
and support, (an interpretation, that supports the previous 
argument that marginally more negative scores on "abnormal", 
"low intelligence" and "confused thinker" on the part of 
acquainted subjects, might reflect concern, not evaluation. ) 
In this way, a more realistic perspective is given to the 
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present approach: the prediction that acquainted subjects 
would show a primary concern with caregiving and would be 
more accepting, coupled with their comparatively positive 
evaluations, made it easy to assume they would show a 
sentimental interest in love and friendliness, together with 
a belief that caregiving is pleasant and trouble free. 
Factor 1, however, suggests that their primary concern is an 
assessment of the burden that has to be shouldered. 
Factor 2 (for acquainted subjects), on the other hand, 
reflects a human interest in personality characteristics, 
which is positive in tone and reminiscent of Gottlieb and 
Corman's (1975) positive stereotype. 
In contrast, Factor 2 tor the unacquainted group focusses 
squarely on subnormal intelligence, particularly its 
manifestations in thought and knowledge, together with 
social incompetence and abnormality and theretore, it 
resembles the medical perspective. Interestingly, its 
presence and secondary position offer empirical support for 
the earlier argument that the uninvolved layman's 
definitions in terms of social characteristics reflect his 
primary interests, not a misconception of the term. 
Although it concerns appearance, Factor 3 for unacquainted 
lay subjects does not seem to represent a meaningful 
dimension. Factor 4 focusses on dependency, but is coloured 
by "ugly" and "lonely" which suggest it is an unwelcome 
burden. 
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Factor 3 for acquainted subjects is also difficult to label, 
but clearly it concerns acceptance, understanding and 
caregiving. Interestingly, the loading on "misunderstood" 
is reversed, which shows that, in this context, it is 
negatively valued. Factor 4 is interesting because it 
overlaps with Factor 1 for the unacquainted group, in 
dealing with the social encumbrance of being with a retarded 
person. Again, this adds a realistic touch by suggesting 
that acquainted subjects are not impervious to the 
difficuties of interacting with retardates and the responses 
of others, but clearly, this is a fourth, not a first 
concern, and, the absence of scales relating to appearance 
and fear suggests interaction is not shunned by them. 
A number of fairly clear traits follow: Factor 5 for 
unacquainted subjects is reminiscent of the positive 
stereotype, but somehow, its subsidiary position and small 
number of scales make it seem niggardly, and intuitively, it 
seems patronisingly to list a few "obligatory traits". Low 
self-esteem probably best describes Factor 6, whereas Factor 
7 in which the loading of "strong" is reversed, might be 
described as "threateningness". 
Factor 5 for acquainted subjects, on the other hand, clearly 
describes a boisterous dimension in which the loading on 
"active" is similarly reversed, indicating that it is 
negatively valued in this context, where it contributes to 
the chaos. Factor 6 which is difficult to label, concerns 
emotional and physical well-being. 
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Factor 7 is interesting: it centres on appearance, but this 
is related to employability, which changes the focus from 
self-interested anxiousness about social interaction, to 
genuine concern. 
Factor 8 for unacquainted lay subjects seems to represent a 
belief that retardates desire human contact, but a negative 
loading on "speech unclear" suggests this is dogged by 
impeded speech. Intuitively therefore, the factor seems to 
carry built-in social rejection. 
Finally, Factors 9,10 and 11 for the unacquainted group, 
which account for little variance, defy simple labels. The 
former seems to conceptualise retardates as at the mercy of 
others, while the presence of "clean" makes Factor 10 
puzzling. Finally, Factor 11 shows that unpredictability of 
personality is negatively valued when linked with 
trustworthiness. 
Six factors yet remain for the acquainted group: Factor 8 
is unclear because positive personal traits covary with 
unacceptability as a neighbour. Factor 9 seems to represent 
the opposite of depersonalisation, while the remainder cover 
self-esteem, the burden imposed on retardates' families, 
dependency, under-protection and neuroticism, respectively. 
To summarise, factor analytic results are consistent with 
predictions in two ways. They demonstrate that acquainted 
and unacquainted subjects' beliefs about retardates differ 
in structure and content and that the latter primarily focus 
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point of view, and the former, though less clearly, on 
acceptance and caregiving. 
At this point it is worth pausing to raise two general 
issues. The first concerns a distinction between roles - 
prescriptive expectations about the behaviour of people 
holding particular positions in society - and stereotypes. 
Guskin (1963) remarks on their similarity, but attempts 
several distinctions. Stereotypes, he suggests, are sets of 
associations about groups of people. For present purposes, 
however, this is not helpful, since many groups, like 
doctors or retardates are associated with positions in 
society. 
Second, he continues, stereotypes usually focus on traits 
and roles, on behaviour. For present purposes, this too is 
of limited use, because traits and behaviours can shade into 
each other - "wanting to join in" - for example, could be 
either. Third, Guskin remarks that a high degree of 
consensus is frequently held to be an essential property of 
stereotypes, but because of the shared aspect of normative 
expectations, this once more fails to provide a distinction. 
Finally, Guskin lists unfavourableness, inaccuracy and 
distortive power as appertaining to stereotypes and these, I 
think, hold the key to a more useful distinction. The 
latter terms are active and suggest that stereotyping 
concerns the effect of role expectations on the perception of. 
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individuals. Such pgrceptual effects form the topic of the 
next chapter: for present purposes, it is sufficient to 
point out that the difference between role and stereotype 
seems one of emphasis and application. Thus, retardate 
"role" and "stereotype" are regarded as essentially the 
same. 
The second general issue concerns stigma, which Goffman 
(1963) defines as the difference between real and virtual 
characteristics of a stigmatised group. It should be clear 
by now that the "real" characteristics of retardates might 
represent an ideal form in Plato's terminology, but here, 
and most probably in Mercer's view, they are "nonsense", in 
that all characteristics are virtual, that is, believed 
real. In other words, there is no absolute truth against 
which stigma may be measured, and establishing a criterion 
is largely a matter of deciding which normative structures 
to "back". In this light, it seems reasonable to 
operationalise stigma as the negative difference between 
beliefs of unacquainted and acquainted subjects. However, 
this raises an anomaly which introduces the first subsidiary 
analysis. Most researchers seem implicitly to regard 
beliefs of professionals as "real", but it seems likely that 
influences of medical and statistical models may make these 
as negative - or more so - as those of lay people. Thus, 
some revision of the conceptual and empirical nature of 
stigma seems needed. 
Table 2.2 gives mean semantic differential scores for 28 
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psychologists who were acquainted with retarded people, and 
23 who were not. Before examining results, however, it is 
sensible to point out that the designation, "psychologist", 
might be premature since most subjects were recruited at a 
post-graduate conference. Moreover, specialist interests 
straddled animal behaviour, neurophysiology and computer 
intelligence, to name but a few areas. Thus many subjects 
might have been equivalent to laymen in having no direct 
professional interest in subnormality. 
Inspection of Table 2.2 shows that the overall effect of 
contact on psychologists' beliefs has sunk to chance level, 
those personally acquainted giving the most positive opinion 
on 43/81 items. In keeping with this picture, ANOVA was 
significant on only four scales. Those with contact 
believed retardates to be significantly more "noisy" (item 
5, p= . 01) and "excitable " (item 49, p= . 02). In 
addition, they believed them "complicated" with 
"unpredictable personality" while psychologists without 
contact rated them "simple" and "predictable " (item 56, p= 
. 04; item 78, p= . 002). 
The keen eye notes again, that variance is smaller among 
psychologists without contact on 61/81 variables, and 
although differences in sample size might again account for 
this, the proportions are reversed compared with the lay 
sample, (that is, slightly more psychologists had personal 
contact), so divergent sample size is unlikely to serve as 
reason in both cases. Rather, it appears that acquaintance 
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is associated with less firm expectancies, perhaps because 
personal experience as well as normative beliefs are 
expressed. Despite this, since contact had no overall 
effect on evaluation or the intensity of beliefs, results 
are nevertheless taken as supporting the hypothesis that 
contact leaves psychologists' beliefs essentially unchanged. 
Therefore, although further research is clearly needed, 
psychologists will be regarded as a single group. 
Examination of Table 2.2 shows that they evaluated 
retardates negatively on 60/81 scales, (p <. 0001), which 
makes their opinion marginally more negative than that of 
unacquainted lay people. Within the present social 
approach, needless to say, this is not taken to mean that 
psychologists are unsympathetic people, but that their 
beliefs reflect the negative evaluations intrinsic to 
statistical and medical perspectives. Indeed, the tact that 
the majority was personally acquainted with a retardate 
makes this all the more striking and clearly, "stigma" if 
defined as the difference between psychologists' and lay 
beliefs, would lose its usual meaning. 
For psychologists, the retardate role may again be 
operationally defined by identifying scales on which beliefs 
were most intense and consensual, although'because agreement 
was generally high, the latter criterion has been made 
stricter (s. d. < 1.35) in order to select a manageable 
number of scales. 
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limited general knowledge 
socially inept 
wanting to join in 
strain for family 
helpless 
demanding 
Even with stricter criteria and a higher proportion of 
acquainted subjects, more scales seem salient for 
psychologists, which suggests they have more expectations 
about retardates. Beliefs seem objective, since "upsetting 
to be with" (item 9) which gave the beliefs of unacquainted 
lay subjects a self-interested flavour, and "controlled by 
others or Fate" (item 73) which seemed to tinge those of 
acquainted lay subjects with an air of concern, are not 
present. In contrast, "dependent" (item 14), "unable to 
cope" (item 17), and "helpless" (item 79) together with 
"understood" (item 31) seem conveyors of a professionalised 
attitude that retardates are patients, not people which is 
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consistent with the hypothesis that normative beliefs can be 
related to the interests and purposes of social systems. 
To move to the second subsidiary analysis, Table 2.3 gives 
mean semantic differential scores for 22 teachers who were, 
and 18 who were not personally acquainted with a retardate. 
Apart from the very small numbers, the sample, it is 
important to note, was somewhat "contaminated", in that it 
contains at least two special teachers, who merely gave 
their occupation as "teacher", but who later happened to 
mention that they, in fact, taught retardates, by which 
time, their anonymous questionnaires had been pooled with 
others, and could not be identified. Clearly, it is a worry 
that other teachers were similarly unspecific, but since, 
their beliefs are of secondary interest within the present 
study, this aspect is simply regarded as an informal pilot. 
Examination of Table 2.3 shows that acquainted teachers were 
ambivalent in their overall evaluation of retardates, while 
their unacquainted peers were categorically negative, 
(41/81, NS; 61/81, p<. 0001). 
In more detail, unacquainted teachers evaluated retardates 
less positively on only 10/81 items, none of which was 
significant. They rated them marginally more 
"unco-ordinated" (item 2), "will have trouble finding a job" 
(item 38), "excitable " (item 49), "accident prone" (item 
60), and a greater "strain for family" (item 77). In 
addition, they rated them less "under-estimated" (item 11), 
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"misunderstood" (item 31), "unpredictable personality" (item 
78), "complicated" (item 56) and "nice" (item 76). Clearly 
these items are unlikely directly to reflect evaluation per 
se, but may simply reflect greater experience. 
On the remaining 71/81 items, personally acquainted teachers 
gave the more positive response, (p = <. 0001, Sign Test). 
According to one factor ANOVA, intensity of beliefs differed 
significantly on 17 variables: teachers with contact rated 
retardates more "secure" (item 4), "friendly" (item 6), 
"loving" (item 10), "lovable" (item 51), "wanting to join 
in" (item 69) and "trustworthy" (item 71). In addition, 
they rated them less "family's shame" (item 22), 
"embarrassing" (item 32) and "frightening" (item 41) with 
less "coarse facial features" (item 72). Finally, 
acquainted teachers believed retardates "valuable" (item 8), 
"healthy" (item 7), "relaxing to be with" (item 9), 
"self-content" (item 25), an "asset to society" (item 44), 
"safe" (item 75) and "nice to live with" (item 77) while the 
unacquainted group rated them "insecure", "unhealthy", 
"upsetting to be with", "would like to be different" "burden 
to society", "dangerous", and "nasty to live with", 
respectively. 
These consistent differences again suggest that acquainted 
and unacquainted teachers should be treated as separate 
social groups, and, applying the stricter criteria, (mean 
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0.0 or >5.0; s. d. <1.35), roles within each may be 
operationally defined. 
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The items unacquainted teachers do not share with their 
acquainted peers, centre very much on abnormalities, 
difficulties of caregiving and the embarrassments of social 
interactions. More striking are the few held by acquainted 
teachers that do not overlap with the unacquainted group. 
Clearly these include positive personal characteristics 
together with "excitable" (item 49), "demanding" (item 81) 
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and "strain for family" (item 76), which in contrast to 
"family's shame" (item 22) and "burden" (item 44), seem to 
represent retardates as challenging, exhausting individuals 
rather than shameful millstones. 
In summary, the beliefs teachers of normal children have 
about retardates seem similar to those held by lay people, a 
result predicted by the present paradigm in which there is 
little reason to assume 'ordinary' teachers represent a body 
with special interests in subnormality. Thus, personal 
contact was expected and found to be associated with a 
marked increase in positive evaluation, together with an 
interest in caregiving and social acceptance. Beliefs held 
by teachers of retarded children, on the other hand, are 
hypothesised to be unaffected by personal contact, because, 
as it did with psychologists, contact is expected to 
represent professional experience for them. *However, since 
special teachers by definition have had contact with 
retardates, this could not be tested in the present between 
subject design, and must await a future opportunity. 
To recap, individual analyses of contact within lay and 
professional groups firmly support predictions. Lay 
subjects and teachers showed an interest in social 
interaction rather than abnormality and intelligence, and 
personal contact was associated with marked increases in 
positive evaluation together with an emphasis on personal 
acceptance. 'Indeed, differences were so robust, that they 
suggested subjects with and without acquaintance should be 
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treated as members of different social systems. Beliefs of 
psychologists, in contrast, were essentially unchanged by 
contact and as a group, they evinced a negative overall 
opinion together with an interest in abnormality and 
pathology. 
In order to elaborate these findings further, lay subjects, 
psychologists and teachers were directly compared by two 
factor ANOVA (with 3 levels on the first, occupation, and 2 
on the second, contact), in order to examine main effects of 
occupation and occupation x contact interactions. However, 
because of the divergent sample sizes, the relatively small 
numbers of teachers and psychologists together with some 
reservations concerning the "purity" of samples, these 
comparisons should only be taken as preliminary. 
Table 2.4 gives mean semantic differential scores for each 
occupational group, and shows that psychologists gave the 
most negative evaluations overall, while there was little to 
choose between teachers and lay people, (p 55: 9: 17 a <. 001, 
chi square). (Conversely, the figures for the most positive 
evaluations were 16: 37: 28, although these are less 
impressive because of the relatively high proportion of 
acquaintance among teachers compared with lay subjects). 
ANOVA yielded 24 significant main effects for occupation, 
and when this occurred, t tests were used to pinpoint the 
difference. 
Psychologists rated retardates "unhealthy" (item 7) and 
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"weak" (item 33) while lay people and teachers rated them 
"healthy" and "strong". Similarly, psychologists' beliefs 
were significantly more intense on "low intelligence" (item 
46), "unable to cope" (item 17), "frequently ill" (item 28), 
"slow" (item 29), "bad at expressing meaning and desires" 
(item 34) and "helpless" (item 79), and in each case, at 
test showed a significant difference between them and lay 
subjects, but no difference between lay subjects and. 
teachers. These stand out in particular because 
psychologists seem to emphasise intelligence per se and 
pathology, together with a professionalised attitude that 
retardates are passive patients, not people. 
Several more variables followed the same pattern: 
psychologists rated retardates greater "family's shame" 
(item 22), and gave more intense ratings on "unattractive 
friend" (item 36) and "will have trouble finding a job" 
(item 38). Similarly, they rated them "dirty" (item 40), 
and were neutral on "insensitive to others" (item 48), 
whereas lay subjects and teachers rated them "clean" and 
"sensitive to others". In addition, psychologists 
attributed retardates more "low self-esteem" (item 50) and 
categorically believed them "friendless" (item 74) and 
"unwanted" (item 61) while means for teachers and lay 
subjects hovered around neutral. The latter was qualified 
by a significant interaction, contact being associated with 
more positive views for teachers and lay subjects, but more 
negative views for psychologists, but since none of these 
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variables seems directly relevant to the interests and 
purposes of psychologists, it is hypothesised that they 
represent a negative "halo effect" of statistical and 
medical models. 
Finally, psychologists believed retardates have "poor family 
background" (item 54) while teachers and lay subjects were 
ambivalent, a result which adds some internal validity, 
since it seems reasonable to assume that psychologists 
should be more aware of this statistic. 
This leaves 11 significant differences which did not follow 
quite the same pattern: psychologists rated retardates most 
"hard done by" (item 65) and teachers agreed, while lay 
subjects believed them marginally "well treated". T tests 
confirmed that the former groups differed from lay subjects 
but not each other, but the finding is qualified by an 
interaction in which contact was associated with more 
positive opinions for teachers and lay subjects and more 
negative opinions for psychologists, which intuitively 
supports the hypothesis that contact represents "experience" 
for psychologists, since it is as if acquainted 
psychologists are thinking of institutions, for example, and 
acquainted lay subjects and teachers of more homely care. 
Psychologists rated retardates most "ugly" (item 12) with 
most "unusual appearance" (item 68), but in both cases, t 
showed they differed from teachers, not lay subjects, which 
is consistent with the lay emphasis on bizarre appearance, 
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but which warns that teachers and lay subjects may not be 
entirely equivalent. 
The three significant differences where psychologists did 
not give the most negative evaluation, are interesting. 
Teachers rated retardates lowest on "bad at concentrating" 
(item 18), which seems relevant to their profession, in 
contrast to "low intelligence" per se (item 46) which seems 
more to represent a symptom and hence to "belong" to the 
psychologists. "Difficult to relate to" (item 21) followed 
the same pattern, but perhaps this has a different 
connotation for teachers and refers to classroom behaviour. 
Finally, lay subjects rated retardates more "moody" (item 
20) and "excitable" (item 49) which fits with the hypothesis 
that they are most concerned with deviant behaviour. (In 
the former case they differed only from teachers and in the 
latter, from both teachers and psychologists. ) 
Apart from the two instances already described, no main 
occupation effects were qualified by interactions. However, 
there were 6 significant interactions, unaccompanied by the 
former. The majority follow the same pattern as before: - 
teachers and lay subjects with contact believed retardates 
less "insecure" (item 4), "noisy" (item 5) and "burden to 
society" (item 44) whereas for psychologists, contact had 
the reverse effect. Similarly, teachers and laypeople 
without contact rated retardates "nasty to live with" (item 
77) while their acquainted peers rated them "nice to live 
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Interestingly, teachers and lay subjects with contact 
attributed retardates marginally more "unpredictable 
personality" (item 78), whereas, in the reverse direction, 
psychologists with contact believed them predictable, which 
suggests that contact makes the former groups see retardates 
as individuals whereas for psychologists it makes them into 
better understood patients. 
The final interaction did not follow this pattern and is of 
little interest, since it simply reveals that teachers 
predominantly accounted for acquainted subjects' belief that 
retardates are more "friendly" (item 6). 
To summarise, this analysis supports predictions in 
confirming that psychologists have the most negative beliefs 
about retardates and that ordinary teachers do not differ 
markedly from lay people, a finding that puts into 
perspective the recurring emphasis on negative teacher 
attitudes (e. g. Parish, Dyck and Kappes, 1979; Burden, 
1977; Foster and Keech, 1977 and Carroll and Reppucci, 1978) 
by revealing that teachers are not comparatively negative. 
Further subsidiary analyses were undertaken*to-examine sex, 
age and class effects, but these are not of central interest 
and will only be briefly described. 
Table 2.5 gives mean scores for 234 females and 260 males. 
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Females evaluated retardates more positively on 51/81 
variables, (p <. 05, Sign Test), which agrees with many 
studies (e. g. Gottlieb and Corman, 1975; Carroll and 
Reppucci, 1978; Greenbaum and Wang, 1965 and Butt and 
Signori, 1976). To be consistent with the present 
framework, it is argued that these differences result from 
conformity to different social norms, and it is worth 
looking more closely to see if any evidence for this can be 
discerned. 
ANOVA yielded 19 significant differences: females believed 
retardates are more "happy" (item 35), "nice" (item 59), 
"lovable (item 51, "helpful" (item 80) "loving" (item 10), 
"self-contented" (item 25), "strong" (item 33) and "valuable 
(item 8). Similarly, they rated them less "lonely" (item 
19), "ugly" (item 12), "upsetting to be with" (item 9), 
"embarrassing" (item 32) and "insecure" (item 4), less their 
"family's shame" (item 22) and from less "poor family 
background" (item 54). Finally, they rated them "well 
dressed" (item 26) while males rated them "badly dressed". 
Thus, there is some indication that females place more 
emphasis on personal feelings and the family, values 
traditionally associated with feminine roles. 
In the negative direction, females were more intense on 
"controlled by others or Fate (item 73), which as discussed 
before, might not reflect negative evaluation. similarly, 
females believed retardates more "childlike", but it is 
possible that this scale has different connotations for the 
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sexes, perhaps denoting immaturity for males but innocence 
and vulnerability for females. Finally, women believed 
retardates have significantly more "limited general 
knowledge" (item 63). Closer examination of Table 2.5, 
however, shows all but one of the other items relating to 
intelligence and social competence followed 
(insignificantly) the same pattern, but perhaps this seeming 
emphasis on subnormal functioning merely reflects an 
interest in how much care-giving is needed. 
Many of the remaining items on which females gave 
(insignificantly) more negative responses may more easily be 
attributed to normative expectations of a feminine social 
system. For example, females rated retardates more 
"dependent", "frequently ill", "passive", "accident prone", 
"demanding" and a greater "strain for family". A bad joke 
is irresistible - rather than representing negative 
evaluation per se, these items seem to suggest that women 
think retardates need mothering! Of course, the 
expectations of a masculine social system are also fitted by 
default: males rated retardates as less "frightening", 
"aggressive" and "dangerous" and consonant with the 
notorious double standard, more "sexually restrained". 
To summarise, the relatively positive attitudes of females 
are attributed to the norms of masculine and feminine social 
systems, and while it might be argued that different social 
systems merely reflect fundamental biological differences, 
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the,, explanation is preferred in that it is consistent with 
the present approach and more economical. 
Table 2.6 shows semantic differential scores for each 10 
year age group. The numbers of most positive and negative 
responses, which differed significantly according to chi 
square (p < . 0001) are summarised below, where it can be 
seen that subjects aged 21 to 30 were least, and subjects 
aged 31 to 40, most negative. Similarly, those aged 31 to 
40 were least and those from 51 to 60, most positive in 
















most + 11 11 3 15 29 12 
means 
No. of 
most - 9 2 28 4 14 24 
means 
The reciprocal nature of positive and negative responses for 
subjects aged <40, suggests they have the most negative view 
of retardates. However, younger subjects tend to be less 
positive and less negative and older subjects more negative 
and more positive, which means that response style rather 
than evaluative differences might be responsible or, younger 
subjects might simply feel less strongly about retardates. 
Data support Gottlieb and Switzky (1982) who suggested 
positive and negative beliefs about retardates represented 
separate dimensions. 
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Like that of Gottlieb and Switzky, present data indicate no 
consistent trends. Different cutpoints, however, can give 
different pictures, and if like Hollinger and Jones (1970) 
age groups from 20 to 30,30 to 50 and over 50 had been 
used, a consistent trend for older subjects to grow more 
intense (i. e. positive and negative) would have been 
observed. 
Finally, the relatively large numbers in the 20 to 30 age 
group represent the fact that virtually all the 
psychologists were post graduates. Noticeably, however, the 
negative opinions previously associated with psychologists 
are not in evidence. This it is hypothesised, is because 
the majority of teachers also fell into this group. In 
other words, age and occupation, are not independent. 
In summary, more consistent age effects might emerge in the 
literature if researchers employed longitudinal designs, 
provided some means of dealing with secular changes could be 
found. This is because inconsistent effects might be due to 
a failure in cross-sectional designs to match subjects, 
particularly for profession. Second, an objective way of 
ear-marking cutpoints, perhaps based on life events, like 
leaving school, marriage or parenthood, might also introduce 
greater consistency into results. 
Few studies examine the effect of class on the evaluation of 
retardates. Gottlieb and Gorman (1975) used educational 
level to determine it and found that those from middle 
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strata rated retardates less physically and mentally 
handicapped that those above or below. Gottlieb (1974) 
found lower class children were more accepting towards 
retardates, and similarly, Greenbaum and Wang (1965) found 
lower class subjects generally more positive. The present 
subject sample was grouped according to The Registrar 
General's (1970) classification of socio-economic status, 
and Table 2.7 gives variable means for classes I. II, III, 
IV and V, and as summarised below, those in social class I 
gave the highest number of most negative and the fewest most. 
positive responses (42 and 9, -respectively), whereas the 
picture is almost perfectly reversed for class V. (As an 
aside, the slight deviation, that is the score of 4 most 
negative responses from class II, is in keeping with 
Gottlieb and Corman's results and would be more striking if 
subjects were grouped into top (I), middle (II and III) or 
bottom (IV and IV) strata. If II, III and IV formed the 
middle group, on the other hand,. a smooth progression would 
result. ) 
Class I II III IV V 
n 113 126 101 111 40 
No. most 
- means 42 46 24 5 
No. most 
+ means 9 17 10 10 35 
The finding that low SES groups are more positive towards 
retardates is clearly supported. This, Greenbaum and Wang 
(1965) patronisingly attributed to the relative lack of 
educational skills in the lower echelons, from where, they 
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assumed, retardates would not appear so incompetent. The 
present approach suggests a more satisfying explanation: by 
definition, those having professional contact with 
retardates are concentrated in social class I. Thus, 
occupation rather than class per se might account for the 
negative skew. Indeed, the relatively positive opinions of 
teachers most probably accounts for results in class II. 
Kushlick and Blunden (1974) show that mental retardation is 
more widespread in the working classes, and it was thought 
that more instances of personal contact might further 
account for the relatively positive opinions of class V. 
However, data did not support this idea, since even 
controlling for psychologists, there was no evidence that, 
contact varied with class. Nevertheless, it remains likely 
that the nature of contact will correlate with class, since 
it is most likely to represent "experience" for the upper 
strata, and therefore to steepen the evaluative gradient. 
In conclusion, inconsistent class effects in many studies 
might simply reflect failure to take occupation into 
consideration. 
Overall therefore, there is some evidence that the present 
paradigm might more efficiently explain sex, -age and class 
effects by relating them to social system membership rather 
than individual differences. 
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Concluding Summary 
This chapter was predicated on Tajfel's (1972) fundamental 
axiom that the interests and purposes of perceivers rather 
than objective reality determine the way in which stimuli 
are categorised. it was found that Mercer's (1973,1977) 
social model of retardation best accommodated this view and 
"retardate" was accordingly defined as a social status with 
retardation as the associated normative expectations. 
Characteristics attributed to retardates at other places and 
times were related to prevailing normative structures and 
these ideas also brought form and sense to empirical studies 
of beliefs about retardates. Subsequently, an attempt was 
made to predict from some social institutions what present 
beliefs might entail and these predictions were tested in an 
ecological experiment (Bronfenbrenner, 1979) in which the 
accommodation between human and environment was examined by 
comparing beliefs of subjects from contrasting ecological 
systems (in this case, lay and professional). 
The lesson to be drawn from this chapter is that mental 
retardation is not necessarily an intrinsic function of the 
retardate, but also a function of beliefs, and since these 
may be related to social norms, retardation is also a 
function of the macrosystem, inextricably linked with 
ideologies and cultural history. 
Thus, amelioration of retardation can be initiated by 
changes in public policy or fashionable beliefs, and need 
not wait for a medical breakthrough. 
CHAPTER 3 
Social Categorisation of the mentally retarded: 
a mechanistic link between macrosystems and perception 
1. Introduction 
The previous chapter ended with the notion that mental 
retardation is not only a function of the retardate, but 
also of his macrosystem. However, while organisational 
features of a society can no doubt influence retardates 
directly, the present interest is in social psychological 
pathways whereby exo, mesa and microsystems might contribute 
to their development. This is a tall order and only a 
single route generated from Tajfel's work will be 
identified. 
The first step, which, like an overheard telephone 
conversation, will be confined to others, pinpoints a 
mechanism whereby normative expectations can affect the 
perception of and hence behaviour towards retardates. 
2. Tajfel's approach to stereotyping 
Tajfel (1972) argued that categorisation has inductive and 
deductive aspects. The former, which refers to the way in 
which characteristics become associated with a social 
category, was partially explored in the previous chapter. 
The latter, which refers to the way individuals are assigned 
those characteristics on the basis of category membership, 
forms the basis of this chapter, and clearly describes the 
sought for mechanism which through social perception, links 
macrosystems with the developing individual. 
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The seminal research, for present purposes, was a series of 
experiments in which Tajfel and Wilkes (1963) demonstrated 
that judgements of length were biassed by the way subjects 
classified stimuli. 
Their paradigm was rather complex, but essentially, there 
were two sessions which were separated by a week, and 
subjects estimated the length of 8 lines, successively 
presented in random order, under of one of three conditions: 
1. the 4 shorter lines were labelled "A" and the 4 
longer, "B", so that classification was perfectly 
correlated to length, 
2. lines were alternately labelled "A" and "B", so 
that the relationship between classification and length 
was neither meaningful nor consistent, 
3. lines were unlabelled. 
Intra-class convergence and interclass divergence in judged 
length was predicted in condition 1 relative to condition 3, 
because subjects were expected to infer class membership 
from the labels, and this, in turn, was expected to provide 
additional information that would lead to an emphasis of 
"shortness" or "longness". No such effects were predicted 
for condition two. 
These biases, it was further hypothesised, would increase 
with salience of the categorisation and experience in 
judging the labelled series. 
Dependent measures and results were also rather complex. 
First, interclass divergence was defined as the difference 
between the longest short and the shortest long line 
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(referring, in other words, to the distance between class 
boundaries, not class means). This was 100% larger than the 
actual difference when stimuli were consistently labelled 
and 11% larger when they were not. In the second session, 
the figures were 122% and 44%, respectively. Intraclass 
differences, however, did not significantly follow 
predictions. 
In order to analyse results, linear functions were fitted to 
judgements for stimuli within each class. Thus, the 
gradients not only provided measures of perceived intraclass 
differences which could be separately analysed, but also 
affected the derived interclass difference. This latter 
measure, therefore, reflected combined predicted effects, 
and was subjected to ANOVA. In this way, superimposed 
classification was found to determine a significant increase 
in perceived interclass difference in both first and second 
sessions, (p a . 025, . 05, respectively). 
With respect to the subsidiary hypotheses, it had been 
assumed that simultaneous rather than successive 
presentation of stimuli in a pretest session, would increase 
the saliency of the categorisation, but this had no effect 
on results. 
The effect of experience was insignificant when assessed by 
comparing first and second experimental sessions. Some 
subjects, however, underwent two tests within a session, and 
in the second, classification was associated with a more 
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significant increase in perceived interclass divergence, and 
in addition, a trend towards intraclass convergence. 
Finally, statistical comparisons between first and second 
tests showed practice significantly to increase interclass 
divergence and intraclass convergence for classified 
compared with control conditions. 
In summary: - 
1. Classification superimposed on a series of stimuli. 
led to an exaggeration of perceived interclass 
differences when there was a meaningful relationship 
between the classes and the dimension of interest. 
2. Exaggerated intraclass similarity was not directly 
established, but did occur with practice, and therefore 
might have been established overall had more trials 
been given. 
3. Similarly, although the manipulations to increase 
salience of the classification had no effect, it 
remained likely that more definite increases in the 
relevance of classification to judgements would 
increase biases, and indeed, Tajfel.. (1981,1981a) 
points out that this prediction was later confirmed. 
4. Predicted biases increased with experience (within 
an experimental session). 
The underlying rationale was that according to the inductive 
aspect of categorisation, longness and shortness would be 
associated with class membership, and then, according to the 
deductive aspect, they would be assigned to stimuli, and 
this would result in the increased perceived interclass 
difference and intraclass similarity. As Tajfel and Wilkes 
and more recently, Elser (1979) and Tajfel (1981a) noted, 
however, the precise effect of classification depends on the 
Information it offers regarding stimuli. Indeed, Eiser 
gives a sophisticated account of the "cognitive algebra" 
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that might be involved, demonstrating that any configuration 
of interclass divergence and intraclass convergence can be 
predicted according to the relationship between stimulus 
attributes, the attributes associated with class membership 
and their relative weights. Because of its importance, it 
is worth labouring this point somewhat. Eight lines ranging 
from 1 to 8 inches in length shall serve as example stimuli, 
1 to 4 forming a short, and 5 to 8, a long class. Thus, 
judged length can be expressed as a weighted function of 
actual length plus a weighted function of the length 
predicted on the basis of class membership. Assuming a 
reciprocal relationship between weights, a variety of 
outcomes may be predicted. For example, if class membership 
suggests values 2.5" and 5.5", respectively, one limiting 
condition would be when the weight associated with actual 
length was zero, in which case, stimuli would be perceived 
as 0(1) + 1(2.5); 0(2) +1(2.5)...... 0(8)+1(5.5). i. e. 
total intraclass convergence would have occurred and four 
lines of 2.5" and 4 at 5.5" would be perceived. If weights 
associated with actual length were high, intraclass 
convergence is small, but substantial interclass divergence 
could still occur if the difference between expected class 
values was high. With paper, pencil and patience, any 
number of examples may be generated, (including those with 
increased intraclass divergence, if weights associated with 
stimuli are greater than one. ) 
Thus, although it was never made explicit, the fact that 
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Intraclass convergence and interclass divergence were 
predicted, suggests subjects were expected to associate 
class membership with values corresponding to the means of 
stimuli groups. 
Detailed evaluations of Tajfel's approach in relation to 
theories of perceptual biases that were current at the time 
are to be found in Eiser (1979) and Tajfel (1981a). More 
relevant for present purposes is that these experiments were 
intended to demonstrate that shifts and biases in 
stereotyped judgements can be subsumed under the general 
cognitive effects of classification. In other words, 
judgements of individuals on continuous dimensions like skin 
colour, intelligence or personal traits are analogous to the 
judgements of length, and when a social classification like 
race, (or retardation, it is argued) that is believed to 
correlate with the focal dimension is super imposed upon it, 
class membership provides additional information that biases 
judgements. Thus, the great importance of Tajfel and Wilkes 
paradigm was not that it succeeded wholeheartedly in 
demonstrating stereotyping in judgements in length, but that 
it showed the perceptual homogenisation of outgroup members 
and the intergroup differentiation that are known to 
characterise stereotyped judgements in human interactions 
(Ehrlich, 1973), can be understood through general cognitive 
principles. Indeed, Turner (1981a) writes that in its 
cognitive aspects, stereotyping can be considered to a large 
extent, the operation of Tajfel's approach in the perception 
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of social groups. Furthermore, the ambiguity and complexity 
of social situations, the frequent saliency of social 
categories and their importance for maintaining self-esteem 
and expressing values, combine to enhance its effect. (e. g. 
Tajfel and Wilkes, 1963; Tajfel, 1972,1978,1981,1981a). 
The previous chapter provided some notion of beliefs 
associated with retardates. According to Tajfel's approach, 
these should provide additional information which will bias 
the perception of individuals labelled mentally retarded. 
Armed with this hypothesis, a journey into the relevant 
literature will be ventured. 
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3. Tajfel'a approach to stereotyping and the literature on 
labelling the mentally retarded 
At first sight, the literature concerning labelling the 
retarded seems both confused and confusing. While it is 
generally accepted that classification is necessary because 
retarded individuals must be identified before they can be 
helped, (Clarke and Clarke, 1974; Carroll and Reppucci, 
1978), its effects are traditionally condemned because, as 
the previous chapter showed, it generates negative 
expections which are feared to underpin dire effects, like 
self-fulfilling prophecies in educational settings (Foster 
and Keech, 1977; Parish, Dyck and Kappes, 1979; Foster, 
Schmidt and Sabatino, 1976); failure of community 
integration programs, (Gottlieb, 1975a) and isolation and 
rejection of labelled children, (Gampel, Gottlieb and 
Harrison, 1974), for example. Underlying such studies, is 
the assumption that classification leads to stereotyping and 
the assignment to individuals of class attributes which are 
unfavourable, inaccurate and distortive (Guskin, 1963). 
Indeed, for Redner (1980) and Parish, Dyck and Kappes (1979) 
negative attitudes and stereotypes are synonymous. 
On the other hand, another tradition holds that labelling 
can be beneficial since it provides causal explanations for 
negative behaviour that deflect personal blame and hence 
make retardates more acceptable, (e. g. Gibbons, . 
1981; 
Guskin, 1963; Towne and Joiner, 1968) 
The implication seems to Pe that these approaches are 
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mutually exclusive. A few writers like Guskin (1963); 
Mercer (1973) and Gottlieb (1974) suggest that labels might 
have positive and negative results, but even here, this 
seems between rather than within individuals. 
There are those who are protected by the label 
"mentally retarded" and there are others for whom [it] 
is a burden and a stigma". 
Mercer (1973), p 172. 
From Tajfel's point of view, stereotyping is a cognitive 
effect of categorisation, neither good nor bad, but a fact 
of life. Its outcome is determined, it will be remembered, 
by the relationship between the information conveyed by the 
label, characteristics of the labelled person and the 
dimension on which judgements are made. Whether the label 
is shown to be a burden or an asset, it follows, is a 
function of these, and not of the stereotyping process. In 
other words, Tajfel's approach provides a paradigm that is 
likely to resolve many apparent conflicts. 
a. Information conveyed by the label 
In the previous chapter, between subject variation in 
beliefs about retardates was demonstrated. Hence, the 
label, "mentally retarded" should have different effects for 
different'subject groups. For example, Studylshowed males 
were more negative towards retardates than females, and less 
clear cut, high SES subjects more negative than low. 
Coupled with Tajfel's approach, these differences help 
explain why Spierstein, Budoff and Bak (1980); Siperstein 
and Gottlieb 
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(1977) and Siperstein, Bak and Gottlieb (1977) found the 
label elicited a more negative shift in boys and similarly, 
why Gottlieb and Budoff (1973) and Gottlieb (1974) found 
evidence that low SES children showed less rejection of 
retarded peers as a function of the label, than high. 
Age should also be mentioned, although it attracts little 
attention in the literature, perhaps because of its 
inconsistent effects. Nevertheless, the previous study 
yielded some evidence that younger subjects are less 
positive and less negative towards retardates, which fits 
nicely with Freeman and Algozzine's (1980) remark that 
young subjects are simply less affected by the label, 
(rather than less negatively affected). Perhaps, therefore, 
they are insufficiently practiced in judging classified 
series -a factor not generally considered in labelling 
studies where children are involved. 
Whatever the reason, this has serious implications in 
suggesting that conclusions based on labelling studies with 
schoolchildren as subjects may not be meaningful. 
In Study 1, psychologists had a more negative conception of 
retardates than other occupational groups, and according to 
other studies, professionals working with retardates seem 
particularly negative (Greenbaum and Wang, 1965; Carroll and 
Reppucci, 1978), which can explain the somewhat 
counter-intuitive finding that teachers of retarded children 
responded more negatively than regular class teachers and 
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non-professionals, to labelled compared with unlabelled 
targets, (Copeland and Weissbrod, 1976). 
Similarly, differences in beliefs related to the interests 
of different social groups, might explain why Seitz and 
Geske.. (1976) found that the label affected a group of 
graduate trainees in mental retardation more than a matched 
group of mothers on competence measures and less on items 
relating to interpersonal liking. 
Although personal contact with a retardate appeared to have 
the most potent influence on beliefs in the previous study, 
it does not seem to have been incorporated into any 
labelling experiments, but an interesting study by Gibbons 
and Gibbons _(1980) 
deserves mention. 
Fifty-nine retardates heard a story about a successful or 
unsuccessful target who lived at a private address or an 
institution (which, it was hoped, would be equivalent to a 
label). After listening, they rated him on a series of 
dependent measures, which included an adjective checklist 
(friendly, smart, hardworking, likeable, happy and kind) and 
a social distance scale. 
Place of residence had no effect on the former, but elicited 
a significantly greater social distance score. Thus, 
results seemed simultaneously to reflect the finding that 
retardates do not have negative opinions about the mentally 
retarded, in general (Gan, Tymchuk and Nishihara, 1977), and 
Edgerton's (1967) famous finding that dischargees from 
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institutions take great care to avoid each other in public 
places. More recently, Gibbons and Kassin (1980) found 
institutionalised retarded adolescents rated a target less 
smart and likely to succeed when labelled, but showed no 
labelling effect on personal adjectives. 
Finally, Budoff and Siperstein (1982), on the other hand, 
found "mentally retarded" had a significant negative effect 
on both attitudes and social distance scores of a class of 
retarded school children who rated a target under labelled 
and unlabelled conditions. 
It is difficult to evaluate these studies, because 
information regarding retardates' beliefs about retardates 
per se is lacking. However, it seems likely that these will 
resemble those of mainstream society, (this will be 
justified in-chapter 5) and therefore, to be relatively 
positive on personal, but negative on ability related 
characteristics. 
To summarise, there is some evidence that, as predicted by 
social categorisation theory, configurations of beliefs 
associated with perceivers' group membership influence 
labelling effects, and it seems likely that these might 
provide a means to understand apparent differences in the 
outcome of many labelling studies. 
Information conveyed by the label might differ in salience 
as well as content. Tajfel and Wilkes, it will be 
remembered, found some evidence that experience of judging 
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labelled stimuli increased the perceptual effects of 
labelling. Thus, subjects who are used to evaluating 
retardates might show greater labelling effects. Although I 
have been unable to find any directly relevant studies, 
recent investigations into a different phenomenon, conceal 
data consistent with this view. In 1982, Reiss, Levitan and 
Szyszko established the existence of diagnostic 
overshadowing, or a reduced likelihood that debilitating 
phobias will be considered psychopathological when the 
patient is labelled mentally retarded. Reiss and Szyszko 
(1983) went on to find that overshadowing was not affected 
by the amount of experience subjects had in dealing with 
retardates. Subjects read a case history which was 
attributed to an individual with IQ 68 or 108, respectively, 
and to check on this manipulation, dependent variables 
included a7 point perceived mental retardation scale, on 
which the keen eye notes, experienced subjects 
(psychologists. at a state mental hospital) rated labelled 
and unlabelled targets 5.86 and 1.00 (minimum possible) 
respectively, whereas the relevant figures for inexperienced 
subjects (students in clinical psychology) were 5.64 and 
1.85. In other words, experience was associated with an 
ir}creased interclass difference, (although, of course, its 
significance was not analysed). 
Finally, differently worded labels are likely to be 
associated with different configurations of beliefs, and 
hence, different labelling effects. 
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Hollinger and Jones (1970), and Foster; Md- Ysseldyke 
(1976), for example, found "mentally retarded" elicited more 
negative attitudes than "slow learner" and "learning 
'disabled", while Siperstein, Budoff and Bak (1980), found 
"mentally retarded" and the derisive American colloquialism 
"retard" had different meanings, the former denoting 
objective clinical problems and the latter eliciting 
negative emotional reactions. On this basis, they concluded 
that removal of the former label might encourage spontaneous 
idioms and therefore do more harm than good. 
In a 2x2x2 between subject design, they studied the 
attitudes of 136 fifth and sixth graders towards a target 
(1) whose photograph appeared normal or mongoloid, (2) whom 
they heard spelling competently or incompetently and (3) who 
was labelled "mentally retarded" or "retard". Results 
yielded a significant main effect in the expected direction 
for competence and label and an appearance x label 
interaction which showed subjects did not differentiate 
between labels when appearance was subnormal, (a likely 
reason for which will be discussed below). The authors 
concluded that "retard" had more stigmatising power, and 
with "cautious optimism" that "mentally retarded" might be 
beneficial to normal appearing retardates by explaining away 
their incompetence. Read closely, this study grows 
confusing, because, for example, without an unlabelled 
control condition, there is no evidence that "mentally 
retarded" is beneficial except in comparison to "retard". 
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Second, the exact nature of beliefs associated with "retard" 
can only be guessed on this side of the Atlantic, but 
perhaps it is a term like "spastic", which ironically seems 
a taunt for normal people and a faux pas if applied to a 
real spastic. Thus, the idea that "mentally retarded" is 
beneficial might be erroneous, because the extremely 
negative responses to "retard" might not actually apply to 
retardates. Indeed, it would be interesting to look at the 
the beliefs associated with a range of different labels 
across cultures. Nevertheless, the important point for 
present purposes is clear: different labels underpin 
different labelling effects. 
b. Stimulus characteristics 
Characteristics of the labelled person form a second major 
source of influence, since the response to any stimulus, it 
will be remembered depends on the relationship between its 
attributes and the information conveyed by the label. 
Translated for present purposes, this means that the effect 
of the mentally retarded label depends heavily on how the 
individual would have been perceived without it. 
Guskin (1963) commented that too many or too few cues of 
subnormality weaken the impact of the label, which from the 
present point of view, is likely to be only half right: 
when an unlabelled individual is judged in terms that 
closely resemble the abstract ideal suggested by the label, 
as might occur when many cues to subnormality are present, 
the label itself is likely to have a minimal effect. 
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However, this is not a function of the number of cues per 
se, but of how useful the label is in conveying additional 
Information. It follows that the less like a retardate the 
individual is perceived unlabelled, the more effect the 
label should have. Thus, in contradiction to Guskin, there 
can never be too few cues, provided, of course, the label is 
accepted as meaningful. Taken further, this argument also 
suggests the counter intuitive hypothesis that the label 
might improve ratings where an individual is judged extremely 
negatively, unlabelled, because whenever a judgement is 
below that associated with class membership, the label 
should improve it. 
An attempt to discover the relative weights of physical 
attractiveness and the mentally retarded label on perceived 
subnormality, illustrates the first point. Aloia (1975) 
measured the attitudes of 105 student teachers to 5 
"attractive" or 5 "unattractive" photographs on a scale of 
bipolar adjectives (clumsy/skilled; strange/ordinary; 
unintelligent/bright; helpless/capable and confident/timid) 
under one of three conditions (mentally retarded label, 
normal label or no label). 
Results yielded a significant effect for type of photograph, 
but no labelling effect. In the present opinion, this is 
entirely unsurprising because "attractive" photographs had 
been chosen for their normal appearance, while 
"unattractive" ones had been picked from a group of 
profoundly retarded targets, for their "obvious deformity 
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and physical stigmata. " Hence, it is clear that 
"unattractive" photographs would, in any case, be 
categorised retarded, rendering information conveyed in the 
label, superfluous. 
In contrast, Foster and Keech (1977) illustrate the second 
point. Fifty teachers viewed a twelve minute video of a 
schoolboy - chosen for actual and apparent normality - 
engaging in various normal activities. Half were told he 
was normal and the other half, that he was retarded. 
Dependent measures were a 35 item personality questionnaire, 
which subjects completed as they thought the boy would, and 
a 23 item checklist on which his skill and personal 
adjustment was rated. 
Results showed that judgements under the retarded label were 
significantly more negative on both measures, although there 
were no cues to subnormality present. 
It might be argued that this example stretches the 
credibility of the present approach, since with no cues to 
subnormality at all, how could the label be accepted as 
meaningful? An important reason was suggested by Tajfel 
(1959; 1963; 1972; 1978,1981) who argued that 
classification systems function in a way that preserves and 
reinforces values, which biases the kind of mistakes 
observers make. Hence, since there is a clear evaluative 
gradient from normal to subnormal, there is likely to be 
over-exclusion from the former and over-inclusion in the 
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latter, because errors in these directions do not 
contaminate the valued category, but purify and maintain it. 
This does not imply that the label will be accepted whatever 
the circumstances. Indeed, as commonsense would suggest, 
Freeman and Algozzine (1980), found its impact could be 
reduced by the addition of categorically inconsistent 
evidence. It does imply, however, that observers are likely 
to be more receptive to the label "subnormal" than "normal" 
whenever they Interpret evidence. 
This has wide implications for clinical diagnosis and 
educational placement, in suggesting it is much easier for 
the individual to enter rather than leave their aegis. It 
also hints that stigmata might be so noticeable because of 
consensual biases in perception, rather than objective 
distinctiveness, although of course, this hypothesis can 
never be tested while normality is valued above 
subnormality, since it is impossible to achieve the 
necessary objectivity. 
Data consistent with this view may be gleaned front a closer 
look at Aloia's results, which show "mentally retarded" had 
more effect on normal targets than "normal" had on 
subnormals. (i. e "unattractive" control score rises only .9 
units from 68.2 to 69.3 under the "normal" label, whereas 
the "attractive" control score sinks 5.8 units from 86.8 to 
81.0 under "mentally retarded. ") 
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LABEL CONDITION 
Mentally retarded no label normaL 
PHOTOGRAPH 
Attractive 81.0 86.8 87.0 (perceived 
(subnormality 
Unattractiv 66.6 68.2 69.3 (scores 
(As an aside, it is also apparent that the interclass 
difference between attractive and unattractive photographs 
has increased under meaningful labels relative to the 
unlabelled condition. (i. e. 86.8 - 68.2 to 87.0 - 66.6). 
This suggests that a labelling effect consonant with 
Tajfel's theory may well have occurred, although no main 
effect was found. 
A related question concerns just how far perceived relevance 
of the label and hence categorisation effects extend. 
Redner (1980) and Goffman (1963), for example, argue that 
people closely associated with retardates may be 
"contaminated" and it is interesting to hypothesise that 
they too might be stereotyped. Redner (1980), however, 
found no evidence that this actually occurred. In a2x2 
design, his subjects rated a video of mothers discussing 
their children, half of whom were normal and half retarded - 
under "normal" or "retarded" labelling conditions. Only 
type of mother had a significant effect, which suggested 
that negative attitudes towards parents of retarded children 
are not a function of the label, but of differences in 
behaviour, although as Redner cautioned, volunteer mothers, 
conscious of being filmed, might not have yielded reliable 
experimental material, and it might be added, it is 
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difficult to believe that the content of their discussions 
did not reveal, as efficiently as a label might, that their 
children were retarded, which would mean that the label 
conveyed little useful information. 
Unfortunately, Redner presents no data, so it was not 
possible to hunt for the a labelling effect defined by the 
present paradigm, but since he found a distinct stereotype 
of a mother whose child is handicapped, one may well have 
occurred. 
This is a concrete example of the uncomfortable nature of 
the marriage between the present approach, to which measures 
that reflect distributions of judgements are most 
appropriate, and its application to the individual level 
studies and analyses that form the literature on labelling 
the mentally retarded. Necessity justifies the match, 
because, as far as I can determine, social categorisation 
theory has not yet been applied in this area, and therefore, 
established designs must provide the preliminary testing 
ground. 
c. The focal. dimension 
Finally, the dimension along which judgements are made 
contributes to labelling effects. First, it must be 
relevant, that is, believed to correlate with the 
classification. Tajfel and Wilkes pointed out that cases 
like skin colour and race which correlate almost perfectly, 
are rare and that the effect of a label should vary across a 
series of dimensions according to their perceived relevance. 
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The evaluative nature of focal dimensions may be used to 
make more precise predictions about the effect of "mentally 
retarded". For example, the previous study showed 
retardates are associated with the positive pole of a few 
items relating to personal disposition. Therefore, on 
average, the label might be expected to improve ratings on 
such dimensions, and indeed, Seitz and Geske (1976) found a 
group of mothers rated the same retardates significantly 
happier and more appealing when labelled, while 
corresponding ratings of competence and social acceptability 
were negatively influenced. 
Although conceptually different, such positive shifts are 
unlikely to be distinguishable from those resulting from 
causal attributions which are said to reduce dissonance, 
(e. g. Goodman et al (1972); Gottlieb and Davis (1973); 
Gottlieb, (1975a), (except that the latter might be more 
likely in association with negative behaviour). Through 
either mechanism, however, the label can generate tolerance, 
and hence greater social acceptability for the retardate. 
Indeed, the aforementioned authors have used the loss of 
such privileges as an argument against mainstreaming. 
The kind of tolerance at stake can be seen in a study by 
Farina, Thaw, Feiner and Hurst (1976) who asked subjects in 
a "teaching experiment" to punish mistakes with electric 
shocks. Pupils in fact, were stooges labelled mentally 
retarded or normal, and in the former condition, duration 
and intensity of shocks were significantly less. 
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Interestingly, Farina at al were unable to detect any 
differences in expressed attitudes - which provides a happy 
counterbalance to the finding that positive expressed 
attitudes do not necessarily covary with accepting 
behaviour, (Gottlieb and Gottlieb, 1977). 
The kind of attributions that might have underpinned these 
results are illustrated in an interesting study (Severance 
and Gasstrom, 1977) where subjects were asked to assess the 
relative influences of ability, effort, task difficulty and 
luck on two 10 year olds' success or failure in completing a 
ten-piece jigsaw puzzle. Half the subjects were told the 
targets were mentally retarded and half were not given a 
label. 
Results yielded a significant label x outcome interaction on 
3 variables: ability and task difficulty were considered 
more potent causes of failure for mentally retarded targets 
and effort a more important factor in success. 
Hoffman and Weiner. (1978) showed that children's-effort on 
a second task was a function of the attribute they received 
regarding their performance on a first. -If success and 
failure were attributed to ability, they tried more and less 
hard, respectively, whereas the outcome was reversed if 
their performance was attributed to effort or luck. 
Clearly, these experiments together build a pathway whereby 
labels, through the attributions of others, might effect 
children's performance. 
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As Severance and Gasstrom continue, if the label protects 
retardates from blame when they fail, it also robs them of 
kudos when they succeed, hence the subsidiary finding that 
successful outcomes produced a significant increase in 
expectations of future success, which was greatly attenuated 
when the target was labelled. Gibbons, Sawin and Gibbons, 
(1979) found similar results with a slightly more complex 
paradigm. Thus, Guskin's (1963) "special dispensations" 
which relieve retardates of the responsibility for negative 
behaviour, seem extended into a stinging "patronization 
effect" (Gibbons, 1981), which holds them responsible for 
nothing at all and which, Gibbons adds differentiates them 
from people afflicted with other handicaps who seem to 
receive extra credit (augmentation) when they succeed. 
Further evidence that special tolerances may become 
self-fulfilling is illustrated by Copeland and Weissbrod 
(1976) who examined the attitudes of "socialising agents" - 
105 special class and 53 regular teachers together with 63 
non-professional caretakers of institutionalised retardates. 
In a complicated design, the sex and label (normal/retarded) 
of a target child was varied with acceptable 
(dressing-up/driving a toy truck) and unacceptable 
(over-dependent/aggressive) sex-stereotyped play. Dependent 
measures included ratings of typicality, approval and 
willingness to nurture. 
Although a significant main effect showed appropriate, 
desirable sex-typed behaviour was rated most typical, a 
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qualifying interaction showed that retarded children were 
rated typical when behaving undesirably. A futher 
interaction with profession yielded the disturbing 
information that special class teachers accounted most for 
this finding. 
This is entirely consistent with Hamilton and Gifford's 
(1976) "illusory correlation" phenomenon, or the tendency 
for aberrant behaviour to be perceived as typical of the 
group when it is displayed by a minority group member, but 
more important, it implies that teachers may be more 
inclined to tolerate undesirable behaviour in retarded than 
normal children and that this discrimination itself is 
likely to increase its prevalence and hence, its typicality. 
Indeed, since Gibbons, Gibbons and Kassin (1980) found 
subjects less inclined to blame and punish a teenage boy for 
vandalism when he was labelled retarded, this might have 
implications far beyond the classroom. Similarly, although 
mental retardation is the present focus of interest, special 
tolerances are likely with children bearing other labels. 
For example, Algozzine, Mercer and Countermine (1977) found 
emotionally disturbed behaviour was rated more acceptable 
and less disturbing when it was attributed to a child 
bearing the label, "emotionally disturbed" than when it was 
attributed to other children. 
In summary, beliefs that retardates are well meaning or that 
their negative behaviour is caused by their retardation and 
cannot be helped, are likely to improve a variety of 
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judgements. However, the tolerance that is so generated, 
has a number of stings. Related to the recent work of Reiss 
et al (1982,1983), it may overshadow the need for 
therapeutic care. Furthermore, it is still a perceptual 
distortion that discriminates between normal and retardated 
people, and worse, it may, through self-fulfilling 
prophecies, perpetuate the very behaviour it assumes cannot 
be helped. Thus, it goes without saying, the loss of 
special dispensations is not seen as an argument against 
integration. 
Finally, Guskin (1963) has suggested that these special 
tolerances mean a different cognitive system is "switched 
on" when observers judge retardates. Labelling effects 
related to the constellation of beliefs associated with 
retardation, provide a mechanism whereby this might occur. 
4 
Study 1 revealed that positive beliefs (likely to generate 
tolerance) were in the minority and that the negative poles 
of most items are associated with retardates. Thus it is 
not surprising, as Budoff and Siperstein (1982) note, that 
while the research is equivocal overall, the bulk of studies 
demonstrate a negative effect as a function of the label, 
"mentally retarded". Study 1 suggested that beliefs 
relating to competence were the most negative, (and 
simultaneously, it might be argued, the most relevant to the 
normal/retarded dichotomy). Hence, it is not surprising 
that Gottlieb and Gottlieb (1977) found that "smart" and 
"bright" accounted for most variation between labelled and 
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unlabelled targets. 
On the other hand Yoshida and Meyers (1975), found that the 
label "educable mental retardate" failed to have a 
significant effect on performance expectancies "in the face 
of first hand evidence". Eighty teachers viewed a video of 
a black 13 year old confederate taking four concept 
formation tasks, ostensibly separated by 2 week intervals. 
Half were told he was in a regular, and half that he was in 
a special class. The predicted number of correct responses 
in each following trial was the dependent measure. 
Only one significant effect was found, namely that subjects 
predicted an improvement over trials, which in the present 
view, was entirely unsurprising, since the videos were not 
presented in random order, but depicted 2,4,6 then 8 out 
of 10 responses correct, so subjects most likely learned to 
raise predictions over successive trials, whatever the 
labels. 
Yoshida and Meyers (1975) concluded that first hand evidence 
was more important than the label and indeed, a number of 
other writers have argued that actual behaviour is more 
influential than labels in determining judgements. (e. g. 
Freeman and Algozzine, 1980). From the present point of 
view, this does not seem warranted, not only because of what 
seem to be artefacts in experimental procedure, but more 
important, because the assumption that evidence and labels 
have independent, additive and reciprocal effects, seems 
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false. In the present paradigm, evidence and labels 
transact, the former influencing the content of the latter 
and, perhaps more important in experiments, the latter 
influencing the perception of the former. With the 
characteristics of the labelled person and expectations 
associated with the label providing third and fourth 
dimensions of influence, it is clear that the question 
whether behaviour or labels are more important, is not only 
unanswered but also unanswerable. 
Gottlieb (1974), however, developed a2x2 paradigm in 
which the relative weights of various behaviours and the 
mentally retarded label could be examined, the critical 
condition being the cell in which normal behaviour is 
labelled retarded. 
In the first of an ongoing series, Gottlieb (1974) wondered 
if "mentally retarded" or academic incompetence was more 
influential "in the rejection process". 
Forty-eight 4th grade middle-class children viewed a video 
of a 12 year old spelling competently or incompetently. 
Within each condition, half were told he was in the fifth 
grade, and half that he was in a special class. Dependent 
measures were an adjective checklist (range 10 -50) and a 
six point social distance scale. Analyses yielded main 
effects for competence on both. The label, on the other 
hand, had no effect and there were no interactions. 
A replication on 40 4th grade low SES children - mostly 
r 
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Second generation Portugese - yielded no significant effects 
atall. 
Gottlieb concluded that contrary to the findings of Baldwin 
(1958) and Johnson (1950) that retarded children are 
rejected for their anti-social behaviour, not their academic 
incompetence, the latter, afterall, has had a significant 
negative effect. Already this seems confusing, first, 
because Gottlieb ignores the second half of his own study, 
and second, because academic competence is unlikely to be 
equivalent in Gottlieb's label x competence paradigm and the 
earlier competence x aggression studies. 
I 
He further concludes that labels do not lead to rejecting 
attitudes, at least among 4th graders, who are far more 
influenced by academic competence. 
Much can be gleaned from a closer look at the means for each 
rnnr7 i f- inn 
Adjective Social distance 
Middle SES 
retarded competent 38.50 4.50 
nonretarded competent 39.67 4.75 
retarded incompetent 33.25 3.58 
nonretarded incompetent 35.42 4.42 
Low SES 
retarded competent 37.80 
nonretarded competent 38.40 
retarded incompetent 35.00 





For middle SES subjects, means for the retarded competent 
target are higher than for both incompetent conditions, and 
show an additive label x competence relationship. For the 
low SES group, on the other hand, means for the nonretarded 
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incompetent target are higher than both retarded conditions 
on the adjective checklist, and competence has no effect in 
the retarded condition on the social distance scales. 
Although ANOVA may not have been significant, within 
Gottlieb's paradigm, these suggest the label might be more 
weighty for low SES subjects, so it is surprising he does 
not discuss them at all. 
Unfortunately, it simply is not possibly to apply the 
present approach to these studies in any detail, because 
being derived from a different paradigm, they do not give 
the relevant information. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to 
suppose that the classification regular/special class can be 
superimposed on the stimulus characteristic, academic 
performance. Since the focal dimensions, (adjective 
checklist and social distance measures) according to 
Gottlieb, reliably reflect this characteristic, perceived 
interclass difference in attitudes and social distance 
should increase in the consonant compared with inconsonant 
cells. Thus, targets are regarded not as individuals, but 
as group representatives, and the focus is on the 
differences between them, rather than absolute scores. For 
middle class subjects, the difference between competent and 
incompetent conditions is greater when labels are 
consistent, i. e. (38.50 - 35.42) vs (39.67 - 33.25) and 
(4.50 - 4.42) vs (4.750 - 3.58). More interesting, results 
for low SES subjects follow the same pattern: (37.8 - 38.0) 
vs (38.4 - 35.0) and 4.70 - 4.60) vs (5.10 -4.70). 
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Within Tajf el's approach, the inconsistencies between the 
studies have disappeared and a labelling effect (of unknown 
significance) appears, although none could be detected in 
Gottlieb's analysis. In other words, doubts and conflicts 
regarding the label seem likely to arise because, in the 
present opinion, Gottlieb's paradigm directs the search away 
from the most relevant measures. Indeed, the array of 
studies published by him and his associates over the last 
decade, which focus on different aspects without an obvious 
unifying directive seem testimony to its inefficiency. 
In a second study, Gottlieb (1975) used the paradigm to 
examine the relative weights of the label and behavioural 
aggressiveness, since a number of writers, including 
MacMillian, Jones and Aloia (1974) had recently argued that 
retarded children might be rejected because of their 
behaviour, not their labels, and Goodman, Gottlieb and 
Harrison (1972) had found delabelled, reintegrated retarded 
children were rejected more than their labelled peers. 
Forty-eight middle class 10 year olds watched a video of a 
12 year old actor aggressively punching or quietly modelling 
some clay. Within each condition, half were told he was in 
the fifth grade and half that he was in a special class. 
Dependent measures were adjective rating and social distance 
scales. Anti-social behaviour, ANOVA showed, had a 
significant negative effect on both scales, and the label on 
the adjective scale only, although it approached 
significance on the social distance measure. The 
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interaction was non-significant. 
Gottlieb was unable to explain why the label should have an 
effect in this, but not his 1974 study. Indeed, it is hard 
not to notice that the relative outcomes seem to contradict 
his suggestion that anti-social behaviour rather than the 
label might account for the rejection of retarded children, 
in which case, labelling effects should have been less 
marked in the second. Furthermore, there is no sign of a 
"special dispensation". Gottlieb simply concludes that the 
effect of the label is not consistent. Interestingly, 
however, examination of mean results indicates that 
differences between aggressive and nonaggressive targets 
increase from . 08 and . 58 units on adjective and social 
distance scales to 8.65 and 1.58 units, respectively, under 
consistent compared with inconsistent labels. 
In other words, lack of a consistent labelling effect might 
be due to the paradigm. 
Budoff and Siperstein (1978) went on the replicate 
Gottliebs first experiment on a larger group of 96 white 
6th grade low SES children, using more sensitive measures. 
However, they substituted audiotapes and photographs for the 
videos, used a new adjective checklist and activity 
preference scale and a rather different subject sample, so 
comparisons between the studies might well be invalid. 
In this case, both competence and the mentally retarded 
label elicited significant positive effects on the adjective 
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checklist, qualified by a significant interaction indicating 
that subjects were positive towards the competent child 
regardless of label but more positive towards the 
incompetent child when he was labelled. Results on the 
activity preference scale followed a similar pattern. 
Budoff and Siperstein go on to conclude that contrary to 
Gottlieb's (1974) subjects, their low SES sample "parallel" 
middle-class children in preferring competent to incompetent 
targets, although this conclusion seems to omit several 
definitely divergent findings, such as the significant 
positive main and interactive labelling effects compared 
with the insignificant negative additive effect that was 
shown by Gottlieb's middle-class group. In other words, 
instead of clarifying Gottlieb's (1974) study, Budoff and 
Siperstein,. (1978) seem to cloud the issue further. 
Siperstein and Gottlieb (1977) seem to exemplify further 
this apparent lack of direction. The 2x2 paradigm might 
not have yielded a significant negative labelling effect, 
they argued, because subjects might dismiss the label as 
incorrect in the dissonant condition. For this reason, the 
label was "cast" in terms of the physical stigmata of Down's 
syndrome, which they felt, subjects would be less able to 
ignore. 
Seventy-two school children heard what they thought was a 
normal or a mongol boy spelling competently or 
incompetently, then were asked to complete an adjective 
checklist and a social distance scale. Results yielded a 
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significant positive effect for competence and normal 
appearance on the former, but neither had an effect on the 
latter. The authors duly concluded that children's 
attitudes are affected by both academic competence and 
physical stigmata. 
No data were presented, so it is possible only to question 
the underlying logic. Gottlieb (1974) made it clear that 
the very purpose of the paradigm is to see whether the label 
influences judgements in the inconsistent condition. 
Indeed, Budoff and Siperstein (1978) make this absolutely 
explicit: 
The critical cell is the cognitively dissonant 
one: the labelled competent condition. The 
critical question is, how do children respond to a 
child called mentally retarded who performs 
competently? 
(p. 475) 
Within the framework of their paradigm, it follows that the 
apparent dismissal of the label in the competent condition 
leads to the conclusion that behaviour determines attitudes. 
Clearly, therefore, it does not make sense to introduce a 
further study at this point. 
Finally, yet another result was obtained by Budoff and 
Siperstein. (1982), who asked sixty-eight retarded children 
to listen to the tapes of competent and incompetent 
spelling. As usual, within each condition half were told 
the actor was mentally retarded and half that he was normal, 
and on this occasion, both incompetence and (perhaps 
ironically) the mentally retarded label had significant 
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negative effects on both measures. In Tajfellian terms, 
however, the differences between competent and incompetent 
targets on adjective rating and social distance scales of 
2.33 and . 36 units, increase to 11.30 and 3.43 under 
consistent compared with inconsistent labels, respectively. 
In other words, results might after all be in line with the 
previous studies. 
In summary, although it is agreed that different behaviours 
are likely to be associated with different labelling 
effects, from the present point of view, this is because 
they vary in relevance and play different roles in the 
constellation of beliefs associated with the label. 
Attempting to rank various behaviours in terms of their 
weights relative to the label, rests on the assumption that 
they have independent effects, which not only seems 
unlikely, but which also leads to a paradigm that seems to 
lack unifying and directive power. 
To end this journey on a note of concord, the position of 
MacMillan, Jones and Aloia (1974), "that the evidence does 
not support the conclusion that there is a detrimental 
labelling effect", is accepted, but, it is argued, 
meaningful and consistent labelling effects might be 
nevertheless observed if a Tajfellian paradigm were adopted. 
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4. STUDY 2 
THE EFFECT OF LABELLING FOUR NORMAL AND FOUR SUBNORMAL CHILDREN 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
What follows is an attempt to test empirically some of the 
foregoing suggestions, in an examination of the effect of 
the mentally retarded label from a Tajfellian perspective. 
This means that instead of individuals, a distribution of 
targets will be employed, and to complete the analogy with 
Tajfel and Wilkes' (1963) paradigm, they will be normal as 
well as subnormal. 
1. The central hypothesis is that perceived intraclass 
similarity and interclass dissimilarity of normal and 
subnormal children will be enhanced when they are - 
consistently labelled, compared to a control series 
when they are unlabelled. 
lb. Labelling effects are expected to be most marked 
on dimensions that are most relevant --that is, those 
correlating most closely with the classification, and 
lc- for dimensions on which beliefs about retardates 
are negative (as suggested by study 1), the increase in 
interclass difference is expected to result from a 
negative shift in the perceived subnormal group 
boundary, and it will be assumed, a reciprocal positive 
shift in that of the normal group. (Although beliefs 
associated with normal children were not examined in 
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the previous study, its measure was used as the basis 
of a questionnaire (Appendix 3.0) given as part of a 
follow-up of a cohort of over 14,000 children (CHES, 
1983) to a National, representative sample of special 
class teachers. Since attitudes to normal children 
were, in fact positive, there is some basis on*which to 
make such an assumption. ) 
ld. Labelling effects on dimensions on which beliefs 
about retardates are positive, are not expected because 
as Guskin (1963) showed, retardates were not widely 
differentiated from normals on such items, which are 
therefore unlikely to correlate with the 
class if ication. 
2. The second major hypothesis is that the impact of 
the labels on different Targets will vary according to 
their rank in the unlabelled Target distribution. The 
greatest effect is expected to be on the subnormal 
Target that is perceived most unlike the ideal 
retardate, or in practical terms, the subnormal Target 
receiving the most positive evaluation unlabelled, is 
likely to suffer the most negative labelling effect. 
On the other hand, since Study 1 revealed no maximally 
negative beliefs, responses towards the subnormal 
Target receiving the most negative evaluations might be 
"diluted". Little effect is expected for subnormal 
Targets who, in any case, receive judgements 
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characteristic of retardates. The mirror image of 
these predictions is expected to apply to the normal 
group. 
3. In an attempt to keep the work load manageable, 
only the most important between subject difference, 
personal acquaintance, will be incorporated as an 
independent variable. Since acquainted subjects are 
more experienced with retardates, they are expected to 
show more marked labelling effects. On the other hand, 
study 1 showed their attitudes were positive compared 
with those of unacquainted subjects. Thus enhanced 
intergroup differences are unlikely to involve such a 
marked negative shift in the subnormal group boundary. 
For this reason, inter and intra- group processes will 
be kept conceptually and analytically distinct. 
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4.2 METHOD 
Subjects 
a. The Pilot 
A dozen friends and colleagues including 2 psychologists, 2 
housewives, an actor, 2 postgraduate psychology students, an 
upholsterer, 2 cleaners, an antiques dealer and a waitress. 
Numbers of males and females were equal and ages ranged from 
21 to 65. 
b. The Experiment 
Seventy undergraduates nine weeks into a first year 
psychology course, approximately two-thirds of whom majored 
in other subjects, mainly zoology, botony, chemistry and 
mathematics. The number of males and females was 
approximately equal. 
Apparatus 
a. The Pilot 
15 slides of normal and subnormal children attending an 
assessment centre and 5 "family album" slides of normal 
children. 1 
b. The Experiment 
Selected slides of 8 normal and 4 subnormal children which 
are given in Appendix 3.1 and described more fully in the 
discussion section. A semantic differential of 42 items 
associated with the concept "retardates", which was adapted 
from the previous measure by adding "for age" where 
Thanks are due to Polly Perkin and Dr. Werner Schutt at The Tyndall 
Park Assessment Centre, Tyndall Park Road, Bristol and John Barrett 
at Bristol University's Department of Psychology. 
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appropriate (i. e. to items like "mature"), omitting 
references irrelevant to children, (like those relating to 
employment); reducing direct references to appearance and 
dropping items which seemed redundant. (See Appendix 3.2). 
Procedure 
a. The Pilot 
Subjects were simply shown all the slides in random order 
and asked to describe whether or not they thought the 
children were normal. (see discussion for more detail. ) 
b. The Experiment 
Subjects were instructed about the semantic differential as 
part of a lecture, then they were informed that they were to 
take part in a study of visual cues in person perception, in 
which they would see slides of eight children, whom they 
were to rate quickly and independently on provided 
differentials. 
Next, they were randomly assigned to one of four conditions. 
Condition 1 (n = 18,8 of whom were personally 
acquainted with a retardate). Slides 1 to 4 
(normal Targets) and 5 to 8 (subnormal Targets) 
were used, and no labels were employed. 
Condition 2, (n = 18,7 of whom were personally 
acquainted). As in condition 1, slides 1 to 8 
were used, but they were correctly labelled 
"normal" or "subnormal". 
Condition 3, (n = 16). Slides 1 to 4 and 9 to 12, 
all of normal children were used. and no labels 
were employed. 
Condition 4 (n = 18). As in condition 3. slides 1 
to 4 and 9 to 12 were used, but half were labelled 
"normal" and half "subnormal". 
Conditions 1 and 2, which form the main experiment, and 
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which are an analogue of Tajfel and Wilkes' (1963) paradigm, 
were run simultaneously by two assistants in separate rooms. 
Two days later, conditions 3 and 4, the subsidiary 
experiment were similarly run as an extra control, on the 
advice of Tajfel himself. Within each condition, the order 
of slides was randomised, and where appropriate, assistants 
introduced Targets as being normal or subnormal, in the 
latter case, going on to say, "in fact, he/she is mentally 
retarded". 
On completing the last semantic differential, subjects 
indicated whether they were personally acquainted with any 
retardate, (although one of the assistants forgot to collect 
this data in the subsidiary experiment) then handed in their 
booklets. 
Finally, they were shown all twelve slides in succession, 
and rated them for normality on an imaginary scale ranging 
from 0 to 200 with a central "averagely normal" score of 
100. 
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4.3 TREATMENT OF DATA AND RESULTS 
First hypothesis 
Mean semantic differential scores for each Target in the 
main experiment are given in Table 3.1, but are displayed 
more accessibly in Figure 3.1 which appears at the relevant 
point in the text (p. 190) and which which details variable 
names. 
Two measures were devised to analyse these data: 
a) The intergroup difference was defined as the difference 
between class boundaries - i. e. the lowest "normal" score 
minus the highest "subnormal" score for each subject. One 
factor completely randomised ANOVA, (BMDP7D), was then run 
on each variable to see if intergroup differences were 
greater in. the labelled compared to the unlabelled 
condition. Mean intergroup differences and significances 
are given in Table 3.1a, at the relevant point (p. 193). 
b) Similarly, standard deviations for normal and subnormal 
Targets gave measures of intragroup similarity for each 
subject. Two factor ANOVA, (BMDP2V), with a repeated 
measure on the first factor (normal/subnormal x label/no 
label) tested whether perceived intragroup similarity was 
greater in the labelled compared with the unlabelled 
condition. Mean intragroup similarities and significances 
are given in Table 3.1b (p. 197). 
Samples and justifications of analyses are given in Appendix 
3.3. 
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REIZ 3.1 
an smantic differential scores with and without labels 
NORMAL TARGETS SUBNORMAL TARGETS 
Target 1 Target 2 Target 3 Target 4 Target 5 Target 6 Target 7 Target 8 
unla'lab unla'lab unla'lab unla'lab unla'lab unla'lab unla'lab unla'lab 
1 2.72 2.39 3.94*2.94 4.22*3.17 5.06 4.33 5.56 4.89 6.06 6.11 4.39 5.06 5.39*6.33 
2 2.22 2.11 2.72 2.39 2.78 2.61 4.67*3.44 4.83 3.83 4.61 3.94 3.94 4.22 4.83 4.33 
3 2.28 2.22 2.89 2.44 3.72*2.67 5.11*3.44 4.56 4.33 3.72*3.44 4.67 4.56 4.44 4.17 
4 2.50 2.11 3.00 2.22 3.22 2.89 3.61 3.33 3.50 3.11 2.89 2.50 3.28 3.56 3.44 2.79 
5 1.89 1.94 2.94*2.11 2.50 1.94 4.72*3.17 4.89 4.17 4.78 4.06 4.17 3.83 4.50 4.83 
6 2.39 2.33 3.39 2.89 3.78*2.39 5.33*4.06 5.44 5.72 5.89 5.94 4.33 5.11 4.83 5.39 
7 2.28 2.06 3.11 2.61 2.67 2.56 4.67*3.17 5.50 5.22 5.67 5.44 3.83 3.94 5.22 5.67 
8 2.61 2.44 2.89 2.33 3.11 2.94 3.94 3.39 4.72 4.33 4.00 4.44 4.28 4.72 4.78 4.50 
9 2.33 2.61 3.06 2.44 3.67 2.94 4.83*3.78 5.56 5.22 5.33 5.61 4.22 4.67 5.39 5.56 
10 1.39 1.44 2.11 1.61 2.00 1.33 3.94*2.11 4.28 4.22 4.44 4.56 2.83 3.83 4.78 4.28 
11 1.83 1.94 2.50 2.22 3.17*2.11 3.61 3.39 4.28 4.06 3.56*4.28 3.56*4.17 3.78 4.11 
12 2.39 2.67 3.73*2.67 3.33 3.17 4.50*3.39 4.61 4.33 4.89 4.72 3.89 4.67 4.56 4.78 
13 3.28 3.22 3.39 3.44 4.17 3.56 3.94 4.22 4.72 4.44 4.39 4.78 3.94 4.61 4.61 5.28 
14 2.61 2.78 4.44*3.39 3.78 3.11 4.94*3.94 6.00 5.39 5.67 5.67 4.44 4.89 5.28 5.39 
15 2.28 3.06 3.22*2.39 3.28 2.78 5.22*3.50 5.61 5.11 5.61 5.94 3.78 4.39 4.83 5.72 
16 4.94 5.22 4.94 5.28 5.72 4.83 3.56*4.50 4.83 5.00 4.44*5.44 3.89 4.11 4.89 5.22 
17 2.72 3.22 3.33 2.78 3.78*2.89 4.78*3.67 5.39 4.89 4.83 4.67 4.44 4.83 4.56 5.33 
18 2.50 2.89 3.06 2.61 3.89*2.17 3.61 3.33 4.39 4.22 3.89 4.33 3.11 3.67 4.22 4.39 
19 2.67 2.78 3.56*2.78 3.17 2.94 4.89*3.89 5.56 5.00 5.28 5.06 4.06 4.89*5.22 5.56 
20 2.00 2.17 2.72 2.06 2.78 2.72 4.28 3.61 3.72 3.50 3.44 3.28 3.72 4.33 4.06 3.39 
21 2.39 2.44 3.28 2.61 3.89 2.94 4.94*4.11 5.39*3.94 4.94*4.33 4.39 4.28 4.61 4.61 
22 2.56 3.44 3.00 2.78 3.61*2.56 3.67 3.33 4.72 4.00 4.61 4.44 4.00 3.28 4.06 4.22 
23 1.89 2.22 2.11 1.83 2.89 2.22 3.22 2.83 3.17 2.89 3.06 3.67 2.72 3.39 3.33 3.67 
24 2.11 2.33 3.33*2.56 3.33*2.78 4.61*3.44 4.94 4.56 4.56 5.00 3.67 4.17 4.56 4.67 
25 2.22 2.44 3.44*2.28.3.39 2.67 5.00*3.61 5.94 5.33 5.67 5.89 3.50*4.50 5.39 5.56 
26 4.39 5.06 5.11 5.33 5.11 4.06 3.28 4.22 4.56 5.22 4.39 5.39 3.72 4.28 4.78 5.44 
27 2.94 3.00 3.78*2.94 2.83 3.28 4.56*3.78 4.33 4.06 4.17 4.28 4.22 4.33 4.33 4.17 
28 2.61 2.89 3.61 3.06 3.61 2.89 4.67*3.61 5.56 5.22 4.89 5.50 3.94*4.83 5.17 5.11 
29 2.61 2.78 3.61 3.00 3.28 2.50 3.94 3.33 5.72 4.94 4.33 4.94 3.50 4.39 4.61 4.94 
30 3.22 3.83 3.33 2.89 4.67 3.78 3.17 3.72 3.33 3.94 3.44 3.94 3.22 3.61 3.61 4.06 
31 3.89 4.22 4.28 4.11 4.44*3.50 4.67 3.94 5.67 5.44 5.39 5.56 4.28 4.50 5.44 5.44 
32 2.06 1.94 2.50 2.06 3.11 2.44 3.50 2.89 4.28 3.50 3.06 3.67 3.78 4.06 3.72 4.56 
33 3.33 4.11 3.72 3.50 4.56*3.06 4.44 4.00 5.28 5.28 5.28 5.28 4.61 4.22 4.67 5.50 
34 2.22 2.78 3.56 3.11 3.33 2.67 4.61*3.56 5.94 5.56 5.56 6.00 4.22 4.94 5.17 5.78 
35 1.61 2.06 2.39 2.00 2.94 2.22 5.17*3.72 5.78*4.56 5.00 5.33 3.22 3.22 5.28 5.17 
36 2.78 1.94 3.28 2.78 2.72 2.83 3.94 3.28 4.33*3.28 3.67 2.89 4.00 4.06 3.50 2.83 
37 2.50 2.72 3.56*2.56 4.56*2.83 4.56*3.11 5.22 4.83 5.11 5.33 3.83 4.44 4.89 5.39 
38 2.00*2.67 2.94 2.33 3.89*2.83 3.67 3.22 4.50 3.78 3.67 3.61 3.28 3.78 4.28 3.94 
39 2.28 2.67 3.28 3.06 4.11*3.17 4.44*3.50 5.00*3.94 4.61 3.78 3.94 3.94 4.56 3.78 
40 1.78 2.11 2.06 1.83 2.44 2.06 4.61*2.28 5.78 5.39 5.22 5.83 3.28*4.83 4.83 5.50 
41 3.06 3.00 4.06*3.06 3.94*2.83 4.72*3.67 4.72 4.72 4.28 4.17 3.72 4.06*4.61 4.28 
42 1.89 2.17 2.89*2.06 3.72*2.17 3.50*2.50 4.11 3.11 3.78 3.17 3.44 2.78 3.67 3.11 
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The equivalent data for the subsidiary experiment are given 
in Table 3.2 and Figure 3.2 and Tables32a and b. Since 
these are not central to the main hypotheses, however, they 
are grouped together at the end of this section. 
Mean perceived normality ratings for Targets 1 to 8 were 
calculated using data from subjects in unlabelled conditions 
only, with the following results: - 
Table3lc 
Mean perceived normality ratings 
Target Rating Rank 
1 116.3 1 
2 96.3 2 
3 95.8 3 
4 72.5 6 
5 58.8 8 
6 64.6 7 
7 95.0 4 
8 77.9 5 
Second Hypothesis 
Separate one factor analyses of variance were computed for 
each Target (using BMDP7D). An asterisk on Table 3.1 
indicates where labelled and unlabelled conditions differed 
at the 5% level or better, and the overall trend, in each 
case, was assessed using a sign test. 
For Target 1, "normal" had one significant negative effect, 
and overall, it produced negative shifts on 31/42 variables, 
p= . 002. 
For Targets 2 and 3, "normal" had 12 and 14 significant 
positive effects and overall, elicited positive shifts on 39 
and 40/42 variables, p<. 000l, respectively. 
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For Target 4 "normal" produced 24 significant positive and 1 
negative effect, and positive shifts on 38/42 variables 
overall, p (. 0001. 
Similarly, for Target 5, "mentally retarded" had 4 
significant positive effects and occasioned positive shifts 
on 36/40 variables overall (with two ties), p <. 0001. 
For Target 6, "mentally retarded" had 2 significant negative 
effects and produced negative shifts on 24/40 variables, p= 
. 13, NS. 
For Target 7, "mentally retarded" had 3 significant negative 
effects. Overall, there were negative shifts on 34/40 
items, p <. 0001. 
Finally, for Target 8, one variable distinguished 
significantly between conditions - in the negative 
direction, and overall, there were negative shifts on 26/40 
items, p =. 04. 
Third Hypothesis 
Table 33 gives mean scores for Targets 1 to 8 in labelled and 
unlabelled conditions separately for subjects with and 
without personal experience of retardates. 
- 180 - 
2IB1Z 3.3 
Semantic differential ýaoýea with and without lables 
acqua rated subjects 
.ý 
NORMAL TARGETS SUBNORMAL TARGETS 
Target 1 Target 2 Target 3 Target 4 Target 5 Target 6 Target 7 TargetS 
unla 'lab unla 'lab unla 'lab unla'lab unla 'lab unla 'lab unla 'lab unla' lab 
1 2.50 3.00 3.25 3.14 3.75 3.43 5.13 4.29 6.25 5.00 6.38 5.86 4.13 5.00 5.25 6.14 
2 2.13 2.57 2.88 2.71 2.63 2.57 4.75 3.71 5.50 3.71 4.38 4.14 4.00 3.71 4.63 4.00 
3 1.75 2.57 3.38 3.14 3.50 3.14 5.25 3.71 5.13 3.57 4.63 3.71 4.38 4.29 4.13 3.86 
4 2.13 2.43 2.88 2.86 3.13 3.14 3.50 3.86 3.75 2.14 3.00 2.86 3.25 3.14 3.50 2.14 
5 2.00 2.29 2.50 2.43 2.50 2.57 4.88 3.14 5.25 4.14 5.13 4.29 3.63 4.43 4.75 4.57 
6 2.00 2.71 3.25 3.43 3.50 2.86 5.50 3.86 5.63 5.57 5.88 5.71 3.75 5.14 4.13 5.00 
7 2.63 2.14 3.63 2.71 3.00 3.00 4.75 3.71 5.75 4.71 5.88 5.57 3.63 4.00 5.25 5.29 
8 2.75 2.71 3.13 2.71 2.75 3.43 4.00 3.43 4.63 3.57 4.00 4.57 3.75 4.86 4.75 4.43 
9 2.50 3.00 3.13 2.86 3.50 3.43 4.38 3.43 5.75 4.86 5.00 5.71 4.13 4.86 5.25 4.86 
10 1.63 1.86 2.13 2.00 1.63 1.71 3.75 2.57 4.38 3.86 5.00 3.71 2.63 4.00 4.50 3.86 
11 1.75 2.14 2.63 2.29 3.00 2.71 3.75 3.29 4.75 4.00 3.88 4.43 3.75 4.29 3.88 4.29 
12 2.38 2.71 3.88 2.71 3.63 3.29 4.63 3.57 4.38 3.86 4.75 4.29 3.88 5.00 4.25 4.57 
13 3.25 3.43 3.63 3.43 4.50 3.57 4.00 4.00 4.25 4.43 4.63 4.86 3.63 4.86 4.25 5.57 
14 2.63 3.14 4.50 3.71 3.88 3.43 5.00 3.71 6.00 5.14 5.75 4.86 3.75 4.71 5.38 4.43 
15 2.13 3.14 3.00 2.86 3.00 3.29 4.88 3.14 5.88 4.71 5.75 5.71 3.75 4.43 5.00 5.29 
16 4.75 5.71 5.50 5.00 6.00 5.57 4.00 4.29 5.13 4.71 4.00 5.14 3.63 4.57 4.38 5.00 
17 3.25 3.29 3.75 3.00 3.75 2.71 4.63 3.57 5.25 4.57 5.00 5.00 4.13 4.86 4.75 5.00 
18 2.63 3.14 3.00 3.14 3.88 2.71 4.00 3.29 4.13 4.14 3.63 4.57 2.88 4.00 4.13 4.86 
19 2.88 3.00 3.38 3.14 3.00 2.86 4.63 3.71 5.13 4.57 5.25 4.86 4.00 5.29 5.75 5.00 
20 2.38 2.57 2.63 2.43 2.50 3.00 4.63 3.57 4.13 3.29 3.50 3.43 3.88 3.86 3.88 3.14 
21 2.88 3.14 3.38 3.71 4.00 3.14 5.00 4.43 5.25 4.14 4.88 4.14 3.75 4.14 4.63 4.43 
22 2.63 3.43 3.38 3.14 3.88 3.14 4.38 3.00 5.00 3.71 4.75 3.86 3.38 3.14 4.13 4.14 
23 1.75 2.14 1.98 1.86 2.63 2.29 3.13 3.14 2.50 3.14 2.88 3.29 2.75 3.43 3.00 3.57 
24 2.75 2.57 3.50 2.86 3.25 2.86 5.13 3.71 5.13 4.43 4.88 4.57 3.50 4.14 4.88 4.29 
25 2.13 3.14 3.50 3.00 3.39 3.29 5.63 3.71 6.13 4.71 5.75 5.29 3.38 4.43 5.63 4.86 
26 4.00 4.86 5.75 5.43 5.88 4.43 3.63 3.86 4.25 5.14 3.89 5.00 3.00 4.71 4.88 5.29 
27 2.63 3.00 3.25 2.86 2.75 3.29 4.50 3.57 4.88 3.71 4.50 4.14 3.88 4.14 4.50 4.14 
28 2.63 3.14 3.75 3.57 3.75 3.29 4.63 3.86 5.50 4.57 4.88 4.86 3.50 4.71 5.38 4.57 
29 2.63 3.29 4.00 3.57 3.13 2.71 4.13 3.29 5.75 4.71 4.13 4.71 3.25 4.57 4.50 4.71 
30 3.25 4.14 3.88 3.43 4.38 3.86 3.63 4.14 3.50 3.57 3.25 4.14 3.00 3.57 3.75 4.57 
31 4.38 4.14 4.38 4.57 4.50 4.29 4.63 3.71 5.63 5.57 5.75 5.43 4.13 4.71 5.25 5.43 
32 2.50 2.14 3.00 2.57 3.00 2.86 4.13 2.86 3.75 3.00 3.13 3.43 3.63 3.57 3.38 4.43 
33 3.50 4.29 3.88 3.57 4.88 3.14 4.50 3.57 5.25 5.14 5.25 4.86 4.38 3.86 4.50 5.43 
34 2.25 3.14 3.75 3.57 3.50 3.29 4.88 3.57 5.75 5.29 6.00 5.86 3.88 4.71 5.13 5.14 
35 1.75 2.00 2.00 2.14 2.75 2.57 5.63 4.00 5.75 5.00 5.00 5.29 2.63 3.29 5.00 4.86 
36 1.88 2.29 3.38 3.43 2.13 2.71 3.88 3.29 4.50 3.29 3.25 3.29 3.38 3.57 3.50 2.57 
37 3.25 2.86 4.00 2.86 4.25 3.14 4.75 3.29 5.13 4.57 5.25 5.14 3.50 4.43 5.00 5.29 
38 2.13 3.14 3.38 3.29 3.50 3.29 4.38 3.43 4.25 3.71 4.00 3.71 3.13 3.86 4.50 3.86 
39 2.75 3.00 3.63 3.29 3.75 3.29 4.63 3.86 4.63 3.86 4.13 4.14 3.50 3.86 4.75 3.71 
40 1.50 2.71 2.25 2.29 2.38 2.00 5.00 2.71 5.63 5.14 5.50 5.43 2.88 4.86 4.88 4.57 
41 3.38 3.29 4.50 3.29 3.63 3.14 4.63 3.29 4.63 4.71 4.63 4.43 3.75 4.00 4.88 4.29 
42 2.63 2.71 3.38 2.86 3.25 2.57 3.63 3.29 3.88 3.43 3.75 3.43 3.50 3.00 4.00 3.29 
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Ye a 3.3 (Contlaind) i týo quaist btl wbjec ta 
NORMAL TARGETS SUBNORMAL TARG ETS 
Target 1 Target 2 Target 3 Target 4 Target 5 Target 6 Target 7 TargetS 
unla 'lab unla 'lab unla 'lab unla 'lab unla 'lab unla 'lab unla 'lab unlab'lab 
1 2.90 2.00 4.50 2.82 4.60 3.00 5.00 4.36 5.00 4.82 5.80 6.27 4.60 5.09 5.50 6.45 
2 2.30 1.82 2.60 2.18 2.90 2.64 4.60 3.27 4.30 3.91 4.80 3.82 3.90 4.55 5.00 4.55 
3 2.70 2.00 2.50 2.00 3.90 2.36 5.00 3.27 4.10 4.82 3.00 3.27 4.90 4.73 4.70 4.36 
4 2.80 1.91 3.10 1.82 3.30 2.73 3.70 3.00 3.30 3.73 2.80 2.27 3.30 3.82 3.40 3.18 
5 1.80 1.73 3.30 1.91 2.50 1.55 4.60 3.18 4.60 4.18 4.50 3.91 4.60 3.45 4.30 5.00 
6 2.70 2.09 3.50 2.55 4.00 2.09 5.20 4.18 5.30 5.82 5.90 6.09 4.80 5.09 5.40 5.64 
7 2.00 2.00 2.70 2.55 2.40 2.27 4.60 2.82 5.30 5.55 5.50 5.36 4.00 3.91 5.20 5.91 
8 2.50 2.27 2.70 2.09 3.40 2.64 3.90 3.36 4.80 4.82 4.00 4.36 4.70 4.64 4.80 4.55 
9 2.20 2.36 3.00 2.18 3.80 2.64 5.20 4.00 5.40 5.45 5.60 5.55 4.30 4.55 5.50 6.00 
10 1.20 1.18 2.10 1.36 2.30 1.09 4.10 1.82 4.20 4.45 4.00 5.09 3.00 3.73 5.00 4.55 
11 1.90 1.82 2.40 2.18 3.30 1.73 3.50 3.45 3.90 4.09 3.30 4.18 3.40 4.09 3.70 4.00 
12 2.40 2.64 3.60 2.64 3.10 3.09 4.40 3.27 4.80 4.64 5.00 5.00 3.90 4.45 4.80 4.91 
13 3.30 3.09 3.20 3.45 3.90 3.55 3.90 4.36 5.10 4.45 4.20 4.73 4.20 4.45 4.90 5.09 
14 2.60 2.55 4.40 3.18 3.70 2.91 4.90 4.09 6.00 5.55 5.60 6.18 5.00 5.00 5.20 6.00 
15 2.40 3.00 3.40 2.09 3.50 2.45 5.50 3.73 5.40 5.36 5.50 6.09 3.80 4.36 4.70 6.00 
16 5.10 4.91 4.50 5.45 5.50 4.36 3.20 4.64 4.60 5.18 4.80 5.64 4.10 3.82 5.30 5.36 
17 2.30 3.18 3.00 2.64 3.80 3.00 4.90 3.73 5.50 5.09 4.70 4.45 4.70 4.82 4.40 5.55 
18 2.40 2.73 3.10 2.27 3.90 1.82 3.30 3.36 4.60 4.27 4.10 4.18 3.30 3.45 4.30 4.09 
19 2.50 2.64 3.70 2.55 3.30 3.00 5.10 4.00 5.90 5.27 5.30 5.18 4.10 4.64 4.80 5.91 
20 1.70 1.91 2.80 1.82 3.00 2.55 4.00 3.64 3.40 3.64 3.40 3.18 3.60 4.64 4.20 3.55 
21 2.00 2.00 3.20 1.91 3.80 2.82 4.90 3.91 5.50 3.82 5.00 4.45 4.90 4.36 4.60 4.73 
22 2.50 3.45 2.70 2.55 3.40 2.18 3.10 3.55 4.50 4.18 4.50 4.82 4.50 3.36 4.00 4.27 
23 2.00 2.27 2.30 1.82 3.10 2.18 3.30 2.64 3.70 2.73 3.20 3.91 2.70 3.36 3.60 3.73 
24 1.60 2.18 3.20 2.36 3.40 2.73 4.20 3.27 4.80 4.64 4.30 5.27 3.80 4.18 4.30 4.91 
25 2.30 2.00 3.40 1.82 3.40 2.27 4.50 3.55 5.80 5.73 5.60 6.27 3.60 4.55 5.20 6.00 
26 4.70 5.18 4.60 5.27 4.50 3.82 3.00 4.45 4.80 5.27 4.80 5.64 4.30 4.00 4.70 5.55 
27 3.20 3.00 4.20 3.00 2.90 3.27 4.60 3.91 3.90 4.27 3.90 4.36 4.50 4.45 4.20 4.18 
28 2.60 2.73 3.50 2.73 3.50 2.64 4.70 3.45 5.60 5.64 4.90 5.91 4.30 4.91 5.00 5.45 
29 2.60 2.45 3.30 2.64 3.40 2.36 3.80 3.36 5.70 5.09 4.50 5.09 3.70 4.27 4.70 5.09 
30 3.20 3.64 2.90 2.55 4.90 3.73 2.80 3.45 3.20 4.18 3.60 3.82 3.40 3.64 3.50 3.73 
31 3.50 4.27 4.20 3.82 4.40 3.00 4.70 4.09 5.70 5.36 5.10 5.64 4.40 4.36 5.60 5.45 
32 1.70 1.82 2.10 1.73 3.20 2.18 3.00 2.91 4.70 3.82 3.00 3.82 3.90 4.36 4.00 4.64 
33 3.20 4.00 3.60 3.45 4.30 3.00 4.40 4.27 5.30 5.36 5.30 5.55 4.80 4.45 4.80 5.55 
34 2.20 2.55 3.40 2.82 3.20 2.27 4.40 3.55 6.10 5.73 5.20 6.09 4.50 5.09 5.20 6.18 
35 1.50 2.09 2.70 1.91 3.10 2.00 4.80 3.55 5.80 4.27 5.00 5.36 3.70 3.18 5.50 5.36 
36 3.50 1.73 3.20 2.36 3.20 2.91 4.00 3.27 4.20 3.27 4.00 2.64 4.50 4.36 3.50 3.00 
37 1.90 2.64 3.20 2.36 4.80 2.64 4.40 3.00 5.30 5.00 5.00 5.45 4.10 4.45 4.80 5.45 
38 1.90 2.36 2.60 1.73 4.20 2.55 3.10 3.09 4.70 3.82 3.40 3.55 3.40 3.73 4.10 4.00 
39 1.90 2.45 3.00 2.91 4.40 3.09 4.30 3.27 5.30 4.00 5.00 3.55 4.30 4.00 4.40 3.82 
40 2.00 1.73 1.90 1.55 2.50 2.09 4.30 2.00 5.90 5.55 5.00 6.09 3.60 4.82 4.80 6.09 
41 2.80 2.82 3.70 2.91 4.20 2.64 4.80 3.91 4.80 4.73 4.00 4.00 3.70 4.09 4.40 4.27 
42 1.30 1.82 2.50 1.55 4.10 1.91 3.40 2.00 4.30 2.91 3.80 3.00 3.40 2.64 3.40 3.00 
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Table 3.3a gives mean intergroup differences in the two 
conditions for each group. These were analysed using 2 
factor (experience x condition) completely randomised ANOVA 
(BMDP2V) and the relevant significance levels have been 
included in the table. 
Table3.3b gives mean intragroup similarities in the two 
conditions for each group. These were analysed using 3 
factor ANOVA (also BMDP2V) with a repeated measure on the 
third (experience x condition x Target type). Again, 
relevant significances are included in the table and Tables 
3.3a and 3.3b are inserted in the text, (p. 222 and 224). 
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TABLE 3.2 
Mean judgements of 8 normal chi3dren labelled and-un label led 
"NORMAL LABEL GROUP" "SUBNORMAL LABEL GROUP" 
Target 1 Target 2 Target 9 Target 11 Target 3 Target 4 Target 10 Target 12 
unla lab' unla lab' unla lab' unla lab' unla lab' unla lab' unla lab' unla lab' 
1 3.63 3.94 4.56 4.44 4.50 3.44 3.81 3.72 5.25 4.17 5.63 5.00 4.94 4.44 3.88 3.56 
2 3.50 2.67 2.44 3.06 4.88 4.39 2.94 2.50 4.75 3.83 5.31 4.44 4.44.3.11 2.19 3.06 
3 3.50 3.28 3.06 3.11 4.88 4.50 3.13 2.94 5.50 4.28 5.06 3.94 3.88 3.56 3.38 3.11 
4 3.44 2.61 2.50 2.44 3.69 4.00 2.50 2.28 4.25 3.39 3.94 3.72 3.25 2.44 2.50 2.94 
5 2.63 2.56 2.88 3.00 3.69 3.22 2.50 2.11 3.94 3.28 4.75 4.11 3.31 2.89 2.44 2.50 
6 3.44 3.67 4.13 4.17 3.63 2.94 2.69 3.39 4.69 4.22 5.50 5.28 5.00 4.83 3.63 2.89 
7 3.06 3.33 3.63 3.72 3.81 3.22 2.88 3.17 3'. 81 3.72 4.75 4.39 4.50 3.94 3.94 3.11 
8 3.25 3.44 3.19 3.17 4.94 4.33 3.38 2.83 4.81 4.28 5.13 4.22 4.19 3.61 3.25 3.33 
9 3.63 4.17 4.31 3.61 4.44 3.06 3.19 4.17 5.50 4.28 5.63 4.67 5.13 4.61 4.44 3.39 
10 2.00 2.28 2.13 2.78 2.63 2.22 1.69 1.61 3.56 2.72 4.19 4.17 2.56 2.39 1.81 2.06 
11 2.69 2.72 2.56 2.72 3.44 2.94 2.56 2.78 4.19 3.50 4.13 3.83 3.25 3.56 2.00 3.00 
12 3.56 3.39 3.63 3.61 4.75 4.44 3.38 3.00 5.06 4.06 5.25 4.78 3.88 4.00 3.31 3.50 
13 4.31 3.89 3.63 4.39 4.88 3.89 3.00 3.33 4.94 4.61 4.50 5.06 4.63 4.72 3.25 3.83 
14 3.69 3.83 4.00 3.72 4.56 3.33 3.31 4.28 4.38 4.28 5.38 5.17 4.63 4.94 3.94 4.28 
15 3.13 3.89 3.13 3.44 3.56 3.00 3.69 4.00 4.75 4.28 5.50 4.89 4.69 4.89 3.19 3.50 
16 4.19 5.39 4.69 5.00 3.13 3.06 4.25 5.11 5.19 3.67 4.50 4.33 4.88 4.76 4.94 5.33 
17 3.81 3.67 3.56 3.61 5.13 4.33 3.50 3.50 5.13 4.61 5.13 4.72 4.44 4.72 3.06 3.33 
18 3.56 3.61 3.25 3.50 2.94 2.94 2.88 2.89 4.44 3.61 4.44 4.06 4.13 3.67 3.38 2.83 
19 3.44 3.44 3.63 3.67 4.94 3.94 3.75 3.72 4.88 4.78 5.69 4.89 4.81 4.72 3.75 3.56 
"20 3.31 2.72 2.44 2.67 4.88 4.17 2.88 2.17 4.56 3.61 4.69 4.11 3.81 2.94 2.13 2.44 
21 3.38 3.94 3.19 3.11 3.94 3.72 3.44 2.78 4.56 3.61 4.69 4.11 3.75 3.61 2.88 3.00 
22 3.31 3.28 3.81 3.00 3.75 2.89 3.06 2.67 4.38 3.39 5.00 3.72 4.13 2.33 3.00 2.89v 
23 2.69 2.28 2.69 2.28 3.31 2.61 2.44 1.83 3.75 2.94 4.00 3.17 3.06 2.67 2.00 2.11 
24 3.19 3.17 2.88 3.00 3.88 3.39 2.81 3.17 4.50 3.83 4.50 4.22 3.88 3.89 3.06 3.11 
25 3.00 3.28 3.13 3.28 3.38 2.78 2.75 3.89 4.63 4.17 5.25 5.11 4.56 4.67 3.13 3.44 
26 4.88 4.78 5.19 4.89 4.81 3.28 4.19 4.72 5.38 4.50 4.88 4.33 4.94 5.17 5.25 4.89 
27 3.06 3.33 3.13 3.33 4.25 3.83 3.44 3.33 4.56 4.50 4.69 4.28 4.00 4.06 2.81 3.17 
28 3.75 3.94 3.75 3.67 4.31 3.11 3.31 4.11 5.06 4.28 5.50 4.61 5.06 4.67 4.31 3.39 
29 3.63 4.00 4.13 3.67 3.44 2.61 2.69 3.06 4.44 3.89 5.06 4.44 4.19 4.22 3.50 3.44 
30 3.69 4.11 3.38 3.17 3.81 3.44 3.13 3.83 5.19 3.22 3.75 3.89 3.75 3.39 3.00 3.67 
31 3.81 4.78 4.88 4.67 4.44 3.50 3.94 4.67 5.00 4.11 5.44 5.17 5.25 4.83 4.63 4.00 
32 2.63 2.39 2.06 2.89 3.25 3.17 2.75 2.50 4.19 3.33 3.75 3.44 3.38 2.72 2.50 2.72 
33 4.13 4.89 4.19 4.61 3.88 3.94 3.06 3.94 5.25 4.17 5.06 4.67 5.25 4.83 3.50 4.44 
34 3.69 3.50 3.25 3.61 4.69 3.67 3.63 3.50 5.19 4.33 5.44 5.11 4.75 4.72 2.94 3.44 
35 3.38 2.50 2.25 2.67 2.56 2.06 2.25 1.94 4.25 2.94 5.81 5.22 4.25 2.17 1.94 2.44 
36 2.88 2.83 2.50 2.78 3.81 3.94 3.44 2.28 3.19 3,33 4.19 3.28 3.06 3.17 2.38 2.61 
37 3.31 3.89 3.88 3.67 4.19 3.44 3.00 3.17 5.06 3.89 5.06 4.39 4.38 4.39 3.25 3.44 
38 3.19 3.22 3.13 2.94 3.56 3.33 2.56 2.72 4.13 3.33 4.06 3.67 3.13 3.39 2.63 2.94 
39 2.88 3.61 3.81 3.56 3.94 3.28 2.69 2.72 4.81 3.61 4.38 3.83 3.69 3.11 3.06 3.61 
40 2.81 2.78 2.19 3.11 3.00 2.78 2.38 3.22 4.06 3.56 5.06 4.72 3.06 4.28 2.19 2.67 
41 3.30 3.94 3.81 4.06 4.38 3.78 3.25 3.11 4.69 3.72 4.69 4.56 4.25 4.06 3.63 4.00 




Intergroup differences when all Targets were normal 
Item Unlabelled Labelled 
agile/poorly coordinated -1.31 -1.39 
chatty/uncommunicative -3.00 -2.22 
secure/insecure -2.75 -1.94 
loving/cold -1.88 -2.17 
healthy/illness prone -1.88 -1.67 
speech clear/unclear -1.31 -0.94 
takes care of self/dependent -2.06 -1.39 
contented/frustrated -2.13 -2.00 
good/bad at concentrating -1.88 -2.17 
physically normal/h'capped -1.13 -1.11 
family's pride/shame -1.50 -1.00 
easy/hard to relate to -1.94 -1.56 89 -0 001 predictable/unpredictable -2.69 . . 
mature/childish for age -2.00 -1.44 
quick learner/slow learner -1.81 -2.06 
quiet/noisy -2.19 -2.83 
well/poorly understood -2.19 -1.72 
not embarrassing/embarrassing -1.56 -1.39 05 
good/bad self expression -2.38 -1.28 00 -2 
. 05 happy/sad -2.94 . . 
attractive/unattractive -1.63 -2.11 
clean/dirty -1.56 -1.44 
not frightening/frightening -1.63 -0.94 
asset/burden ' -1.56 -1.22 
high/low intelligence -1.38 -1.78 
calm, stable/excitable -2.00 -1.89 
high/low self esteem -1.88 -1.22 
clear/confused thinker -1.75 -1.50 
knowing/not knowing right -1.38 -1.56 
not aggressive/aggressive -2.06 -2.50 50 -1 careful/accident prone -1.13 . 06 -1 . 04 wanted/unwanted -1.88 . 61 -1 tidy/untidy -1.56 . 17 -1 . 04 socially skilled/inept -2.25 . 67 -1 normal/strange face -2.00 . 44 -2 wanting/unwilling to join in -2.81 . 56 -1 easy/strain for family -1.50 . 22 -1 nice/nasty to live with -1.44 . 56 -1 helpful/obstructive -1.19 . 22 -2 normal/abnormal -1.69 . 78 -1 sensitive/insensitive -2.00 . 28 -1 welcome/unwelcome -1.06 . 
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TABLE 3.2b 
Intlägroup Simi 7aritiea when all Targets are r xr a1 
UNLABET. I. ED 
"normal" "subnormal" 
agile/poorly coordinated 0.95 0.89 0.83 0.81 
chatty/uncommunicative 1.48 1.30 0.99 1.09 . 008 
secure/insecure 1.29 1.32 0.95 0.90 . 03 
loving/cold 0.80 1.09 0.88 0.91 
healthy/illness prone 1.02 1.10 0.78 1.16 
speech clear/unclear 1.14 0.97 0.84 0.89 
takes care of self/dependent 1.06 1.20 0.80 0.84 . 03 
contented/frustrated 1.03 0.96 0.84 0.99 
good/bad at concentrating 1.27 0.86 0.96 1.06 
physically normal/h'capped 0.75 1.08 0.55 1.13 
family's pride/shame 0.83 0.96 0.39 0.78 . 03 
easy/hard to relate to 1.03 1.00 0.77 0.88 
predictable/unpredictable 1.28 1.13 0.65 0.80 . 0007 
mature/childish for age 1.07 1.01 0.84 0.74 
quick learner/slow learner 1.07 1.11 0.95 1.07 
quiet/noisy 1.20 1.08 1.18 0.97 
well/poorly understood 1.19 1.00 0.87 0.90 
not embarrassing/embarrassing 0.98 0.77 0.73 0.69 
good/bad self expression 1.30 1.09 0.83 0.80 . 01 
happy/sad 1.36 1.08 0.98 0.99 
attractive/unattractive 0.93 0.88 0.87 " 0.80 
clean/dirty 1.08 0.86 0.47 0.76 . 02 
not frightening/frightening 0.92 0.94 0.45 0.82 
asset/burden 0.88 0.77 0.56 0.79 
high/low intelligence 0.95 1.02 0.89 0.99 
calm, stable/excitable 1.12 0.87 1.03 0.76 
high/low self esteem 0.98 0.90 0.70 0.72 
clear/confused thinker 1.13 0.96 0.84 0.84 
knowing/not knowing right 1.05 1.07 0.81 0.86 
not aggressive/aggressive 1.20 1.03 0.87 0.87 
careful/accident prone 0.95 0.74 1.00 0.68 
wanted/unwanted 0.85 1.05 0.53 0.62 . 004 
tidy/untidy 1.21 0.87 0.88 0.76 
socially skilled/inept 1.19 1.04 0.69 0.82 . 04 
normal/strange face 1.13 1.49 0.70 1.58 
wanting/unwilling to join in 1.26 1.10 1.09 1.06 
easy/strain for family 1.13 0.96 0.81 0.80 
nice/nasty to live with 0.79 0.75 0.57 0.59 
helpful/obstructive 0.92 0.86 0.74 0.82 
normal/abnormal 0.85 1.31 0.99 1.19 
sensitive/insensitive 1.13 0.80 0.83 0.89 
welcome/unwelcome 0.67 0.79 0.50 0.71 
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" 4.4 DISCUSSION 
Four normal and four subnormal Targets for conditions 1 and 
2 were selected from a set of 15 slides of children 
attending a child assessment centre in Bristol. This 
provided the first lesson, since three of the four 
provisionally selected on the basis of apparent normality, 
it transpired, had been diagnosed subnormal, and similarly, 
one of the four apparently subnormal Targets was normal. 
This vindicated the argument that most subnormal children do 
not present obvious visual cues (Gottlieb, 1975a; Burden, 
1977), but also meant that it was not feasible to use 
Targets whose retardation varied by consistent amounts on 
some "objective" criterion, like IQ, in the same way that 
Tajfel and Wilkes' stimuli varied in absolute length. 
Instead, perceived normality had to be used. This was 
serious, because the study entailed an unavoidable design 
problem: quite simply, if patently subnormal Targets were 
used, subjects most probably would categorise them for 
themselves in the unlabelled condition, whereas normal 
looking subnormal targets would not be perceived to 
correlate with the classification in the labelled condition. 
A solution was reached by means of the pilot study in which 
a dozen subjects simply gave verbal subnormality ratings of 
the available slides. On this basis, the selected 
distribution ranged from extremely subnormal to 
"supernormal", although none of the subnormal group 
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presented intrusive stigma or was deformed, in the hope that 
implicit labelling would not be triggered. It is, of 
course, acknowledged that the set of slides could have some 
bearing on results and that replications of the experiment 
would be wise. For instance, although elimination of 
stigmatised children and the pilot study meant few choices 
had to be made, selections ostensibly made on the basis of 
the slides' clarity, might have been influenced by 
experimenter bias. Indeed, the whole set of available 
slides might have been determined by children's appeal, 
interest as cases or some other factor. The four normal 
Targets, however (numbers 1,2,3 and 4) included one who 
looked subnormal (number 4), and similarly, the four 
subnormal Targets (numbers 5,6,7 and 8) included one who 
appeared normal, (number 7), despite the fact that the 
overlap p would weaken the perceived correlation with the 
classification, because it introduced a measure of 
ecological validity into the study and allowed the 
hypothesis that labels would have the greatest effect where 
cues are minimal, to be tested. Finally, because relative 
differences rather than absolute judgements were of 
interest, no attempt was made to standardise Target slides. 
In case activities and backgrounds interact with labels, 
however, a replication using neutral "portrait" shots might 
again be wise. Copies of the 8 slides are given in Appendix 
3.1. 
In, parenthesis, it is worth noting that the pilot also 
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provided a second lesson. Two of the dozen subjects had had 
professional experience with retardates, and interestingly, 
these seemed more likely to give "subnormal" ratings, 
interpreting, for example, the angle at which a sleeping 
child's hand lay as a clue. The net result was that they 
missed fewer retardates but also misjudged more normals. Of 
course, the numbers are too small to be of significance, but 
they are consistent with Tajfel and Wilkes' subsidiary 
hypothesis that experience increases susceptibility to 
labels, and as will be fully discussed in the following 
chapter, they are consistent with. the idea that 
professionals evince greater evaluative bias. 
Mean labelled and unlabelled semantic differential scores on 
the 42 focal dimensions are given for each Target in Table 
3.1. These are displayed as profiles in Figure 3.1, which 
although complex, shows clear intragroup convergence and 
intergroup divergence on the majority of items in the 
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Clearly, the 4 subnormal children were judged more like each 
other and less like the 4 normal children when they were 
labelled, and similarly, the 4 normal children were judged 
more like each other and less like the subnormal group. 
Thus, classification has affected perception 
stereotypically, and informally, the first and central 
hypothesis has been confirmed. 
More formally, Table 3.1a shows that the interclass 
difference increased on every single variable in the 
labelled compared with the unlabelled condition, which, in 
practical terms, has meant that labelling reduced or 
reversed the overlap between the classes. ANOVA showed that 
this was significant on the majority, (26/42), and with 2 
exceptions, the expected positive and negative shifts for 
normal and subnormal class boundaries, respectively, also 
occurred on each of these. (On "sensitive/insensitive to 
others", and "welcome/unwelcome next door", there were large 
and tiny positive shifts, respectively. ) 
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TABLE 3. la 
Perceived intergroup differences 
Item Labelled Unlabelled p 
agile/poorly coordinated -0.11 -1.50 . 02 
chatty/uncommunicative -1.28 -1.72 
secure/insecure -0.83 -3.06 . 0002 
loving/cold ' -1.78 -2.50 
healthy/illness prone -0.17 -1.78 . 01 
speech clear/unclear -0.06 -1.94 . 005 
takes care of self/dependent -0.06 -1.89 . 002 
contented/frustrated -0.67 -1.61 
good/bad at concentrating 0.06 -1.56 . 02 
physically normal/h'capped 0.72 -1.83 . 0007 
family's pride/shame -0.17 -1.28 
easy/hard to relate to -0.44 -1.89 . 01 
predictable/unpredictable -0.89 -2.00 . 04 
mature/childish for age -0.06 -1.39 . 02 
quick learner/slow learner 0.56 -1.78 . 0002 
quiet/noisy -2.78 -3.33 
well/poorly understood -0.28 -1.61 . 04 
not embarrassing/embarrassing -0.33 -2.28 . 0004 
good/bad self expression -0.17 -1.33 . 02 
happy/sad -1.28 -1.83 
attractive/unattractivefriend -1.06 -1.56 
clean/dirty -1.33 -1.50 
not frightening/frightening -0.94 -1.94 
asset/burden 0.28 -1.72 . 0002 
high/low intelligence 0.72 -1.72 . 0002 
calm, stable/excitable -2.06 -3.00 . 03 
high/low self esteem -0.06 -1.50 . 003 
clear/confused thinker 0.22 -1.78 <. 0001 
knowing/not knowing right 0.06 -1.61 . 0022 
not aggressive/aggressive -2.11 -2.78 
careful/accident prone -0.89 -1.78 
wanted/unwanted -0.17 -2.06 . 003 
tidy/untidy -1.11 -2.06 
socially skilled/inept 1.00 -1.00 . 002 
normal/strange face -1.67 -2.33 
wanting/unwilling to join in -2.00 -2.44 
easy/strain for family 0.28 -2.11 . 0001 
nice/nasty to live with -0.83 -1.61 
helpful/obstructive* -1.56 -1.83 
normal/abnormal 1.28 -1.83 . 0001 
sensitive/insensitive -0.78 -2.22 . 004 
welcome/unwelcome -0.39 -1.50 . 02 
The 16 items on which interclass difference was only in- 
significantly increased, included "chatty/incommunicative", 
"loving/cold", "happy/sad", "clean/dirty", "wanting/not 
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wanting to join in" and "helpful/obstructive". Since these 
are items on which positive beliefs were expressed in Study 
1, it is likely that although they are associated with 
retardates, they do not distinguish between retardates and 
normals. Put another way, in accordance with hypothesis ld, 
they do no correlate with the classification. Clearly, an 
empirical examination of distinguishing (as opposed to 
associated) items would be a useful topic for further 
research, and would, hopefully, confirm this interpretation. 
This also implies of course, that the bulk of items defining 
the social meaning of "retardates" are those that 
distinguish them negatively from normal, a serendipidous 
fact for the present study. 
Interclass divergence was also not significantly increased l 
on "not frightening/frightening", "noisy/quiet", 
"careful/accident prone", "attractive friend/unattractive", 
"not aggressive/aggressive" and "contented/frustrated". 
Although Study 1 suggested that retardates are associated 
with the negative, and intuitively, normals might be 
associated with the positive poles of these items, it seems 
likely that any correlation with the classification 
normal/subnormal, was ineffectual in the present context, 
because all the Targets were children and likely all to be 
perceived as noisy, not frightening and so on to subjects. 
Similarly, contextual interactions are likely to account for 
the lack of a significant increase in interclass divergence 
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on "tidy/untidy" and "normal/abnormal face", since labels 
are less likely to be informative for explicitly visual 
judgements made from slides. Having made this point, the 
normal class boundary on the latter variable was defined by 
a girl whose chubby puzzled face appeared more subnormal 
than the little boy who bounded the subnormal class. Hence, 
the substantial, if insignificant reduction of interclass 
overlap in the face of what Yoshida and Meyers (1975) would 
have called "first hand evidence", attests to the powerful 
impact of the labels. 
This leaves "family's pride/family's shame" and "nice/nasty 
to live with". Figure 3.1 shows the increase in interclass 
divergence for the former was substantial and since it 
borders on signficance (p = . 06), further dicussion does not 
seem warranted. In Study 1, mean beliefs on the latter were 
precisely at the neutral point in the semantic differential 
scale, and therefore, this variable was probably irrelevant. 
On the other side of the coin, interclass divergence showed 
a significant increase at or beyond the . 0001 level on 
3 
items, "normal/abnormal", which may be assumed a priori to 
be almost perfectly correlated with the normal/retarded 
classification, "clear/confused thinker" and "strain/easy 
for the family". which in Study 1 were among the-items most 
closely associated with retardates. 
As Table 3. lb shows, perceived intraclass similarity 
followed a similar pattern: overall, it increased on every 
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single variable as a function of the labels. In this case, 
however, both analyses and results are less straightforward. 
ANOVA with one between subject factor (label vs no label) 
and one within (normal vs subnormal group) showed that 
labelling had a significant main effect on only 22 variables 
- just over half. (Probabilities are included in Table 
3.1b. ) Fortunately - and presumably for the same reasons, 
the 20 exceptions correspond almost perfectly with the items 
on which interclass difference was not significantly 
increased. I 
r, 
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TABIZ 3.1b 
]gyp 1ntra m ginslari lea 
Labelled Unlabelled 
Item Normal Subnormal Normal Subno rmal 
agile/poorly coordinated 0.90 0.95 1.24 0.96 
chatty/uncommunicative 1.02 1.11 1.35 0.96 
secure/insecure 0.76 0.91 1.68 1.23 . 0002* 
loving/cold 0.79 1.01 1.24 0.83* 
healthy/illness prone 0.74 0.80 1.39 0.99 . 004 
speech clear/unclear 1.05 0.77 1.49 1.00 . 02 
takes care of self/dependent 0.71 1.08 1.37* 1.19 . 004* 
contented/frustrated 0.92 0.87 1.00 1.10 
good/bad at concentrating 0.87 0.74 1.40 0.87 . 02* 
physically normal/h'capped 0.43 0.98 1.28 1.36 . 0008 
family's pride/shame 0.74 0.66 1.09 0.90 . 03 
easy/hard to relate to 0.67 0.88 1.19 1.02 . 01* 
predictable/unpredictable 0.82 0.84 0.86 - 1.20 
mature/childish for age 0.67 0.80 1.26 0.90 . 002 
quick learner/slow learner 0.73 0.74 1.36 0.99 . 0004 
quiet/noisy 1.01 1.11 1.27 1.19 
well/poorly understood 0.77 0.90 1.13 0.93 
not embarrassing/embarrassing 0.66 0.72 1.22 0.90 . 005 
good/bad self expression 0.85 0.87 1.10 0.99 
happy/sad 0.88 0.89 1.11 0.94 
attractive/unattractive 0.89 0.76 1.25 0.85 
clean/dirty 0.92 0.75 1.13 0.95 
not frightening/frightening 0.72 0.80 1.02 0.91 
asset/burden 0.60 0.63 1.22 0.94 . 0007 
high/low intelligence 0.72 0.71 1.29 1.13 . 0007 
calm, stable/excitable 1.05 0.83 1.25 1.04 
high/low self esteem 0.53 0.31 1.07 0.77 . 0008 
clear/confused thinker 0.70 0.67 1.23 1.01 . 0001 
knowing/not knowing right 0.65 0.77 1.06 1.20 . 001 
not aggressive/aggressive 0.86 0.98 1.08 0.90 
careful/accident prone 0.91 0.71 1.05 0.97 
wanted/unwanted 0.63 0.77 1.14 1.11 . 005 
tidy/untidy 0.97 0.84 1.42 0.93 
socially skilled/inept 0.64 0.59 1.21 0.94 . 0006 
normal/strange face 1.15 1.42 1.75 1.26* 
wanting/unwilling to join in 1.06 1.11 1.43 1.04 
easy/strain for family 0.76 0.65 1.28 0.99 . 003 
nice/nasty to live with 0.77 0.58 1.05 0.90 . 05 
helpful/obstructive 0.88 0.87 1.18 0.97 
normal/abnormal 0.83 0.62 1.54 1.23 . 0001 
sensitive/insensitive 0.66 0.95 1.14 0.92* 
welcome/unwelcome 0.35 0.57 1.03 0.78 . 004* 
Two variables, "family pride/family's shame" and "nice/nasty 
to live with", however, showed significant increased 
intraclass similarity unaccompanied by interclass 
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disimilarity. The former, it will be remembered may have 
just failed to show it by chance. The latter remains 
problematic, because Figure 3.1 does sugest that a labelling 
effect occurred. Perhaps the lack of a significant increase 
in interclass divergence merely illustrates that the loci 
associated with normal and subnormal group membership stand 
relatively close together. 
Conversely, six items on which increased intraclass 
convergence failed to reach significance, had shown 
significant increased interclass divergence: 
"graceful/poorly co-ordinated", "predictable/unpredictable", 
"well/poorly understood", "good/bad self-expression", 
"stable/excitable" and "sensitive/insensitive to others". 
These remain something of a puzzle, perhaps merely 
reflecting Tajfel and Wilkes' results and Eiser's (1979) 
p 
comment that intragroup convergence is more difficult to 
demonstrate than intergroup divergence. 
In this case, intraclass similarity showed a significant 
increase at the . 0001 level on two items, "normal/abnormal" 
and "clear/confused thinker", which to recap, seem most 
relevant to the normal/retarded classification. 
Without labels, Figure 3.1 also shows that the profiles of 
normal Targets 1,2 and 3, together with 7, the subnormal 
Target who looked normal, tend to be grouped together. 
Similarly, subnormal profiles 5,6 and 8 together with 4, the 
normal girl who looked subnormal, form a second closer 
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group. This suggests, as feared, that subjects stereotyped 
unlabelled Targets for themselves which would have weakened 
the contrast between conditions - although, without a method 
of objective ranking, it is possible that the choice of 
Targets was poor, and that this grouping reflected their 
characteristics in a direct and unbiassed manner. Table 
3.1c (see results section) which gives the perceived 
normality ratings, suggests this is unlikely because Targets 
2,3, and 7 rather than 4,5,6 and 8 received the most similar 
scores. However, because these ratings might have been 
influenced by participation in the experiment itself 
(although only data from subjects who had been in unlabelled 
conditions was used), and because perceived normality does 
not necessarily correlate perfectly with the dependent 
measures, Table 3.1c can only offer a rough guide. 
In fairness, it is also possible that the apparent implicit 
stereotyping was an artefact of the instrument: since items 
had been chosen for their relevance to retardates, they . 
might have encouraged subjects to seek cues of subnormality. 
This however, seems unlikely because although "retardates" 
might suggest "loving", "abnormal", "happy", etc., the 
reverse seems improbable. 
For these reasons, the first interpretation seems most 
likely, and subjects probably tended to stereotype 
unlabelled Targets for themselves, which is supported 
because perceived group membership and biassed perception do 
not, of course, depend on explicit labels in real life, as 
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anyone who has judged a hippy from his appearance knows. 
What are more interesting, however, are the group level 
reverberations, since it looks as if the presence of a 
retarded individual, once inferred, also biasses the way in 
which normals are perceived. 
A related point, also illustrated in Figure 3.1, is that the 
label "normal" visibly produces a more marked effect on the 
profiles of the normal group. *As Table 3.1b confirms, this 
is probably because the subnormals tended to be stereotyped 
more unlabelled, and indeed, ANOVA revealed that this 
interaction was significant (p<. 05) on some eight variables 
(which have been marked with an asterisk. ) 
Together, these points have implications for special 
education: labelling children subnormal - at least in 
schools of mixed ability - labels other children normal, by 
default, and this is likely to have a homogenising effect on 
the way bo 
groups are perceived, which, ironically, may be more 
pronounced on the latter. 
In summary, the primary hypothesis has been confirmed: 
labels significantly increased perceived interclass 
divergence and intraclass convergence of normal and 
subnormal children on items that commonsense and the 
literature suggested are correlated with the normal/retarded 
dichotomy. This involved positive and negative shifts in 
normal and subnormal class boundaries, respectively, and 
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there was some evidence that the most marked effects ocurred 
on the most relevant dimensions. This means that the very 
act of labelling probably creates a perceived cleavage 
between the characteristics of normal and subnormal 
children, which is likely to be seen as further 
justification for the' classification, and which, at a 
personal level, is likely to have the most swingeing effects 
precisely where the greatest differentiation is required to 
place borderline-cases. 
At this point, it should be mentioned that an additional 
control condition - inconsistent labelling of the Targets - 
which would have completed the analogy with Tajfel and 
Wilkes, was not included due to end of term subject 
attrition! Since no difference was found between 
inconsistent and un-labelled conditions in the original 
paradigm, however, it was decided not to pursue this loss. 
At Tajfel's suggestion, however, a subsidiary experiment 
using all normal Targets was run. In this case, no 
labelling effects were predicted because the classification 
should not correlate with the distribution of Targets. 
Mean scores on each item for the 8 normal Targets randomly 
labelled "normal" or "subnormal", are given in Table'3.2 and 
displayed as profiles in Figure 3.2, which shows no clear 
increase in intraclass similarity and interclass 
dissimilarity in the labelled condition, since for some 
reason, all eight profiles seem closer together. 
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Table 3.2a confirms that the labels failed to increase 
interclass similarity: ANOVA yielded only one difference 
significant at the . 01 level and a further four at . 05, and 
since these 5 items do not seem to form a meaningful 
pattern, they are perhaps chance effects. Overall, there 
was an insignificant trend in the "wrong" direction, since 
interclass similarity decreased on 27/42 items. 
Coupled with this result, Table 3.2b confirms the notion 
that all eight profiles were perceived more alike when 
labelled, since ANOVA yielded 4 increases in intraclass 
similarity, significant at the 1% level and a further 5 at 
5%. Although this is a poor score in comparison to the 22 
highly significant results in the main experiment it is 
unlikely to be a chance effect, because it follows an 
overall trend: perceived intra -normal and -subnormal group 
similarity increased on 39 and 35 variables, respectively, 
(p <. 0001). 
There is a good reason-for this trend towards a partial 
labelling effect: Target 4 the subnormal appearing normal 
girl, as bad luck had it, was randomly assigned to the 
subnormal label group along with Target 3. To make matters 
worse, targets 1 and 2 received normal labels, which means 
that there was most probably some perceived correlation 
between the Target distribution and the classification. 
Thus, the subsidiary experiment does not detract from the 
main study by indicating that intragroup labelling effects 
occur across any random series of Targets. 
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As a final footnote to the first hypothesis, Luskin, (1963) 
suggests that retardates are conceptualised in different 
cognitive systems to normals. Within the present approach, 
it is interesting to speculate that this might correspond to 
a multidimensional labelling effect, and that separate 
factor analyses of target ratings might reflect individual 
differences when unlabelled, but would diverge into distinct 
pasterns for normals and subnormals labelled. 
Although such analyses were undertaken, they are not 
presented here for a number. of reasons. At the practical 
level, they yielded a massive amount of data which, added to 
the present, already lengthy account, seemed prohibitive and 
at the theoretical level, results were not sufficiently 
enlightening to justify full presentation. 
To give a feel for the outcomes, items associated with 
retardation, like "high/low intelligence", 
"normal/abnormal", "quick/slow learner", "clear/confused 
thinker", and "good/bad at concentrating" seemed to appear 
in Factor 1 for most targets unlabelled. Thus, there was no 
evidence of distinct cognitive systems for the two Target 
types, the presence of a retardate perhaps triggering 
general perception in dimensions related to retardation to 
generate common dimensions along which comparisons might be 
made. 
In the labelled condition, it is interesting that 
"normal/abnormal" and "clear/confused thinker" had dropped 
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from Factor 1 for normal targets, but were shared by all the 
subnormal Targets except No. 7, who is the little boy who 
appeared normal. However, this inkling that the dimensions 
in which normal and subnormal children are conceptualised 
differ when they are labelled, was more than swamped by a 
great number of overlapping items. Nevertheless, future 
research directed specifically at this topic, might prove 
fruitful. 
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Hypothesis 2 
Separate analyses of variance were computed for each Target 
to compare labelled and unlabelled conditions, so that the 
present study also incorporates 8 more conventional 
labelling experiments. Table 3.1, it will be remembered, 
gives mean judgements in each condition, and an asterisk 
indicates a significant effect at the 5% level, or better. 
Target 1, who received the highest perceived normality 
score, and who was evaluated most positively unlabelled, 
loses this distinction in the labelled condition, and on 
Figure*3.1, his profile shifts to overlap with Target 2. In 
total, "normal" elicited 31 negative shifts, (p - . 002), 
although ANOVA was significant on only one, "nice/nasty to 
live with". Clearly therefore, the label "normal" as well 
as "mentally retarded" entails disadvantages, which 
re-emphasises the possible dangers of streaming for "normal" 
children. Distinctive excellence, it seems is a concept 
without place among children grouped together on the basis 
of normal ability. Furthermore, it is impossible not to be 
struck by the possible cost in human terms to a "super 
normal" child entering a streamed class, nor to worry that 
perceived enhanced similarity may deprive bright children of 
extra stimulation. 
As a footnote, it is worth mentioning that Target 1 was 
judged (insignificantly) less normal when labelled "normal". 
This superficial confusion is easily cleared up, when it is 
remembered that conceptually, there seem to be degrees of 
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normality as well as subnormality, and as might be expected, 
the value associated with normal class membership may be 
visualised as "average", well below the highest extreme. 
The effect of the normal label for Target 2, who had been 
ranked below Target 1, was very different. Overall, there 
were 39/42 positive shifts, (p<. 0001). Among these, she was 
rated significantly more of an asset, easier for her family, 
more graceful, easier to relate to, better at expressing 
herself and a faster learner with more intelligence. She 
was also rated healthier with higher self-esteem, more 
mature, sensitive and welcome to live next door. 
Interestingly, the former items in particular, seem 
reciprocals of some of the beliefs that are characteristic 
of retardates. 
When labelled "normal", Target 3, who had been ranked third 
in terms of perceived normality, was judged significantly 
more her family's pride, cleaner, tidier, securer, clearer 
spoken and better understood, also more graceful, 
unembarrassing, careful and easy for her family, nicer to 
live with, more helpful, sensitive and welcome to live next 
door. Overall, ratings improved on 40/42 items, (p<. 0001). 
Finally, on Target 4, the normal girl who appeared subnormal 
and who was ranked 6th, "normal" had a striking positive 
effect: she was judged significantly easier for her family, 
more of an asset, more intelligent and socially skilled, 
clearer thinking, quicker learning, better at concentration 
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and self-expression, better spoken, easier to relate to and 
better understood, more normal, physically normal and of 
more normal facial appearance. She was also judged 
significantly maturer, healthier, more independent, helpful, 
sensitive, and attractive as a friend. Similarly, she was 
judged to have higher self-esteem, and to be, more secure, 
welcome to live next door and chatty. As predicted, the 
label has had the most striking effect on the way she was 
judged, eliciting 23 significant positive shifts with 39/42 
positive shifts overall, (p (. 0001). Interestingly, -the 
improvements again seem particularly to contradict the 
retardate stereotype. 
Pessimistically, this may not generalise, -because factors 
likely to maintain perceived subnormal status in real life, 
probably did not operate within the experiment. For 
example, in addition to evaluative bias, which-has already 
ben discussed, a number of classic experiments have 
illustrated that observers seek cues that fit into their 
conceptual frameworks, and therefore, once believed, 
subnormality is likely to be confirmed (e. g. Tajfel, 
1981a). This can not only impede (e. g. Bruner and Potter, 
1964) but actually block perception of discrepant 
information (Bruner and Postman, 1949). Such influences may 
well underlie the otherwise incredible story of Doug Valpey, 
(Turner, 1980; Valpey, 1982) who spent 18 years living as a 
retarded ward of court in a hostel, despite being of normal 
intelligence and, astonishingly, publishing several papers 
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on pa. laeontology in learned journals like "Earth Science". 
His own verdict, "maybe the label overpowered all their 
abilities to see-the evidence presented" fits exactly the 
present hypothesis. Unlike such real life situations where 
the "normal" label might be pit against an accustomed view of 
an individual as subnormal, subjects in the present 
completely randomised design only saw Target 4 in one 
condition and therefore, had no pre-established opinion of 
her. Future research could perhaps explore whether "normal" 
applied for the first time is more influential than when 
applied after "subnormal". 
Finally, although sex stereotypes are beyond the present 
scope, it is possible that these results are artefactually 
generated by the fact that Targets 2,3, and 4 are girls, and 
l 
1, a boy, because "normal" might be qualified by gender, the 
normal girl being more positively evaluated than the normal 
boy. However, this does not seem likely in view of its post 
hoc nature in comparison to the success of the a priori 
predictions. Clearly, however, in any further research, the 
sex of the Targets should be controlled. 
Overall, the label "mentally retarded" created positive 
shifts on 36/40 variables, (p ( . 0001). for Target 
5, who 
had been ranked least normal. She was judged significantly 
more helpful and wanting to join in, items on which positive 
shifts were most expected, because they are among the 
positive stereotypic beliefs. She was also judged 
significantly more attractive as a friend with less strange 
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facial appearance. Thus, if this were an independent 
labelling study, the conclusion would be that "mentally 
retarded" does not have a negative, but a strong positive 
effect. 
For Target 6, who was rated 7th, on the other hand, the 
labet'"mentally retarded" produced a negative shift on 24/40 
variables, which is insignificant overall (p - . 13). She 
was judged significantly noisier, and the perception that 
she was her family's pride reversed, so that she was rated 
her family's shame. Within the sixteen variables on which 
(insignificant) positive shifts ocurred, are the positive 
stereotypic elements, loving, helpful and well-meaning, 
happy, wanting to join in and chatty. 
For Target 7, the subnormal Target who appeared normal, the 
label "mentally retarded" resulted in three significant 
shifts. In each case, judgements that had been positive 
were reversed. Hence, he was judged abnormal, unintelligent 
and a confused thinker, items clearly most closely 
associated with retardation. Overall, the label elicited 
34/40 negative shifts, (there were 2 ties: p <. 0001). 
Finally, the effect of "mentally retarded" on judgements of 
Target 8 who was ranked fifth, was negative on 26/40 items, 
which just reaches significance, p= . 041. Among 
these, he 
was rated significantly more poorly co-ordinated. 
Familiarly, the items showing (insignificant) positive 
shifts included loving, happy, well-meaning and'Wanting to 






In summary, results fit exactly the hypothesised model, 
since labelling depends largely on the ranking of each 
target: on the normal Target who had been perceived least 
normal, "normal" had the strongest positive influence. For 
the two middle rankers, it was also significantly positive, 
whereas for the high flying "supernormal" Target, it 
inflicted a strong negative effect. 
For "mentally retarded", on the other hand, these results 
are mirror reversed. On the subnormal Target who had been 
perceived least retarded unlabelled, it had the most 
powerful negative effect, on the next in line, its negative 
effect just reached significance. For the following Target, 
"mentally retarded" had an insignificant impact, and 
finally, for the child who had been judged most subnormal 
and who received the most negative evaluations unlabelled, 
it had a significant positive effect. 
This means that the second hypothesis has been entirely 
fulfilled, and Guskin's (1963) argument that too many or too 
few cues to subnormality weaken the impact of-the label,. may 
be reformulated: the fewer the cues, the greater the 
impact 
is likely to be. As the number of cues increases, the label 
provides less and less information, and this is why its 
impact wanes. Finally if there are so many cues that 
responses overshoot even the negativity associated with 
subnormal class membership, then the impact of the label is 
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not weakened, but reversed. 
In conclusion, the 4 subnormal targets exemplify four 
excellent reasons why there is little consistency between 
labelling studies in the literature. 




The role of personal contact as an independent variable 
In Study 1, personal acquaintance with a retardate 
transpired as the most potent influence on (lay) attitudes. 
Acquainted subjects expressed more positive beliefs and 
specifically rated retardates unalike. Unacquainted 
subjects, on the other hand, not only evaluated retardates 
more negatively, but also believed them to be like each 
other. On this basis, unacquainted subjects might be 
expected to show greater labelling effects. 
From Tajf et's point of view, labels accrue power with 
experience and emotional investment, and therefore, 
labelling effects should be greater in acquainted subjects. 
This prediction is complicated by evaluative differences 
because the influence of the label "retarded" is likely to 
be relatively positive for the acquainted group, and 
therefore, likely to elicit less increased intergroup 
divergence even if a "perfect" labelling effect occurs. A 
double complication is that subjects were psychology 
students and might resemble the Psychologists rather than 
the lay sample in Study 1, and differ little according to 
contact - although, because they were only weeks into their 
course and approximately two-thirds majored in other 
subjects, this hopefully was not a serious problem. 
Table 33 shows mean semantic differential scores for each 
Target unlabelled and correctly labelled for subjects with 
and without personal contact. These are displayed in Figure 
i 
J. 
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3.3, which conveys an enormous amount of information and is 
extremely complex. Nevertheless, careful scrutiny is repaid 
with some fascinating insights. 
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First, unacquainted subjects tend to group Targets 4,5,6,7 
and 8 together in the unlabelled condition, whereas profile 
7, of the subnormal boy who appeared normal, belongs if 
anything, to the normal class for the acquainted group. 
This seems to be a neat example of evaluative bias, since 
unacquainted subjects, who attached the greatest value 
differential to the normal/subnormal dichotomy in Study 1, 
show clear over-inclusion in the subnormal class. 
In the labelled condition, profile 4, the subnormal 
appearing normal Target, though shifted towards the other 
normal children, stands clearly apart from them for the 
non-acquainted subjects, but seems wholeheartedly included 
in the normal group by subjects with personal acquaintance. 
Again, this illustrates greater evaluative bias in the 
unacquainted group who over-exclude from the normal class. 
Simultaneously, it suggests that acquainted subjects are 
more susceptible to the labels. 
This has had an interesting and unexpected effect. Because 
unacquainted subjects have the more negative view of 
retardates, they were expectected to show a greater enhanced 
intergroup difference in the labelled condition. Figure 3-3 
shows a wider span between normal and subnormal Targets for 
them, which confirms the spirit of the prediction. 
Ironically, however, because Target 4 for the most part 
bounds the normal group, their apparent reluctance to class 
her with the normal Targets seems to have prevented marked 
intergroup divergence compared with the acquainted subjects. 
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Indeed, it is impossible to see from Figure 3.3 who have 
shown most. 
Table 3.3a gives actual intergroup differences labelled and 
unlabelled for the two subsets of subjects, and confirms 
that there is nothing to choose between them, since, 
acquainted and unacquainted groups show, increased intergroup 
differences on 40 and 41/42 variables, respectively, and 
when the magnitude of the increases is painstakingly 
compared item by item, it is greater for the acquainted 
group on 21/42 items, exactly half. ANOVA yielded just 2 
significant effects, both experience x label interactions. 
On "loving/cold" and "welcome/unwelcome next door" 
intergroup differences grew smaller in the labelled condition 
for the acquainted group which probably means that they have 
a more positive opinion about retarded than normal children 
on these items. 
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TABLE 3.3a 
Intergroup differences according to personal experience of retardatef 
Acquainted Not acquainted 
lab unlab lab unlab 
agile/poorly coordinated 0.00 -1.25 -0.18 -1.70 
chatty/uncommunicative -1.57 -1.63 -1.09 -1.80 
secure/insecure -0.86 -2.50 -0.82 -3.50 
loving/cold -2.57 -1.75 -1.27 -3.10 
healthy/i]. lness prone 0.29 -1.38 -0.45 -2.10 
speech clear/unclear 0.14 -2.38 -0.18 -1.60 
takes care of self/dependent -0.29 -1.75 0.09 -2.00 
contented/frustrated -0.71 -1.38 -0.64 -1.80 
good/bad at concentrating 0.00 -1.38 0.09 -1.70 
physically normal/h'capped 0.29 -1.50 1.00 -2.10 
family's pride/shame 0.29 -0.63 -0.45 -1.80 
easy/hard to relate to -0.86 -1.75 -0.18 -2.00 
predictable/unpredictable -0.57 -2.00 -1.09 -2.00 
mature/childish for age -0.57 -1.88 0.27 -1.00 
quick learner/slow learner 0.71 -1.38 0.45 -2.10 
quiet/noisy -2.71 -3.63 -2.82 -3.10 
well/poorly understood 0.29 -1.50 -0.64 -1.70 
not embarrassing/embarrassing -0.14 -2.38 -0.45 -2.20 
good/bad self expression 0.14 -1.25 -0.36 -1.40 
happy/sad -1.57 -1.63 -1.09 -2.00 
attractive/unattractive -1.00 -1.88 -1.09 -1.30 
clean/di. rty -1.29 -1.75 -1.36 -1.30 
not frightening/frightening -0.86 -1.75 -1.00 -2.10 
asset/burden 0.00 -1.75 0.45 -1.70 
high/low intelligence 0.29 -2.25 1.00 -1.30 
calm, stable/excitable -1.71 -3.50 -2.27 -2.60 
high/low self esteem 0.00 -1.00 -0.09 -1.90 
clear/confused thinker 0.14 -1.88 0.27 -1.70 
knowing/not knowing right -0.14 -2.13 0.18 -1.20 
not aggressive/aggressive -1.71 -2.50 -2.36 -3.00 
careful/accident prone -0.71 -2.00 -1.00 -1.60 
wanted/unwanted -0.86 -2.75 0.27 -1.50 
tidy/untidy -0.57 -2.50 -1.45 -1.70 
socially skilled/inept 0.57 -1.25 1.27 -0.80 
normal/strange face -1.57 -3.00 -1.73 -1.80 
wanting/unwilling to join in -1.86 -2.13 -2.09 -2.70 
easy/strain for family 0.14 -2.13 0.36 -2.10 
nice/nasty to live with -0.71 -1.50 -0.91 -1.70 
helpful/obstructive -1.29 -1.88 -1.73 -1.80 
normal/abnormal 0.71 -2.25 1.64 -1.50 
sensitive/insensitive 0.00 -2.00 -1.27 -2.40 
welcome/unwelcome -0.57 -0.50 -0.27 -2.30 
To summarise, the expected trend for unacquainted subjects 
to show increased intergroup differences to a greater 
degree, was not found. However, evidence from Figure 3.3 
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suggests that this was not because the hypothesis was in 
error. It is clear that in the labelled condition, 
unacquainted subjects show the greater general separation 
between normal and subnormal Targets but because of 
evaluative bias, the Target who for the most part, bounded 
the normal class, apparently has not been wholeheartedly 
included in it, so the general separation has not been 
reflected in greater enhanced intergroup differences. 
Clearly however, this interpretation needs further testing. 
Before leaving the question of evaluative differences and 
personal experience, one more point must be made, which will 
be vitally important for the coming studies. It is possible 
to see on Figure33 that the evaluations of acquainted and 
unacquainted subjects differ little in the unlabelled 
condition. This means that the relatively positive opinions 
that acquainted subjects show towards retardates, seem not 
to depend so much on their acquaintance, but on the labels. 
Table 33b shows intragroup similarities for acquainted and 
unacquainted subjects. For the former group, labels 
enhanced perceived intragroup similarity on 42 and 37/42 
items for normal and subnormal Targets, respectively. The 
relevant figures for unacquainted subjects were 40/41 (with 
one tie) and 33/42. Thus, labels enhance intragroup 
similarity slightly more for personally experienced 
subjects, especially where subnormal Targets are concerned. 
However, this crude approach reveals no real difference 
- 223 - 
between subjects, since all 4 sets of figures are highly 
significant. Hence, more detail is necessary. 
TABLE 3.3b 
jntzagrop gi'i lari IH for acquaýn and Hfl V l1ýZInt. 0d subjects 
Acquainted subjects Unacquainted subjects 
Labelled *Unlabelled Labelled Unlabelled 
norm' sub' norm' sub' norm' sub' norm' sub' 
agile/poorly coordinated 0.72 0.73 1.15 1.03 1.02 1.09 1.31 0.91 
chatty/uncommunicative 0.86 1.03 1.27 0.95 1.13 1.16 1.41 0.96 
secure/insecure 0.60 0.65 1.52 1.09 0.86 1.07 1.80 1.34 
loving/cold 0.87 0.72 0.91 0.83 0.73 1.19 1.51 0.82 
healthy/illness prone 0.53 0.59 1.28 0.86 0.87 0.94 1.48 1.09 
speech clear/unclear 0.85 0.63 1.51 1.13 1.17 0.86 1.47 0.89 
takes care of self/dependent 0.65 0.92 1.23 1.08 0.75 1.19 1.48 1.28 
contented/frustrated 0.71 0.91 0.92 1.06 1.05 0.84 1.07 1.13 
good/bad at concentrating 0.70 0.71 1.27 0.80 0.98 0.76 1.50 0.92 
physically normal/h'capped 0.55 0.55 1.22 1.29 0.35 1.26 1.33 1.42 
family's pride/shame 0.56 0.53 0.90 0.71 0.85 0.74 1.25 1.06 
easy/hard to relate to 0.73 0.90 1.02 0.91 0.63 0.87 1.32 1.11 
predictable/unpredictable 0.55 0.82 0.85 0.88 0.99 0.85 0.86 1.45 
'mature/childish for age 0.43 0.98 1.23 1.04 0.83 0.69 1.29 0.79 
quick learner/slow learner 0.54 0.68 1.29 0.97 0.85 0.77 1.42 1.00 
quiet/noisy 0.80 1.01 1.28 1.07 1.14 1.17 1.26 1.29 
well/poorly understood 0.50 0.80 1.07 0.78 0.94 0.96 1.17 1.06 
not embarrassing/embarrassing 0.50 0.70 1.19 0.78 0.77 0.73 1.25 1.00 
good/bad self expression 0.70 0.73 0.94 1.09 0.94 0.96 1.22 0.91 
happy/sad 0.78 0.90 1.06 0.75 0.94 0.89 1.15 1.09 
attractive/unattractive 0.77 0.46 1.18 0.86 0.97 0.94 1.30 0.84 
clean/dirty 0.66 0.75 1.18 0.77 1.09 0.76 1.09 1.10 
not frightening/frightening 0.70 0.77 0.86 0.74 0.73 0.83 1.15 1.06 
asset/burden 0.50 0.49 1.11 0.93 0.67 0.72 1.31 0.94 
high/low intelligence 0.44 0.65 1.43 1.25 0.91 0.75 1.18 1.03 
calm, stable/excitable 0.94 0.63 1.24 1.09 1.13 0.95 1.26 1.00 
high/low self esteem 0.38 0.38 0.88 0.68 0.63 0.27 1.22 0.83 
clear/confused thinker 0.58 0.38 1.18 1.00 0.77 0.86 1.28 1.01 
knowing/not knowing right 0.59 0.70 1.14 1.25 0.68 0.82 1.00 1.16 
not aggressive/aggressive 0.64 0.72 0.97 0.65 1.00 1.15 1.17 1.11 
careful/accident prone 0.85 0.53 1.02 0.90 0.95 0.82 1.07 1.02 
wanted/unwanted 0.60 0.80 1.40 0.87 0.64 0.75 0.94 1.31 
tidy/untidy 0.46 0.76 1.43 0.87 1.30 0.90 1.40 0.98 
socially skilled/inept 0.45 0.67 1.15 0.95 0.77 0.53 1.26 0.93 
normal/strange face 1.16 1.12 1.70 1.42 1.14 1.61 1.80 1.13 
wanting/unwilling to join in 0.84 0.92 1.33 0.95 1.20 1.24 1.50 1.11 
easy/strain for family 0.55 0.57 0.96 1.08 0.90 0.71 1.54 0.92 
nice/nasty to live with 0.56 0.39 1.01 0.74 0.90 0.70 1.08 1.03 
helpful/obstructive 0.61 0.73 0.97 0.80 1.05 0.96 1.34 1.10 
normal/abnormal 0.74 0.61 1.47 1.46 0.89 0.62 1.59 1.05 
sensitive/insensitive 0.43 0.48 0.89 0.88 0.81 1.25 1.35 0.96 
welcome/unwelcome 0.30 0.42 0.52 0.47 0.38 0.67 1.43 1.04 
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Perceived intragroup differences were subjected to 3 factor 
ANOVA, (conditon x experience x Target type, with a repeated 
measure on the third), and the label x acquaintance 
interaction, which tests whether the label had more effect 
for the experienced group, was significant on only one 
variable, "welcome/unwelcome next doors (p. = . 02). Table 
3" 
3b shows that this was accounted for by comparatively less 
perceived intragroup similarity on the part of unacquainted 
subjects in the unlabelled condition. Interestingly, 
perceived intragroup similarity tended to be more enhanced 
for the experienced group on "high/low intelligence" (p = 
. 056), but no other result neared significance. 
The laborious task of comparing the overall magnitude of 
labelling effects on Table 3.3b for each group shows, that 
1 
the overall trend was afterall as predicted: labels 
enhanced perceived intraclass similarity more for acquainted 
subjects on 33/42 variables (p <. 002 Sign Test). Thus, the 
lack of significance on individual items is probably due to 
the small numbers in each cell (as few as 7 acquainted 
subjects in the labelled condition), rather than inaccuracy 
of the hypothesis. In other words, there is some evidence 
that experience is associated with more marked labelling 
effects. 
This has the serious implication that bia:, ed perception is 
not the result of ignorance. On the contrary, it is 
probably most prevalent in precisely those who "should" know 
better. In this sense, education per se is unlikely to be a 
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defense and might even prove counter productive. Foster, 
Ysseldyke and Reese,. (1975) for example, found that students 
towards the end of a course in special education which had 
included work on labelling and expectations, were 
significantly biasJ, ed in their evaluation of a normal child 
when he was labelled subnormal. On a brighter note, 
however, the same students were stunned when presented with 
the results they had generated, which suggests that 
practical demonstrations based on the present Tajfellian 
approach, might one day provide an invaluable aspect of 
professional training. 
4.5. CONCLUSIONS 
This study has demonstrated empirically that the 
psychophysical principles underlying Tajfel and Wilkes' 
(1963) paradigm with its neutral stimuli, can be extended to 
cover the perception of normal and subnormal children, at 
least in an experimental situation.. This added weight to 
the argument that Tajfellian principles provide a unifying 
paradigm within which literature on labelling the mentally 
retarded may be interpreted and apparent inconsistencies 
resolved. Generalisations from experimental to real life 
situations will be discussed more fully in the next chapter, 
but with the provisos that have already been mentioned, 
because real life is likely to be more complex and 
amibiguous. than slides, information conveyed by labels is 
likely to be valuable and hence, labelling effects 
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prevalent. (Tajfel and Wilkes, 1963; Tajfel, 1972; 1978; 
1981; 1981a). 
In more general terms, this has supported the social model 
of mental retardation in demonstrating that the perception 
of retardates (and by extrapolation, their treatment and 
hence, aspects of their development) is not simply a 
function of their characteristics but a complex interplay 
0 
between these,. how they are labelled and the information 
conveyed by the label. It is in this last aspect that 
categorisation provides a linking mechanism with 
macrosystems, exosystems and the developing individual since 
as the previous chapter showed, beliefs about retardates, 
and hence, the information conveyed by the label, can be 
related to cultural, environmental and ideological histories 
of social systems. 
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CHAPTER 4 
SOCIAL IDENTITY AND PERCEPTION: 
DOES THE OBSERVER'S ROLE INFLUENCE WHAT HE SEES? 
1. Introduction 
To recap, Study 1 revealed significant differences in the 
way subjects conceptualised "retardates", and mediated by 
the categorisation effects demonstrated in Study 2, these 
can lead to different perceptions and hence, to differently 
directed interactions which will Influence the development 
of retarded people. However, the focus of Study 2 was on 
the mechanistic aspects of this pathway which was therefore 
psychological, but not social psychological. Some attempt 
at rejecting individualistic explanations in favour of a 
social psychological approach (see Tajfel, 1981) had been 
made in Chapter 2 where between group differences (and 
hence, within group similarities) in beliefs were attributed 
to conformity to shared group norms, rather than individual 
characteristics that members of a particular group (like 
psychologists) have in common, but this attempt was not 
explicit in Chapter 3, which virtually ignored what Brown 
and Turner (1981) call the "master problem" of how the 
individual is related to the group. The task of this 
chapter is to redress the balance and identify a social 
psychological link between beliefs about retardates at the 
macrosystem level and the mechanistic individual level 
perceptual processes which help mediate them. 
The present work is underpinned by the fundamental 
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assumption that humans, like lay scientists, try to 
understand their environment in order to respond adequately 
and achieve some control over events (see Tajfel, 1981). 
Thus, the adaptive function of conceptual categories, like 
beliefs about retardates is to facilitate appropriate 
responses to the perceived environment. 
Since man is self aware, however, he must constitute a focal 
point in the very world he tries to interpret. Thus the 
importance of how he categorises his environment finds an 
analogue in the importance of how he construes himself, 
which means that common factors in the self-definitions of 
individuals belonging to the same social system, might 
provide a mechanism whereby active intrapersonal 
psychological process rather than amalgamated interidividual 
differences in experience or personality, mediate effects of 
group membership. Put another way, self-categorisations 
provide a mechanism whereby individual group members can 
apply a mutual psychological field, reflecting macrosystem 
influences, in their interactions with retardates. 
This is precisely one direction that Tajfel and extending 
his work, Turner have taken. Before describing in detail 
their approach, however, it seems wise to provide some 
appropriate background. 
2. The present notion of self-concept 
For present purposes, self definitions are themselves 
defined as the self-concept a term introduced with 
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trepidation because it unlocks a Pandora's box of spectral 
difficulties as wide as psychology itself. Conceptual 
problems are compounded by semantic puzzles since, as 
Brookover, Thomas and Paterson. (1964) write, the term 
"self-concept" is frequently the only similarity between 
self-concept studies and, on the other side of the coin, the 
briefest taste of the literature reveals a bewildering array 
of different terms, all apparently referring to it. 
Burns (1979), who first notes psychology's 
characteristically imprecise terminology and lack of agreed 
definitions, summarises the situation in his delightfully 
bombastic phrase: "Self referent constructs stand foremost 
in the ranks of this confusion". 
Clearly . 
therefore, some attempt to define and elucidate the 
present terminology must be made. 
The Pocket Oxford English Dictionary defines "self" as 
"person's or thing's own individuality or essence, person or 
thing as an object of introspection or reflexive 
. 
action, 
ones nature or state at a particular time or in a particular 
aspect. " It defines "concept" as "Idea of the attributes 
common to a class of things" but ironically, it does not 
tackle "self-concept". Avoiding the temptation perpetually 
to look up words like "person" and "individuality", the 
dictionary is consistent with the notion of self-concept as 
the totality of an individual's thoughts about himself. 




self-concept. However, the intention is not to take sides 
in the notorious philosophical controversy about subjective 
and objective self that has endured from the earliest 
psychological writings, like William James' (1890) "I" and 
"me" to the present, roughly reflected (for example), in 
Gordon and Gergen's (1968) self as process or structure. 
Although full discussion is beyond the present scope, common 
sense suggests the controversy might be a pseudo issue: as 
James argued, the notion of awareness without content or 
content without awareness is meaningless. In other words, 
thinking is a process- which includes thinker and thoughts 
and it is semantic constraints that imply a division between 
them. In this light, it seems wise to state that the coming 
emphasis on what is thought, is simply an heuristic 
strategy, not intended to imply a fundamental dualism. The 
self-concept is visualised as an intricate, dynamic system, 
so complex that imagining it in terms of structure and 
process must be a crude oversimplification. Imaginary 
petrification of the latter aspect, however, seems necessary 
in order that the subject may be approached at all. 
The self-concept, like other cognitive structures, is 
hypothesised to mediate-responses to the environment. Thus, 
ideally, knowledge of an individual's self-concept should 
permit explanation and prediction of his behaviour., Not 
surprisingly therefore, self-concept is frequently viewed as 
an aspect of personality - another difficult term for which 






those structural dynamic properties of an 
individual or individuals as they reflect 
themselves in characteristic responses to 
situations. 
1975, p. 3 
Since the self-concept is defined as the individual's 
beliefs about himself, it must include his mini personality 
theory about himself. Thus any topic in personality 
research might be mirrored microcosmically in the 
self-concept and the simple. "top down" relationship between 
personality and self-concept becomes an unfathomable, 
self-referential circle which gives a frightening taste of 
the complexities involved in the area. 
Nevertheless, intuitively it seems that the focus of 
interest differs in personality and self-concept research in 
a way that makes an interesting -if subjective- link to the 
present framework. Personality theory seems predicated on 
"objective reality". Theorists seem to seek what people 
"really" are, through, for example, the dark instinctive 
forces of Freudian psychodynamics, or through trait theories 
(e. g. Allport, 1955; Cattell, 1950), Sheldon and Stevens' 
(1942) body types, Skinner's (1938) behaviourist and 
Bandura's (1965) social learning theories and many more. 
The assumption seems to be that the role of the individual 
is essentially passive. He provides data that conceal the 
personality he is hypothesised consistently to enact. In 
contrast, self-concept research is. phenomenologica. l: what 
the individual thinks he is is the focus of interest, and 
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the question, what he "really" is, is unimportant. In other 
words, the individual's personality theory about himself is 
of more interest than that of the experimenters! 
An example illustrates the point: - 
Some theorists like Eysenck (1973) would probably argue that 
IQ is a personality characteristic reflected reliably across 
situations. Brookover, Thomas and Paterson (1964) however, 
found that self-concept of ability was significantly related 
to achievement even when intelligence was controlled. In 
other words, what subjects believed, not "real" intelligence 
accounted for variation. Intuitively therefore, 'personality 
research seems predicated on an interactional and 
self-concept research, a transactional paradigm. More 
specifically, the self-concept provides a mechanism whereby 
1 
an individual can determine and be determined by his own 
behaviour, independent of his "stable personality 
characteristics. " Hence, it is a fitting a starting point 
for the notion that self definitions rather than "objective" 
individual differences account for between group variation 
in beliefs about retardates. 
So far, the present notion of self-concept has been defined, 
but its hypothetical organisation-has not been considered. 
Taxonomtcal representations seem almost as numerous as 
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writers on the subject. James (1910) for example, 
visualises the self as known as having 3 constituent parts, 
each of which gives rise to emotions and actions. First, 
the material self includes body, family, home and 
possessions and gives rise to feelings of satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction. Associated acts are attention to bodily 
needs and acquisition of property and goods. The second 
constituent is the social self, by which James means 
knowledge of the recognition received from others or groups 
of others. Thus, an individual has as many social selves as 
there are people or groups who recognise him and about whose 
opinions he cares. As before, these give rise to emotions 
of satisfaction or dissatisfaction. Associated behaviours 
include sociability, emulation, the pursuit of friends, 
social ambition and so on. Finally, James postulates a 
spiritual self - the individual's knowledge of his 
psychological faculties and states. This he argues is the 
"nucleus of ourself as we know it". As an object of 
thought, it evokes emotions in the same way as the other 
constituents, and associated actions include all attempts at 
psychic (i. e. moral or intellectual) enlightenment. 
In contrast to the emotions evoked by the constituents, 
James argues that some aspects of self-feeling seem 
independent. For example, the individual has a choice as to 
which aspects of self are "backed". Thus self-esteem is the 
ratio between success and pretensions, and therefore, within 
each individual's power. 
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James continues that bodily comforts are easy to part with, 
compared with friends, but that the spiritual self is valued 
above life itself. This implies, he argues, a hierachical 
organisation. Beyond this, however, he gives little 
indication of how the constituents relate to each other, or 
the "I" that is embedded in them. 
Allport (1955) coins 'a new word, proprium to represent what 
the individual construes as pertaining to himself. This he 
visualises as eight aspects, briefly, (1) a bodily sense, or 
what the individual perceives to belong intimately to his 
body, (2) a self-identity or perceived continuity over time, 
(3) ego enhancement or self love, (4) ego extension, or the 
identification of self with possessions, groups or even 
abstract ideals, (5) rational processes which mediate 
between inner needs and outer reality (6) self-image or what 
the individual thinks he is and what he would like to be, 
(7) propriate striving or motivation towards self 
actualisation and (8) the knower, which unlike James' "I" is 
not an aspect of what is known, but the distinct entity that 
experiences it. 
In this case, there is no information at all concerning the 
proprium's internal organisation. 
Although fascinating, these classical approaches are of 
little help in the present effort to formulate some idea of 
how the self-concept might be organised. They seem to be 
outcomes of inductive armchair reasoning, neither based on, 




writes, the insights they provide "lie around like a pile of 
loose bricks in the brickyard waiting for the builder. " 
Burns' (1979) notion of self-concept is also largely 
taxonomical, but, in addition, he suggests a useful 
organising principle. Both agreement and disagreement with 
his approach help build the present notions. He envisages a 
hierachical structure, headed by the "global self", a term 
too wide, he argues, to be valuable. This bifurcates into 
"I" and "me", and the latter further splits into self-image 
and self-esteem. From both of these aspects, the 
self-concept descends. 
This differs from the present view which sees "I" and "me" 
as facets of the self-concept, which in including all self 
referent thoughts, of course, also encompasses notions of 1 
self-image and esteem. Apart from this difference, with the 
best will, Burns' formulation simply does not seem clear: - 
Self as known appears twice - both above and below 
self-concept. Furthermore, Burns describes self- evaluation 
as a process, which seems to contradict its appearance under 
"me" (which represents structure) in his diagrammatic 
scheme. Most problematic, however, the text describes 
nothing beyond-this initial and puzzling bifurcation. For 
these reasons, Burns' structural notion of the self-concept 
will be left in favour of his more useful hypothesis that it 
can be viewed as a constellation of attitudes to the self. 
This viewpoint not only links self-concept study with the 
vast literature on the nature and measurement of attitudes, 
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(including, what will be useful later, semantic differential 
techniques), but also, it provides an embracing organising 
principle. 
Definitions of attitude are many, but for once, relatively 
similar. The broadest noted by Summers (1971) is the sum 
total of inclinations, beliefs and feelings about a topic, 
which, when the topic is self, is virtually synonymous with 
the present definition of self-concept. More detailed 
definitions seem to have descended from that of Katz and 
Stotland (1959) who distinguish (1) cognitive, (2) emotional 
and (3) conative aspects. These correspond to (1) beliefs 
about an object, which according to Katz and Stotland are 
evaluated, although other writers like Thomas (1970), prefer 
to include evaluation in the emotional aspect, while still 
others, including Burns, view it as a separate fourth 
element. Nevertheless, all agree that evaluation is an 
important attitudinal component. (2) The emotional aspect 
refers to how the individual feels about the object and 
therefore, in contrast to the evaluative component, ' belongs 
to him rather than it -a distinction which becomes complex, 
but 'as will be seen, useful, when "it" is the self. * (3) The 
conative. component refers to a response-tendency embedded in 
the attitude, (although this might have no behavioural 
counterpart). 
Burns finds two great advantages in conceptualising the 
self-concept in this way. First, it does not imply a 
sterile, single entity, but a differentiated system and 
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second, self-esteem can be visualised as the evaluative 
attitudinal component. (However, since Burns' diagram 
separated self-esteem from the self-concept, his idea seems 
more at home in the present formulation than in his own! ) 
More serious contention arises when Burns continues, without 
explicit justification, that conceptualising the 
self-concept as a set of attitudes, means that a positive 
self-concept can be equated with positive self-esteem and 
therefore, that "self-concept", "self attitudes" and 
"self-esteem" can be regarded as synonymous. 
According to Summers (1971), a number of theorists have 
argued that the notion of attitude should be restricted to 
the evaluative dimension, and presumably, this has 
influenced Burns' thinking. However, even though Burns 
notes that Wylie (1961) and as great a figure as Coopersmith 
(1967) also use self-concept and self-esteem 
interchangeably, his position is not supported here, for the 
obvious reason that it ignores cognitive, emotional and 
conative aspects. 
For practical purposes, this contention may have little or 
no use since Osgood et al (1957), it will-be remembered, 
found evaluation accounted for up to 75% of attitudinal 
variance but "up to" are crucial words. In their famous 
Thesaurus study, Osgood et al found 7 dimensions in addition 
to evaluation, which in this case accounted for only 18% of 





self-esteem might be the best unidimensional representation 
of self-concept, but it might omit as much as 82% of its 
content. 
Burns' approach also ignores the emotional attitudinal 
dimension, which I think can be interpreted as self worth, 
but which he describes as "nebulous" and "more within the 
ambit of the self as knower", whom, it will be remembered, 
was banished from his formulation of self-concept. Unlike 
the evaluative aspect, this pertains to the individual 
rather than his beliefs, and therefore, might be linked to 
James' notion of a more independent source of self-esteem. 
For example, while it is likely an individual whose 
self-concept includes the knowledge that he is successful, 
attractive and admired by others, will have the positive 
self regard implied by such beliefs, this is not inevitable. 
On the other side of the coin, equating self-concept and 
self-esteem leaves many researchers pondering why people can 
know they are black or retarded and yet not show cringeing 
levels of self regard - an important point which will be 
more fully aired in the next chapter. 
Although it is difficult to visualise, the idiosyncratic 
life force of the knower seems to be embodied in the 
emotional attitudinal dimension. To adapt a cliche, he 
breathes the self into self-concept. 
Finally, equating self-concept with the evaluative 
attitudinal component also ignores the conative aspect. 
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which after all, is the major raison d'etre of the 
self-concept as a hypothetical variable intervening between 
stimulus and behaviour. 
To end, visualising the self-concept as a constellation of 
attitudes, is not the only alternative to the classic 
taxonomic approaches. For example, Brim (1976) argues that 
it may be visualised as a theory of self, with components 
corresponding to basic premises and hidden assumptions, used 
as a basis for predictions and explanations. However, 
although fascinating, this is of little practical value for 
present purposes. A constellation of attitudes, on the 
other hand, may be measured using well tried techniques, and 
in addition, it offers a way of conceptualising beliefs, 
self-worth and self-esteem. 
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3. Social categorisation and social and personal-identity 
In the previous chapter, "social categorisation" or the 
"division of the social world into distinct, discontinuous 
classes" (Tajfel, 1972) was the central aspect of how 
individuals construe the environment. "Social identity" or 
the individual's knowledge that he belongs to 
certain social groups together with some emotional 
and value significance to him of the group 
membership 
Tajfel, 1972, p. 31 
is the correspondingly central aspect of how he construes 
himself. According to the previous definition, "social 
identity" must constitute an aspect of self-concept. 
Recently, Tajfel"s terminology has been extended by Turner, 
(1981; 1981a; 1982), who (echoing the process/structure 
dichotomy) uses "social identification" to refer to the 
process of self location within a system of social 
categories or as a noun, as any social categorisation used 
by an individual in self definition. The sum total of 
social identifications in this latter, structural sense, he 
defines as the individual's "social identity". "Personal 
identity", Turner implies, is what remains: 
self-definitions that are not group memberships. 
As an aside, it is interesting to note that any 
characteristic within personal identity is potentially a 
social identification, the transition occuring if it 
facilitates extrapolation "beyond the information given". 




process is the attribute blonde hair, which may be used in 
order to transmute women into Blondes, to facilitate sexist 
inferences regarding libido, morality and intelligence! 
Interestingly, Turner's idea of social identity as a 
distinguishable part of the self-concept, though perhaps new 
in terminology, can be detected in the earliest 
psychological writings. For example, before William James, 
who has been described as the first psychologist to deal 
with the self-concept, (Burns 1979), theories of self had 
been almost exclusively the domain of theologians, 
philosophers and phrenologists, some of whom, incidentally, 
claimed to have isolated such organs as "self-esteem". (See 
Viney, 1969). James (1890) it will be remembered, suggested 
that objective self comprises spiritual, material, bodily 
and as many social selves as there are people and groups 
about whom individuals care. 
James went on to add that these social selves may sometimes 
conflict with each other, which implies that they must to 
some extent function independently. This completes the 
analogy with Turner's social identity by anticipating his 
argument that while the self-concept is relatively stable 
and enduring in its entirety, (which provides individuals 
with their sense of unity and consistency), its structurally 
differentiated parts can function relatively independently. 
In his own words: 
in any given situation, a different part or 
combination of parts of the self-concept could be 
at work with the subjective consequence that 
different self images are produced. 
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More specifically: 
social identity may on occasions function to the 
more or less exclusion of personal identity, i. e. 
that at certain times, our salient self-images may 
be based solely or primarily on our group 
memberships. 
1981a, p 97 
The literature abounds with empirical evidence that the 
individual's perceptions of self are more influenced by 
social identity in some situations than others, (see Turner, 
1981a, p 98 for examples) but the proposition is given 
weight by its great explanatory power. For example, Turner 
points out that distinguishing between the self-concept as a 
cognitive structure and the self-images associated with its 
aspects, can solve the longstanding controversy whether the 
self-concept is cross situationally consistent or 
situation-specific (Gergen, 1971; Mischel, 1976), which had 
sprung from contradictory findings like the stability of 
subjects' self discriptions over time (Mischel, 1976) versus 
variations in self-descriptions according to social 
environment (Block, 1952). Within Turner's framework, the 
former might reflect personal or social identity, or even a 
specific social identification reliably elicited by the same 
4 
testing situation, and the latter, various social 
identifications triggered by different environments. 
Of more interest and relevance here are the hypothesised 
function and ultimately the results of these changes in 
self-image. These are fundamental to the present approach, 






people have learnt to regulate their social 
behaviour in terms of different self-conceptions 
in different situations. Different situations 
tend to "switch on" different conceptions of self 
so that social stimuli are construed and social 
behaviour controlled in the appropriately adaptive 
manner. 
1981a, p 98 
In other words, the subsystems of the self-concept - 
personal and social identity - function like other cognitive 
structures to facilitate understanding of and adequate 
responding to the environment. 
In 1981, Turner wrote 
social identity seems to be switched on by certain 
situations in ways that we do not yet understand 
1981a, p 99 
Fortunately, however some recent progress has been made in 
tackling this problem, (e. g. Tajfel, 1981; Oakes 1983). 
The fundamental principle derives from Tajfel's (1972) 
description of categorisation and is therefore already 
familiar: since cognitive categories function to simplify 
the environment for purposes of action, it may be assumed 
that individuals define themselves in terms of social rather 
than personal identifications when these mediate more 
effectively between perceived environment and adaptive 
behaviour. Tajfel (1981) details three such conditions: 
(1) when self-definitions in terms of social identifications 
facilitate understanding of a complex situation; (2) when 
they justify actions, which are usually directed against an 
outgroup, or (3) when they provide the individual with an 
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opportunity to enhance self-esteem. (See also Brown and 
Turner, 1981). 
-245 - 
4. Social and personal identity and behaviour 
Turner continues that the two extremes, personal and social 
identity are likely to underpin interpersonal and intergroup 
behaviour. These are best understood in terms of a 
theoretical continuum postulated by Tajfel (1974), that 
conceptualises interpersonal behaviour as interaction 
between individuals entirely determined by individual 
characteristics, and intergroup behaviour as interaction 
between individuals (or groups of individuals) entirely 
determined by respective group memberships. (See also 
Turner and Giles, 1981; Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Tajfel 
forewarned that the continuum is theoretical and that pure 
instances of each extreme are unlikely in real life, 
although examples approaching pure intergroup behaviour are 
relatively easy to find, like - at the time of writing - 
British and Argentine forces battling with each other on the 
Falkland Islands, uninfluenced by the fact that some of them 
trained together in Portsmouth and might have formed 
personal relationships. According to Turner, this 
situationally appropriate intergroup behaviour is regulated 
through the relevant aspects of self-concept, that is 
protagonists' self perceptions as British and Argentine 
soldiers. 
Clinical situations provide a less extreme, but perhaps more 
relevant example, since it is well known that clinicians 
interact with "cases" and "retardates", not people. Indeed, 
those who fail in this respect often provide valuable 
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currency for more sensational reporting! 
The greater difficulty of finding examples approaching pure 
interpersonal behaviour is reflected in the hackneyed cinema 
device of providing heroes with temporary respite from 
intergroup behaviour in interactions with blind hermits or 
innocent infants. Only those cut off from the relevant cues 
or as yet unsocialised it seems, are able to respond as 
individuals. According to Turner, such interactions are 
likely to be underpinned (primarily) by personal identity, 
but even here, social identifications like age, sex and so 
on clearly influence behaviour to some extent. 
Although Turner's proposition is as yet in its infancy, 
empirical support for the link between personal identity and 
interpersonal behaviour and between social identity and 
intergroup behaviour is not sparse (see Turner 1981a, pp 
99), but perhaps the most convincing, derives from the so 
called minimal group experiments. The seminal paradigm was 
developed by Tajfel (1970) and Tajfel, Flament, Billig and 
Bundy (1971) who found that social categorisation per Be was 
sufficent-to cause intergroup behaviour. Subjects were 
randomly assigned to one of two groups - ostensibly on the 
basis of artistic preference - and were asked to carry out 
an unrelated task, namely awarding money to anonymous in- 
and outgroup members. Despite the fact that there was no 
interaction, membership was anonymous and personal gain 
impossible (hence the title, "minimal group"), subjects 
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discriminated for in- and against outgroup members. In 
other words, the mere perception of belonging to a group 
(i. e. social identification) was sufficient as well as 
necessary for intergroup behaviour. 
Although thought provoking, these original studies do not 
illustrate any change in behaviour as self-image shifts from 
personal to social identity. This can be seen in a later 
minimal group experiment (Turner 1973, reported in his 1975 
article), where subjects again distributed money to 
anonymous in and out group members and, in addition, to 
themselves. In the latter case they took the opportunity to 
discriminate for self and against everyone else. In a 
condition where social identity was salient, however, they 
were altruistic towards ingroup members and still more 
discriminatory against the outgroup. In other words, 
salience of social identification transformed interpersonal 
into intergroup discrimination as subjects acted as members 
of a group, not individuals, (see also Turner, 1978 and 
Brown and Deschamps, 1980/81 for replications). 
More support is given by common experience: introspection, 
for example, reveals that individuals adapt without 
conscious effort to different situations, switching for 
instance, from clinician or teacher to "individual" without 
apparent contradiction or sense of discontinuity. Again, 
according to Turner, such changes are predicated on changes 
in self-image according to the situational relevance of 
various social and personal identifications. 
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Consciousness of these processes seems to arise when 
conflicting identifications are simultaneously triggered. 
Indeed the resulting consternation forms the mainstay of 
many comedies. 
Social identifications can be stable or transient or even as 
yet "unoccupied", in the sense that individuals hold 
information about social categories with which they are 
never likely to identify, but which can become functional, 
should a situation arise which makes them relevant. Such an 
explanation might underlie Zimbardo's (1973) shocking study 
of naive subjects in an experimental prison who instantly 
behaved as punitive "correction officers" or victimised 
prisoners to such an extent that the experiment had to be 
abandoned. Particularly interesting was their subsequent 
disbelief in their own actions, which presumably was because 
I 
they were inconsistent with customary social identifications 
or personal identity. 
Although such metaphysical speculation is far beyond the 
present scope, it is interesting to wonder if the influence 
of personal identity or some socially approved social 
identification contributes to a "conscience". 
Similarities might be found with Milgram's (1965) still more 
notorious study, where in contradiction to psychiatrists' 
predicted . 0125%, some 62% of subjects administered what 
they thought might be fatal 450 volt shocks to pupils in a 
learning experiment. The falling off of compliance as 
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contact with the pupil-victim increased can be interpreted 
as due to the waxing relevance of personal identity and 
hence, the waning of the social identification that 
prescribed the behaviour. However, since obedience was 
heavily dependent on the experimenter's presence and 
subjects' were evidently reluctant to comply, the 
experimentally imposed social identification could not have 
been internalised and other factors must also have been 
involved. For this reason, resemblances will not be further 
expanded. 
It is also interesting to contrast this view of (negative) 
intergroup behaviour with Zimbardo's (1969) concept 
"deindividualisation", which grew from his argument that 
individuals are most likely to behave antisocially under 
conditions of anonymity and alienation, that is to say, when 
their sense of identity is lost. The important point is, 
that unlike Zimbardo's and older traditional theories such 
as Le Bon's. (1896) analysis of crowd behaviour or Dollard et 
al's (1939) frustration-agression hypothesis, Turner's 
social identity theory argues that anti-social (intergroup) 
behaviour is not characterised by a loss of self and 
rationality, with the locus of control subsequently shifting 
to volatile and primitive "instincts". On the contrary, it 
depends on a change in the individual's self definition, 
mediated by a cognitive act of self-categorisation. Hence, 
idiosyncratic self-images based on personal identity are 




depersonalised self-image which prescribes the same course 
of behaviour for all ingroup members. 
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5. Social and personal identity and the self-concept 
Social identity corresponds precisely, Turner continues, to 
the first of two major subsystems of the self-concept as 
cognitive structure uncovered empirically by Gordon (1968) 
and formally described by Gergen (1971) as "terms that 
denote one's membership in various formal and informal 
social groups. " Similarly, Turner "defines" and "equates" 
personal identity with Gordon's second class of self 
descriptions which were more formally described as terms 
"that are more personal in nature and that usually denote 
specific attributes of the individual. " (Gergen, 1971, 
p. 62). Thus Turner's notion of social and personal identity 
rests on a direct empirical as well as a convincing 
theoretical basis. 
Although the point may seem pedantic, it seems important to 
remember. that Turner visualises social and personal-identity 
as cognitive structures, whereas Gergen refers to actual 
self reports. The former are clearly hypothesised to 
underpin-the latter, and therefore should not be equated 
with them. 
This proviso does not seem to go far enough because the 
notion of personal identity in particular, remains 
confusing. Turner's definition essentially boils down to 
(the cognitive structure underlying) whatever self- 
descriptions an individual uses that are not social 
identifications, such as traits, tastes, concerns, bodily 
attributes, idiosyncratic styles of thought and relating to 
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others, feelings and any other specific attribute, (i. e. 
Gordon and Gergen's second class of self-descriptions). 
This equation, however, (which Turner now thinks over hasty) 
tends to give the false impression that the difference 
between personal and social identity is primarily linguistic 
- terms like "I am optimistic" reflecting the former and "I 
am an optimist", the latter. This is serious because, 
although the expression of a functioning social identity in 
terms of a self description could be a single group 
membership, it is more likely a list of attributes coloured 
by the membership would be given. These of course would 
fall into Gergen's second class of self-descriptions and 
hence, be wrongly equated with personal identity. Indeed, 
in this sense, there might be a "personal identity" for each 
social identification, which is not easy to visualise 
because, as Bem and Allen (1974) point out, trait words 
encourage thinking in terms of underlying consistencies, but 
commonsense and experience suggest that different, even 
conflicting characteristics are selected as self 
descriptions in different situations. On the other hand, it 
seems reasonable (but not necessary) to assume that such 
descriptions are relatively consistent within themselves 
because of cognitive consistency (Festinger, 1957) and 
implicit personality theory (Passini and Norman, 1966). 
Indeed, it is interesting to speculate, for example, that a 
specific "good subject" social identification is often 
elicited by experimental artefacts, and that this accounts 





it is found. 
Conversely, a personalised self-image might even be 
expressed through an idiosyncratic list of social 
identifications. 
Clearly, Turner does not intend a superficial linguistic but 
a fundamental cognitive distinction, according to whether 
the source of an individual's current self-image is 
primarily located in a group membership or not. To borrow 
an analogy from psycholinguistics, personal or social 
identity do not refer to the cognitive structures 
underpinning different classes of self-descriptors, so much 
as to prelinguistic "deep-structures" that need not 
necessarily map directly onto verbal reports. 
To summarise, this rather pedantic and arduous diversion 
seemed necessary because on close consideration a number of 
nagging inconsistences appeared in Turner's (1981a), brief 
exposition of personal identity (which was peripheral to his 
purpose and therefore only cursorily examined. ) Probably 
the easiest solution would be to distance the association 
with Gergen (1971) and Gordon's (1968) research so that the 
straight forward notion of personal and social identity as 
psychological states need not be blurred by assuming a 




6. Categorisation, social identity and beliefs about retardates 
It is now possible to use Turner's extension of Tajfel's 
social identity theory as a social psychological pathway 
whereby membership of social groups like psychologists or 
various lay communities can determine beliefs and hence, the 
perceptions and behaviour of individual members towards 
retardates. The key has been implicit throughout, and has 
grown so obvious that to state it explicitly seems something 
of an anti-climax. If the function of a salient social 
identity is to guide behaviour in a situationally 
appropriate manner, then it is clear that individuals who 
share a particular social identity (i. e perceive themselves 
as members of the same social group) are likely to respond 
in the same way in a situation that enhances its relevance. 
In other words, functioning social identity produces 
conformity in group members. To give a specific example, 
doctors in a clinical setting are likely to apply the same 
conceptual framework to and hence, to act in the same, 
clinically appropriate manner to a retardate, but if the 
same doctors met the same retardate in another situation, 
say a children's party (where self-images, and hence 
behavioural control are based on personal identity) a 
spectrum of individual responses is likely. 
Turner (1981; 1981a; 1982; Tajfel and Turner, 1979) 
delineate two process through which social identity enhances 
characteristically uniform intergroup behaviour. The first, 
which will be discussed more fully in the following chapter, 
-255 - 
ýý i 
concerns the motivational effects - specifically the desire 
for positive self-esteem - that seem always to characterise 
self-descriptions and that are hypothesised to determine the 
evaluative direction intergroup behaviour takes. The 
second, by now, should be self evident. To give a plainer 
clue, conformity might be rephrased as "enhanced intragroup 
similarity". In other words, the automatic perceptual 
effects of social categorisation - stereotyping -. apply to 
self and ingroup as well as outgroup. According to Tajfel's 
(1972) categorisation theory, it will be-remembered, 
criterial attributes, that is characteristics that are 
perceived to correlate with membership of a social group, 
are inferred by an induction process from example group 
members and then attributed to all group members, -including 
self, by a process of deduction, so that the original-fuzzy r 
continuous, but correlated distribution of characteristics 
becomes a sharply discontinuous property of the category. 
Thus perceived similarities between ingroup members, 
including self, on any attribute associated with group 
membership will be exaggerated. In short, or in a nutshell, 
as Turner puts it, stereotypic perception results directly 
from a functioning social identity. - This means that in 
situations of salient social identity, self and ingroup 
members become perceptually interchangeable because all are 
perceived in terms of common group characteristics - as 
group members - not individuals. At the same time, 
perceived intergroup dissimilarity and intragroup similarity 
are also exaggerated, and consequently, conformity will be 
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directly and indirectly enhanced. 
To recap on the most immediately relevant point, if group 
members assign themelves the same criterial characteristics 
including motives, emotions and normative expectations in 
addition to the traits more usually associated with 
stereotyping, consensus in their beliefs about retardates 
and hence, in their perceptions and reactions will result. 
Futhermore enhanced perceived-similarity within in-and 
outgroups is likely indirectly to increase conformity of 
social interactions. Put another way, functioning social 
identity is a vehicle for macrosystem influences. 
Although there is much about self-categorisation and social 
identity related behavioural conformity still to discuss, 
this will be deferred until the next chapter because the 
notion of self-definitions resulting in conformity of action 
and opinion towards an outgroup is precisely what this 
chapter set out to explore. 
1¼ 
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7. STUDY 3 
Normative expectations about retardates 
or 'social identity associated demand characteristics'? 
7.1 Introduction 
The notion that subjects' self-definitions as members of 
various social groups, rather than summed individual 
differences account for variations in beliefs about 
retardates between groups, can-now be approached: it is 
hypothesised that beliefs are mediated through shared 
social- rather than individual personal- identifications. 
In other words, beliefs reflect norms appropriate-to social 
identifications rather than idiosyncratic beliefs and 
experience. 
To put this into hypothesis form, its resemblance to a 
situation of experimental artefact may be exploited. Quite 
simply, it is hypothesised. that characteristic beliefs that 
members of different groups hold about retardates'are shaped 
by "demand characteristics" associated with social 
identifications rather. than by real individual differences 
underpinning group memberships. in this context, Orne's 
definition of demand characteristics: 
the cues which govern his (the individual's) 
perception - which communicate what is expected of 
him and what the experimenter hopes to find 
1969, p 146 
is used in a special sense to refer to normative 
expectations associated with various social groups within 
our culture. Clearly, in this sense they represent elements 
of the macrosystem, and in the sense that individuals will 
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conform to them, should they define-themselves in terms of 
these groups, they also represent the basic material 
underlining Turner's self-stereotyping. 
Kruglansky (1975) and Orne (1962,1969) outline two relevant 
strategies to test for demand characteristics. The first 
examines directly whether they account for an experimental 
outcome by keeping them constant and eliminating the 
treatment. This may be achieved by a) a non-experiment, in 
which the paradigm is described in detail to participants 
who predict how they would behave as subjects or b) a 
simulated experiment in which participants are not given 
treatments,, 
-. but are asked to simulate 
the performance of 
real subjects. In either case, experimental treatments 
clearly cannot mediate results. Thus, if these resemble the 
typical experimental outcome, it is likely - not proven - 
that demand characteristics account for results in the 
original paradigm. If, on the other hand, there is no 
resemblance to the typical experimental result, demand 
characteristics are unlikely to have played a material role. 
The second strategy is to treat the supposed source of . 
demand characteristics as an independent variable which can 
then be varied orthogonally with treatment variables. This 
method unconfounds their influences and shows whether the 
typical experimental outcome depends on the demand 
characteristics or the treatments alone or some interaction 
between them. 
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This experiment rests on the first strategy, (although in a 
subsidiary aspect, an attempt will be made to adapt the 
second), in order see whether between group differences in 
the meaning of "retardates" might be attributed to normative 
expectations associated with various social identifications. 
In a repeated measures design, subjects will be asked to 
predict responses for 
1. a doctor 
2. somebody personally acquainted with a retarded 
person 
3. a teacher 
The hypothesis will be supported if predictions vary in a 
way that resembles responses of actual doctors, acquainted 




Eighteen males and twelve females aged 18 to 25 from a stage 
management and theatrical design course at Bristol Old Vic 
Theatre School, ' eight of whom said they knew a retarded 
person. 
Apparatus 
A 46 item semantic differential (Appendix 4.1), derived from 
the original 81 item measure by: - 
1. eliminating or combining items that correlated highly 
with others 
2. omitting a small number of descriptive items on which 
there was massive consensus and which therefore would 
neither convey additional information, nor be 
sensitive to differences between groups, and 
3. adding items 15 & 46 from the original pilot which 
seemed relevant to "teacher" but which had not been 
given frequently enough to warrant inclusion in the 
item pool (see Appendix 2.1). 
Items were in random order with positive and negative poles 
counterbalanced. Two versions (one the reverse order of the 
other) were employed so that any effect of item order on 
judgements could be examined. 
Procedure 
Testing comprised a single session, during which subjects 
completed booklets of 4 semantic differentials, headed "a 
Thanks are due to John Teller for arranging access and Chris Denys, 
the Principal for his permission. 
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doctor would probably think retardates are.... ", similarly, 
"a teacher would... " and "someone personally acquainted 
with a retarded person would... " which were presented in 
random order. ("Doctor" was chosen, although "psychologist" 
would have been more comparable with Study 1, because 
informal preliminaries showed many lay subjects were unsure 
exactly what a psychologist was. ) Finally, they completed 
the the fourth giving their own beliefs, and indicating 
their age, sex and whether they knew any retarded people. 
Instructions were taken from Osgood et al (1957), as usual. 
(See Appendix 2.3). 
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7.3 RESULTS 
ANOVA revealed no significant order effects, so data from 
the two versions of the questionnaire were combined during 
the following analyses, examples of and justifications for 
which are given in Appendix 4.2. 
Table 4.1 gives mean predicted scores on each semantic 
differential item for the three social identifications and 
shows that "someone personally acquainted with a retarded 
person" was associated with the most positive evaluation on 
45/46 items, "doctor" on 1/46 (item 8) and "teacher" on 
0/46. Conversely, "someone personally acquainted with a 
retarded person" was associated with the most negative 
evaluation on one item, (No. 8), "doctor" on three, (Nos. 
7,10 and 41) and "teacher" on forty-one (with one tie). 
A three factor ANOVA was computed for the prediction data, 
with 2 between (actual acquaintance-and sex), and one within 
subject factor with three levels (the three social 
identifications), usuing BMDP 2V (N. B. which abbreviates p) 
. 0001 to 0). Probabilities are included on Table 4.1 where 
predictions differed significantly. 
Predicted social identification had 42 significant main 
effects. In each case "someone personally acquainted with a 
retarded person" was associated with the most positive 
evaluation. Conversely, in all but two cases (one of these 




Mean-predicted semantic differential scores for the 
three social identifications 
item "doctor" "acq'ted" "teacher" p 
1 6.20 4.90 6.20 0 
2 4.37 2.97 4.60 . 01 3 5.03 4.23 6.00 . 0005 4 2.53 1.83 3.50 0 
5 4.93 3.83 5.26 . 01 6 5.80 4.83 6.13 . 002 7 5.97 4.77 5.53 . 03 8 4.63 4.83 4.80 
9 5.60 4.87 6.40 . 0004 
10 4.40 3.83 4.30 
11 4.37 3.43 5.27 0 
12 5.33 3.20 5.73 0 
13 4.83 4.53 5.67 
14 6.30 5.43 6.43 . 0007 15 6.07 4.30 6.33 0 
16 3.57 2.23 4.57 . 0005 17 2.90 2.73 3.57 
18 4.83 3.77 5.63 0 
19 5.53 4.40 5.73 . 0005 20 4.00 2.93 4.33 . 03 21 4.90 3.20 5.60 0 
22 4.10 2.60 4.60 0 
23 3.10 2.17 4.63 0 
24 5.37 4.33 5.40 . 03 25 5.30 3.70 5.70 0 
26 5.53 4.10 6.10 0 
27 3.77 2.57 4.73 0 
28 5.97 5.57 6.07 . 03 29 4.83 3.90 4.93 . 003 30 5.40 4.73 6.37 0 
31 4.30 3.13 5.37 0 
32 4.43 3.23 4.97 . 0002 33 5.57 5.13 5.67 . 03 34 4.47 2.67 5.17 . 0001 35 4.63 2.60 4.80 0 
36 4.23 3.13 4.83 0 
37 5.70 4.23 6.00 0 
38 4.47 3.70 4.73 . 01 
39 2.90 2.10 3.73 . 003 40 5.27 4.70 5.63 . 02 41 6.77 5.27 6.33 0 
42 4.60 3.43 5.07 0 
43 3.70 2.97 5.37 0 
44 5.83 4.10 5.97 0 
45 3.93 2.33 5.23 0 
46 5.37 4.03 6.53 . 0001 
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Table 4.2 shows mean scores by actual personal acquaintance 
which, ANOVA showed, had only one significant main effect 
(item 29), although there were two significant interactions 
in which acquainted subjects predicted less negative 
responses for "someone personally acquainted with a retarded 
person" on items 18 and 31 (p = . 02 and . 03, respectively. 
) 
Averaged across predictions, the effect of contact was 
exactly at chance level. However, compared with 
unacquainted subjects, those who knew a retarded person 
predicted relatively positive responses on 33/46 items for 
doctors and negative on 39/46 for teachers. Interestingly, 
on "someone personally acquainted with a retarded person" 
the effect of real contact was EXACTLY at chance level. 
Since gender effects were neither significant nor of present 
relevance, they will not be presented. 
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TABLE 4.2 
The effects of actual personal acquaintance on predictions 
"DOCTOR" "ACQUAINTED" "TEACHER" 
Item yes no yes no (p) yes no 
1 6.25 6.18 5.00 4.86 6.25 6.18 
2 3.38 4.73 3.00 2.95 4.63 4.59 
3 4.88 5.09 4.25 4.23 6.00 6.00 
4 2.13 2.68 1.75 1.86 4.13 3.27 
5 5.00 4.91 4.63 3.55 6.25 4.91 
6 5.75 5.82 4.88 4.82 6.25 6.09 
7 5.88 6.00 4.75 4.77 5.50 5.55 
8 3.38 5.09 5.00 4.77 3.88 5.14 
9 5.50 5.64 4.88 4.86 6.50 6.36 
10 4.25 4.45 4.50 3.59 4.75 4.14 
11 4.38 4.36 3.63 3.36 5.63 5.14 
12 5.25 5.36 2.75 3.36 6.38 5.50 
13 4.63 4.91 4.88 4.41 5.50 5.73 
14 6.13 6.36 5.25 5.50 6.63 6.36 
15 6.00 6.09 4.50 4.23 6.63 6.23 
16 3.50 3.59 2.63 2.09 4.50 4.59 
17 3.13 2.82 2.63 2.77 3.75 3.50 
18' 4.75 4.86 2.88 4.09 (. 02)6.25 5.41 
19 4.88 5.77 4.00 4.55 6.38 5.50 
20 4.00 4.00 3.75 2.64 4.75 4.32 
21 4.38 5.09 3.13 3.23 5.63 5.59 
22 4.00 4.14 2.75 2.55 4.75 4.55 
23 3.13 3.09 2.38 2.09 5.50 4.32 
24 5.50 5.32 4.63 4.23 5.88 5.23 
25 5.13 5.36 3.75 3.68 5.88 5.64 
26 5.25 5.64 4.00 4.14 6.63 5.91 
27 3.13 4.00 2.00 2.77 5.38 4.50 
2a 6.00 5.95 4.75 5.86 6.13 6.05 
29 4.00 5.14 3.00 4.23 4.63 5.05(. 003 
30 4.88 5.59 4.25 4.91 6.63 6.27 
31 3.25 4.68 1.75 3.64 (. 02)5.88 5.18 
32 4.50 4.41 3.63 3.09 5.13 4.91 
33 5.38 64 5 5.13 . 5.14 6.13 
5.50 
34 4.25 . 55 4 3.00 2.55 5.25 5.14 
35 4.38 . 4.73 3.00 2.45 5.13 4.68 59 4 36 4.13 4.27 2.88 3.23 5.50 . 95 5 37 5.50 5.77 4.00 4.32 6.13 . 45 4 38 4.63 4.41 4.13 3.55 5.50 . 73 3 39 2.00 3.23 1.63 2.27 3.75 . 41 5 40 5.75 5.09 4.75 4.68 6.25 . 
41 6.63 6.82 4.75 5.45 6.38 6.32 
42 3.88 4.86 3.13 3.55 5.63 4.86 
43 2.75 4.05 2.00 3.32 5.50 5.32 
44 5.50 5.95 4.00 4.14 6.13 5.91 
45 4.13 3.86 2.13 2.41 5.50 5.14 
46 5.88 5.18 4.63 3.82 6.50 6.55 
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Table 4.3 shows mean semantic differential scores by actual 
personal contact when subjects completed the fourth semantic 
differential giving their own beliefs. Subjects with 
contact gave the most positive responses on 39/45 items 
(with one tie). 
ANOVA yielded 4 significant differences, contact having a 
positive effect in each case. Relevant probability levels 
are included in the table. 
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TABLE 4.3 
Subjects' own beliefs about retardates 
Item Acquainted S's Unacquainted S's 
Mean s. d. Mean s. d. 
1- 5.00 1.41 5.86 1.10 
2 3.30 1.16 4.00 2.00 
3 4.40 2.17 5.36 1.01 
4 2.10 1.10 2.86 1.35 
5 4.40 1.71 4.29 1.82 
6 4.80 1.48 5.64 1.08 
7 4.90 1.73 5.07 1.82 
8 4.40 1.96 5.00 1.88 
.9 
5.50 1.27 5.71 1.33 
10 4.20 1.62 4.36 1.22 
11 3.90 0.88 3.93 1.49 
12 3.40 1.43 5.21 1.42 
13 4.50 2.07 4.79 1.67 
14 4.90 1.29 5.50 1.45 
15 5.30 1.57 5.57 1.22 
16 2.90 1.66 2.64 1.91 
17 2.70 1.64 1.79 0.97 
18 4.20 0.63 4.57 1.28 
19 5.70 1.34 5.57 1.02 
20 3.10 1.85 4.00 1.04 
21 3.70 1.06 4.79 1.12 
22 2.80 1.40 3.71 1.68 
23 3.20 2.04 3.29 1.94 
24 3.90 1.91 5.00 1.41 
25 4.40 1.71 4.43 1.28 
26 3.70 1.34 5.00 1.62 
27 2.00 1.15 2.86 1.79 
28 5.20 1.75 5.79 0.97 
29 5.00 1.76 5.00 1.30 
30 4.50 1.72 4.93 1.73 
31 3.60 1.96 4.07 1.33 
32 3.70 1.77 3.50 1.09 
33 5.30 1.06 5.50 1.16 
34 3.50 1.90 4.43 1.87 
35 3.00 1.63 3.14 1.51 
36 3.90 0.88 4.00 1.36 
37 4.70 0.95 5.07 1.00 
38 4.10 1.29 4.14 1.51 
39 -2.30 1.25 2.71 2.02 
40 4.80 1.62 3.93 1.59 
41 5.70 1.06 5.86 0.95 
42 3.90 1.29 4.36 1.22 
43 2.70 1.34 3.71 0.91 
44 4.20 1.75 4.71 1.20 
45 2.80 1.62 3.07 1.59 
46 4.60 1.84 4.64 1.98 
p . 006 
p . 03 
p= . 05 
p= . 04 
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Predicted scores were factor analysed for each social 
identification (BMDP4M). Initial analyses yielded 13 
factors for "doctor" and "someone personally acquainted with 
a retarded person" and 14 for "teacher". Since the first 
ten factors accounted for approximately 90% variance in each 
case and factors 11 onwards seemed particularly vague, data 
were reanalysed specifying an eigenvalue of 1.5. 
This yielded 10 factor solutions for "doctor" and "someone 
personally acquainted with a retarded person" and an 11 
factor solution for "teacher", which are given in Table 4.4, 
although to clarify the picture further, only items loading 
above .4 have been included. 
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7.4 DISCUSSION 
The first aspect of the analysis is a variation on Orne 
(1962,1969) and Kruglansky's (1975) first strategy: the 
supposed source of demand characteristics, that is general 
cultural expectations associated with the social 
identifications "doctor", "someone personally acquainted 
with a retarded person" and "teacher" (macrosystem 
influences) remain constant - in the sense that their 
influence is as freely available here as in other paradigms 
- while at the same time, the fact that their predicted 
effect is examined in a repeated measures design eliminates 
the influence of the usual independent (treatment) variable, 
actual differences between doctors, acquainted subjects and 
teachers. 
There were 42 significant differences between predictions 
for "doctor", "someone personally acquainted with a retarded 
person" and "teacher" which means that members of these 
social categories are hypothesised to have different beliefs 
about retardates, - or in the present terminology - that 
there are different demand characteristics associated with 
these social identifications. 
In each of the 42 cases, "someone personally acquainted with 
a retarded person" was associated with the most positive 
evaluation -a trend insignificantly repeated on all but one 
of the remaining four items. 
Since semantic differential responses are scored from 1 to 
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7, the former being assigned to positive and the latter to 
negative poles, simply counting the number of positive 
scores indicates overall predicted evaluation. In this way, 
the demand characteristic associated with "someone 
personally acquainted with a retarded person" was found to 
be evaluatively ambivalent, whereas those associated with 
"doctor" and "teacher" are extremely negative (according to 
the Sign . Test, 26/46, N. S.; 8/46, p<. 001; 3/46, 
p<. 0001). 
Results may therefore be summarised as follows: - demand 
characteristics associated with the social identifications, 
"doctor", "someone personally acquainted with a retarded 
person" and "teacher", can generate significant differences 
in beliefs about retardates, independent of subjects' 
"personalities", background and experience. Futhermore they 
generate both absolutely and relatively negative responses 
in the first and third cases, compared with absolutely 
ambivalent, relatively positive in the second. 
Since this is broadly consistent with Study 1 and follows 
the trend of many others, e. g. Buden, 1977; Efron and 
Efron, 1967; Foster and Keech, 1977; Greenbaum and Wang, 
1965; Harth, 1973; Hollinger and Jones, 1970; Kennon and 
Sandoval, 1978 to name but a few, it is likely - though not 
proven - that conformity to social identity related demand 
characteristics (i. e. normative expectations associated 
with group membership) rather than summed individual 
differences between group members accounts for variation 
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between responses of real doctors, acquainted subjects and 
teachers. The relative negativity of the teacher role 
compared with predictions for doctors, however, is not 
consistent with Study 1, but was probably artefactually 
generated by a subject who joked about the draconian nature 
of his teachers, and in his opinion, teachers in general, 
even though subjects were reminded they should predict for 
an average contemporary teacher. 
Unfortunately, it is never possible to conclude from this 
sort of procedural probe that demand characteristics do 
account for experimental outcomes. It is merely probable. 
(Kruglansky, 1975; Orne, 1962,1969). However, the 
alternatives (1) that genuine equivalence of the mediating 
psychological processes (Bem, 1965,1967) or (2) empathy 
(Kruglansky and Eilam, 1974) account for the similarity 
between predicted and actual responses, seem improbable 
here, (with the possible exception of actually acquainted 
subjects predicting for the acquainted identification) 
because all subjects were lay people and it seems unlikely 
that they mimicked teachers and doctors by empathising so 
successfully that they were able to reproduce "genuine" 
clinical or professional beliefs. Rather, the general 
cultural expectations that guided subjects in the present 
experiment also guide doctors, teachers and acquainted 
subjects. 
Kruglansky's (1975) second strategy, he argues, _can 
be 
conclusive. When a supposed source of demand 
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characteristics is varied orthogonally with an experimental 
variable, 
(1) the former alone might replicate the typical result 
(2) both might replicate it independently or 
(3) in interaction or 
(4) only the experimental variable elicits it. 
The first outcome, is of course the most serious. It 
indicates conclusively that demand characteristics rather 
than the-treatment account for the usual outcome of a 
paradigm. 
The subsidiary aspect of the analysis, which is something of 
an after thought, is a variation on this strategy in the 
form of a comparison between the effects of actual contact - 
representing the usual experimental variable - and 
expectations about contact - the suspected source of demand 
characteristics. Ideally, equal numbers of doctors, 
acquainted subjects and teachers should have been employed 
so that "experimental variables" and the three sources of 
demand characteristics could be systematically varied, but 
it simply was not possible to recruit and screen the large 
number of subjects this would have required, so it was 
necessary to settle on this preliminary approximation. 
Retrospectively, a more appropriate design could have been 
achieved by asking subjects also to predict for "someone not 
personally acquainted with a retardate", but for reasons 
which will become plain, a new experiment was not undertaken 
to achieve this. 
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Table 4.2 shows mean predicted scores given by acquainted 
and unacquainted subjects for the three identifications. 
ANOVA yielded only 1 main effect, in which actual contact 
subjects predicted a higher level of self esteem would be 
attributed to retardates across the 3 identifications (item 
29, p- . 003), but since there were 46 analyses, this could 
easily have been a chance effect. Similarly, there were 
just 2 interactions, (unacquainted subjects predicted 
"someone personally acquainted with a retardate" would find 
them more "embarrassing" (item 18, p= . 02) and "unaware of 
right and wrong", (item 31, p- . 02), also explicable by 
chance. ) Although there was a trend for acquainted subjects 
to make more and less positive predictions for doctors and 
teachers, respectively, compared with unacquainted subjects, 
it is more striking that the effect of actual contact on 
predicted scores for "someone personally acquainted with a 
retarded person" was exactly at chance level. Data from the 
fourth semantic differential in which subjects gave their 
own beliefs, showed this lack of contact effects was not 
because subjects were atypical. Table 4.3 shows the "usual" 
pattern, with acquainted subjects giving more positive 
responses on 39/45 items (with one tie), 4 differences being 
signif icant. 
In summary, actual contact, the independent variable usually 
believed to account for the positive beliefs of acquainted 
subjects has had a chance overall effect whereas 
expectations about acquainted subjects, the supposed source 
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of demand characteristics, with which it is usually 
confounded, accounted for 45/46 most positive scores, (p 
<. 0001). Thus, despite the preliminary nature of this 
aspect, results are striking enough_to suggest that a more 
rigorous design would reveal, according to Kruglansky's most 
serious situation, that differences in beliefs about 
retardates are not due to summed individual differences 
between groups of subjects but to conformity to expectancies 
mediated by shared social identifications. 
So far data have only been treated in a unidimensional 
fashion, and therefore results could perhaps be explained if 
subjects simply responded to an evaluative demand that 
acquainted subjects are "kind", for example, which falls far 
short of the complex ideological and attitudinal influences 
attributed to the macrosystem. For this reason, raw scores 
were factor analysed, despite the relatively small sample 
size, and the predicted meaning of retardates for "doctor", 
"someone personally acquainted with a retarded person" and 
"teacher" is given in Table 4.4. Differences are striking, 
showing that expectations associated with social 
identifications prevail into multidimensional levels. 
-275 - 
TABLE 4.4 
PREDICTED DIET IDIMß'NSIONAL MEANINGS OF 'RETARDATES' 
"Doctor" 
FACTOR 1-(30.1% variance) 


















FACTOR 1 (35.3% 
easy to relate 
badly dressed 
wanted 








nice to live with 
loving 
family's pride 
(-bad at expressing self) 
FACTOR 2 (14.1% variance) 
. 86 abnormal 
. 78 mentally ill 
. 56 need special classes 
. 54 socially inept (-asset to society) 
bad at expressing self 
FACTOR 3 (10.4% variance) 
speech impeded . 91 dependent . 85 
mentally ill . 62 
poorly-coordinated . 50 





































FACTOR 4 (8.7% variance) FACTOR 4(8.0% variance) 
hard to relate to . 71 (-unpredictable) . 
80 
aggressive . 64 healthy . 
70 
abnormal . 61 high self esteem -"62 
strain for family . 60 happy . 
60 
(-wanting to join in) -. 49 
bad at concentrating . 47 
FACTOR 5 (7.8% variance) 
physically h'capped . 74 
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FACTOR 5 (7.9% variance) 
good gov'ment provision . 74 
dirty . 70 poorly understood . 68 
nasty to live with . 53 not frightening . 56 family's shame . 47 (-frustrated) -. 50 (-dependent) -. 49 




need special classes 
FACTOR 7 (5.7% variance) 
unpredictable 














FACTOR 8 (5.6% variance) 
unaware of right & wrong . 78 (-good gov'ment provision) "60 
(-alike) . 46 
nasty to live with . 20 
FACTOR 9"(4.8% variance) 
embarrassing 
bad at concentrating 
excitable 
FACTOR 10 (4.7% variance) 





FACTOR 7 (6.3% variance) 
well-meaning 
different 
FACTOR 8 (5.0% variance) 
sensitive to others 
C--speerJt Cnyocdtä) 
FACTOR 9 (4.5% variance) 
quiet 
insecure 
FACTOR 10 (3.8% variance) 
. 81 acceptable neighbour 
. 53 
FACTOR 11 (3.9% variance) 
abnormal face . 63 
confused thinker -. 61 










FACTOR 1 (36.1% variance) 
slow learner . 83 
childlike . 82 
bad at concentrating . 81 
poorly-coordinated . 80 
speech impeded . 66 
accident prone . 56 low intelligence . 52 
insecure . 45 
FACTOR 2 (14.0% variance) 
family's shame . 82 
dirty . 73 
badly dressed . 70 
(-loving) . 68 
unwanted . 66 
frightening . 64 
illness prone . 59 
nasty to live with . 54 
burden to society . 50 
unattractive . 47 
embarrassing . 46 
FACTOR 3 (10.0% variance) 
unaware of right & wrong . 85 
unacceptable neighbour . 71 
need special classes . 69 
confused thinker . 85 
dev'ment fixed by birth . 50 
obstructive . 49 
FACTOR 4 (8.6% variance) 
abnormal . 72 
(-wanting to join in) . 64 
socially inept . 59 
mentally ill . 55 
low intelligence . 52 
illness prone -. 47 
unattractive . 47 
alike . 50 
burden to society . 45 
FACTOR 5 (7.1% variance) 
insensitive to others . 67 
speech impeded . 53 
aggressive . 49 
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FACTOR 6 (6.1% variance) 
alike . 71 bad gov'ment provision . 56 insecure . 48 
frightening . 47 
FACTOR 7 (5.7% variance) 
excitable . 65 
strain for family . 62 
mentally ill . 52 
. 
FACTOR 8 (4.9% variance) 
low self esteem . 74 
dependent . 66 
sad . 59 
unpredictable -. 56 
FACTOR 9 (4.0% variance) 
quiet/noisy -. 64 
physically h'capped . 61 
FACTOR 10 (3.6% variance) 
frustrated -. 84 
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Factor 1 for "doctor" which accounts for almost a third of 
overall variation, is close to a textbook definition of 
retardation. It concerns intelligence, social competence 
and abnormality. Clearly, the demands on a doctor to be 
primarily concerned with "symptoms" of the medical model are 
extremely pervasive: even a small group of lay people are 
familiar with them. Although the remaining factors are 
neither so clear nor so striking, they seem to centre on 
social competence or acceptability, further symptoms of 
retardation and the burden of caregiving. It is-not until 
Factor 6 that personal characteristics arise, but even here, 
less "loving", more "frustrated" and "sad" covary with the 
belief that retardates should be in special classes, which 
suggests that doctors are expected to be interested in 
personal characteristics not for human reasons, but to 
facilitate decisions about placements. 
Throughout the predicted multidimensional meaning of 
retardates for "someone personally acquainted with a 
retarded person" the emphasis is on interpersonal 
relationships: elements of the medical model being 
subsidiary. Factor'l, which accounts for more than a third 
of overall variance, centres on how easy retardates are to 
relate to, but this covaries not with their aggressiveness 
and abnormality as it did in Factor 4 for "doctor", but with 
more personal characteristics like lovingness, approach 
tendencies and attractiveness. Also, the correlation with 
"wanted", "well dressed", "clean" and "family's pride" 
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4 
suggests that acceptability is less a function of 
constitutional factors and more dependent on the love and 
care of others. 
Factor 2 contains elements of the medical model, but 
interestingly, low intelligence, is missing. This appears 
in Factor 3-where it covaries (primarily) with items 
relating to thinking, learning and emotional stability. 
Thus, the influence of the medical model, in contrast to 
that predicted for doctors, is secondary, and there is 
something of an emphasis on practical aspects of 
intelligence, rather than on intelligence as a 
constitutional trait. 
Throughout the following factors - with the exception of 
Factor 6, the emphasis returns to personal characteristics. 
Predicted Factor 1 for teachers clearly centres on learning 
ability; low intelligence covaries with "slow learner" and 
"bad at concentrating", not with "abnormal" and "socially 
inept" as predicted for doctor. 
Factor 2 shares some dimensions with with Factor 1 for 
"someone personally acquainted with a retarded person", but 
is negative in tone and the items relating to personal 
characteristics and caregiving covary with "embarrassing", 
"frightening" and "burden to society", not with 
"easy/d. ifficult to relate to". In other words, it suggests 
a negative reaction . rather than an openness 
to interaction. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting to speculate that it 
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assesses suitability for classroom integration. This is 
perhaps the theme of the remaining factors, but in general 
they seem fuzzy and do not constitute meaningful units. 
In summary, two points may be made:. most important, 
expectancies associated with the three roles, "doctor", 
"someone acquainted with a retardate" and "teacher" of 
themselves are sufficient to generate multidimensional 
differences in beliefs - that is to say, in belief structure 
and content as well as evaluation. Second, doctors are 
clearly expected to show primary concern with clinical 
rather than personal aspects, while personally acquainted 
subjects and teachers are expected to show more interest in 
personal characteristics and intellectual functioning. 
Since the outcome of factor analyses depends entirely on the 
data analysed, it would be necessary to gather parallel 
information from real doctors, acquainted people and 
teachers in order to see whether results mimic those of real 
subjects. Thus, no direct comparisons are possible, 
although anecdotal complaints that doctors conceptualise 
retardates in dehumanised, clinical terms, are suggestive 
(e. g. Bogdan and Taylor, 1976; Turner, 1980; Valpey, 1982). 
A comparison with factors derived from acquainted lay people 
in Study 1, is less supportive, since although these showed 
an interest in personal characteristics, they focussed more 
on abnormality, which it was argued, might have represented 
an assessment of the amount of care needed. Present results 
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might therefore reveal that the demands associated with the 
personally acquainted role are rather sentimental (at the 
multidimensional level), which means that the more practical 
beliefs of real acquainted subjects are mediated by actual 
experiential or personal factors. However, this conclusion 
is not inevitable: first, there are differences in subject 
numbers and the instrument between this and Study 1, and 
more important, consideration reveals that there are 
qualitative differences between the present study and 
others, like Study 1, which would make comparisons 
inconclusive even if parallel data were available. For 
example, an interesting and conceptually knotty question is 
just how detailed normative expectations can be assumed to 
be. Clearly, it would be nonsensical to imagine that a lay 
person is as well versed in the norms of medical, 
"personally acquainted" and educational social systems as 
are doctors, acquainted people and teachers. Thus, subjects 
might have lacked the knowledge necessary to make precise 
predictions. Furthermore, subjects were consciously making 
predictions about three roles, which is likely to be very 
different from actually conforming to one of them. For 
example, contrast effects and the explicit focus might have 
resulted in a clearer - or perhaps even artefactual 
generation of differing predicted responses. This lack of 
psychological equivalence suggests that a rigorous othogonal 
variation between actual group membership and expectations 
associated with group membership (Kruglanski's second and 
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conclusive strategy), cannot be attained via this prediction 
method. 
To conclude, Study 3 has shown that normative expectations 
are sufficient to generate between group differences in 
beliefs about retardates, at uni- and multi- dimensional 
levels. Resemblances with evaluative outcomes in Study 1 
and others suggest that conformity to expectations rather 
than averaged inter-individual differences account for broad 
evaluative differences between clinically oriented, 
personally acquainted and teacher subjects in real 
experiments, but lack of relevant comparisons together with 
design restrictions preclude more detailed, and confident 
conclusions. Furthermore, post hoc logical criticisms 
suggest that predictions and actual conformity are unlikely 
to be psychologically equivalent. For this reason, stronger 
evidence will be sought by means of a different design, in 
Study 4. 
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B. STUDY 4 
An attempt to enhance medics' shared social identification 
8.1 Introduction 
To recap, the argument of this chapter is that through 
aspects of self -definitions, specifically Turner's social 
identifications, individuals assign themselves relevant 
norms and this results in conformity, including attitudinal 
conformity, amongst those who perceive themselves as members 
of the same group. Thus, Turner's theory provides an 
explanation for between group differences in beliefs about 
retardates that is truly social psychological, that is 
dependent on shared intra individual factors (perceived 
group membership), rather than averaged experiential or 
personality differences. 
In order to validate this empirically, it is necessary to 
show that norms and expectations associated with group 
membership, rather than individual characteristics of group 
members, mediate beliefs about retardates. 
Study 3 attempted to exclude the influence of real 
differences between doctors, acquainted people and teachers, 
by using a single group of lay subjects. Subsequently, the 
effect of expectations associated with these roles was 
probed by asking subjects to predict beliefs for a member of 
each. However, lay subjects might not have been 
sufficiently aware of relevant norms, and were unlikely to 
respond in a way psychologically equivalent to real doctors, 
acquainted subjects and teachers in experiments. 
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The present study effectively reverses the previous 
strategy. The effect of summed individual differences 
between members of different groups will be controlled by 
using members of the same social group - medics - and 
randomly assigning them to treatments designed to facilitate 
(1) self -perceptions as clinicians, and hence conformity to 
group norms or (2)individual, personalised self-perceptions. 
Of course, this also eliminates the fear that subjects will 
not be familiar with normative expectations. 
With a salient social identification, it is hypothesised 
that medics: 
(1) will be more likely to class targets as "retarded", 
due to a change in response bias rather than 
sensitivity, because a) they will conform to the code 
that. it is worse to dismiss an ill patient than to 
retain a well one and b) because they will evince the 
inherently negative evaluative nature of the medical 
model (see Chapters 2.2 and 3.3a). 
In order to operationalise this, signal detection 
theory will be used to measure ability to distinguish 
between (slides of) retarded and normal children and 
the direction of "misdiagnoses". 
(2) their beliefs about retardates will be more 
negative, 
(3) their beliefs about retardates will show greater 
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consensus and closer correspondence to the medical 






Forty-five students aged 18 to 33,19 males and 26 females, 
at Bristol University's Medical School. Prof. Butler, Head 
of Bristol University's Department of Child Health, kindly 
recruited 23 who were 10 weeks into their first year, 15 
were beginning their second year and the remaining 7 were 
qualified. Nineteen were personally acquainted with a 
retardate, 24 were not and 2 females did not say. 
Apparatus 
1. Slides of 10 children who had been diagnosed retarded 
and 10 who were mentally "normal". (These were the same 
slides that were used in Study 2 and are to be found in 
Appendix 3.2). 
Following signal detection theory (McNicol, 1972), the 
former were designated signals and the latter, noise. 
Signals included Target 7- the normal appearing subnormal 
boy of Study 2- and Target 16 who was only mildly retarded. 
Noise included Target 4- the subnormal appearing normal 
girl of Study 2- together with Target 17 who had a physical 
handicap and who was photographed strapped into his go cart. 
The inclusion of-these more anomolous targets was designed 
to ensure an area of overlap between signal and noise 
distributions during which response bias should be more 
clearly revealed. 
2. Rating Forms labelled "Medical diagnosis and visual 
cues" or "Personality and person perception". (Appendix 
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4.3). 
3. The 46 item semantic differential of Study 3 (Appendix 
4.1) labelled "Medical diagnosis and subnormality: - beliefs 
about retardates" or "Personality and perception: - personal 
beliefs about retarded people". 
Procedure 
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of two groups, on the 
basis of the instructions and materials they were given: - 
Group 1 (n = 22) was designated the Medical Group and 
received instructions designed to increase the salience of a 
shared medical social identification: - 
"E is a psychologist researching into subnormality, and 
needs the help of medically trained people in an 
experiment. If you don't feel experienced enough to 
qualify as "medically trained" yet, don't worry. Just 
try to be clinical in your approach. There are two 
tasks. The first concerns the visual cues that 
identify children as retarded. As medics, you might go 
on to do clinical work with retardates and it's 
important to identify the aspects of appearance that 
you as medical people find most influential. You'll 
see slides of 20 subnormal and normal children - it's 
not always obvious which have been diagnosed as 
retarded: Will you please rate the likelihood that 
each child is subnormal by marking the appropriate box 
on your rating form. Obviously as clinicians, you 
would have to make diagnoses based on incomplete 
evidence, but of course, you wouldn't be confined to 
visual information only. 
Task 2: - Please fill in the semantic differential to 
describe what you think someone diagnosed retarded is 
like. 
Rating forms and semantic differentials for this group bore 
the medical labels in a hopeful attempt to add impetus to 
the manipulations, although St. Claire and Turner (1982), 
found no real evidence that subjects are particularly 
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vigilant and susceptible to such devices. 
Questions relating to subjects' age, sex and personal 
contact with retardates, were embedded at the foot of the 
semantic differential where it was felt, they would not be 
noticed until responses had been completed, and hence, they 
should not weaken the salience of the social identification. 
Group 2 (n = 23) received instructions designed to enhance 
the salience of their personal identities: 
"E is interested in the way personality affects 
how people perceive others, who they find 
attractive and what they believe, and is trying to 
apply this to help mentally subnormal children. 
There are two tasks: the first concerns the 
visual cues that make people think someone is 
retarded. Obviously different individuals will be 
affected by different aspects of appearance. 
You'll see slides of 20 subnormal and normal 
children - it's not always obvious which is which. 
Will you please rate the likelihood that each 
child is subnormal by marking the appropriate box 
on your rating form. 
Task 2. Please fill in the semantic differential 
to describe what you personally think someone 
who's retarded is like. 
To make the emphasis on personality more convincing, copies 
of Cattell's 16PF personality test were distributed, and 
experimental materials bore the personality labels. 
In this case, questions relating to subjects' age, sex and 
personal contact headed rating forms, since it was felt they 
should further enhance personal identity. 
At the last moment Prof. Butler changed access to the 
subjects. As a result, two groups (of 11 and 12 first 
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years) became available, which made it possible to vary the 
order of tasks within treatments to check for any order 
effects. The opportunity was taken, although materials were 
already prepared and half the subjects in the medical 
condition would therefore have to give personal details 
between tasks, which might have weakened the impact of the 
"doctor" manipulation. 
Giving personal details between tasks does not seem 
necessarily disadvantageous for the personal group, but on 
the contrary, might have "boosted" the treatment. 
Individual and group testing was employed since a number of 
writers, e. g. Deutsch et al (1969), Doise and Sinclair, 
(1973), St. Claire and Turner (1982) have found evidence 
that social identity might be less salient when subjects are 
tested as a group, because, Deutsch argues, interpersonal 
relationships and hence, personal identity, are more likely 
to intrude when subjects sit together. This suggests that 
individual and group testing respectively, might usefully 
contribute to Medical and Personal treatments. Deutsch's 
reasoning derives from the-so called minimal group 
experiments (originating with Tajfel (1970), Tajfel, 
Flament, Billig and Bundy (1971)), in which it will be 
remembered, social categorisation per se was isolated by 
dividing classes of schoolboys into ad hoc groups, 
ostensibly. on the basis of a trival criterion, and informing 
them only of their own group membership. - Under these 
circumstances, it is reasonable to suppose that the 
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temporary experimental social identifications would be 
supplanted by pre-existing social and personal 
identifications when subjects are within sight of each 
other. All subjects in the present experiment, however 
share membership of the same situationally relevant social 
category, and testing with other known ingroup members might 
therefore Increase its salience, which suggests group and 
individual testing respectively, might contribute to Medical 
and Personal treatments. Since this is precisely the 
reverse of the previous conclusion, both methods of testing 
were employed as an additional independent variable. 
Group testing occurred during lectures (with kind permission 
from Prof. Butler). Throughout, subjects were asked not to 
confer. In the first session, 10 were available, 5 were 
assigned to each condition and the slide task was taken 
first. In the second session, 13 were available. Six were 
assigned to the medical and 7 to the personal condition and 
the semantic differential task was first. 
Individuals (n = 22) were approached in the library and 
commonroom, but unfortunately, in these "public" places they 
were almost invariably joined by others, so it is doubtful 
that the two testing methods were entirely distinct. 
After testing, subjects were told that they had been 
addressed in a way designed to be clinical or personal and 
asked whether they felt they had responded as "doctors" or 
"individuals" and whether they would have responded 
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differently had they received the other approach. They were 
then debriefed and asked for any comments. 
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8.3 TREATMENT OF DATA AND RESULTS 
No differences due to the order of tasks were found and data 
were therefore combined across this variable. 
a. Rating Task 
To measure each subject's ability to distinguish 'normal' 
and 'retarded' targets, areas under respective ROC curves 
were calculated (and are given in Table 4.5). Because only 
20 target slides were available (each viewed once), it 
seemed sensible to use a non parametric measure of response 
bias. For this reason, McNicol's B was calculated for each 
subject. Briefly, response categories are numbered from 1 
(strictest) to the most lax (6 in this case), and B is 
simply the category at which subjects have made half their 
responses - that is to say, half are more strict and half 
more lax. Thus, B is the point at which subjects are 
equally disposed to respond signal or noise i. e. can not 
distinguish between target types. It follows, therefore 
that the nearer B to the strictest category, the more 
biassed a subject is towards making signal responses when in 
doubt. In the present context, this means that small B 
measures indicate a bias towards classing a target retarded. 
(See McNicol, 1972 for a full explanation of both measures). 
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TABLE 4.5 

























Mean . 730 3.08 





Mann-Whitney's U showed no difference between conditions of 
subjects' ability to distinguish normal and retarded 
targets, (U = 209, p= . 317, two tailed), but those 
in the 
Medical condition were significantly more biassed towards 
responding "retarded" (U =161, p= . 018,1 tailed). 
N 
b. Semantic Differential Task 
1. Mean s. d. scores for medical and personal conditions 
are given in Table 4.6, and displayed in Figure 4.1. 
Overall, subjects in the medical condition gave more 




























. 805 815 : 83 
755 : 765 
. 635 
. 835 










































5 illness prone 
6 speech impeded 
7 dependent 
8 frustrated 
9 bad at concentrating 
10 physically h'capped/normal 
11 family's shame 
12 hard to relate to 
13 unpredictable 
14 childlike 
15 slow learner 
16 good/bad gov'ment provision 
17 poorly understood 
18 embarrassing 




23 frightening/not frightening 
24 dev'ment fixed by birth 
25 burden to society 
26 low intelligence 
27 different to each other 
28 excitable 
29 low self esteem 
30 confused thinker 
31 unaware of right and wrong 
32 aggressive 
33 accident prone 
34 unwanted 
35 un/acceptable neighbour 
36 badly dressed 
37 socially inept 
38 abnormal face 
39 wanting to join in 
40 mentally ill/sane 
41 strain for family 
42 nice/nasty to live with 
43 well-meaning 
44 abnormal 
45 sensitive to others 
46 should be in special classes 
+p<. 05 
*pc . 01 
Medical Personal Var 
Mean s. d. Mean s. d. Ratio 
5.91 0.92 5.70 0.82 0.80 
4.27 1.16 4.00 1.35 1.35 
4.82 1.44 4.87 1.32 0.85 
2.32 0.89 2.65 1.30 2.12 
5.05 1.40* 4.48 0.99 0.51 
5.32 1.76 5.61 1.08 0.38 
5.73 0.98 5.35 1.11 1.28 
4.64 1.59 4.30 1.61 1.02 
5.59 1.65 5.48 1.53 0.86 
4.86 1.08+ 3.91 1.12 1.08 
5.14 1.13+ 4.65 1.19 1.12 
5.41 1.62 4.48 1.56 0.93 
5.36 1.40 5.04 1.15 0.67 
6.41 0.73+ 5.57 1.31 3.18 
6.41 0.96 6.22 0.80 0.69 
4.00 1.69 3.78 1.48 0.76 
6.14 1.13* 5.04 1.36 1.47 
5.23 0.97* 4.39 1.20 1.51 
6.05 0.84* 5.04 1.43 2.07 
3.59 1.10 3.52 1.04 0.90 
5.41 1.18 4.70 1.29 1.20 
4.73 1.49+ 3.87 1.29 0.75 
4.45 1.57 3.74 1.48 0.90 
4.95 1.40 4.22 1.86 1.77 
4.95 1.21 4.83 1.03 0.72 
6.00 1.02 5.96 0.98 0.91 
2.86 1.64 2.91 1.70 1.08 
5.55 1.30 4.91 1.04 0.64 
4.86 1.21 4.35 1.03 0.72 
5.64 1.29 4.96 1.30 1.01 
4.36 1.81 4.30 1.64 0.81 
4.73 1.16 4.26 0.81 0.49 
6.14 0.71* 5.04 1.30 3.33 
4.68 0.95* 4.87 1.14 1.45 
4.32 1.59 3.70 1.64 1.06 
4.95 1.33 4.04 0.98 0.54 
5.55 1.37 5.04 1.36 0.99 
5.09 1.15 4.91 1.41 1.50 
2.95 1.53 2.87 1.14 0.56 
4.00 1.75 3.57 1.59 0.03 
6.23 0.97 6.22 0.90 0.86 
4.18 1.01 3.87 0.92 0.04 
3.32 1.32 3.70 1.10 0.80 
5.73 0.98* 4.87 1.42 2.09 
3.73 1.67 3.26 1.29 0.60 
5.41 1.30 5.26 1.86 2.07 
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A2x2 (condition x method of testing) ANOVA using BMDP 2V 
showed significant main effects for condition on 11 
variables, and relevant probability levels are included in 
Table 4.6. In each case, subjects in the medical condition 
were more negative. 
Variance ratios are also included in Table 4.6: five 
differed significantly between conditions, subjects in the 
medical condition showing greater consensus in each case, 
but there was no overall trend (p 20/46 - . 23). 
2. There was a significant main effect for method of 
testing on 3 variables, individual testing resulting in a 
more negative response. This reflected an overall trend (p 
30/46 = . 014), which per se is of little interest and 
therefore, only included for completeness. 
Of more relevance were 4 significant (condition x method of 
testing) interactions, but these were not consistent: on 
variable 9, individual and grouped subjects in the personal 
condition gave the most positive and negative responses 
respectively, and on variable 16, the most negative and 
positive (p = . 04). On variables 5 and 11, 
individual 
subjects in the medical condition were the most negative and 
individual/personal the most positive (p - . 0009, and. 
01) 
but none of these seemed to reflect the overall trend which 
was for individual/medical subjects to give most negative 
and grouped/personal the most positive responses (Chi-square 
- 57.39, d. f. = 7, p <. 001). 
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Mean semantic differential scores for condition and method of testing 
Medical condition Personal condition 
individual group individual group 
Mean s. d. Mean s. d. Mean s. d. Mean s. d. 
Item 
1 5.67 1.03 6.00 0.89 5.58 1.00 5.82 0.60 
2 4.67 0.82 4.13 1.26 3.67 1.56 4.36 1.03 
3 4.83 1.94 4.81 1.28 5.08 1.56 4.64 1.03 
4 2.17 0.75 2.38 0.96 3.08 1.38 2.18 1.08 
5 6.33 -_0.82 4.56 1.26 4.17 0.58 4.82 
1.25 
6 6.00- 0.89 5.06 1.95 5.33 _1.23 5.91 
0.83 
7 5.50 1.38 5.81 0.83 5.33 1.30 5.36 0.92 
8 4.17 1.72 4.81 1.56 4.25 1.36 4.36 1.91 
9 6.17 1.17 5.38 1.78 4.67 1.72 6.36 0.50 
10 4.83 0.75 4.88 1.20 3.83 1.03 4.00 1.26 
11 6.00 0.63 4.81 1.11 4.50 1.24 4.82 1.17 
12 5.67 1.86 5.31 1.58 4.58 1.98 4.36 1.03 
13 6.00 1.26 5.13 1.41 5.33 1.15 4.73 1.10 
14 6.33 0.82 6.44 0.73 5.33 1.50 5.82 1.08 
15 6.50 1.22 6.38 0.89 6.33 0.78 6.09 0.83 
16 3.50 1.97 4.19 1.60 4.42 1.31 3.09 1.38 
17 6.50 0.55 6.00 1.26 5.42 1.38 4.64 1.29 
18 5.67 1.03 5.06 0.93 4.33 1.56 4.45 0.69 
19 6.50 0.55 5.88 0.89 5.08 1.62 5.00 1.26 
20 3.67 1.63 3.56 0.89 3.92 0.29 3.09 1.38 
21 5.50 1.22 5.38 1.20 4.17 1.34 5.27 1.01 
22 5.50 1.38 4.44 1.46 4.08 1.31 3.64 1.29 
23 5.00 2.10 4.25 1.34 4.00 1.48 3.45 1.51 
24 5.00 1.67 4.94 1.34 4.67 1.78 3.73 1.90 
25 5.33 1.21 4.81 1.22 4.75 1.14 4.91 0.94 
26 5.83 1.17 6.06 1.00 5.75 1.06 6.18 0.87 
27 2.17 1.83 3.13 1.54 2.92 1.56 2.91 1.92 
28 5.33 1.63 5.63 1.20 4.75 1.14 5.09 0.94 
29 5.33 1.21 4.69 1.20 4.58 1.00 4.09 1.04 
30 5.67 1.21 5.63 1.36 4.67 1.50 5.27 1.01 
31 5.17 1.83 4.06 1.77 4.50 1.73 4.09 1.58 
32 4.83 1.47 4.69 1.08 4.17 0.58 4.36 1.03 
33 6.50 0.55 6.00 0.73 5.08 1.31 5.00 1.34 
34 5.00 0.89 4.56 0.96 4.83 1.03 4.91 1.30 
35 4.50 1.97 4.25 1.48 4.08 1.44 3.27 1.79 
36 5.50 1.05 4.75 1.39 4.08 0.51 4.00 1.34 
37 5.67 1.51 5.50 1.37 5.25 1.29 4.82 1.47 
38 4.83 0.98 5.19 1.22 5.08 1.16 4.73 1.68 
39 3.67 2.07 2.69 1.25 3.25 1.06 2.45 1.13 
40 3.83 2.48 4.06 1.48 3.67 1.50 3.45 1.75 
41 6.67 0.52 6.06 1.06 6.17 0.94 6.27 0.90 
42 4.33 1.03 4.13 1.02 3.92 0.90 3.82 0.98 
43 2.83 1.72 3.50 1.15 3.67 1.23 3.73 1.19 
44 6.50 0.55 5.44 0.96 5.25 1.22 4.45 1.57 
45 4.67 2.34 3.38 1.26 3.58 1.31 2.91 1.22 
46 5.00- 1.67 5.56 1.15 4.67 2.02 5.91 1.51 
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. : 40 
3. Separate analyses were carried out (using BMDP2V) to 
examine the effects of contact and sex within conditions. 
Relevant s. d. scores are given in Table 4.8. 
Within the Medical Group, there was a main effect for contact 
on 1 variable (p - . 03), but this was evaluatively neutral, 
subjects personally acquainted with a retardate believing 
them significantly noisier and chattier. Overall the effect 
of contact was exactly at chance level. 
There was a main effect for sex on 7 variables, males being 
more negative in each case. Overall they were more negative 
on 34/46 items, (p >. 001, Sign Test). 
In addition, there was one interaction in which the 
influence of contact was positive for females and negative 
for males (p =. 02). Overall, males with contact gave the 
most negative response on 24/46 variables compared with 3/46 
for females with contact. Conversely, males with contact 
were most positive on only 5/46 items compared with 21/46 
for females. (Chi square = 31.69, d. f. = 3, p< . 0001). 
Similarly, within the Personal Group, there was a main effect 
for contact on 6 variables, on four of which, subjects 
personally acquainted with a retardate gave the most 
positive responses. This reflects an insignificant overall 
trend (p 26/40 = . 23, Sign Test). 
There was a main effect for sex on 4 variables, females 
responding most positively on three. Overall, females were 
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most positive on 28/46 items, (p = . 09, N. S., Sign Test"f. 
There were no interactions. 
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TABLE 4. $ 
Sex and contact effects within conditions 
MEDICAL CONDITION PERSONAL CONDITION 
Males Females Males Females 
Ite m yes no yes no yes no yes no 
1 6.00 6.00 6.00 5.67 5.75 5.00 6.20 5.50 c 
2 c 5.00 4.50 4.60 3.17 4.00 3.25 5.40 3.50 c 
3 4.60 5.00 4.20 5.33 4.50 4.25 4.80 5.13 
4 2.20 2.00 2.40 2.67 3.50 3.00 1.60 2.88 
5 5.20 5.33 4.80 4.83 4.75 4.75 4.20 4.50 
6 3.80 6.33 5.40 5.50 5.25 5.25 6.00 5.38 
7 6.00 5.67 4.80 6.33 5.25 4.75 5.40 5.50 
8 4.80 4.17 4.20 5.33 3.00 4.00 4.40 5.00 
9 5.00 5.83 5.40 6.00 5.50 5.00 6.00 5.75 
10 5.40 5.17 4.40 4.50 4.00 3.50 4.20 3.75 
11 s 6.00 5.33 5.00 4.33 5.50 4.50 4.20 4.38 
12 5.20 6.33 4.40 5.50 4.50 5.00 3.00 5.38 c 
13 5.40 5.33 5.20 5.50 4.75 5.00 4.40 5.63 
14 6.80 6.50 5.80 6.50 5.25 4.25 6.40 5.50 s 
15 6.60 6.83 6.00 6.17 5.50 6.50 6.20 6.25 
16 3.80 4.00 4.40 3.83 3.25 3.25 4.00 4.38 
17 5.60 6.33 6.20 6.33 5.00 4.25 4.80 5.75 
18 5.80 5.17 4.80 5.17 5.00 3.75 4.20 4.50 
19 6.80 5.83 6.00 5.67 5.00 5.50 4.80 5.13 
20 4.40 3.17 3.20 3.67 3.50 4.00 2.80 4.00 c 
21 S 6.20 6.00 4.60 4.83 4.75 5.25 4.40 4.38 
22 S 6.20 5.00 3.80 4.00 4.75 4.50 3.60 3.13 s 
23 S 5.40 4.67 3.00 4.67 4.25 3.25 4.20 3.25 
24 4.60 5.17 4.60 5.33 "4.25 4.75 3.20 4.38 
25 5.20 5.17 4.40 5.00 4.75 5.50 4.60 4.50 
26 6.20 6.50 5.40 5.83 6.25 6.25 6.00 5.50 
27 2.20 3.00 3.20 3.00 3.00 3.25 1.40 3.00 
28 5.40 5.33 5.80 5.67 4.75 4.50 5.20 4.75 
29 S 6.00 5.50 4.00 4.00 4.25 4.00 4.20 4.50 
30 6.60 5.67 5.00 5.33 4.00 5.75 4.40 5.13 c 
31 4.80 5.00 3.20 4.33 4.50 6.00 3.20 4.13 s 
32 5.20 4.33 4.60 4.83 4.25 3.75 4.00 4.63 
33 6.20 6.17 5.80 6.33 5.25 5.25 5.40 4.63 
34 4.60 5.00 4.60 4.50 5.00 5.00 4.40 5.00 
35 s 5.20 5.00 3.80 3.33 4.50 4.25 1.80 3.63 S 
36 5.80 5.17 4.20 4.67 4.25 4.00 3.80 4.13 
37 6.00 5.83 5.40 5.00 5.50 4.50 5.40 4.63 
38 s 5.40 5.67 4.00 5.17 4.00 5.25 5.60 4.38 
39 3.20 2.67 3.00 3.00 3.25 3.25 2.40 2.63 
40 4.40 4.33 3.00 4.17 3.75 3.75 2.60 4.13 
41 6.60 6.17 6.40 5.83 6.25 5.75 6.60 6.00 
42 4.80 4.33 3.80 3.83 4.25 4.25 3.80 3.75 
43 3.40 3.17 3.40 3.33 4.00 3.50 3.60 3.13 
44 S 6.40 6.17 5.40 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.60 4.38 
45, 5.20 3.67 3.60 2.67 3.75 3.25 3.20 3.00 
46 5.40 5.83 5.80 4.67 5.00 6.00 4.00 6.13 c 
c effect of contact p< . 05; C< . 01 s effect of sex p< . 05; S< . 01 
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4. Raw scores were factor analysed for each condition, with 
eigenvalues set at 1 (the default). This yielded 14 factor 
solutions. Because the last 6 factors accounted for only 
20% variance and were particularly difficult to interpret, 
data were re-analysed specifying 8 factor solutions. These 
are given in Table 4. q. To simplify even further, only 
items loading >. 5 have been reported. 
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8.4 DISCUSSION 
The immediate and insurmountable problem was that all 
testing occurred under the aegis of Bristol University's 
Medical School, which was almost certain to weaken the 
impact of the Personal manipulations. Ideally, of course, 
subjects for this condition would have been approached in 
various non medical environments, but with present 
resources, this simply was not possible. Second, the very 
act of recruiting subjects probably contributed to this 
unwanted effect, since it inevitably identified E as a 
psychology student, which, in making a social category 
salient, might have been sufficient to trigger the 
reciprocal clinical social identification. Unsolicited 
evidence of this fear was given by a number of subjects who 
warned, that as recruits from the Medical School, they 
comprised an extremely atypical sample, which shows that 
they had their shared social identification in mind. Third, 
it is also possible that the experimental interest in 
retardates itself triggered subjects' clinical social 
identification, since this might be the most relevant self 
image within the situation. Taken together these points 
suggest that the personal manipulations might have been 
weak. 
In this light, the fact that the superficially trivial 
difference in treatments has apparently elicited significant 
variation in subjects' perceptions and beliefs, generates 
" both astonished delight from an*experimenter's point of 
view, and disbelieving gloom from that of a "human being! " 
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As predicted, medical students and doctors scored more hits 
in identifying retarded children when approached in a way 
designed to enhance their clinical social identification. 
This was not due to any difference in sensitivity (p s . 32) 
but to an increased bias towards responding "retarded" (p 
. 018). 
The processes behind such over-inclusion have been discussed 
more fully in Chapter 2.2 and 3.3a and by Tajfel (1972 and 
in 1981a, for example). They represent an attempt to 
preserve a value laden system of social categories, since 
misclassification of a retardate as normal 'contaminates' 
the preferred class and therefore, threatens the underlying 
value system. Over-exclusion, on the other hand, merely 
refines the class, and hence, preserves the values. On this 
basis, over inclusion in the retarded category might be 
generally expected, since "normal" is self-evidently 
preferable to "retarded" in natural usage. However, since 
the medical model of retardation is "essentially evaluative" 
(Mercer, 1973), normality being equated with the absence of 
pathology and retardation with biological dysfunction which 
is to be prevented or alleviated, higher over-inclusion was 
expected in the medical condition, because closer conformity 
to the evaluative medical ethos among subjects whose medical 
social identification is salient, was expected to introduce 
heavier value loading, and hence, greater perceptual bias. 
Interestingly, this reasoning is supported from a different 
orientation by Scheff (1966), who argues that medical 
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decision-making is underwritten by a fundamental code that 
it is much worse for a physician to dismiss an ill patient 
than it is for him to retain a well one. As mentioned in 
Chapter 2, Mercer (1973) points out that this means 
misdiagnosis is likely to be in the direction of 
over-inclusion in the "ill" category, a process that might 
well be more active in subjects whose medical social 
identification is salient, and it is interesting to 
hypothesise that this code itself is underpinned by 
(Tajfellian type) evaluative bias. 
With respect to the second hypothesis, Figure 4.1 shows 
semantic differential data reflect clearly the negative 
evaluation of retardation hypothesised to be mediated by 
medical norms, especially on several items relating to 
pathology that might be related to them on an a priori 
basis. 
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good at concentrating 
physically normal 
Paaity's pride 




good gov'ment provision 
well understood 
soothing 





dev'rent shaped by envirc 
asset to society 
high intelligence 
diFFerent to eachother 
calm 
high selF esteem 
clear thinker 
aware oP right and wrong 
unaggressive 






wanting to join in 
Mentally sane 
tonic For Family 
nice to live with 
well-weaning 
norea l 
sensitive to others 
should not be in special 
Medical Condition 
,..... ».. Personal Condition 









bad at concentrating 
physically h'capped 
Feeily's shame 




bad gov'went provision 
poorly understood 
embarrassing 
bad at expressing selF 
sad 
unatt. ract i ve 
dirty 
Frightening 
dev'ment Fixed by birth 
burden to society 
low intelligence 
same as eachother 
excitable 
low seLF esteem 
conFused thinker 








not wanting to join in 
mentally ILL 
strain For Family 
nasty to live with 
obstructive 
abnormal 
insensitive to others 
should be in special class 
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In more detail, subjects in the medical condition believed 
retardates to be significantly more abnormal and unhealthy, 
(p = . 005, . 007) more childlike, (. 02), embarrassing, (. 008) 
and accident prone (. 0009), a greater family shame (. 04), 
worse understood, (. 003), worse at expressing themselves, 
(. 004) and less well dressed (p = . 006). In addition, they 
rated them physically handicapped and dirty while those in 
the personal condition, rated them physically normal and 
clean (p = . 01). Overall, the medical group-evaluated 
retardates more negatively on all but 6/46 variables, which 
according to the sign test, is highly significant (p 
<. 0001). The exceptions were, they rated them 
(insignificantly) less insecure, unwanted and unclearly 
spoken together with more loving, helpful and unalike, the 
personal nature of which seems least relevant to a medical l 
orientation. 
The belief that retardates are like each other is intended 
as a direct measure of stereotyping and in Study 1, it was 
more closely associated with negative evaluations. It 
therefore seems surprising that it is among the few items on 
which subjects in the medical condition were more positive, 
since these not only have more negative beliefs, but also, 
in sharing a salient social identity should show greater 
stereotypic perception. Perhaps the item varies 
qualitatively, referring to pathological syndromes for the 
medical, and individual differences, for example, for the 
personal group. It must not be forgotten however, that this 
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difference is both minimal and unreplicated. 
There were four significant (treatment x method of testing) 
interactions: grouped and individual subjects in the 
personal condition believed retardates to be most and least 
bad at concentrating, respectively, (p = . 04). Conversely 
the-former believed they received best government provision 
while the latter believed them most unprovided for (p ". 04). 
Similarly, individuals in the medical condition believed 
retardates most shameful to their families and most illness 
prone, while personal/individuals believed them least on 
both counts (p = . 01, . 0009). 
The overall pattern of means, however, suggests that 
individual subjects in the medical condition tend to be most 
negative and subjects tested together in the personal 
condition most positive (chi-square = 57.39, d. f. = 7, 
p<. 0001). Clearly, therefore, if individual and group 
testing had been incorporated as part of medical and 
personal treatments, conditions would have differed more 
sharply, which is exactly as Deutsch et al (1969) reasoned. 
In other words, it seems that group testing weakened the 
salience, and hence, the negative influence of subjects' 
clinical social identification. Because of its situational 
relevance, however, this seems counter intuitive, so other 
explanations should be considered: an obvious explanation 
is that students in the group situation were first-years and 
sitting together reminded them of their common lack of 
experience, so that diffidence in self-definitions as 
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medics, not interpersonal influences per se, weakened their 
shared social identification. It therefore seems wise to 
defer conclusions about the way group and individual testing 
might interact with personal and social identifications 
until further investigation with subjects secure in their 
social identification has been carried out. 
The prediction that subjects in the Medical Group would show 
greater consensus in their judgements was not 
straightforwardly confirmed. Although there were 5 
significant variance ratios, all in the predicted direction, 
(subjects with enhanced medical social identities showing 
greater agreement that retardates are abnormal (p - . 05), 
loving, childlike, accident prone (p - . 01)-and bad at 
expressing themselves (p - . 05)), this was the case on only 1 
20/46 items, which is an insignificant trend in the wrong 
direction (p a . 23). Clearly, however, there is consensus 
in the sense that those in the medical condition gave 
reliably more negative judgements, whole distributions of 
responses shifting in a negative direction, which means that 
the spirit of the prediction has been confirmed. Put 
another way, to generate within-group convergence, it is 
clear that opinions at the negative extreme of the 
distribution would have to be less negatively or even 
positively affected, which of course, is a selective effect 
not predicted by the hypothesised unidirectional influence. 
Perhaps therefore, statistical variance (to measure 
"convergence") is not a suitable measure of conformity in 
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this case, a point which will be aired again in the next 
chapter. Second, it is also possible that variation in the 
personal group was artefactually decreased, since the 
emphasis on personal identification might have made subjects 
more susceptible to evaluation apprehension, with the result 
that unsympathetic subjects gave more positive opinions. In 
other words, variation might have been reduced'in both 
conditions, for different reasons. Clearly, a third control 
condition with no treatment would have been invaluable here. 
Separate analyses of contact and sex within conditions were 
performed, since these personal characteristics were 
expected to have relatively little effect (thereby 
contributing to reduced variance) within the medical group. 
Interestingly, the overall effect in this condition of 
contact, was exactly at chance level without a single 
significant evaluative effect. Thus, as hypothesised, the 
influence of this subjective experience seems to have been 
eliminated according to the clear demand that personal 
considerations have no place in clinical judgements. This 
also, of course, supports the argument and evidence of Study 
1 (with respect to psychologists). Within the Personal 
condition, on the other hand, subjects personally acquainted 
with retardates rated them easy to relate to and happy while 
those without contact rated them difficult to relate to and 
sad (p = . 01, . 03, Sign Test). In addition, acquainted 
subjects were significantly less adamant that retardates are 
confused thinkers and should be segregated in school, (p = 
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. 04). Overall, however, the usual pattern-for contact 
subjects to give more positive evaluations was insignificant 
(p 26/46 = . 23) (and even reversed on one variable, since 
they rated them more unco-ordinated. (p = . 05)). In other 
words, although the relative effect of personal contact 
within conditions supports predictions, the contrast is not 
striking, since contact effects were unusually small within 
the personal group, which it seems reasonable to suppose, 
might have been due to the unavoidable clinical influences 
that have already been discussed. 
Predictions relating to gender effects were not confirmed at 
all. Within the personal condition the "usual" influence of 
gender was established significantly on 3 variables: 
females rated retardates clean, aware of right and wrong and 
an asset to society whereas males rated them dirty, unaware 
and a burden (p = . 04, . 03 and . 009). In addition, females 
rated them significantly more childlike (p = . 04), which as 
dicussed in Experiment 1, is not necessarily a more negative 
evaluation. Overall, they were more positive on 28/46 items 
(p - . 09, N. S. ). Within the Medical group, however, there 
was a more striking sex effect. Males rated retardates a 
significantly greater shame to their families (p= . 03), 
more unattractive (. 005), more abnormal, (. 009) and of more 
abnormal facial appearance (p = . 05). In addition, 
they 
rated them dirty, unacceptable neighbours with low self 
esteem, whereas females rated them clean, acceptable and 
were neutral (p = . 005, . 03, . 0002). Overall, 
there was a 
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clear trend for males to be more negative (p 34/46 = . 001). 
Unlike the influence of personal contact, therefore, the 
effect of gender on judgements seems enhanced within the 
Medical Condition. This might be partly artefactual, 
because females were overrepresented in the personal group, 
but on post hoc reflection, it seems that the prediction 
itself may not have been valid, but overgeneralised from the 
clear demand characteristic that gender effects should be 
suppressed in clinical situations relating to sexual matters 
which does not necessarily mean that clinicians are expected 
to be asexual creatures. It is possible, therefore, that 
subjects conformed to their expectations of male or female 
doctors, which might have been more divergent than the 
effects of male versus female (person) in the personal 
condition. If this were the case, the lack of relative 
consensus in the former condition could be explained. This 
could be tested by asking subjects if they have different 
expectations for male and female physicians, or by seeing if 
consensus is greater in the medical condition separately 
within sexes. (This was not tried here, because the small 
-uneven sample sizes suggest the'additional expenditure of 
resources would not be justified. ) 
In parenthesis, these doubts regarding predicted gender 
effects suggest that it would be uneconomical to discuss 
(sex x contact) interactions. within experimental conditions 
beyond mentioning that only one was significant (within the 
medical group males with contact believed retardates to be 
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most over dependent, whereas females with contact believed 
them to be least (p = . 02)), especially as, a single 
significant interaction out of 92, is easily explained by 
chance. 
To summarise, the apparent elimination of personal contact 
effects, the pervasive negative influence on opinions and 
the bias towards responding "retarded" within the medical 
condition are interpreted as the result of conformity to 
normative expectations of what is appropriate for doctors, 
mediated by subjects' shared social identification as 
medics. However, there is no striking increase in 
intra-group consensus (as measured by standard deviations) 
relative to the personal condition, which means that the 
third prediction has not been straightforwardly fulfilled. 
Debriefing sessions were both fascinating and surprising. 
Subjects were asked whether they had responded as 
"individuals" or "medics" and to quantify their position on 
an imaginary continuum ranging from 1 ("absolute medic") to 
10 ("absolute individual"), which, of course, was intended 
to mirror Tajfel's intergroup and interpersonal behaviour 
continuum. It had been intended to use this information as 
a check on manipulations and also to see if there was any 
correlation with dependent variables, but the plan had to be 
abandoned because all Medical group subjects said they had 
responded as individuals (with the exception of two who said 
they had tried to be clinical which made them more cautious 
of misdiagnosing targets retarded - although their responses 
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did not differ from other group members - and three who did 
not answer). Retrospectively, these questions should have 
been formally posed on a questionnaire, since for the most 
part, subjects merely scrawled "individual" on their 
response sheets, although a handful went on to scribble 
unquantifiable messages that they would have responded in 
the same way under the Personal treatment because they 
lacked the experience to do otherwise, a point they also 
mentioned in general discussion. Three points arise from 
these disappointingly sparse results. Intuitively, the 
insistence that responses were-personal, seems defensive. 
Clearly, the dehumanising attitudes of some doctors receives 
much "bad press" and consequently, no subject is likely to 
admit he was easily manipulated into behaving in this way. 
This seems more likely than the possibility that the 
influence of the medical social identification was 
subconscious and entirely inpenetrable to introspection, 
even with the benefit of hindsight. Interestingly, while 
the majority of subjects (defensively? ) condemned the 
experiment as impossible and unlikely, one or two remarked 
that their clinical identification would have been more 
active had they been recruited on leaving the wards, still 
wearing their white coats. The most important point is, 
--however that the majority of predicted effects clearly 
occurred despite the Medical group's insistence on personal 
responding. 
Third, some subjects seemed to imply they had to respond as 
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'individuals' since they lacked the experience to respond as 
clinicians, which suggests a readiness to confor+ithout the 
"know how". This leads to the tempting .,.. '. conclusion that 
the experiment would have been still more successful had all 
subjects been qualified and practising and supports the idea 
that some subjects, specifically the first years, might have 
resisted conforming to normative expectations because they 
did not yet feel confident in their new social 
identification. On the other hand, it seems unlikely that 
as medical students, they would be unaware of medical norms, 
thus since they differed as predicted from personal group 
subjects, their self-reported lack of experience might 
simply have been to add weight to their insistence on 
personal responding. 
Post-experimental data from the Personal group was still 
more sparse - only 12 (52%) answered at all, perhaps 
illustrating that unlike the Medical subjects, they were not 
motivated by evaluation apprehension to say they had 
resporiiod as individuals. Of these, all but one said they 
had responded as individuals. Interestingly, the exception 
was the third most biassed towards classing targets retarded 
(B = 2.75) but of course, a result from a^single case can do 
no more than provoke thought. In contrast to the Medical 
group, a handful quantified themselves on the Medic - 
individual continuum (2 as 100%, 2 as 90% and 1 as 75% 
individual), but-this bore no relationship to dependent 
variables. 
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Raw data were factor analysed, 
in order to explore the multi dimensional 





Multi-dimensional meanings of "retardates' 
Medical Condition Personal Condition 
FACTOR 1 (27.3% variance) FACTOR 1 (21.7% variance) 
unaware of right & wrong . 85 noisy " ". 
83 
dirty . 85 (-acceptable neighbour) . 
83 
badly dressed . 80 unaware of right and wrong . 64 
socially inept . 63 should be in special classes . 
60 
nasty to live with . 58 hard to relate to . 
55 
(-wanting to join in) . 55 excitable -. 
54 
abnormal . 53 poorly-coordinated ". 
52 
illness prone . 51 (-wanting to join in) . 
51 
bad at concentrating . 50 
FACTOR 2 (14.4% variance) FACTOR 2 (17.5% variance) 
poorly understood . 93 unattractive ". 
73 
bad at concentrating . 75 (-happy) . 
69 
speech impeded . 67 frustrated . 
68 
accident prone . 59 poorly understood . 
69 
illness prone . 56 bad at concentrating -. 
66 
nasty to live with -. 54 low self esteem . 66 
unpredictable . 50 unpredictable . 
63 
burden to society -. 52 
FACTOR 3 (13.5% variance) FACTOR 3 (14.9% variance) 
well-meaning . 95 clean . 
82 
different . 77 sensitive to others . 
74 
sane . 65 not frightening . 
65 
happy . 62 physically h'capped/normal . 
58 
(-aggressive) . 54 well-meaning . 
50 
FACTOR 4 (12.5% variance) FACTOR 4 (12.6% variance) 
dependent . 77 (-different) . frightening frightening . 76 confused thinker . 
70 
abnormal face . 69 badly dressed -. 
65 
childlike . 66 socially inept . 
55 
confused thinker . 56 excitable . 
51 
FACTOR 5 (9.9% variance) 
(-sensitive to others) 
slow learner 
unattractive 




FACTOR 5 (9.9% variance) 
. 76 dependent 
. 62 childlike 
. 59 family's shame 
. 58 strain for 
family 








FACTOR 6 (8.8% variance) 
excitable 
socially inept 
dev'ment fixed by birth 
poorly-coordinated 
strain for family 
loving 
bad gov'ment provision 
FACTOR 6 (8.8% variance) 
. 73 illness prone 
. 64 abnormal 
. 61 dev' ment 
fixed by birth 










FACTOR 7 (7.3% variance) FACTOR 7 (7.6% variance) 
insecure -. 87 accident prone -. 92 
physically h'capped -. 68 embarrassing . 63 
bad gov'ment provision . 63 abnormal face -. 53 
FACTOR 8 (6.3% variance) FACTOR 8 (7.0% variance) 
unwanted -. 75 low intelligence . 85 
poorly-coordinated . 59 (-loving) . 
61" 
mentally ill . 50 aggressive . 
58 
(-well-meaning) . 57 
Plainly, factor structure differs between groups. For 
example, only 2 out of a possible 17 items are common to 
Factors 1, and the following factors overlap to a similarly 
small extent. Nevertheless, it is impossible not to find 
the content of the factors - particularly for the medical 
condition - disappointing. Although Factor 1 contains 
"socially inept", "abnormal" and "illness prone", the 
presence of other characteristics mean it does not, by any 
stretch of the imagination, seem exclusively to reflect a 
medical model of retardation. Factor 2 includes "illness 
prone" and the "symptoms", impeded speech and bad 
concentration and it is interesting to hypothesise that 
"poorly understood" and "unpredictable" refer to a lack of 
medical knowledge about retardation. Factor 4 centres on 
retardates' dependency and Factor 6 primarily on negative 
symptoms, the intra organismic nature of which is emphasised 
by "development fixed by birth". Remaining factors however, 
do not seem directly relevant to a medical perspective, 
perhaps indicating that multi-dimensional meaning is less 
easily affected - or reliably measured - than evaluative 
differences. 
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Although such a comparison might not be valid because this 
is an 8 factor solution whereas that of Study 3 was 10 
factor, comfort might be gained from the fact that there is 
some resemblance between predicted Factor 1 for doctors and 
Factor 1 in the present medical condition (as opposed to the 
personal). 
The purpose of results from the personal group is to provide 
comparisons, since on the basis of Study 1, to combine 
acquainted and unacquainted subjects might not be 
meaningful. Thus, discussion will be kept brief. Factor 1 
seems diffuse, but primarily seems to concern social 
acceptability. Factor 2 seems to relate to a dynamic aspect 
of retardates' personality: the less they are burdensome, 
unattractive and unable to concentrate, the more it is 
assumed they will be frustrated. Factor 3 apparently 
reverts to acceptability and interestingly, Factor 4 seems 
to represent the retardate stereotype, since its highest 
loading item considers whether retardates are like each 
other - the direct measure of stereotyping - and various 
stereotypic traits then follow. Factor 5 seems clearly to 
relate to the family, and a final interesting point, is that 
Factor 8 begins with the only appearance of "high/low 
intelligence". 
To summarise, the multidimensional meaning of retardates 
seems to differ between medical and personal groups, which 
suggests that the conceptualisation as well as the 
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perception and evaluation of retardates is mediated through 
observers' salient self images. 
Conclusions 
This study evinced strong evidence that being a medic per se, 
does not mediate the negative evaluations, diagnostic 
over-inclusion and medical orientation that are associated 
with medical opinions about retardates. Rather, these seem 
to depend on subjects' salient self definitions as medics. 
Clearly, this is evidence against the "bottom-up" view that 
personal characteristics which medics, on average possess, 
common experiences or the medical training itself determines 
their beliefs. Rather, the "top-down" social psychological 
view that the beliefs members of one group hold about 
another are determined by normative expectations through the 
shared, yet individual process of social identification, is 
supported. 
The burning question, of course, concerns the extent to 
which the experiment generalises to real life. Important in 
this connection is "ecological validity", which intuitively 
involves the inclusion in experiments of real-life factors, 
on the assumption that these might increase 
generalisability. (For example, slides of real subnormal 
children were included in Study 2 although they looked 
normal, because this was a closer representation of the real 
world and made it seem more plausible that the demonstrated 
categorisation effects would actually generalise to real 
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subnormal children. ) 
Bronfenbrenner (1979) writes that ecological validity has 
no agreed definition, but suggests it usually refers to 
research carried out in natural settings. He rejects the 
implication that naturalistic research is necessarily valid 
and goes on to define ecological validity as 
the extent to which the environment experienced by the 
subjects has the properties it is supposed or assumed 
to have by the investigator 
1979, p 29 
Thus, defined, Bronfenbrenner continues, ecological validity 
is unattainable. Psychologists do not know how to determine 
the phenomenological field of their subjects and the problem 
grows out of all proportion if an attempt is made to sample 
testing situations in order to ensure they actually 
represent the real world. The concept, however, need not be 
abandoned: the closer the experimental to the real life 
setting of interest, the greater the likelihood subjects' 
experience of the two will approximate. Furthermore, enough 
idea of their experience to understand the significance of 
their behaviour can be gained, provided researchers have 
extensive knowledge about the subjects, the experimental 
setting and the setting to which they want to extrapolate. 
The major source of information is the subjects themselves, 
whose comments and 'interpretations should be sought. 
Bronfenbrenner's notion of ecological validity is of little 
help in determining whether the present experiment 
generalises to real life. First, far from being directly 
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informative, subjects' comments for the moat part, seemed to 
contradict their behaviour. Second, there is no basis on 
which to make a quantative judgement of its ecological 
validity (medical students and doctors are likely to be 
representative of medics; similarly. the setting was a 
medical institution and the slides, -genuine, but the 
experimental'task - by definition in the personal condition 
- was unlikely to approximate to real clinical judgements). 
Even if entirely ecologically valid, - however, - just as 
Bronfenbrenner rejected the implication-that natural 
settings guarantee valid research, intuitively, only the 
likelihood of generalisability would be increased. 
In a complex,. scholarly article, Turner (1981b) gives voice 
to this intuitive disquiet. In employing variables as they 
occur in real life, ecological research might be 
theoretically spurious, because of the possible masking 
effect of naturally confounded factors. In other words, 
ecological validity can be at odds with experimental 
attempts to purify and isolate theoretically important 
variables. 
The present : study is a case in point. In real life, "a 
salient medical social identification and being a medic are 
hypothesised always to be confounded when'diagnoses about 
retardates are made. The present paradigm sought to 
unconfound. them by creating a situation-in which-medics made 
judgements-while-their personal-identifications were salient 
-a situation not ecologically valid, but theoretically 
-323 - 
crucial. The crux of Turner's argument for present 
purposes, is that the generalisability of experimental data 
is not a matter of empirical representativeness, but of the 
theoretical analogue between experiment and real life. In 
other words, it is fallacious to assume that generality of 
experimental findings across settings that approximate to 
the real world are a basis for generalisability. The latter 
involves extrapolating to new situations and therefore, has 
a theoretical basis. 
From this point of view, the generalisability of the present 
experiment becomes a question of its theoretical, not its 
literal correspondence to real life. Put another way, it is 
a question of whether medical social identifications are 
salient in clinical situations. 
It has already been stressed that understanding precisely 
the conditions leading to salient social identifications and 
intergroup behaviour is only just beginning (see section 3 
of this chapter). Nevertheless, since clinical interactions 
with retardates are, by definition based on that social 
category, they fulfill the conditions Oakes (1983), Tajfel 
(1981) and Brown and Turner. (1981) regard as sufficient: 
they are cognitively salient, that is distinctive, useful, 
informative and relevant, a priori. Thus, it is suggested 
that doctors' self-definitions play a role in mediating 
clinical judgements about retardates in real life. 
To go further, it is also clear that experiments in which 
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subjects respond to "retardates", the abstract social 
category, are intergroup by definition. More interesting 
are informal interactions. For example, "someone personally 
acquainted with a retardate" might be a salient social 
identification in an experimental situation where it helps 
provide meaningful responses to an abstract label, but in 
real life interactions between people, its influence seems 
less likely. Nevertheless, it makes perfect sense to 
imagine such interactions guided primarily by what the 
acquainted normal person thinks is appropriate, rather than 
by, for example, the personal needs and desires of the 
retarded victim on the receiving end. -Indeed, it might be 
hypothesised that such interactions would be most likely 
when the individual derives great self-esteem as a 
"do-gooder", and it is interesting to construct similar 
imaginary scenarios. As Bronfenbrenner (1979) would say, 
"It all depends". 
A key factor in such interactions, as yet unconsidered, is 
the retarded person himself. It seems obvious that 
intrusive stigmata are likely to increase the perceived 
salience of normal and social categories, and hence 
intergroup behaviour, which is an example of a passive 
transaction, since by his presence, the retarded person 
might modify the perceptions of others, and hence his own 
developmental environment. -In this way, the individual 
influences his own behaviour. This is to ignore one thing. 
The retardate too is a human being and can influence the 
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influence he has on others. Furthermore, he can influence 
the influence they have on him.. In other words, it is time 
to consider the last and most complex factor - the active 
role the retardate is likely to play in the present social 
psychological approach to mental retardation. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RETARDATES AND SELF STEREOTYPING 
Introduction 
.... people you meet. They take me as If I'm 
not a smart person. And I mean they act like I 
don't understand things, which I do understand 
things. That's a terrible thing. I'd never do that 
to anybody. I don't know why I have to suffer 
like this. Sometimes I'd rather be dead than 
have people act like I'm not a smart person. 
To recap, in the present approach mental retardation is 
conceptualised as a set of expectations associated with the 
social status, mental retardate, and because normative 
beliefs are related to the historical evolution of social 
groups in their cultural contexts, -mental retardation is 
influenced by macrosystems. In Study 1, such expectations 
were examined for lay, psychologist and teacher social 
systems and, it was argued, they represent the social 
meaning of retardation and the role that shapes the 
behaviour of retardates. 
Study 2 examined the perceptual effects of categorising an 
individual "retarded". It was found that the way an 
individual was seen, depended not only on him, but also on 
the way he was labelled. This was seen as further support 
for the social model because retardation was not intrinsic 
to its victim but also a function of observers' perceptual 
processes. In addition, it was argued that the effect of 
the label depended on the information it conveys, which in 
turn depends on the beliefs held by the perceiver. In this 
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way, categorisation was identified as a mechanism which 
provides a pathway for the macrosystem to influence directly 
the perception and hence' treatment and subsequently, 
development of retardates. 
In chapter 4, an attempt was made to give these ideas more 
ecological validity by conceptualising the observer as a 
human being rather than an automaton who mediates 
categorisation effects will he nill he, and Turner's (1981, 
1981a, 1982) social identification nafet provided a vehicle to 
understand not only how, but also, to some extent why and 
when observers would base interactions on normative beliefs. 
It was found that observers' behaviour in labelling children 
"retarded" and expression of-normative beliefs about 
retardates depended on their own self definitions. 
The focus of this chapter is the retardate himself. It is 
his turn to be conceptualised as a human being - not simply 
the passive recipient of, but also an actor in the foregoing 
processes. 
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1. Turner's referent informational influence 
In the previous chapter, the theoretical framework, which is 
based on Turner's self-stereotyping, was left at the point 
where the notion of behavioural and attitudinal conformity 
among individuals sharing the same salient social social 
identification was introduced. To summarise, it was argued 
that individuals' knowledge about the groups they belong to 
- their social identity - is internalised as an aspect of 
their self concepts. According to situational relevance, 
facets relating to specific group memberships - social 
identifications - become "salient", as self-definitions are 
adjusted in order adaptively to construe the situation and 
regulate behaviour. Individuals belonging to the same 
social group, it follows, are likely to show conformity in 
self-definitions and behaviour in situations that enhance 
its relevance. 
Turner (1981,1981a, 1982) has delineated two processes 
whereby such conformity is enhanced. The first, which has 
already been mentioned, concerns the familiar perceptual 
effects of categorisation which apply to self and ingroup as 
well as the outgroups that are traditionally central in the 
literature. This means that individuals sharing asalient 
social identification will perceive themselves more like 
each other because each attributes the same criterial group 
characteristics to himself. In"this way, they become 
self-stereotyped, that is, depersonalised, interchangeable 
group members rather than individuals because, the 
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functioning aspects of their self concepts is based on a 
shared social, not. individual personal identities. 
The second process concerns the desire for positive self 
esteem, which is accepted here as a fundamental 
psychological premise. Its place in Turner's theory has 
evolved through several generations of thought and begins 
with Tajfel's (1972) social psychological extension of 
Festinger's (1954) theory of Social Comparison-Processes. 
Festinger had argued that individuals need to evaluate their 
attitudes and abilities and that when objective criteria are 
unavailable, they will make social comparisons with those of 
relevant others. - In the case of abilities, Festinger 
continued, there exists "-a unidirectional drive upward", 
that is, where values are involved, the individual has a 
need to evaluate himself positively. 
In his extension of these ideas, Tajfel first broadens the 
role of social comparisons by putting forward the, by now 
familiar, argument that we have no means of discovering real 
"objective". criteria. He then argues that so-called 
"objectivity" may therefore be defined as a socially agreed 
lack of perceived alternatives and that comparisons are not 
social by default, but on the contrary, even the 
significance-of so-called objective comparisons are social. 
Tajfel then-applies these notions to his concept of social 
identity. Social groups, -he argues, are evaluated 
through 
comparisons with each other and since social identifications 
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are an aspect of the individual, the fundamental desire for 
positive esteem becomes a desire for positive social 
identity. Just as the former is expressed through 
inter-individual, the latter is expressed through intergroup 
comparisons which, "are focussed on the establishment of 
distinctiveness between one's own and other groups". (1972, 
p 296. ) 
The relevance of these ideas to Turner's theory of 
self-stereotyping may now be sketched. Quite simply, the 
previous notion of behavioural conformity among individuals 
sharing the same social identification, has been given 
direction: when a particular social identification is 
salient,. behaviours under its influence will tend to enhance 
the self-esteem of group members. (See also Tajfel and 
Turner, 1979; Turner 1981a and 1982). 
Since Turner's work on self stereotyping is the pivot on 
which the present approach turns, it seems worth digressing 
to outline something of its social psychological context, 
where it is likely to have a major impact in three areas: 
intergroup relations, group formation and social influence. 
I. First, the notion that the desire for positive 
self-esteem enhances conformity in individuals sharing a 
salient social identification by motivating them to 
establish positive intergroup differentials in their group's 
favour, has been developed into the theory of Social 
Competition, which Turner fully describes and explains in 
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his 1975 article. Essentially, this refers to intergroup 
conflict created by the desire for positive self-esteem, in 
contrast to the traditional view pioneered by the Sher ifs 
(e. g. Sherif and Sherif, 1953; Sherif et al, 1955; 1961) 
that it is caused by incompatible group goals. In other 
words, self- evaluation, not self interest is the fuel, an 
alternative, Turner (1975; 1981) argues, masked by the fact 
that conflicting and superordinate goals always covaried 
with conflicting or co-operative intergroup behaviour, 
respectively in traditional realistic conflict research. 
Turner (1975; 1981) cites an impressive array of support, of 
which only a few favourites will be mentioned. For example, 
Ferguson and Kelly (1964) found that groups of subjects 
working on identical tasks, assured of the same rewards, 
(i. e. with independent, non-conflicting goals), developed 
feelings of rivalry and behaved competitively when made 
aware of each other. Kahn and Ryen (1972), on the other 
hand, found subjects showed ingroup favouritism even when 
they anticipated co-operative intergroup interaction (i. e. 
had superordinate goals). 
Perhaps the most striking evidence dervives from the by now 
familiar, extensively replicated (Turner, 1980) minimal 
group studies. In the seminal paradigm, -it will be 
remembered, Tajfel et al (1971) found that social 
categorisation per-se was sufficient for intergroup 
behaviour which took the form of awarding more money to in 
than outgroup members. When analysed in detail, however, 
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realistic gain could not have underpinned this 
discrimination. Choices for in--and out- group members were 
not independent, but had to be made on matrices where the 
sum chosen for one determined that for the other, and 
unexpectedly, subjects preferred to award their own group a 
small sum, if by so doing, they could award the outgroup an 
even smaller one. The "rational goal", i. e. awarding as 
much as possible to the ingroup, did not conflict with, but 
entailed awarding as much - and more - to the outgroup but 
subjects ignored this, creating as it were, a situation of 
intergroup conflict. This flies in the face of traditional 
views and only makes sense in terms of social competition, 
since subjects clearly desired to win by a decisive margin, 
not to gain.. As Turner (1975) argues, they used the 
experimental social identifications to enhance self esteem 
by creating -a differential in favour of their own group (or 
more formally, by making a positive social comparison along* 
the available relevant value dimension, money). This means 
they did not-'internalise the proffered social 
identifications as a matter of course, but actively used 
them to mediate the most adaptive behaviour in the 
experimental situation. 
Two further studies strongly support this position:. - Turner 
(1973, reported in his 1975 article) found subjects did not 
identify with minimal groups when given the. opportunity to 
make positive interpersonal comparisons, and-in a later- 
study, Oakes and Turner (1980) found that discriminative 
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behaviour in the minimal group paradigm resulted directly in 
raised self-esteem. 
Turner's theory of social competition has been extended into 
a model of intergroup relations (Doise, 1978; Tajfel and 
Turner, 1979; Turner, 1975; 1981a), with the sobering aspect 
that positive esteem is universally desired and that social 
categorisation stimulates social comparisons and hence, its 
expression in actions and opinions that favour the ingroup. 
Thus, there will always be a tendency to conflict between 
groups that is not destined to be eliminated by 
non-conflicting goals like plentiful resources for all. 
II. Second, and perhaps more relevant to present purposes, 
Turner's theory of social identification-and self 
stereotyping forms the basis of a cognitive redefinition of 
the social group (fully described in his 1981a article) as 
J 
an alternative to the more traditional view - that Turner 
calls the Social Cohesion Model - that a group is two or 
more interacting individuals who are mutually interdependent 
(e. g. Shaw, 1976). 
Within this traditional view, Turner (1981a) explains, 
initial interactions might have occurred-for a variety of 
reasons, "satisfaction of needs, attainment of goals or 
consensual validation of attitudes and values", and it is 
assumed that the resulting interdependence is expressed 
through mutual co-operation, attraction and-influence - the 
classic group characteristics - and that a group, perhaps 
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with a well organised social structure, evolves as these 
stabilise. Thus, members are primarily bound by emotional 
bonds. 
Turner's Social Identification Model, on the other hand, 
asserts that a group exists when individuals perceive 
themselves in terms of a common social category. Self 
definition, not mutual-affiliation therefore follows as the 
key to group formation. 
Convincing - if informal - evidence is provided by a 
consideration of professional bodies, races or even nations 
that cannot reasonably be thought to be based on networks of 
emotional bonds yet which clearly form large scale groups. 
More formal evidence derives again from the minimal group 
studies, which-demonstrated intergroup behaviour (and 
therefore, the creation of groups) in the total absence of 
variables normally associated with group formation. 
However, since research has reliably indicated that - 
perceived similarity engenders and increases liking, it was 
first necessary to eliminate the possibility that subjects 
assumed they were grouped together on the basis-of some 
unknown similarity, in which case, the Social Cohesion Model 
could afterall have accounted for-results. 
In a2x2 design, Billig and Tajfel. (1973), found 
assignment to minimal groups could be explicitly random and 
still result-in group. formation and discriminative - 1 
intergroup behaviour. In contrast, subjects who were 
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divided on the basis of interindividual similarity - without 
the notion. of groups being enhanced - showed no significant 
intergroup behaviour. 
Similarly, AIQ, n and Wilder (1975) found that subjects 
favoured dissimilar ingroup over similar outgroup members, 
and Turner (1981a) cites the remaining - as yet few - but 
persuasive studies. 
Within his formulation, variables like extreme similarity, 
common fate, shared threat and proximity, which have been 
shown to increase affiliation (Hensley and Duval, 1976; 
Rabbie and Horwitz, 1969; Burnstein and McRae, 1962 and 
Feshback and Singer, 1957)-function simultaneously as 
criteria for social categorisation, rather than as direct 
determinants of affiliation and hence group formation. More 
interesting, however, is the possibility that social 
cohesion results from social identification, because the by 
now familiar stereotypic assignment of the same criterial 
attributes to self and ingroup members, in enhancing 
perceived intragroup similarity, should result in increased 
mutual liking. Clearly, this is an intregroup not an Inter 
Individual phenomenon. Other "hallmarks" of intragroup 
relations, like mutual esteem, emotional empathy, altruistic 
co-operation and of course, attitudinal and behavioural 
uniformity can be similarly explained. 
Because social categorisations extend self-definitions 
beyond the individual, Turner (1981; 1981a; 1982) argues, we 
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help other ingroup members because we perceive their needs 
as those of our. social category and hence, as our own. 
This, he continues, is "a simple and elegant mechanism for 
bypassing the supposed egotism of human beings" (1981a, p. 
108). A more cynical interpretation, however, is that even 
altruism represents a cognitive extension of self-interest. 
III. The notion of uniformity among members of social 
groups introduces the third area in which I believe Turner's 
theories will be important. Since social identity produces 
conformity, it is in social psychological terminology, a 
vehicle of social influence, which Turner (19816) calls 
Referent Informational Influence. (Indeed, Study 4 and the 
coming Study 5 can be interpreted as preliminary empirical 
investigations of it. ) Perhaps its most exciting 
theoretical aspect is that it is truly social psychological. 
As Turner and Giles (1981) point out, referent 
informational influence explains consistency and conformity 
of group behaviour in terms of shared, yet individual 
psychological processes. Brown and Turner -(1981) take the 
argument further: collective interaction-mediated by-social 
identification can lead to the emergence of social 
structures within a culture, which in turn become 
determinants of individual psychological processes in a 
continual causal loop. 
Traditional theories of social influence generally attribute 
conformity to the desire to be right, -since it increases in 
ambiguous situations, or to the desire to win rewards, since 
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it increases when individuals wish to be liked by group 
members or. approved by powerful others (Aronson, 1973). The 
former include Kelman's (1961) "internalisation" and Deutsch 
and Gerrard's (1955) "informational influence", whereas the 
latter, known collectively as normative influences, include 
Kelman's "compliance". Within referent informational 
influence, on the other hand, situational contingencies make 
relevant and hence, salient, particular social 
identifications in the individual's repertoire, and 
following the deductive aspect of Tajfel's categorisation 
theory, he assigns himself the associated norms he has 
learned, which are subsequently reflected in conformative 
behaviour. 
Clearly, only referent informational influence provides a 
convincing explanation of conformity in situations where 
there are no ingroup members to copy, no ambiguity in the 
situation nor powerful other to met'- out rewards. ' In 
parentheses, it is fun to note that in conforming to his own 
beliefs, the individual's behaviour might be wildly 
inappropriate, which of course, provides the basic material 
for many comic dramatists and reminds us that we may all be 
Eliza Dolittles at times. 
To summarise and illustrate this brief, inadequate sketch, a 
facetious personal anecdote will be introduced. A more 
formal summary is to be found in Brown and Turner (1981). 
I was in Germany in the mid 1960's when England won the 
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Eurovision Song Contest, (which even then, I considered the 
lowest form of entertainment). Nevertheless, I remember the 
enhanced feeling of being English and my subsequent attempts 
to recreate English "mod" fashions, despite the fact that my 
hosts, far from being impressed, thought them hilarious. 
It does not require Turner's social identification theory to 
realise that I became overtly English - instead of trying to 
appear German - in order to enhance vicariously my self 
esteem. The fashions served a dual role: they were an 
attempt . to reinforce 
the positive differential already 
established through the contest (! ) and, they expressed 
what I thought was appropriate behaviour, although there 
were no ingroup members to copy or to approve my actions. 
Still funnier, school fellows on the same exchange, whom I 
met some days later were behaving in exactly the same 
manner. Together we exemplified the conformity that 
Turner's self-stereotyping predicts. 
We rushed together with a chauvinism that must have been 
deeply offensive to onlookers. At home, however, nothing 
would have. been more mutually insulting to be considered 
like our school fellows or even to admit that we knew each 
other, yet there we were, flaunting a togetherness which was 
clearly mediated by our shared salient social identification 
and not by pre-existing affiliations. 
In encompassing the behaviour of a party of-teenaged 
schoolgirls, Turner's model is indeed of epic power! 
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On a more serious note, through processes of self 
categorisation and self stereotyping, -referent -informational 
influence is the vehicle whereby Mercer's social model of 
retardation is tobe extended into the present social 
psychological model of retardation, in which retardates are 
not simply those who are believed retarded, but those who 
believe themselves retarded - or put more precisely, those 
whose behaviour-'is mediated by the knowledge that they are 
members of the social category, retardates. -Thus, "retarded 
behaviour, it is argued, can be the outcome of a functioning 
retardate-social identification, rather than a manifestation 
of intra-. organismic pathology or a direct-result of the 
treatment and behaviour of others. Thus, the present 
approach to mental-retardation has become truly social 
psychological. 
Before examining the implications of this position in more 
detail, it seems worthwhile considering how a retardate 
social identification might evolve as part of an 
individual's self concept. 
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2. Social Identification and the self concept of retardates 
The first step in the present social psychological approach 
to mental retardation, is to consider how a retardate social 
identification might develop. The nature and content of the 
infant's self concept is, of course, speculation. Classic 
writers on the subject suggest that very young children have 
little idea of what is self and not self. Piaget (1954), 
for example suggests that the child's self concept evolves 
from an "undifferentiated absolute" as he learns to 
distinguish himself from the outside world, and it is 
interesting to wonder if infants learn that the entities 
they can. control directly are self, as opposed to the 
external objects they cannot influence at will. As Burns 
(1979), argues, it seems reasonable to suppose that a body 
image - or cognitive diagram of the body - is probably-the 
first element of self concept to develop. 
Severely impaired children who show little motor activity 
are likely to be exponentially disadvantaged, since reduced 
movement is likely to result in an impoverishment of the 
self-stimulation necessary for already impaired cognitive 
structures to form a body-image but there seems little 
reason to assume different self-concept development at this 
stage for children destined to become "subculturally 
retarded". 
As the. infant develops, experience extends to include 
interactions with others or in Bronfenbrenner's (1979) 
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terminology, microsystem influences, which must contribute 
to the growth of self concept. Language development is 
clearly a milestone in this process. Indeed, the self 
concept (as object) often seems envisaged as a. set of covert 
verbalisations, and Sher if and . Cant il, (1947) go so far as 
to argue that learning the word "I" Is the genesis of self 
concept, whereas others like Burns, (1979) imply that the 
young child's particular difficulty with pronouns reflects 
his inability to distinguish self and others. Cooley 
(1912), on the other hand, suggested that such difficulties 
arise because pronouns cannot be imitated directly, but need 
"translating" for use from the child's perspective, an 
explanation supported by a doctoral thesis (Stedmon, 1983) 
which shows that children have similar difficulties with 
deitic spatial prepositions. Whatever the truth, possession 
and use of pronouns must reinforce self-other divisions. 
It seems clear that mentally impaired children will be both 
disabled and handicapped in this process. In their national 
survey of 15,000 children, Butler et al (1983), for 
example, found severely subnormal children were 37-times 
more likely to have . language difficulties 
than their normal 
peers, while as early as 1959, Rosenberg found adults used 
oversimplified, non-stimulating language to children they 
believed retarded. In other words, impairments are-likely 
to interact and transact with the linguistic aspect of the 
child's microsystem. 
There seems no reason to assume abnormal language based 
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self-concept development in children destined to become 
retarded at school, except in the sense that the vast 
majority of them are from the lower classes (Kushlick and 
Blunden, 1974) where according to Bernstein's controversial 
arguments, (1970) the linguistic environment might be 
impoverished. 
Particularly interesting in the language context is Mead's 
(1934) suggestion-that true self conception begins when the 
child learns his name and thus creates an identity, which 
following Erikson (1968) is understood to involve 
recognising self and being recognised by others. The idea 
becomes fascinating, if dangerously metaphysical, when 
linked to Mercer's (1973) argument - outlined in chapter. 2 - 
that the question "what is it really? " is a nonsense 
question because entities have, no name and belong to no 
class until we put them in one. Perhaps this can be applied 
to humans. Indeed, it is a feature of Celtic mythology, 
where in one Irish legend the nameless hero wanders lost, 
unfulfilled and unable to find his destiny until - by chance 
- he is caught stealing a pig and named "Cuchollon" - Little 
Pig Stealer. The giving of new names to religious initiates 
often symbolises rebirth and in this context, the 
implications of the marriage ceremony, which strips the 
woman of her own name and gives her that of another, are 
unsavoury food for thought. 
Such notions embedded in folklore do deserve serious 
consideration, particularly as Wolfenstein (1968) found that 
r 
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children whose names were changed, frequently become 
disturbed, as if their developing sense of self depended (at 
least in part) on them. 
Cruelty of children to each other is well known and 
researchers like Jones (1972), Siperstein, Budoff and Bak 
(1980) have noted that derogatory nicknames are quickly 
attached to. those of stigmatised appearance or who fail to 
keep up with peers. Burns (1979) argues that names are 
often converted into self- conceptions which generalise to 
define the whole person and his behaviour. From this point 
of view, _the names that retarded children learn to associate 
with themselves are clearly likely to introduce the 
knowledge that they are retarded into their self concepts. 
Language cannot be separated from the feedback from others, 
which Burns (1979) identifies as the third source of the 
individual's self concept - an idea that Cooley (1912) 
expressed-in his notion of the "looking glass self". 
Parents,. Burns continues, almost always provide the 
individual with his first source of information. He argues 
that the infant learns to value and desire the love and 
esteem of others, since parental care - i. e. the rewarding 
fulfillment ofbasic needs - is accompanied by signals of 
love. The internalisation of parental love is a source of 
individual self esteem, and through classical association, 
arguably, a behaviouristic explanation of our-desire for it. 
Evidence. for the first proposition is to be found as early 
as 1939 when Stott noted that children whose parents were 
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accepting and loving thought more positively about 
themselves, as replicated later by Coopersmith (1967). 
Feedback from parents not only provides children with 
self-evaluation, but also with the content of self 
conceptions. Jourard and Remy (1955) and Helper (1955) for 
example, show that children's self concepts are similar to 
the view they think their parents have of them and Burns 
(1979) notes that even casual parental comments can "be 
converted in the child's mind to vital self-conceptions" (p. 
15). 
Although. direct evidence seems lacking, it is reasonable to 
suppose that feedback from parents frequently provides 
children with the knowledge that they are retarded. For 
example, Rondall -(1977) found mothers of retarded children 
used more requests and imperative sentences and solicited 
leadership less to their children than mothers of normal 
boys and girls. In some instances, feedback might even 
include feelings of rejection, since, for example, Meyer 
(1980), somewhat surprisingly, found 83% of a sample of 
retardates' parents favoured institutionalisation over 
desegregation., Other parents might provide a child with 
unstable and confusing information as their "apprehension, 
anxiety, alarm and bewilderment" (Booth, 1978) over his 
disability unfolds. 
In more detail, -Booth's touching analysis of 46 case 
histories shows all but 2 severely handiapped babies were 
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infact "normal" until their second year and beyond, since 
parents and frequently doctors-explained away retarded 
development, particularly when there was some physical 
handicap which served as excuse. Diagnoses, he shows, were 
the result of anxious and insistent negotiations when 
parents could no longer accommodate their children's 
" behaviour within this strategy, and their babies, it might be 
imagined, had become literally, stateless persons. 
Subsequently parents reinterpreted their infant's behaviour, 
and it is reasonable to hypothesise that their reactions 
changed accordingly. In other words, it seems important to 
point out that feedback does not simply bounce off others 
like waves off a rock, but is more likely to be a complex 
transactional affair between parent-child interactions at 
the microsystem level; interactions in other settings, like 
professional consultation rooms at the meso system level - 
(or in a negative sense, since Bronfenbrenner (1979) points 
out that parents with retarded children frequently absent 
themselves from social intercourse); at exosystems-levels, 
in the decisions taken by parents and doctors or 
professionals at case conferences and finally, at the macro 
systems level as sets-of ideologies become psychologically 
relevant. 
Finally, still other parents might deny their retarded child 
feedback altogether, in the belief that he is incapable of 
assimilating it. Clearly, the situation is extremely 
complex and must vary from case to case, but in general, it 
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seems likely that those who believe their children are 
retarded will react-in a way that transfers this information 
to them. 
As the child ventures beyond his family circle, interactions 
mushroom and so increase massively feedback from others. 
Kirchner and Vondraek (1975) found that 3 to 5 year olds 
already identified peers and siblings as liking them more 
often than-they identified their parents, which suggests 
'that parents' -central role might be relatively 
short lived. In a further interesting study, Wooster and 
Harris (1973) predicted and found that highly mobile 
children of service families had impaired self images. Such 
children, they-reasoned, suffered -frequent changes of 
teachers, peers and neighbours and hence received disrupted 
feedback on which to build self conceptions. Finally, Burns 
(1975) showed how the individual thinks others see him 
correlates highly with how he sees himself. 
In a number of studies, , Gottlieb and his associates, 
eg 
.' Gottlieb 
and Harrison (1972) have noted that retarded 
school children are ostracised by their peers, which is 
likely to leave them in little doubt that they belong to a 
negatively valued social category. Indeed, feedback from 
schoolmates might provide ESN children-with the first - 
indication that they are not "normal" in the world outside 
their family circles. 
An interesting study (Farina, Thaw, Feiner and Hust, 1976) 
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it will be remembered, warns against assuming that negative 
attitudes mean negative feedback, since in their learning 
experiment, subjects punished a stooge for his mistakes far 
less when they thought he was retarded. Analogous 
kindnesses in real life might provide retardates with the 
false belief that they perform rather well in learning 
situations. On the other hand, Guskin (1963) notes that 
"normal" people tend to take over retardates' work and 
responsibility - kindnesses which might provide 
self-perceptions relating to inability and incompetence and 
reduce opportunities for acquiring competence and 
self-esteem. 
From the present viewpoint, diverse reactions of others and 
groups of others are likely to be the source of the child's 
developing personal and social identity. It is fascinating 
to speculate that the dichotomy between the former and a 
retardate social identification might develop in situations 
like real life labelling experiments. For example, consider 
the experience of the stooge in Farina et al's study, or 
extrapolate from the slides of children in Studies 2-and 4. 
Exactly the same individuals were perceived and reacted to 
quite differently when observers thought they were retarded. 
This suggests, that in situations where-their retardation is 
salient, individuals will receive different feedback on 
which to build self-conceptions, (which, it is worth 
emphasisi1g, is likely to be stereotypic in nature) whereas, 
in other situations, it might relate to other social or 
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personal identifications. This is supported by Burke and 
Tully, (1977) who suggest role identities are the meanings 
individuals attach to self as object in social situations 
which develop i :..: '. ; ý. '.. ' ; through 
interaction with others. 
Clearly, this must be a massively complex process, not only 
interacting with the self-definitions of others, but also 
transacting with the individual. Thus, children who are not 
generally categorised probably develop personal and social 
identities like "normal" children, apart from a relatively 
comparmentalised retardate identification acquired in part 
of each school day. At the other extreme, some profoundly 
handicapped children are unlikely ever to be seen as 
anything else and consequently might receive little or no 
feedback at all. 
"the effect that these people have on the rest of 
us: the sense of nothingness they evoke..... we 
wonder whether they are human at all, in any way 
like us. Our interaction with them seems so 
minimal ......... we do not know who we are for them 
or what they are for us. Is there any mutual 
identity we can establish, any reciprocity between 
us, and if there is, do we want to know about it? 
Ryan and Thomas, 1980, p. 13 
These ideas link directly with Bronfenbrenner's (1979) 29th 
hypothesis that "development is enhanced as a direct 
function ofthe number of structurally different settings in 
which the developing person participates in a variety of 
joint activities and primary dyads with others, particularly 
when these others are more mature or experienced", since it 
seems clear that the more impaired an individual is, the 
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narrower range of settings and joint activities he will 
elicit and hence, the less he "produces" his own development 
(Lerner and Busch-Rossnagel, 1981). 
Since the retardate is himself a part of society, he is 
likely to learn to interpret the environment as others do 
and to assimilate his anticipation of-their responses as a 
source of behavioural control and self esteem, an idea which 
Mead (1934) encapsulated in his "generalised other", and 
which might be linked with Bronfenbrenner's macrosystem 
influences. This is illustrated by Staffieri (1957), for 
example, who found that six year old boys could pinpoint. 
their own body types reasonably accurately, already - 
preferring athletic physiques and associating stereotypic. 
expectations with body-shape. -A fat child is therefore 
likely to receive negative feedback and also to be 
socialised--according to cultural norms, but since he is a 
member of. society himself, he will have internalised the 
same standards and thus, will most likely repeat the process 
in microcosm. In other words, as a child is socialised, he 
learns to evaluate himselfagainst cultural norms and to 
extrapolate about himself from cultural expectations. 
The notion of a generalised other, though perhaps 
introducing a complicated extra piece of jargon, -is 
centrally important here, because to use some-more jargon, 
it represents the internalisation of cultural expectations, 
that is, macro system influences * or what-were termed-"demand 
characteristics" in the previous study, and linked to 
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Turner's referent informational influence, embodies the 
source of criterial attributes a child will learn to assign 
himself when a particular social identification is salient. 
In plain English, a child will develop expectations about 
groups of people, and if he perceives himself a member of 
one. of them he will apply the expectations to himself. 
I 
The "generalised other" and "looking-glass self" are perhaps 
misleading since they imply that the individual is a tabula 
rasa whose self- conception, fundamental desire for positive 
self esteem and internalised standards are provided by 
others. This is contrary to the present transactional view 
of development to which Cooley's (1912) symbolic 
interactionist approach more closely approximates. This 
suggests that the individual's response to the reactions of 
others is shaped by the way he interprets them, but that the 
meanings upon which his interpretations are based are the 
product of social interactions, which themselves are modified 
directly by his behaviour and indirectly by his 
interpretation. In this way, self and others are mutually 
dependent, or as Cooley rather beautifully puts it: 
The notion of a separate and independent ego is an 
illusion. 
p. 5 
A small scale example illustrates this difficult point: 
Parental reactions have been mentioned as a potent source of 
the infant's self-perceptions, but clearly their effect 
depends on what the child makes of them, which, -. in turn, 
might be based on a "family culture" of shared meanings that 
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child and parents developed together. 
This completes the present speculations on how a retardate 
social identification might develop as part of an 
individual's self concept. It is a massive understatement 
to say the process must be headspinningly complex, and a 
comprehensive summary seems impossible. Wooster's approach 
(1970), however, is a useful peg on which to hang the major 
points: First, his premise that social adjustment depends 
on self-perceptions, is agreed with and extended to include 
a wider range of behaviours. Second, the importance of 
cognitive categories as the fundamental system on which 
perceptions are based is also in accord with the present 
approach. Third, there-is no reason to disagree with his 
argument and empirical finding that retardates have less 
differentiated self-concepts and hence class a wider range 
of stimuli as equivalent, which explains-their failure to 
make-finely tuned social responses. Even his observation 
that differentiation correlates with IQ, is not necessarily 
to be found fault with. Contention arises when it is 
implied that IQ -causes impoverished differentiation. By now 
it should be clear that the development of a retardate's 
self concept is seen as-an immensely complex transaction 
with cultural expectations and reactions of others, and not 
just the result of his impairment. 
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3. Pattern of acceptance: 
Referent informational- influence and retarded behaviour 
It is now possible to consider in more detail some 
implications of the present approach and to state the 
central hypothesis of the present social psychological-model 
of retardation: In certain cicumstances, an individual 
whose self-concept includes the knowledge that he belongs to 
the social category, retardates, will categorise himself in 
terms of that group, in order adaptively to respond. At 
such times, his retardate social identification will be 
salient, which means that the part of his self-concept 
concerned with membership of that category-mediates-his 
behaviour. He will then assign himself, the characteristics 
he has learned to associate with retardates, which as the 
previous section indicated, are likely broadly to mirror 
relevant cultural beliefs and therefore, to resemble those 
found in Study 1. 
Thus, in situations which enhance the salience of an 
individual's retardate social identification, self image-and 
behaviour should converge towards a retardate stereotype, 
and retarded behaviour, it follows, is role- and not 
necessarily impairment- or disability- determined. 
Previously, others' beliefs about retardation were 
identified as possible sources of handicap. The present 
hypothesis provides a vehicle to carry the argument -into 
the 
self-concepts of retardates and hence, it provides a means 
whereby retardation can be viewed as active, self-generated 
.0 
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(Lerner and Busch. -Rossnagel, 1981), handicap. 
AB in Mercer's view, the 'recipe'-for defining retardation 
is seen as culturally dependent so the same individual or 
behaviour can be retarded in some situations and not in 
others. Here, however, this is not only due to differences 
in prevailing social systems, but also, to self-generated 
changes in the salient aspect of self-concept. - This is 
because retarded behaviour is seen as behaviour mediated by 
a retardate social identification and a retardate as an 
individual whose retardate social identification is salient 
and who is therefore created by an act of self-definition. 
Thus the same individual or behaviour can be retarded or not 
within the same situation. 
Despite these differences, Mercer's model and the present 
probably co-incide in practice because individuals are 
likely to have internalised cultural norms, and therefore, 
to label themselves as others would. 
The major advantage and purpose of what could be given the 
cumbersome title "the referent -informational model of 
retardation". should now be obvious. According to the 
medical model, amelioration lies principally in scientific 
breakthrough. For.. Mercer, -loci of intervention have 
mushroomed to, include the beliefs of others. in the present 
model, however,: amelioration may be self initiated. -A 
retardate can become'"normal" through a change in 
self-def inition. 
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Of course, it is not hypothesised that impairments will 
magically disappear. Rather, the individual will be freed 
from the handicapping effect of criterial attributes like 
low intelligence and incompetence that referent 
informational influence predicts he'will assign himself, 
should his retardate social identification be salient. Such 
attributes according to Turner (1981a) will affect 
behaviour directly and in addition, metacognitive 
attributions indirectly affect it (Hagen, Barclay and 
Newman (1982). 
Before continuing, it is sensible to point out that 
profoundly impaired people are at the limits of the present 
approach, because according to Ryan and Thomas (1980) they 
may have no self-concept at all, and clearly, if this is so, 
they cannot be handicapped by-beliefs about themselves. If 
they do have a self-concept, it is unlikely to be widely 
differentiated, because they are unlikely ever to receive 
feedback undominated by their . impairment. If this 
is the 
case, arguably they are the most handicapped of all. 
However, such speculations-stand at the limit of-the present 
approach, which is far more relevant to retarded people who 
also have personal and a repertoire of social 
identifications. 
So far, implications have only been considered at an 
individual level, which is ironic, since retardation is seen 
primarily as a group level phenomenon. 
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According to referent informational influence, individuals 
sharing a salient retardate social identification will 
assign themselves the same criterial attributes, resulting 
in increased behavioural and attitudinal conformity which 
will be further enhanced by the stereotypic effects of 
categorisation, directly (because retardates will perceive 
themselves more like other ingroup members) and indirectly, 
(because perceived intra group similarity of and therefore, 
behaviour towards others like doctors, teachers and 
"normals" will also be increased. ) Hallmarks of 'group 
belongingness', it will be remembered, including mutual 
liking, admiration and empathy, follow from this increased 
similarity, and in behaving and construing self and 
environment in terms of the same social identification 
instead of personal identities, retardates will tend to 
become depersonalised, interchangeable exemplars of the 
social category rather than individual people - living 
embodiments of the retardate stereotype, in other words. On 
the evidence of Study 1, the precise pattern of behaviours 
towards which retardates should-converge,, -is likely to 
depend on the prevailing social system. 
From the previous-chapter, it will be remembered that a 
comprehensive understanding of the conditions leading_to 
behaviour mediated through a social identification, though 
being developed, Oakes, -(1983); Tajfel and Turner (1979), 
is 
not yet complete. The latter write, for example, --that 
discovering the precise conditions in which one set of 
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states rather than another will be adopted, is a long term 
research task. Sufficient for present purposes, however, is 
Oakes' first conclusion that "the mere cognitive salience of 
social categories can result in behaviour which, is: based on, 
group membership" provided there is at least the potential 
for the individual to evaluate himself positively. - Common 
sense suggests that a salient retardate social - 
identification offers precious little opportunity for 
positive evaluation and it follows therefore, that impaired 
individuals are likely to be retardates less often than 
researchers, for example,. might thinks Patterns of 
resistance,. however, form the subject of the next section. 
The present theme is what might happen-when the retardate 
identification Is salient. 
Tajfel (1974); Tajfel and Turner (1979) caution that pure 
intergroup behaviour; that is, behaviour entirely mediated by 
a social identification, is a hypothetical extreme which is 
unlikely to occur in real life, although fighting soldiers, 
they point out, provide an almost pure example. It seems 
clear to me that institutionalised retardates most probably 
embody another. The relative newness and specialisation of 
this idea means that evidence is exploratory and anecdotal. 
Taken as a whole, however, -it is persuasive. 
Thomas (1978) argues that placement is a specific 
socialising experience because it involves exposure to 
extreme conditions and involuntary association with 
similarly handicapped others. In Goffman's (1961) famous 
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words, institutionalisation entails-a-series of abasements, 
degradations, humiliations and profanations of self. 
Indeed, by definition, institutions forthe retarded are 
predicated on the attributed characteristics of that social 
category. Thus, they fulfill Oakes' criterion and probably 
initiate intergroup behaviour mediated by the retardate 
social identification. 
Goffman's classic essay seems particularly relevant to the 
present approach, and deserves a closer look. His notion of 
'self'. for example, seems specifically to refer to what is 
free and , 
idiosyncratic and therefore to resemble personal 
identity. Hence, entry into a total institution (that is 
one whose objects . and products are people), amounts 
to an 
assault on personal identity and - by default - an emphasis 
on a relevant social identification. 
This interpretation is supported more strongly when Goffman 
goes on to identify four characteristics that seemed, 
intuitively to him, to distinguish total institutions. 
First, sleep, work and play occur in a single location, 
under a single embracing authority, so that the 
distinctiveness between different spheres of life . is 
broken 
down. Second, inmates are treated as a group and required 
to do the same thing together. Third, a-rigid daily routine 
is imposed. and fourth, these characteristics form a single 
plan, designed to fulfil the official aims of-the institute. 
Well over a decade before the models on which the present 
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approach is based, Goffman seems to have delineated exactly 
the intragroup conformity, , deindividualisat. ion, - 
depersonalisation and emphasis on administrative 
categorisation which might be expected to eliminate personal 
identity and make salient a retardate social identification. 
Many other classic writings of the 1960's and early 1970's 
can be interpreted as. f urther support for the present 
position. 
Tizard (1964) for example, writes "The pattern of 
residential care for the mentally handicapped, -laid down in 
the 19th century, has not changed much in the twentieth". 
Typical institutions (like The Fountain Hospital, just 
outside London), house upwards of a thousand inmates in some 
isolated rural spot. All services are provided on site, and 
visits from "normal" outsiders are difficult or impossible. 
Homogen. ity of grouping, he continues, is a primary problem. 
Non-speakers, for example, are often placed together in 
wards where over-burdened staff do-not bother to talk, and 
the most-serious effect of inadequate facilities-and 
overcrowding, -he argues, is deindividuation. '=Staff are 
simply unable to give personal care, and space-limitations 
mean personal possessions are banned. 
Such impoverished experience most likely limits ability 
directly, but clearly it must also prevent development of 
virtually any self-concept other than a shared-retardate 
social identification predicated on the institution. 
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Therefore, deindividuation will not only be imposed 
externally, but also, internally through the self-concepts 
of inmates, in a sad vicious circle. 
In addition, Tizard describes the constant routine and 
uniform experience of young inmates, whose lives are 
governed by ward practice, rather than personal needs. Most 
striking, children are "lifted" five times nightly - i. e. 
woken up, taken out of bed and sat on a lavatory, in an 
attempt to avoid bedwetting. Approximately an hour a day, 
Tizard estimates - or over 4% of their lives - was spent in 
trying to pass water, to please someone else. Clearly, such 
treatment must serve virtually to eliminate any sense of 
personal identity. Indeed, through-referent informational 
influence, self-concepts should mediate appropriate* 
behaviours, which could even include enuresis and 
encopresis, despite "lifting". 
Similarly, King, Raynes and Tizard (1971) argue that 
residential care for mentally handicapped children compares 
unfavourably with that provided for "normal" deprived 
children. Organisational differences rather than 
differences between normal and subnormal children, --they 
found, seemed to account for contrasts in child management. 
Taking Goffman's approach as starting point, they envisaged 
a continuum between institutional and child-oriented 
practices, which does not simply represent a conflict 
between Institutional efficiency and individual 
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considerations, because, as their studies progressed, they 
found many practices that denied individuality, but were 
neither convenient nor efficient. 
In order to operationalise the continuum, they concentrated 
on 4 areas: - Rigidity of routine considered the flexibility 
of practices across individuals, situations and time, and 
was assessed according to whether changes were made to 
accommodate unusual events and individual needs, or whether 
set times existed for activities. -Block treatment 
considered whether inmates were regimented as a-group or 
whether-they were allowed individually to procede. Third, 
depersonalisation-assessed opportunities for personal 
expression and initiative, by checking for personal 
possessions and privacy. Finally, . social distance 
considered the separation between staff and children in 
activities and accommodation, which was assessed by 
ascertaining whether, for example, staff ate and watched TV 
with children and allowed them access to their rooms. 
Using this 
. approach, King and Raynes (1968) devised an 
interview shedule of 30 items with a possible score ranging 
from 0 (entirely child centred) to 60 (entirely institution 
centred. ) Intuitively, this scale could have been devised 
with the present approach in mind, since it explicitly 
concerns. depersonalisation, intragroup similarity and 
intergroup dissimilarity - the very factors that might 
predict salience of the retardate social identification, but 
sad to say, its application was not - King, Raynes and 
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Tizard were interested in differences between institutions, 
rather than the behaviour or self-concepts of inmates. 
Interestingly, however, they found scores from a 
subnormality hospital were significantly higher than those 
from a paediatric unit, which supports the present argument 
that institutions for the subnormal are most likely to 
trigger intergroup behaviour. 
More recently, Eyman, McLain, Miller and Silverstein (1977) 
note the lack of systematic relationships between physical 
characteristics of institutions, including size and 
staff/patient ratio, and inmates' behaviour. They therefore 
attempted to examine the-relationship between residential 
environments (quantified-by a version of King and Raynes' - 
scale, and a second similarly oriented measure), -intensive 
training programs and adaptive behaviour. Subjects were the 
inhabitants of two American-State Institutions and of 
community facilities like convalescent hospitals, foster 
homes and hostels. Although the paradigm is complex, since 
subjects were grouped according to age, type of placement 
and level of-impairment, results indicated a clear general 
trend: environmental measures accounted for more change in 
adaptive behaviour than treatment programs. According to 
the present view, these results are easily understood, if it 
is hypothesised. that subjects' self-definitions-played a 
role in their behaviour, since those living in 
personally-oriented environments were less likely to be 
handicapped by a retardate social identification, whereas 
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such a self-image was likely to be enhanced by particaption 
in a behaviour modification program. 
Similarly, Zigler and Balla (1977) found 
institution-centred regimes, exactly as referent 
informational influence predicts, resulted in increased 
behavioural conformity among inmates. 
Still more support comes from Gunzburg and Gunzburg (1973) 
who focus on the physical environment typically endured by 
institutionalised retardates. They. describe the 
transmutation into bricks and mortar of depersonalising 
institution centred policy. Whole colonies, they point out, 
are designed round central toileting blocks, where inmates 
can be sluiced down in groups at pre-set times. They even 
cite a planning committee in which the central concern was 
the external, appearance and acceptability to locals of a 
projected institution. Less extreme, they note that 
lighting and heating controls are almost invariably under 
lock and key and turned on when policy dictates, not when 
somebody feels chilly or wants to stay up late. Similarly, 
dormitories, some grim and cheerless, others bright and 
colourful, . are generally. uniform without facilities 
for 
personal expression. 
Finally, there is also some evidence that staff-are 
typically institution centred. Gilbert and Levinson (1956) 
for example, found aides were very high in authoritarianism 
and oriented towards custodial care. 
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Such attitudes, from 
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the present point of view, are also likely to result from 
referent informational influence and not "personality. " 
The idea that staff and hence, staff/patient interactions 
are likely-to be depersonalised by the demands of total 
institutions, is supported by Pratt, Raynes and Roses 
(1977) who found that institutional staff who perceived 
themselves excluded from decisions about patient care and 
administration and whose duties-tended to be confined-to a 
single role had lower morale and gave more 
institution-centred care. 
In view of the general consensus concerning its importance, 
writes Zigler (1966), it is amazing that more work has not 
been done to investigate the effects of institutionalisation 
on retardates. Today, his comment seems to hold, and in the 
absence of further more direct evidence, the foregoing must 
serve as preliminary support for the idea that 
institutionally-oriented placements are likely to enhance a 
shared retardate social identification, and mediate 
behaviour at the intergroup end of Tajfel's continuum, 
conforming to appropriate (i. e. incompetent) patterns that 
are role, not ability-determined. 
A number of studies that seem to concern the interpersonal 
end of Tajfel's continuum rather than institutionalisation 
per se, may also be interpreted as support. 
In the classic Brooklands experiment, Tizard and his 
associates took 16 severely subnormal children aged 4 to 10 
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years (average seven-and-a-half) and whose mean non-verbal 
mental age, 2 years 10 months, far exceeded their verbal 
age, from the institution-centred environment of the 
Fountain Hospital. The idea was to provide them with the 
type of care afforded "normal" deprived children. 
Accordingly, they entered a specially developed unit with an 
atmosphere as homelike as possible, and were divided into 2 
family groups, each with its own 'mother', sitting room and 
eating arrangements. They were given outings, treats and an 
individual developmental approach in a warm permissive 
atmosphere. Play, characteristic of 'normal'-nursery 
schools,. was the first lesson, but most important were the 
conditions known to promote happiness - affection, fairness 
and security. 
When institutional constraints were first removed,. Tizard 
(1964) continues, most children showed behaviour disorders, 
the worst affected being the longest institutionalised. 
Soon, however, a qualitative behavioural change took place - 
the children began to play like normal children of their own 
age and even to help around the house. Similarly, their 
emotional adjustment improved, they grew more independent 
and most important, began to "express individuality" (P- 
1l)-In addition they showed a significant-average increase in 
verbal mental age of 14 months, --compared with only 6 months 
shown by controls -left at the hospital. Indeed, according 
to Tigard, they showed ". language behaviour remarkable for 
children so backward" (p. 134). 
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behaviour after two years. 
The same framework can be hypothesised-to. underpin the 
Gunzburg's 
_(1973) argument 
that deliberate environmental 
manipulation can improve mental function, social competence, 
happiness, stability and IQ. Traditional approaches, they 
argue, have lead to remedial programs directed at school 
like subjects and social competence, for the benefit of 
others, with virtually no interest in personality 
development, except for old fashioned "character building" 
usually with an imposition of coercive standards far 
stricter than those applied to normal people. 
Much normal behaviour may be possible, they continue, if 
only subnormal people are given the chance to develop as 
human beings. 
Their approach, "personalisation", involves giving the 
subnormal freedom of choice, an opportunity to develop an 
awareness of personal tastes, to own possessions, to learn 
and experience the practicalities of living, -, and privacy. 
The key, -"normalisation", involves creating patterns of 
existence as close as-possible to. norms of society, which, 
they continue, can only produce normal living patterns if 
the subnormal are made aware of themselves as-people. 
Because of their interest in physical environment, they 
continue with descriptions of institutions that are as 
homelike as possible; where opportunities are given to 
understand contexts for appropriate behaviour, where, for 
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example, lights and heaters are visible-and usable, not 
unseen and centrally controlled, and where meals have to be 
shopped for, prepared and cooked, not simply eaten. 
Interestingly, their theories were put into practice at 
Coldeast Hospital in 1971 (Gunzburg and Gunzburg, 1973), 
where inmates, including 40 wheelchair patients and 45 who 
were incontinent, were given a new environment that had been 
reshaped to be 'normal'. Within 6 months, -only 4 remained 
in their chairs and 10 were incontinent. Of course, 
improvements in enthusiasm, staff morale and the environment 
per se must have contributed directly to these changes, but 
in addition, they are seen as the result of a reversal of 
institution-centred practices and consequently, -the 
establishment of individual personal identities, as-opposed 
to a shared retardate social identification, and 
role-determined behaviour. 
I agree with their statement, that given this approach, 
no-one knows what improvements may be possible. 
Parnicky (1977) embarked on a program which fits exactly 
the present view. Beginning with the premise that 
limitations may reside in learning environments rather than 
retardates, he chose 40 out of a sample of 55 men (aged 18 
to 30 who, on average had been institutionalised for 14 
years) to begin an experimental program to prepare-them for 
community placement. Training covered-vocational, social 
and daily living skills, but what was more important, 
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programs were individually designed to encourage 
idiosyncratic development. Still more relevant, social 
skills involved promoting the acquisition of "an adult 
self-concept" through role playing, discussion and 
individual therapy which was especially designed to 
counteract effects of the retarded label, which Parnicky 
continues, meant subjects were treated as children whatever 
their age but "more damnably" came to think of themselves as 
children. Clearly, this might be interpreted as a strategy 
to develop a repertoire of social and personal 
identifications as alternatives to a single retarded social 
identification. 
Results were promising: 18% of experimental subjects became 
entirely independent, with another 48% becoming 
semi-independent, while the-figures for controls, who 
received the usual preparation provided by the institution, 
were 0 and 14%. Similarly, only 30% of subjects were 
reinstitutionalsed compared with 73% of controls. 
To conclude this section, it is easy to assume that the 
gothic-like institutions of the 1950's and 60's are no 
longer with us, and that the present theories are not. likely 
to prove relevant today. A number of points answer this 
challenge. First, occasional news reports and the recent 
work of Ryan and Thomas (1980), attest that massive,.. 
dehumanising institutions are very much still with us,. for, 
as Malin Race and Jones. (1980) point-out, despite new 
legislation, the status quo has tended to prevail. Second, 
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and more important, deindividuation and referent 
informational influence do not require Dickensian style 
hardship, but are psychological states that can occur in the 
brightest surroundings with the kindest care. -Third, 
the 
present approach is based on continua,. and while some 
institutionalised retardates probably represent virtually 
pure instances of intergroup behaviour (see Tajfel, 1974), 
interactions uninfluenced by social identifications, 'it will 
be remembered, are almost unimaginable, and real life 
bristles with situations in which a retardate social 
identification is likely to be salient and therefore, -to 
produce handicap, for example, in special schools,, -remedial 
classes and even interactions with psychologists. 
Bronfenbrenner (1979) neatly summarises the present view: 
Placing people in different roles, even in the same 
setting, can radically influence the kinds of 
activities and relations in which they engage and 
thereby presumably alter the course of their 
development. 
p. 84 
This of course, extends massively the application of the 
present approach, and increases the number of studies which 
are compatible and hence, indirectly supportive (although 
stronger conclusions require confirmatory research). 
Gampel, Gottlieb and Harrison (1974) for example, had an 
opportunity to study 55 chilren who were moving to a new 
school building. Twenty-six who had been segreated in a 
special class were randomly assigned-to new special-or 
integrated classes. After 4 months, the former showed 
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significantly more negative behaviour, which, in accord with 
the present views, the authors suggest reflects the 
conformity to expectations associated with the special 
class, which was mediated by self-definitions. 
In two fascinating studies on retarded readers, Lawrence 
(1971,1972) investigated the effects on reading attainment 
of individual counselling compared with traditional remedial 
programs, the hyothesis being that motivation and ultimately 
attainment would be improved by providing personal 
expression with a sympathetic adult. 
In his 1971 paper, Lawrence begins with the idea that 
educational failure invades the whole personality and that 
retarded readers, consequently, grow demotivated. --However, 
he points out, poor self-image and emotional adjustment 
might be a cause as much as a consequence of poor 
performance. 
Accordingly, 48 retarded readers and a random sample of good 
readers were given Porter and Cattell's Children's 
Personality Questionnaire. In support of Lawrence's 
arguments, the former scored significantly more on-the "0 
Factor" which indicated that they were somewhat 
apprehensive, worrying, depressed, and guilt prone. The 
poor readers also took word recognition and non-verbal 
intelligence tests. Next, they were divided into 4 matched 
groups. 1 received specialist remedial teaching, 2, 
personal conselling, 3 received both, and 4 was a control. 
- 371 - 
After 6 months, tests were retaken. Group 2 had made most 
progress on all measures, including reading, although they 
did not differ significantly from group 3. 
Lawrence hypothesised that counselling had improved the 
motivation of his retarded readers, but he does not discuss 
just how this might have occurred. The present idea-is that 
it helped children to develop personal identities and move 
away from the intergroup end of Tajfel's, continuum where 
their behaviour and self-images would have been based on a 
retarded-social identification. This is strongly supported 
by two facts. First, counselling sessions were child 
centred, and involved encouraging personal revelation 
through the expression of interests, attitudes, -hobbies, 
relationships and anxieties. Exactly the influences, in 
other words, that would be expected to enhance personal 
identity, but which per se, seem unlikely to improve 
reading. Second, (although the difference was 
insignif-icant), counselling plus remedial help was less 
effective than counselling -a result that'Lawrence. does not 
discuss at all, but which makes perfect sense in the present 
framework. Quite simply, . remedial 
teaching is. likely to 
reinforce the child's self image as a retarded reader and 
hence to encourage retarded reading behavour. 
In summary, Lawrence's studies can be interpreted to support 
the hypothesis that poor performance can be mediated by a 
retardate social identification. 
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Further evidence comes from a fascinating study (Granat, 
1977) of 2,000, Swedes undergoing testing as part of the 
enlistment procedure for military service. From these, 128 
who had never been labelled, but who were intellectually 
subnormal, were identified. The intelligence profile (the 
relationship between verbal, spatial, numerical, perceptual 
and psychomotor tests) differed significantly from a-group 
of similar intelligence who had been labelled, and it-is 
interesting to hypothesise that the labelling experience 
accounted for the differences, rather than that the 
differences accounted for the labelling. 
Similarly, the work of researchers like Jeffree and Cashdan 
(1971) whose retarded subjects not only showed a verbal 
deficiency but also a verbal disinclination can be- - 
interpreted as consistent with the present approach, since 
behaviour not attributed to fixed intrinsic qualities, (like 
"ability") might be mediated by referent informational 
influence. Unfortunately, the present paradigm is worlds 
apart from those concerned with retardate learning 
performance, so there is nothing relevant to Tajfel's 
familiar continuum among MA and CA controls. Nevertheless, 
such studies are important and interesting in-their own 
right and must still be mentioned, especially as It is 
important to see whether established findings nevertheless 
fit comfortably into the present approach. 
Herriot, -Green and McConkey (1973) for example, investigated 
whether the same processes could be inferred to account for 
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free recall in retarded (with a vocabularly age between 5 
and 8 years) and normal subjects. They found that the poor 
spontaneous performance of the former could be improved by 
various cues, including practice in categorising objects 
before trials, or simply instructions to note that some 
stimuli belonged together. This lead to the important 
conclusion that high level coding strategies to aid recall 
are within retardates' repertoire, yet not spontaneously 
employed. They added, however, that the most subnormal of 
their subjects did not appear to benefit in the same way, 
which could imply that high level strategies are'not 
available to all. 
More recently, Farb, Cottrell, Montague and Throne (1977) 
were able to improve intelligence levels (defined as WISC 
scores) with training. 
Ann Brown (1974) provides a highly sophisticated review and 
empirical investigation of strategic behaviour in retardate 
memory, which requires a lengthy excursion into cognitive 
psychology and therefore cannot be done justice to here. 
Because human memory is a limited system, she begins, 
efficient performance relies on the effective use of 
mnemonic strategies to transform random input into 
information-rich units, and retardates perform poorly, 
because they are deficient in the spontaneous use of such 
strategies, rather than deficient in memory: 
She goes on to note that information processing models, 
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which-had the greatest influence duringthe early 19701s, 
were characterised by an emphasis on computer-like flow 
diagrams and stores. For example, information was thought 
to be maintained by rehearsal in a short term memory (STM) 
before being passed to long term memory (LTM). Studies of 
retardates based on this paradigm, it follows, were 
concerned with locating the missing or defective store. 
Such approaches, it seems to me, may be linked theoretically 
with the medical model of retardation,. because both are 
essentially structural, implying that retardation is a 
constitutional impairment that cannot as yet, be repaired. 
Indeed, it is very easy to assume that the usual culprit, 
short term memory, actually refers to a structure in the 
brain, where the micro-surgeon, one day, will begin his 
work. 
Within the levels of analysis approach, on the other hand, 
processing is thought to begin with physical, and progress 
to semantic features, cognitive performance being a function 
of the depth of analysis. - This fits comfortably into the 
present view, since, as Brown points out, processes that are 
subsumed under STM in information processing models, are 
seen as the result of--deliberate attention, an-optional' 
strategy, in other words, rather-than a structural feature. 
Thus, the well documented deficiency in retardate STM 
becomes a failure to select and employ mnemonic strategies 
and not a constitutional impairment. 
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Without relevant strategies, the individual is dependent on 
involuntary memory, - whether material seems to present 
itself for recall. For example, Brown cites an experiment 
by a (unnamed) Russian psychologist who gave subjects 
stories to read, half being warned that they were to 
remember them. On testing, these recalled 47% of the 
content, but those who had had no warning recalled almost as 
much. With normal subjects, however, warnings improved 
recall by some 30%. Similarly, a plethora of studies 
illustrate that retardates fail to rehearse to-be-remembered 
material (e. g. Ellis, 1970; Belmont and Butterfield, 1971). 
Herriot, -Green and McConkey (1973), it will be remembered, 
showed they fail to use associative clustering, and in 
addition, they. fail to-use mnemonic elaboration (Rohwer, 
1968) or redundancy (Spitz, 1973), and are unable to focus 
on task relevant aspects in visual discrimination (Zeaman 
and House,. 1963). Finally, Brown herself found they did not 
forget irrelevant information. 
Essentially, all these studies represent the failure of 
strategic patterns that are under voluntary control, and 
which can. be induced with training, (within certain 
hypothesised limits related to developmental level). Thus, 
deficiency in retardate memory performance and-hence,, many 
educational tasks, -is not primarily ability-determined, 
but 
represents a lack of "the mysterious intent to learn". -(Brown 
1974, p 56). Just why this might occur is not-. considered, 
but it seems possible, from the present point of view, that 
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it might be mediated-through a functioning-retardate social 
identification, within which behaviours like the employment 
of purposive learning strategies are. inappropriate. This 
interpretation is-supported by Friedman et al -(1977) who 
argue for the importance of metamemory in determining 
performance and its' development in interaction with 
environmental factors. 
Also relevant to the present discussion, is the work of 
Zigler (e. g. _. 
1966), who argued that motivational and 
emotional rather than intellective factors influences 
retardate performance. 
A number of researchers, he points out, have found 
differences between social adequacy-and inadequacy to be a 
matter of personality differences that are shaped by 
experience, particularly pre-institutional social 
deprivation. He goes on to argue (Zigler, 1969; 1971), that 
parents (of both normal and subnormal children) tend to base 
expectations on children's chronological age, regardless of 
their mental age,. and therefore that mentally retarded 
children. especially, are likely consistently to fail to live 
up to them. Such experiences, he continues, result in a 
heightened motivation to interact with a supportive adult, 
coupled with a reluctance and wariness to do so, -which both 
tend to be increased by institutionalisation,. =particu-larly 
in institution-centred establishments. --Similarly, he 
continues anxiety and fear of. failure are higher-in 
retardates than in normals, and he cites ample documentation 
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to suggest these. have debiliting effects on-performance, 
through depressing aspirations and motivations and 
establishing an outer-directed style of problem-solving 
which might be mistaken for distractability. Together, 
these factors rather than intellectual deficit, can account 
for patterns of retarded behaviour such as compliance and 
perseveration retarded children typically show. 
"If the retardate could somehow be-guaranteed a more typical 
history of success", Zigler writes, "we would expect his 
behaviour to be more normal, independent of his intellectual 
level", 1966, p. 148. 
Clearly, his ideas are comfortably accommodated by the 
present approach. The major difference seems tobe that he 
envisages an interactional, not a transactional role for the 
retardate in determining his own performance, seemingly 
arguing that experiential factors produce long-term, almost 
constitutional personality changes in subnormal chidren 
which go on to-determine task performances. --Here, however, 
such changes are seen as being self determined, according to 
changes in current self image. 
So far, it might be argued that self-determination-has been 
in little evidence, since emphasis has been laid on the 
factors likely to trigger not only self-stereotyping and 
subsequently role- determined-behaviour,. but also actions 
based on personal identities. This is why the present - 
section was called "Patterns of Acceptance. " The next 
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section-further complicates the picture by considering some 
possible "black box" properties of subnormals - the active 
part they might play in determining their-own-retardation 
despite prevailing situational exigencies. 
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4. Patterns of rejection 
"I'm not retarded", proudly proclaims a young man, "I'm 
brain injured". 
Posner, 1977, p. 372 
Oakes (1983) warned, it will be remembered, that the 
cognitive salience of social categories only results 
directly in intergroup behaviour if it affords an 
opportunity to enhance self-esteem. Common sense suggests 
that a retardate social identificaton is unlikely to 
facilitate this, and therefore, individuals are likely-to 
resist categorising themselves as retardates. 
Tajfel (1978) delineated three types of strategy that help 
cope with social identifications that contribute negatively 
to self-esteem, which, although-largely concerned with 
political and racial minorities and extensively 
re-elaborated (e. g. Tajf el, 1978; Turner and Brown, 1978; 
Tajfel and Turner, 1979), are relevant here. 
The first, "assimilation into the majority, whenever this is 
possible" (Tajfel,. 1978, p. 14), does nothing to change the 
relative status of a negatively valued group, but applies to 
the lucky few who escape. If it were unconstrained, the end 
result would . be the merging of -a minority 
into-the majority. 
Hence, the continued existence of minority groups attests 
its rarity. 
More likely, individuals who leave a negatively valued group 
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will not be fully accepted by the majority. Tajfel (1978) 
wr ites, 
Paradoxically, they are regarded as still 
typifying in some important ways the unpleasant 
characteristics attributed to their group and at 
the same time, as exceptions to the general rule. 
p. 14 
Not surprisingly, therefore, a second type of assimilation 
is based on deception in order to "pass". Interestingly, 
there is evidence (e. g. Breakwell, 1979) that-this can lead 
to a particularly vehement identification with the new group 
and rejection of the old. 
Finally, Tu-rner and Brown (1978) note that an individual can 
dissociate himself from a group psychologically, if actual 
social mobility is impossible. 
The second major strategy, "social creativity", essentially 
refers to a reinterpretation or re-evaluation of the 
characteristics of a negatively valued group, so that they 
after all contribute to members' self-esteem. This is 
likely to be adopted where individual mobility is impossible 
or undesirable, and therefore differs from assimilation 
since it is a group, not an individual strategy. 
Social creativity can take a number of forms. First, the 
established values attached to salient group attributes 
might be reversed, the most-quoted example being "black is 
beautiful". Second, an alternative value dimension on which 
the disadvantaged group has superiority, might be 
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established. In the classic demonstration, Lemaine (1966) 
divided schoolboys into two groups. who were to compete in 
building a hut. One was deliberately given inadequate 
materials and could only produce an acknowledgely inferior 
building. However, they went on to add a garden and fence, 
and then to. argue the relative importance and legitimacy of 
these as evaluative dimensions. 
Turner and Brown (1978); Tajfel and Turner (1979) append two 
more variants of social creativity, including the selection 
of an inferior group for comparative purposes, and the 
making of intra instead of intergroup comparisons, since 
Rosenberg and Simmons (1972), for example, found that 
negroes comparing themselves with each other, rather than 
whites, did not suffer from depressed self-esteem. 
The final major strategy, social changer-refers to direct 
competition with the majority in an attempt by the minority 
to topple the social system in which it is negatively 
evaluated. 
In Gibbons' (1981) eyes, because retardates have a negative 
group image, -"it stands to reason" that their self-images 
will also be negative. The present opinion is precisely the 
opposite, since when strategies are taken into 
consideration,, it is clear that there is no necessary 
correlation between-an individual's evaluation of an ingroup 
and his self evaluation as an ingroup member. As Milner 
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(1981) argues in connection with racial minorities, negative 
self- esteem is not an inescapable consequence of a negative 
social identification. 
Such strategies suggest how a retardate social 
identification might be coped with. They fit well into the 
present view of self-esteem as multifaceted, with the 
individual having a choice as to which aspect of self he 
"backs". However, there are a number of reasons why-the 
"fit" is only tentative. First, the coping strategies are 
almost exclusively derived from research into racial 
prejudice and political minority groups, and as yet, they 
pay little attention to situational salience, whereas, it 
seems clear that in the present context, they will only be 
triggered when the negative social identificaton is 
relevant. Second, they are centrally concerned with-their 
motivating factor, self-esteem, whereas, for present 
purposes, it is important to extend this to argue that an 
individual leaving a social group to maintain self-esteem 
must also cease to assign himself criterial (retarded) 
attributes, and hence, cease to show normative (retarded) 
behaviour. 
Consideration of these strategies nevertheless -introduces 
massive potential variance into any paradigm, and it seems 
to me, that literally any outcome, is possible. - At one 
theoretical extreme, a researcher might not be-dealing with 




other more positively valued group. At another, a retardate 
with low self-esteem, can be seen as an individual with a 
salient negative social identification whose coping 
strategies have failed. In between must lie a gamut of more 
likely possibilities which can help explain why the 
literature bristles with contradictory findings and 
experimental failures whenever the self concepts of 
retardates are involved, and why, in particular, the 
hypothesised damage to self-esteem of labelling is so 
difficult to find. 
1 
To give a taste of the confusion, Meyerowitz (1962) for 
example, -. found retarded children showed significantly more 
self derogations on the Illinois Index of Self Derogation 
than vormals, and more recently, Leahy, Balla and Zigler 
(1982) found they had less positive self-images. Mayer 
(1966) on the other hand, -found no difference between normal 
and retarded subjects, while Collins, Burger and Doherty 
(1968) who administered the Tennessee Self Concept Scale to 
school children, found retardates did worse on identity and 
moral subscales and normals on self-criticism and social 
self. Overall, however, . 
they too-found no difference. Fine 
and Caldwell (1967) went so far as to suggest that their 
retarded subjects' self-concepts were "inaccurate, inflated 
and unrealistic" (p. 324) when they failed to find the 
predicted low levels of. self-esteem. . Similarly, Horai and 
Guarnaccia (1975) found retardates attributed their own 
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successes to ability and their failures to =lack . of -effort, a 
pattern resembling people with high achievement motivation 
and opposed to the attributions others make regarding 
retardates' performance (that were discussed in Chapter 3). 
Such "surprises" and inconsistencies, coupled with a belief 
that retardates. are difficult to work with, has resulted in 
a dearth of studies using retardates as subjects,. rather 
than targets, (Gibbons, 1981), which makes the present task 
more difficult. 
An interesting methodological point is that these 
contradictory findings and many like them, might represent a 
paradigm in crisis (Kuhn, 1974). They seem-to be based on a 
linear developmental model in which particular conditions 
are hypothesised to have consistent, unidirectional effects. 
Writers like MacMillan, Jones and Aloia (1974) therefore, 
blame failure to find a -reliable labelling-effect on the 
lack of proper experimental controls, which leaves the 
confounding. of label x segregation x curriculum-x teacher 
and so on, unchecked. On reading their paper, -however, it 
is difficult not to feel that the attempt to control these 
extraneous factors represents an effort to shore up a 
failing paradigm,. and ultimately, that diff-iculties in 
interpretation as ever more complicated refinements are 
added, would render it virtually useless. In other words, 
in the present opinion, a mini scientific revolution is 
required, to introduce a paradigm accommodating the present 
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approach, in which the active role. of the individual in 
shaping his self-conceptions is acknowledged, and in which 
it is recognised that retardates are human beings who 
strive, like everyone else, to preserve self-esteem. Such a 
paradigm, it is argued, will introduce more predictability 
and consistency into research, and the following discussion 
is an initial attempt to demonstrate some of the 
possibilities. 
The third strategy, social change, would involve direct 
action from retardates as a group to change their status 
relative to the majority. This seems both unlikely and 
unsupported in the literature, and therefore, will not be 
discussed. 
More relevant, is the first strategy, assimilation, which in 
in its first form, involves genuine social mobility from a 
negative to a positive group. 
Koegel and Edgerton (1982) together with Clarke and Clarke 
(1974) emphasise the administrative function of-educational 
classification and introduce the notion of a6 hour retarded 
child, suggesting that mild subnormality is a temporary 
incapacity related to school failure. According to Kushlick 
and Blunden (1974), "After leaving school, *the majority of 
these people become socially and economically independent 
and are indistinguishable from the rest of the community". 
Since such adults do not seem to exist as a social group, it 
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is reasonable to hypothesise. that they represent an example 
of genuine assimilation into society. In a fascinating 
study, Koegel and Edgerton (1982) followed-up 45 black 
adults who had received special education and 60% gave some 
indication that they thought they were limited in some way - 
although none used. the term, "retarded" but mentioned 
problems with reading and money-matters. The authors went 
on to argue that their results indicated those leaving 
special education do not merge completely with "normal" 
society. Their conclusion does not seem inevitable for two 
reasons. First, although these adults might have left 
school, 30% had central nervous system impairment and 75% 
were dependent on care-takers. Thus, assimilation might 
have failed for these reasons. Second, personal admissions 
to limitations coupled with avoidance of the term "mentally 
retarded" do not suggest ex-pupils were handicapped by a 
retarded (special school) self-image. Thus, unimpaired 
children leaving special education remain as a probable 
example of genuine social assimilation. 
On a cynical note, however, their-social mobility might 
simply be due to a lack of facilities for further special 
education,.; which according to Parley (1983) is sadly 
inadequate, but which might be fortuitous in. allowing 
children to cast off their retarded social identifications. 
The vehemence with which this is done, is suggested"by- 
Gozali, (1972) who found 85% of a sample of special school 
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leavers perceived their education as "degrading and 
useless". 
The remarkable career of Doug Valpey which was mentioned in 
Chapter 3 (Valpey, 1982; Turner, 1980) provides an 
interesting glimpse of attributions that might underpin the 
transition from "retarded" to "normal". Doug lived 18 years 
in a hostel, labelled mentally retarded, despite being of 
normal intelligence and writinga number of publications. 
Interestingly, while he believed-himself retarded, he used 
his own successes. as evidence of how, retarded people. are 
underestimated, but when he began to redefine himself, they 
became evidence that he was mislabelled. 
Guskin. Bartel and MacMillan (1976), on the other hand, note 
that a degree of social mobility can be "bought" for 
children whose parents shop around-for specialists who 
invoke less troublesome labels, like "learning disability" 
instead of "retardation". Similarly, according to Edgerton, 
(1967), adults prefer to be "criminals" or "alcholics" than 
"retardates". 
The second and third forms of assimilation merge into one, 
because hiding a social identification in order to "pass", 
is likely to exist alongside assimilations that are only 
partially successful, that is, -those in which the individual 
is not fully accepted by the majority. These strategies are 
illustrated by inmates discharged from institutions who do 
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not seem to enjoy unrestricted social mobility. The label 
"retardate", 
not only 'serves as a humiliating, frustrating and 
discrediting stigma in the conduct of one's life 
in the community, but also serves to lower one's 
self-esteem to such a nadir'of worthlessness that 
the life of -a person so labelled is scarcely worth 
living ..... He cannot, and he does not accept the 
official "fact" that he is, or ever was mentally 
retarded. 
Edgerton (1967) p. 145 
Precisely as the framework of coping strategies might 
predict, the "quintessential problem" for 48 Pacific State 
Hospital dischargees was to conceal their past through 
massive and ingenious sherades, despite as Edgerton puts it 
- their defective brains. Strategies included wearing 
broken watches so they could ask the time, feigning 
drunkeness-or poor eyesight to dodge reading, and sadly, 
explaining away sterilisation scars as appendectomies. 
Furthermore, ex-inmates rejected each other with great 
vehemence, which is interesting because it flies in the face 
of the reliable finding that people tend to be attracted to 
similar others, (Byrne, 1971), -and which ties in with the 
attitude studies mentioned in Chapter 3g, -since as-Gibbons 
(1981) points out, xetardates do not necessarily-dislike 
each other, but simply do not want to associate. 
Turner and Brown (1978)-also noted that individuals can 
disassociate. themselves psychologically-from-negatively 
valued groups -a strategy adopted without exception by 
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Edgerton's sample. Indeed, there are many denials that 
could have been quoted with Turner's referent informational 
influence in mind, since they reject so explictly criterial 
attributes and intragroup similarity. 
I was never mental like the others that couldn't 
remember nothing or do nothing 
I sure didn't belong in there with all those dopey 
people 
did they really think I was like them others 
1967, p 206 
These anecdotes, I think, are particularly interesting 
because they reflect the paradoxical nature of unsuccessful 
assimilation, since, despite the denials, behaviour still 
seems to be mediated by a salient retardate social 
identification, in the sense that dischargees had not ceased 
to assign themselves criterial attributes, but rather seemed 
to assign and then attempt to conceal them, so that their 
behaviour was determined by an "anti-role" as it were. 
In a different connection, Pettigrew (1964) argued that 
self-esteem may be maintained by a sharp distinction between 
personal and racial self, which suggests that psychological 
rejection of a negative social identification-might also 
take the-form of an emphasis on personal identity, but, 
ex-inmates, it seems to me, are unlikely to be successful at 
this. One reason. for this was suggested in the previous 
section,, namely, institutionalised retardates are unlikely 
to have much opportunity to develop personal identities, or 
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as the Gunzburgs put it, to become aware of themselves as 
human beings. This is vididly illustrated by an ex-inmate 
of an unnamed British subnormality hospital. 
Being in the institution was bad...... I didn't 
have any clothes of my own, and no privacy.... The 
real pain came from always being a group. I was 
never a person. .... I couldn't figure out who I 
was. I was part of a group. It was sad. 
Ryan and Thomas 1980, p 12 
Once discharged, Edgerton's cohort, almost without exception 
bought memorabillia from church stalls and junk shops in 
order to construct a spurious personal past,, sadly 
reminiscent of Frankenstein's monster. 
In summary, it seems likely that genuine social mobility 
from retardate to normal is likely to be confined to 
ex-special school pupils. 
Where individuals are unable to assimilate into-the majority 
or to find some other way of leaving a negatively valued 
group, they are likely to revert to "social creativity". 
In its first form, this would entail the establishment of a 
new value system, reversing the negative status of 
retardates, without effecting any objective change,,.. but as 
Tajfel and Turner (1979) point out, this is limited by the 
availability of relevant dimensions. Few underprivledged 
groups they, argue, would accept poverty as a, virtue. 
Similarly,. precious few retardates seem likely to extoll 
incompetence. 
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In its second -form, social creativity would ; entail -the 
establishment of an alternative value dimension on which 
retardates are superior, but, as Edgerton writes: 
no other stigma is as basic as mental retardation 
in the sense-that a person so labelled-is thought 
to be so completely lacking in basic competence. 
Other stigmatised persons typically retain some 
competencies, limited though-they may be, but the 
retarded person has none left to him 
1967 p 145 
In other words mental retardation is conceptualised as so 
pervasive, that there are few, if any dimensions on which 
retardates have a chance to be superior. 
Having made this point, Guskin et al (1976) for example, 
mention retarded children who do well in gym as opposed, to 
academic classes, and, in addition to the usual negative 
attitudes, Gottlieb and Corman (1975) found a positive 
stereotype, consisting of beliefs that retardates are 
honest, moral and kind. Thus, some dimensions, along which 
retardates could make positive social comparisons appear to 
exist. 
It is clear, however, that the heated -insistence-on the 
legitimacy of the hut's fence and garden as value dimensions 
in Lemaine's experiment is unlikely-to be mirrored,, for 
example, in retardates establishing moral innocence over IQ 
as a criterion for social ýcompar isons . 
Because retardates are nevertheless expected to desire 
positive self-esteem, this suggests that the salience of 
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auch evaluative dimensions might be. subjective, linked, in 
other words, to James's idea that individuals have a choice 
in what aspect of self they "back". Hence, when an 
individual's retardate social identification is salient, 
aspects relating to morality, friendliness and so on, might 
carry more weight. Measures relating to intellectual 
ability, it follows, might give a misleading and only partly 
relevant picture. 
According to Turner and Brown, the third type of social 
creativity entails the selection of-an inferior group with 
whom to make social comparisons, and an anecodote which 
arose during the forthcoming experiment is relevant here. 
Teachers at Florence Brown School -a special school in 
Bristol - remarked that pupils frequently came to class in 
tears, having been called "spastic" and wondering what it 
meant. On learning the term did not apply to them, they 
happily used it to derogate others, which implies that 
spastics are a group in relation to whom they felt superior. 
Similarly,, Edgerton (1967) remarks that social comparisons 
with profoundly retarded inmates provide an opportunity for 
the less. handicapped to "aggrandize" themselves and 
"reconstruct damaged self-esteem" (p. 146). 
The final form of social creativity, preserving self-esteem 
by making intra rather than intergroup comparisons, is 
perhaps most supported-in the literature but before looking 
at some examples, it is important to mention Tajfel's (1978) 
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point that this too is limited in scope, and depends on the 
individual's ability to insulate himself from the rest of 
the world. 
According to Gozali (1972), it will be remembered, 85% of a 
sample of ex-EMR students said their education had been 
"degrading and useless. " Sixty-one percent of Warner, 
Thrapp and Walsh's (1973) subnormal children, on the other 
hand, liked being in a special class. Only 26% wanted to 
leave. Consideration of intragroup mechanisms easily 
resolves this apparent contradiction: the former are seen 
as having "passed" and therefore, as making intergroup 
comparisons,. while the latter, -still members of a negatively 
valued group are likely to base assessments on intragroup 
comparisons, in order to preserve self-esteem. Indeed, 69% 
specifically mentioned the pleasantness of shared class 
activities, and, I suspect, -their status in comparison to 
"normal" pupils was far from their minds. 
This has serious implications, however. Warner et al, for 
example, conclude that their findings "do not support the 
assumption that most retarded children resent their-special 
class placement with accompanying feelings of rejection and 
stigmatization". From the present point of view, all their 
study probably . shows, . is that children protect 
themselves 
from the misery of. such feelings. Very different results 
might have been obtained if-children were re-tested under 
different conditions. 
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Similarly, Strang, Smith and Rogers (1978) argue that 
experimental failure to find diminished self-regard in 
children assigned to special classes is because they make 
comparisons with classmates of similarly low ability. 
Mainstreamed academically handicapped children, on the other 
hand, are likely to compare themselves with normal 
classmates, and hence show poor levels of-self -esteem. 
Children mainstreamed for half a day, they continued, are 
likely to have the best of both worlds - able to preserve 
academic related self-esteem by making intra-group 
comparisons, but also able to categorise themselves-with 
normal children, and therefore avoid negative intergroup 
comparisons. 
In their first study, half a sample of special class pupils 
(with a mean WISC-R IQ of 87 and age 9 years six months) 
were integrated at random into regular classes for half each 
school day. Dependent measures included WISC-R, 
Metropolitan Achievement and Piers and Harris (1964) self 
concept tests which were administered at the onset of the 
study, one month after treatment began, and 4 months later, 
at the end of the school year. -. ANOVA on the initial 
data 
showed experimental and control groups differed on only one 
variable, which-was-easily accounted for-by chance, -but 
finally, repeated measures ANOVA showed composite 
self-concept. scores were significantly higher-for the 
experimental group, although academic achievement did not 
- 395 - 
-t 
differ. 
Since improvements might have been due to the experience of 
mainstreaming and concommitant beliefs in academic 
improvement, a second study, close in orientation to-the 
present views, was run. A different set of subjects (with 
mean WISC-R IQ 92) mainstreamed for part of each day were 
used, and it was hypothesised that saliency of regular class 
membership would eliminate special classroom peers as a 
comparative reference group and hence, result in lowered 
self-esteem. Half the subjects were randomly assigned to 
the experimental condition and received a treatment that 
involved naming them as regular class members, and reading 
the names of classmates, the dependent measure being the 
Piers Harris self-concept test administered at the beginning 
of the school year. and after experimental treatments. 
Results showed an improvement of 7.3 points in controls' 
scores, but a decrease of 2.5 in the experimental group. 
This resulted in a significant between group'difference, 
which further analysis showed, was primarily accounted for 
by Intellectual and School Status subscores. 
These studies are tantalisingly close to the present views - 
although, =as usual, since they are not based on the present 
paradigm, they are only suggestive. The important point is, 
however, 
-that situational changes can 
be related . 
to social 
identity and through social creativity, induce measurable 
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differences in self-concepts. Strang et al argue, 'that 
unavailability of special classmates coupled with saliency 
of regular class membership,. forced subjects to base self 
assessments on inter group comparisons with their 
intellectual superiors, or in the present terminology, the 
coping strategy, intragroup comparisons, was precluded. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting to speculate that if 
measures had been based on morality or friendliness,; for 
example,. the outcome might have been -reversed. To 
summarise, the studies of Strang, Smith and Rogers help to 
illustrate the present model, which predicts that retardate 
self-concept measures will depend on a transaction between 
social or personal identifications, 'social comparisons and 
comparative dimensions. 
This section would not be complete without a, little more 
consideration of behaviour. Afterall, it is hoped that the 
present ideas might help ameliorate the incompetent 
behaviour that is hypothesised to be mediated through-the 
individual's perceptions that he is retarded. 
Thus, a fascinating study-(Weiss and Weinstein, 1968) in 
which the manipulative tactics employed by 31 
institutionalised and 30 non-institutionalised retardates-to 
secure their own-way, deserves mention. -Subjects who-were 
matched as closely as possible on. MA. (6 to 10 years) and CA 
(16 to >17), were simply asked how they 
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would persuade -(1) _their best friend and (2) a person in 
authority (a) to change T. V. channels so they could see a 
favourite program, and (b) to give them money to buy a cold 
drink on a hot thirsty day. 
Most relevant, asking was found to be the overwhelming 
tactic among the noninstitutionalised group, who seemed 
exclusively to assume they would have their own way simply 
for the asking. Institutionalised retardates on the other 
hand, relied on asking less and reciprocity considerably 
more, showing awareness that the motivations of others would 
have to be accounted for and satisfied before they would 
comply. 
Weiss and Weinstein-stress that their study is exploratory 
and informal, and they do not consider in any detail these 
differences, except to suggest that parental over protection 
might account for them. From the present point of view, it 
is interesting to speculate that the tactics of the 
non-institutionalised group are underpinned by a 
retardate social identification, not imposed by 
environmental influences, but made salient because it 
mediates adaptive behaviour (i. e. getting their own way) 
most effectively. Although little information-was given, 
the institutionalised group, on. the other hand came from 
child-centred homelike units and therefore, their more 
sophisticated strategies might have been Interpersonal, and 
underpinned by salient personal identities. Alternatively, 
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their behaviour might have been intragroup, -representing an 
ability to adjust to differing demands. In other words, as 
Turner (1981a) argues, the interpersonal-intergroup 
continuum might be better conceived as 
interpersonal-intragroup-intergroup. 
This introduces an additional complication that makes a 
priori prediction particularly difficult. The paradox is 
that behaviours are hypothesised to be influenced by 
self-conceptions, and that when an individual's retardate 
social identificaton is salient, he will believe himself 
less competent. It is simultaneously hypothäiaed that, if 
the opportunity arises, individuals whose retardate social 
identification is salient, will make intragroup comparisons 
and therefore, relatively high self-assessments. The first 
premise predicts incompetent and the second, relatively 
competent behaviour. Perhaps the solution is simply to bear 
in mind that beliefs like "I am clever" could be suffixed 
"for a retardate" and that behaviours might correlate with 
self assessments, independent of their actual level, (a 
possibility that will be explored more fully in the next 
section). 
The message seems to be that self-concept measures should be 
interpreted with their context in mind, and that care should 
be exercised when extrapolating from them to behaviour. 
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STUDY 5 
5. AN ATTEMPT. TO MANIPULATE SOCIAL AND PERSONAL IDENTITIES 
IN A CLASS OF SPECIAL SCHOOLCHILDREN 
5. ' 
Introduction 
What follows, it must be stressed is a very preliminary 
attempt to-manipulate the relative salience of social and 
personal identifications and to measure concomitant changes 
in self image and behaviour, the exploratory nature of which 
will be reflected in a relatively informal content and 
style. . 
With the previous discussion of coping strategies in mind, 
the picture has grown so complex that the construction of 
even preliminary testable hypotheses might seem impossible. 
These complexities are seen as reflecting more closely the 
richness-of real life, and using the notion that 
self-concept measures reflect self-images which depend on 
(1) the individual's desire for positive self-esteem, (2) 
whether the context is interpersonal, intragroup or 
intergroup and (3). the nature of dependent measures, 
hierachy of hypotheses has been formulated. 
The first, simplest and most-important is-that emphasis-on 
social categories will enhance the salience of aretardate - 
or more specifically -a special class social 
identification. According to referent informational 
influence, subjects will then assign themselves the same 
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criterial group attributes, and this will result in 
increased actual and perceived intragroup uniformity (along 
dimensions related to group membership), and subsequently, 
in greater intragroup liking and empathy. At the same time, 
increased perceived intergroup distance is expected. 
Second, although it will be assumed that membership of a 
special school is negatively evaluated and-that the 
criterial attribute is academic incompetence, subjects whose 
social identification is salient, are not expected 
automatically to assign themselves negative characteristics. 
On the contrary, through the social creativity of intragroup 
comparisons, they are expected to make relatively high 
self-assessments of ability and to protect self-esteem. 
Third, and paradoxically, ability scores are nevertheless 
expected to be less. 
Finally, subjects are expected to assign themselves any 
positive attributes associated with group membership when 
their social identification is salient. 




Twelve boys and five girls who constituted the most senior 
class at Florence Brown School. Although the school is for 
ESN(M) children, subjects ranged from borderline ESN(S), 
with IQ estimated at 45, to low normal. However, most could 
read, or at least recognise both their own names and those 
of their classmates. None had stigmatic characteristics, 
though perhaps one or two appeared a little ungainly. -, --Most 
had difficulties in addition to educational problems - 
including physical handicap, speech defects and behaviour 
problems., like stealing or simply being too troublesome for 
regular schools. Ages ranged from approximately 13 years 10 
months to 14 years 8 months. 
Apparatus 
Preliminary questionnaires, instructions and a 58 item 
semantic differential-type self-concept (or more-properly, 
self-image) measure. (See Appendices 5.1, In 
order to be relevant to hypotheses,. -items reflecting the 
"hallmarks of group belongingness",. (perceived intragroup 
similarity, liking and empathy),. perceived intergroup 
distance and intellectual ability were essential. '--Wording 
was developed by subjects' teachers and finalised with the 
aid of a pilot on two subjects. -Positive and negative 
criterial attributes were selected from the original 81 item 
semantic differential by the teachers and then similarly 
adapted to suit subjects. Finally, a few miscellaneous 
4. 
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scales. were included at the. teachers' request. In-addition 
two ability measures were kindly supplied by the Project 
Administrator at CHES. 1 
1. The CHES Pictorial Language Comprehension Test, which 
although time consuming, had the advantage of examining 
understanding without requiring speech, consisted of 3 
subscales: - 
i) picking a picture-from 4 to match a given word 
il) picking a picture from 4 to match a given phrase 
iii) ordering 2>4 pictures to match a given phrase 
2. The British Ability Scales consisted of 4 subscales: 
i) word definitions 
ii) digit recall 
iii) similarities 
iv) matrices 
Relevant copies are ".. , given in Appendix 5. G. 
Procedure 
Teachers were asked to pair subjects on the basis of general 
and intellectual-similarity, and one member of each dyad was 
randomly assigned to each experimental condition. -During 
testing however, the enormity of individual--differences grew 
more obvious and threw into relief the small sample which 
1 CHES or Child Health and Education Study, it will be remembered, is a 
longitudinal study of all children (approximately 14,000) born in 
England, Scotland and Wales from 5th to . 11th April 1970. The study 
is directed by Prof. Neville Butler at Bristol University's 
Department of Child Health and is administrated by Dr. Mary Haslum. 
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gave only 8 in each condition. For this reason, it was 
decided to retest subjects on the self-concept measure so 
that the sample would be doubled and a repeated measures 
design possible. Two subjects were unavailable for 
retesting, which took, place after approximately one week, 
which gave a final sample of 15 taking the self -concept 
measures under both conditions. 
Subjects were interviewed singly, but in random order. 
First, they received the appropriate treatment, then 
self-concept and ability measures were taken. 
Treatment 1: The Personal. Condition. Subjects were told E 
was "finding out about different people", and were-asked a 
series of questions about their home, family, idiosyncratic 
preferences and hobbies. 
Treatment 2: The Pupil Condition on the other hand, was 
designed to enhance subjects' shared special class social 
identification. They were told E was "finding out about 
people at Florence Brown School and in your group". First 
they were asked whose class they were in and how long they 
had been at the school. Then (helped if necessary), they 
read out the names of everyone in the group, indicating whom 
they liked best, (following Strang, Smith and Rogers (1978), 
it will be remembered). Finally, they were asked about 
their group's timetable, and most important, what 
distinguished their class from the rest of the school. 
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Both treatment questionnaries are given in Appendix 5.1. 
The self-concept questionnaire (Appendix 5.4) was then 
administered. Throughout, (first on the pressing advice of 
the teachers, then with the benefit of experience) questions 
were read and responses recorded by E, although, the 
questionnaire was fully visible and each item was pointed 
out as it was read. 
Instructions (Appendix 5.2) were similarly read out. 
Always, subjects were asked to choose between the-two poles 
of each item and then their responses were graded, pointing 
to the semantic differential "boxes" and using natural 
language quantifiers like "all the time", "most of the time" 
or "just some of.. the time". Every effort was made to pose 
these in random order, particularly since one or two, E 
suspected, seemed sometimes simply to repeat the last 
possibility. Most, however, anticipated by grading 
responses before being asked. 
Finally, the two ability-measures (Appendix 5.6) were 
administered, according to the instructions (included in 
Appendix 5. ) given by CHES. 
When subjects were retested, exactly the same procedure was 
employed, except (as will be fully discussed below) the 
ability measures-were omitted. 
All testing was done in a relatively private corner of the 
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classroom, which was partitioned off to serve as a coffee 
and recreation area. Finally, subjects were debriefed by 
means of a wild tea party, and any questions were answered. 
i 
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RESULTS 
1.3. d. responses were scored in the usual manner, and 
Table 5.1 shows means together with standard deviations on 
each item for personal and pupil conditions. For reasons of 
space, each has been identified using its positive pole 
only. In additon, the most important aspects of data are 
displayed at relevant spots during the text. 
Repeated measures ANOVA showed 5 items differed 
significantly between conditions with a further 2 bordering 
on significance. These have been noted on Table 5.1. 
Examples and justifications of analyses are given in 
Appendix S. Y. 
q 
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TABLE 5.1 
Self concept scores in pupil and personal conditions 
Item Personal Pupil 
mean s. d. mean s. d. 1 I'm a friendly person 2.20 1.15 1.80 0.86 
2 I'm easy to get on with 2.07 1.44 2.13 1.36 
3 my group understands me 1.73 0.88 1.80 0.86 
4 my family is proud of me 2.00 1.60 2.27 1.79 
5 people know what I'll do 3.33 2.06 4.20 2.21 
6 I'm adult 1.80 1.21 1.60 0.99 
7 my other school was good 4.33 2.82 4.33 2.26 
8 people like me 1.67 0.90 2.27 1.39 
9 people in my class help each other 3.07 1.44 2.67 1.23 
10 kids on the street like me 2.13 1.25 2.47 0.99 
11 I'm clever 3.47 1.96 2.53 1.55 
12 I trust people easily 4.60 1.96 3.73 2.09 
13 I'm good at PT & dancing 2.80 1.70 2.20 1.42 
14 my group &I feel the same 3.73 1.87 2.73 1.53 
15 I'm cleverer than my parents think 3.60 1.96 3.67 1.72 
16 I'm good looking 1.80 1.21 2.13 1.30 
17 my group likes me 2.07 0.96 1.73 1.03 
18 people know what I'm saying 2.80 2.18 2.40 1.55 
19 I like looking after myself 2.53 2.00 3.07 2.69 
20 I'm not moody 3.60 1.76 3.33 1.88 
21 I know why I'm at this school 2.60 2.75 2.20 2.48 
22 kids on the street understand me 2.07 1.44 2.13 1.46 
23 I don't mind if I can't do something 4.13 2.39 4.13 2.29 
24 I can manage by myself 3.53 1.85 4.07 2.09 
25 I can concentrate 2.67 1.40 2.07 1.44 
26 if a classmate's upset, we all are 6.87 0.35 5.27 1.53 27 I'm quick at things 3.20 2.04 2.87 2.17 
28 my teachers understand me 1.93 1.39 1.93 1.22 29 I'm good at saying what I mean 2.60 2.06 2.73 1.91 30 people like being with me 1.73 1.16 1.73 0.88 
31 I'm cleverer than my teacher thinks 3.13 1.55 3.33 1.95 
32 my parents like me 1.13 0.52 1.33 0.62 
33 I stay calm 3.00 2.36' 3.07 1.94 
34 I like my classmates 2.47 0.92 1.87 1.19 
35 I think clearly 3.93 1.98 4.40 2.03 
36 I'm nice 2.13 1.19 2.13 1.36 
37 I don't break things 2.60 1.68 1.87 1.46 
38 people want me around 2.07 1.62 2.27 1.28 
39 things don't bother me 2.27 1.58 2.47 2.00 
40 I know a lot 3.93 2.09 3.00 1.89 
41 I know how to behave with people 2.33 2.23 2.47 2.10 
42 I like to join in with others 2.13 1.92 2.13 1.92 
43 I can be trusted 1.60 1.06 1.80 1.26 
44 I decide what I do 2.00 1.46 2.80 2.18 
45 I'm a help to my family 1.53 1.13 1.87 1.19 
46 I'm good at sports 2.07 1.71 2.40 1.96 
47 I'm good at schoolwork 2.73 1.44 2.67 1.88 
48 my teachers like me 1.73 1.16 1.87 1.06 
49 people arent frightened of me 3.00 1.77 3.53 1.68 
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51 I'm the same as my group 3.13 1.88 1.93 1.53 p=. 057 
52 I try hard 3.27 2.58 2.40 2.03 
53 I'm nice to live with 1.80 1.61 1.47 0.74 
54 looking after me's easy 1.67 1.18 2.47 1.60 p=. 03 
55 people in my class like each other 4.00 2.20 3.20 1.82 
56 this school is great 2.27 1.39 3.00 2.17 
57 I like to be me 1.93 1.75 3.13 2.29 
58 my parents understand me 1.80 1.21 1.73 1.22 
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2. Ability measures were scored by the professional coders 
at CHES, and Table 5.2 gives mean scores on each subscale 
for both experimental conditions. One factor completely 
randomised ANOVA revealed no differences on any. 
3. Scores on items 11,25,27,35,, 40 and 46 were summed to 
give a composite self-concept of ability measure for 
subjects In the pupil condition. Spearman's rho was 
computed between this and ability measures and Table 5.3 
gives the relevant correlations. 
4. Self-concept data were factor analysed for each 
condition, using BMDP4M. With the default eigenvalue of 1, 
12 and 14 factor solutions were yielded for personal and 
pupil conditions, respectively. Since the first 8 factors 
accounted for 83% and 82% of variance, eigenvalues were set 
at 3 and data reanalysed to give the 8 and 9 factor 
solutions presented in Table 5.4V. In order to give a 
clearer picture, the usual convention of omitting items with 
loadings <. 4 has been observed. 
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5. ßi. 
DISCUSSION 
The possibility of artefacts arising out of the experimental 
situation was a constant worry. Experimenter bias seemed 
particularly threatening in view of the intimate interactive 
testing situation and the leading role taken by E in reading 
and recording responses. In practice however, this was less 
likely than was at first feared, because it was difficult to 
remember what treatment had been given initially, throughout 
each testing session. ' 
Furthermore, experimenter bias, if present, could go in 
either direction, since over-zealous attempts to avoid it 
may artef actually disconfirm hypotheses. Nevertheless, should 
this pilot indicate more research is worthwhile, these 
difficulties should be reduced by use of naive 
experimenters. 
On the other hand, there were also some advantages in E's 
close involvement. For example, subjects were asked if they 
would like to be different, if they could. One girl replied 
"Yes", adding-that she had planned to-tint her hair. 
Clearly, without this additional information, her 
self-esteem would have been assessed as artefactually low. 
Possible experimenter bias seemed inherent in the BAS and 
consequently, was instrumental in the decision not to retest 
on the ability measures. The subscales, particularly the 
word definitions, required E to prompt subjects, but there 
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were no guidelines as to what differentiated a prompt from 
unfair help, and it seemed inevitable that greater 
encouragement would be showered on personable, highly 
motivated subjects at the beginning of the day than to less 
attractive, distractible ones at hometime - although of 
course, in trying to be-fair, the reverse might have been 
nearer the truth. 
Testing conditions were a second headache: - Sessions were 
held in a relatively private coffee and recreation area in a 
corner of the subjects' classroom. It had been intended to 
boost treatments by testing-those in the depersonalised 
pupil condition at times when the rest of the-class was 
absent, since, as discussed in Chapter 4, the familiar 
special-school classroom coupled with an absence of possible 
interpersonal influences should have further increased the 
salience of their pupil social identification. In contrast, 
those in the personal condition were to have been tested 
while the rest of the class continued lessons, since the 
presence of others. and-the occasional wink or nod from a 
friend should have enhanced personal identities. However, 
testing conditions can only be described as chaotic. - Since 
each subject required upwards of an hour, and the short 
school day was punctuated with breaks and: two lunch 
sittings, excited, thirsty onlookers would inevitably 
descend for refreshment during sessions, disrupting , 
concentration and most probably, the ability measures. 
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Clearly, in further research, tighter control over testing 
conditions is essential. 
The third source of possible artefact was provided by the 
subjects themselves. Because they had been assessed as 
mentally subnormal, it seemed reasonable-to fear that 
misunderstandings or responses to extraneous factors might 
be even greater than in most experiments. -(Although, of 
course, this is precisely the sort of expectation the 
present approach is supposed to be-directed against. ) in 
general, -however, they appeared easily to understand 
questions and give valid responses. One or two,, perhaps 
were not_clear on the more complex items, and when-this 
happened, the careful counterbalancing was "unscrambled" and 
natural lexical marking followed, so that confusing 
negatives like "doesn't your group like you? " were not 
presented first. -Although this might have introduced error, 
within the present repeated measures design it seemed 
unlikely to have introduced systematic bias. 
Fears regarding co-operation also seemed unfounded. 
Subjects were eager and willing to share self-experiences 
without apparent evaluation apprehension (Rosenberg 1972), 
although. one . or two of , the girls-seemed over modest 
in 
self-ratings of attractiveness and popularity. -Indeed the 
candour-of one subject. provided an anecdotal--validation of 
the instrument. Throughout, the majority-responded that 
they were maximally good looking, but Matthew,. 
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self-consciously fingering several large pimples responded 
that he was only rather good looking at present. During 
retesting, however, the offending pimples had gone and, 
without hesitation, he described himself as maximally 
handsome! Clearly, this is the sort of incident that 
suggests, as previously argued, that self concept 
instruments infact capture self-images at the time of 
testing. 
Despite large differences-between group means on a number of 
items, repeated. measures analysis of variance revealed only 
5 (and a further 2 almost) significant differences-between 
pupil and personal conditions, -which almost certainly 
reflects the small sample-size and massive individual 
variance,, the subject effect, for example, proving highly 
significant (p <. 0003) on every single variable. 
The Primary Hypothesis 
The primary hypothesis was that the self-images of subjects 
receiving the treatment to emphasise their special class 
membership, would converge towards a shared special school 
social identification. Those in the personal condition, on 
the other hand, should grow relatively individualised. 
The previous sections should-have made it plain that-a- 
salient special school social identification is unlikely to 
be reflected in the direct self-assignment of mostly 
negative criterial attributes, and therefore, the search for 
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evidence was. primarily concerned with the "hallmarks of 
group belongingness", since when in the. pupil condition, 
subjects should stereotype themselves and hence conform in 
perceiving themselves more similar to each other, with 
consequent increased perceived liking, understanding and 
empathy. 
Eight items were designed with this in mind,, and subjects 
responded "my group and I feel the same about a lot of 
things" (item 14) significantly more than when they were in 
the personal condition (p = . 01). They also showed less 
variance in their. responses, although the variance ratio was 
not significant (F = 1.49, d. f. 14,14). 
Similarly, subjects in the pupil condition responded "if 
someone in class is upset, we don't all feel upset"-, (item 
26), significantly less than when they were in the personal 
condition (p = . 0008). In this case,, however, they shdwed 
significantly less agreement (F - 18.99, d. f. = 14,14. p< 
. 01), which was clearly because the question was a bad one. 
In the personal condition, all but two, (whose responses 
were only one. category less extreme) responded with maximum 
strength. that the class does. not empathise-when a member 
feels upset. Without exception, -responses were categorical 
and quizzical and, a couple of days' experience of frequent 
classroom scuffles and tears (usually beginning and-ending 
with the least popular children) showed why. Thus, -. there 
was a ceiling effect on this item which virtually eliminated 
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all variance in the personal conditon, but since several 
subjects moderated their responses in the pupil condition, 
variance increased. This high-lights again . the difficulty 
of using variance to measure conformity: - the spirit of the 
prediction was confirmed: - subjects in the pupil condition 
must have agreed more that there was greater emotional 
empathy, since those in the personal condition agreed 
entirely that there was not! 
It is worth digressing to examine this ticklish problem 
again. In the pupil condition, it was hoped that-responses 
on these 8 items would indicate greater mean perceived 
similarity and that variances would indicate greater-actual 
agreement. As suggested in Study 4, however, this 
presupposes that the mean in the pupil condition is the 
value associated with group membership, towards which 
responses converge. This assumption goes beyond the 
hypothesis which merely predicts the directional influence 
of this value. In other words, -conformity should not be 
measured around the mean in the pupil condition, so much as 
around some point that is less than the personal condition 
mean, like for example, the minimum value, -1 - the y axis. 
Thus, unlike Tajfel and Wilkes' (1963) paradigm, systematic 
intragroup convergence around the group mean is no longer 
expected,. 
_because 
the value associated with group 
membership, is not necessarily the same as it. It is worth 
mentioning that I was fortunate enough to discuss this point 
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with Turner himself, who agreed with my reasoning then added 
that groups are defined by contrasts, and convergence around 
Wken, 
the group mean is-therefore expected only4a group is . flanked 
by outgroups on each side. --Thus, although some 
sophisticated statistical technique would be desirable it is 
sufficient to note that variance, and hence, conformity, in 
this sense is likely to be decreased whenever the mean in 
the pupil condition is less than the mean in the personal 
condition. -. For this reason, intragroup conformity to 
normative. behaviours will be assessed by considering shifts 
in group means in the predicted direction, and not by 
variance per se. 
Subjects, in the pupil condition "like the - people in my 
class" (-item 34) and most important, feel "I am the same as 
my group", --(item 51) -more than when they are in the personal 
condition, although, sadly these differences only border on 
significance (p = -. 
057, . 057). They also believed "people 
in my class help each other" (item 9), "my group likes me" 
(item 17) and "people in my class like each other"; (item-55) 
more when they were in-the pupil condition, although none 
was significant (p = . 2, . 2, & .1 respectively). 
Only one of -the eight. variables designed to examine 
perceived similarity, .. mutual 
liking-and understanding, was 
not in the predicted direction: - in-the pupil condition, 
subjects: did-not"_believe "my group understands me" (item 3) 
more, but the difference between means is so small (. 07) 
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that it is probably not. worth theorising about this minimal 
failure in the context of 7 more substantial successes. 
The reverse side of stereotypically increased intragroup 
cohesiveness is, of course, a widening of perceived, 
intergroup differences, resulting in less liking, -perceived 
similarity and understanding of outgroup members, who for 
present purposes, were represented by-"people" and "kids on 
the street" on six items. 
In the pupil condition, subjects believed "people like me" 
(item 8) significantly less (p = . 04), which is-striking in 
view of the small number of significant findings and because 
the superficially fine distinction between "my group" and 
"people" has been made with significantly reversed results. 
Similarly, they believed "people want me round" (item 38) 
and "people aren't frightened of me" (item 49) less, but 
tied exactly on "people like being with me" (item 30). In 
addition, they believed "kids on the street like-me". less 
(item 10) and "kids on the street understand me"-less (item 
22), although neither approached significance, and - 
admittedly, the difference between means in the latter case 
is tiny. 
Results relating to perceived intergroup difference might 
have been more significant had the items been more precise. 
For example, one. or-two subjects asked just what "people"- 
were meant, or remarked that there were no "kids" on their 
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street. Furthermore, items might not have represented a 
distinctive outgroup since subjects could have included 
classmates in either category. "People are frightened of 
me", for instance, seemed more a barometer of classroom 
bullying than anything else. -- On-the other hand, --because 
"people" and "kids on the street" are group-terms , 
themselves, they might have weakened the salience of 
personal identities and hence reduced the contrast between 
conditions. In further research therefore, it would be wise 
to tighten such items, referring perhaps to specific adults 
or children from other (normal) schools. 
Post hoc, a number of items that were added as a courtesy to 
the teachers, can be appended here. Subjects in the pupil 
condition believed "my teachers like me" (item 48) 
non-significantly less, but tied exactly with the personal 
condition on "my teacher understands me" (item 28) and it 
seems reasonable to assume that teachers represent an 
outgroup with whom perceived social distance was increased 
in the pupil condition. 
Such increased perceived intergroup difference is 
interpreted as a. result of the relatively automatic 
cognitive effects of categorisation, but this ignores more 
human considerations, at which level, beliefs like "people 
like me less" simultaneously indicate that retardates become 
aware of the negative reaction their status elicits from 
others. Perceptual effects of self-categorisation, that is 
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to say, do not exist in a vacuum, but are enmeshed in "real 
life". To go one step further, this illustrates the 
complexity of the present transactional approach in 
suggesting that elements of self-concept that reflect the 
individual's concern about others' reactions to him, do not 
develop passively, but themselves depend on the individual's 
self-definition. Thus the individual-provides the impetus 
for his own development as a canvas for the reactions of 
others. Indeed, it is fascinating to speculate that any 
salient, negatively valued social identification should 
increase. perceived dissimilarity to the majority, which 
might be both internalised and reinforced by behaviour and 
therefore-elicit negative responses, in a 
not-so-merry-go-round of self-fulfillment. 
Figure 5.1 summarises results relating to of the primary 
hypothesis, and the movement of the mean profile for the 
pupil condition in the predicted direction is striking. 
Lack of significance on individual variables was at first, 
disappointing but when the small sample size, chaotic 
testing conditions and enormous individual variation are 
taken into consideration, results after all, seem 
impressive. They suggest that the pupil treatment, --as 
predicted,. triggered subjects! special class social 
identification and consequent perceived intragroup 
similarity and intergroup dissimilarity. -Perhaps one of the 
most interesting developments of the present work would be 
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to use some form of the self-concept questionnaire as a 
means of scaling the "personalised vs pupilised" influences 
of various special schools. 
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FIGURE 5.1 
SELF IMAGES OF A GROUP OF ESN SCHOOL CHILDREN 
mg group SI Peel the samet___ _i__ 
iP a classmate's upset, we all are 
I'm the same as my group 
I like my classmates 
people in my class help each other 
my group likes me <ý 
people in my class like each other 
my group understands me 
people like me 
people want me around 
people arent Prightvn. d oP me 
people like being with me 
kids on the street like me 
kids on the street underst 
s. d. score 
personal condition 
----Pup iL condition 
-4: 2- 111 - 
my group &I don't Feel the same 
iP a classmate's upset we're not all 
I'm diPFerent to my group 
I don't like my classmates 
people in my class don't help eachother 
my group doesn't like me 
people in my class don't like eachother 
my group doesn't understand me 
people don't like me 
people don't want me around 
people are Frightened of me 
people don't like being with me 
kids on the street don't like me 
kids on the street don't understand me 
The Second Hypothesis 
Self-stereotyping and perceived enhanced"intra-group 
similarity result as individuals assign themselves the same 
criterial group attributes, but although poor ability is the 
sine qua non of special school status, self-assessments in 
the pupil condition were not expected to be low. On the 
contrary, since the situation was relevant to social 
creativity, subjects were expected to preserve self esteem 
by making intregroup comparisons on such dimensions. Salient 
personal identifications, on the other hand, should 
virtually eliminate special class membership from current 
self-images, and with it, the advantage of easy 
"competition". Consequently, it was predicted that subjects 
would have higher opinions of their ability in the pupil 
compared with the personal condition. 
Six variables were designed with this in mind, and when they 
were in the pupil condition, subjects believed "I can 
concentrate" (item 25) significantly more than when they 
were in the-personal condition, (p = . 05). They also 
reported "I am quick at doing things", (item 27), "I know a 
lot about things" (item 40), "I am good at school work (item 
47) and "I am clever" (item 11) more although none was 
significant. In the latter case, it is important to note, 
one subject, Marie vindicated the rationale precisely, in 
saying that she was quite clever compared with them. 
Only one variable ran contrary to'this trend. In the pupil 
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condition subjects reported "I get mixed-up when I'm 
thinking", but when they were in the personal condition, 
they said "I think clearly" (item 58), the difference 
between conditions being non-significant. On consideration, 
two related points emerge. First, "getting mixed-up when 
I'm thinking" was coined by the class teachers to convey the 
stereotypic attribute, confused thought. However, it does 
not seem to carry particularly negative overtones, but seems 
to have-the ring of a much repeated "class homily". Hence 
subjects in the pupil condition might have assigned 
themselves this criterial attribute without the need for 
defensive intragroup comparisions. Second, the item seems 
particularly subjective, so that to answer it, social 
comparisons might not only be unnecessary but also 
impossible. 
, 
In toto therefore, there seems to be reasonable support for 
the second hypothesis that identifying with a special class 
results in an improved self-concept of ability. As 
previously argued and as present results suggest, the shield 
placement provides in-this way, seems only of limited-use, 
since it functions when the retardate social identification 
is salient and intra group comparisions are made. Clearly, 
it is likely to become an inwardly-directed weapon in 
situations of salient social identity where only intergroup 
comparisons-are possible. An anecdote illustrates the 
point: a social services worker whose job includes 
I 
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placement of unemployed school leavers, said she immediately 
recognises children from Florence Brown School by their 
reluctance to give away their special school status and 
subsequently, their low opinion of themselves. In these 
circumstances, it seems likely that their special school 
social identity is salient but instead of the easy 
competition provided by classmates, self-assessment derives 
from comparisons with representatives of other regular 
schools. It would be interesting to test this adapting the 
present paradigm. 
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Subsidiary hypotheses 
1. Negative stereotypic traits 
Low ability, of course, is not the only negative attribute 
of retardates, and a number of additional variables were 
designed to investigate these, with the same hypothesis, 
that intra group comparisons would result in relatively 
positive self assessment in the pupil condition. 
Item 41 was designed as a "translation" for the negative 
stereotypic trait, social incompetence, but subjects 
responded "I know how to behave with people" less when they 
were in the pupil condition. Similarly, they responded "I 
am easy to get on with" (item 2) less, although neither was 
significant. Superficially therefore, it looks as if the 
trend is for subjects to assign themselves negative 
stereotypic attributes, unameliorated by intragroup 
comparisons. On closer inspection, another possibility 
arises. Since both involve the notion of other people, 
these items might have fallen into the category reflecting 
perceived intergroup distance, an interpretation supported 
indirectly because results on "I am easy to get on with" are 
in the opposite direction to the superficially similar "Ham 
a friendly person", which does not involve the notion of 
others. 
Three variables concerned the attributes clumsiness and poor 
co-ordination. When they were in the pupil condition, 
subjects responded "I am good at things like PT and dancing" 
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(item 13), together with "I don't break things" (item 37) 
more, but "never fall over things"(item 50)-less, no 
difference being significant. The latter contradicts 
predictions, but during testing, subjects seemed rather keen 
to laugh "I'm always falling over things" which seemed 
almost to become a positive group norm. 
Two variables concerned the stereotypic attribute, impaired 
speech. In the pupil condition, subjects reported "people 
know what I'm saying" (item 18) more, but "I'm good at 
saying what. I mean" (item 29) less, both being 
nonsignificant. The latter despite being particularly 
small, is contrary to predictions but like "I get mixed-up 
when I'm-thinking", it was coined by the teacher, does not 
seem negatively valued and perhaps represented a group norm, 
which (pupil) subjects assigned themselves, and in including 
"people" it might again represent increased perceived 
intergroup difference. 
Similarly, five items were intended to represent the 
negative . attributes childish excitability and 
unpredictability. In the pupil condition, subjects reported 
"I am not moody" (item 20) and "I am adult" (item 6) more. 
On the other hand, they responded "sometimes I do things 
without thinking" (item 5) more and "I stay calm" (item 33), 
less, and they tied exactly on the items designed to measure 
frustration, "I, get angry if I can't do something" (item 
23). Again differences in connotation might account for 
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this unimpressive record. Intragroup comparisions might be 
triggered to avoid self-assessments of immaturity, for 
example, but "I get excited a lot", seems to convey 
enthusiasm rather than negative over-excitability. 
Finally, -this might also have been the case with three items 
designed to investigate the attributes, dependency and 
helplessness, since subjects responded "I need help with 
things" (item 24) and "I like looking after myself" (item 
19) together with "I decide what I do" (item 44) less in the 
pupil condition. 
The attribute, ugliness, was represented by item 16, but in 
the pupil condition, subjects responded "I am good looking" 
non-significantly less, perhaps because of chance factors, 
the afore mentioned Matthew, for example, responding with 
pimples in the pupil condition and without in the personal! 
A cluster of items was designed to cover the stereotypic 
notion that retardates are shameful to their families and a 
burden to caregivers. 
In the pupil condition, subjects reported "looking after me 
is no bother" (item 54) significantly less, and "I am a help 
to my family" (item 45) and "my family is proud of me" (item 
4)ýinsignificantly. so. They tied exactly on "my parents 
like me" (item 32) and believed "my parents understand me" 
(item 58) and "I am nice to live with" (item 53) marginally 
more. 
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By way of summary, it is superf lows to add-that results 
relating to this hypothesis are tedious and inconclusive. 
Four important general points, however, need making. First, 
subjects are special school children, whereas the negative 
stereotypic traits were generated originally by their 
relevance to "retardates" and therefore may not have been 
suitable. Clearly, in further research, items should be 
collected for their empirical relevance. Second, evaluative 
connotation, particularly in interaction with subjects' age, 
needs careful consideration: "getting excited a lot" and 
"falling over things" to teenagers are a far cry from 
"unable to control myself" and "unco-ordinated" to adult 
dischargees. Third, many items seemed subjective and may 
not have been relevant to intragroup comparisons. -Finally, 
results were, in any case, non-significant. 
2. Positive stereotypic traits 
Predictions regarding the positive stereotypic 
characteristics friendliness, innocence and co-operativeness 
were easy to make. It was simply hypothesised that subjects 
would attribute higher levels of these to themselves when 
their special school social identification was salient. 
In the pupil condition,. they reported "I am a friendly 
person" (item 1). "I trust people easily" (item 12) and "I 
try hard" (item 52) more, although none was significant. 
There was an exact tie on "I like to join in with others" 
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(item 42), but here again, the notion of "others" might have 
triggered perceived exaggerated intergroup difference. 
3. Miscellaneous Items 
Since it is argued that retardates are probably expected to 
perform at a level below that of which they are capable, it 
was thought subjects might feel under-estimated in the 
personal condition compared with when they are in the pupil 
condition where they should be, as it were, the embodiment 
of such underestimation. Interestingly, they reported being 
cleverer than their parents (item 15) and teachers (item 31) 
think in the personal condition, but unfortunately, these 
two items posed difficulty to some, and the difference 
between means is very small. Nevertheless, follow-up 
research does seem worthwhile. 
Finally, it was impossible to resist adding a handful of 
items relating to self-esteem which, it seemed might not 
accommodate intragroup comparisons and which might therefore 
reflect the negative effects of special school placement 
that, despite their elusiveness, "instinct" expects. 
Subjects reported "I like to be me" (item 57) less when they 
were in the pupil condition although the considerable 
difference between group means was non-significant. There 
was an exact tie on "I'm nice" (item 36) and on the items 
included from Piers and Harris and Coopersmith measures, 
subjects reported "I can be trusted" (item 43) and "things 
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don't bother me" (item 39) less in the pupil condition. In 
other words, there is a smattering of evidence that self 
esteem Is lowered by placement in a special school, 
(although it is important to point out that semantic 
differential scores averaged <4 and therefore, no subject 
evaluated himself negatively overall). 
This covers all but a few miscellaneous items included as a 
courtesy to the teachers, which are in Table 5.1, but which 
will not be discussed here. 
A 
I 
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Ability -M. eaasures 
Since it is hypothesised that retarded behaviour is the 
outcome of a functioning retardate social identification, 
poorer ability measures were expected from subjects when 
they were in the pupil condition, but unfortunately, this 
part of the study was overwhelmed with difficulties: apart 
from the likelihood of error resulting from experimenter and 
subject effects and the chaotic testing conditions, the 
measures themselves seemed insufficiently sensitive. The 
Project Administer at CHES kindly arranged for them to be 
scored by their Coders, so that marking would be comparable 
with their data on approximately 14,000 ten year olds, but 
this turned out to be disappointing because only one point 
was awarded for a right answer and nothing for a wrong, no 
matter how close or reasonable. In the BAS similarities 
subscale, for example, subjects were given three related 
items and asked to give their class name and an additional 
example, but if one was right and the other almost correct, 
no marks were awarded. Similarly, some matrices required 
upwards-of half a dozen elements-and a subject successfully 
and neatly drawing all but one received no more credit than 
one who failed to attempt the item atall. 
With time and care, it might have been possible to rescore 
measures, allowing some marks for partially correct answers, 
but this-was not undertaken, since there were only 8 widely 
different subjects in each condition and so many misgivings 
- 431 - 
about the testing conditions. Nevertheless, the simple step 
of counting correct answers for the similarities Subtest was 
undertaken and these scores are included in bolding on Table 
5.2. 
At the time of writing, norms for the CHES Picture 
Vocabulary Test are not yet available, but in any case, 
these would refer to 10 year olds. Published norms for BAS 
exist, but the Administrator at CHES believes their coders 
mark more strictly, which, since the CHES sample is so 
large, is not a problem for them, (because their sample Is 
effectively, normative. ) but which means present results 
probably underestimate subjects' ability. For what it is 
worth, their average performance was approximately (1) at 
the lowest percentile of . the national norms for the BAS word 
definition Subtest; (2) for digit recall,. it was between the 
4th and 5th percentiles and (3), for similarities between 
the 3rd and 4th. Finally, (4), performance on-the matrix 
completion. subtest was around the fifth percentile. 
Individual differences were enormous, particularly on digit 
recall, where performances ranged from the lowest percentile 
expected of a nine-year-old to the 83rd for the correct age. 
Table 5.2 gives mean subtest scores and according to ANOVA, 
there was no difference between conditions, although 
subjects performed better bn 4 subtests in the personal. 
compared with 3 in-the pupil condition, which at-least, is 
in the right direction overall. It is tantalisingly 
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suggestive, however, that three of these four are the BAS 
subtests that are based on language and numbers, the 
traditional academic building blocks, to which, arguably, 
retarded behaviour is more relevant. Thus, if only the BAS 
had been employed, results would have been a deal more 
impressive. It is also interesting and important that the 
adjusted scores show a slightly increased trend in the 
predicted direction, which suggests that if the subtests 
were more sensitive, predictions might have been better 





Mean s. d. Mean s. d. 
CHES 1 28.13 +- 5.0 29.78 +- 7.1 
2 6.25 1.6 4.44 3.0 
3 7.50 2.5 7.33 2.4 
BAS 1 4.13 2.1 5.22 1.8 
2 
. 
16.88 5.2 17.00 5.1 
3 8.88 1.8 9.89 2.4 
-22.50 
3.3 23.78 4.1 
4 8.75 3.3 6.89 1.9 
(Bolding denotes the number of right answers given in 
Subtest 3) 
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There is no point in discussing these unimpressive results 
further because they are based on samples of eight extremely 
divergent children. Increased numbers, preferably a 
repeated measures design together with improved testing 
conditions and more sensitive measures are required first. 
The second area of interest, whether there are correlations 
between items related.. to self- concept of ability and 
ability measures, is paradoxical: in the pupil condition, 
higher self-concepts of ability (bolstered by intragroup 
comparisons) are expected to be accompanied by lower 
performances, (mediated by an ESN social identification). 
However, since correlations are insensitive to mean values, 
self-concept and ability measures may still correlate. In 
the personal condition, on the other hand, there is no 
obvious reason to expect correlations between self-concepts 
of ability and performance, because the former, it is 
assumed, result from interpersonal comparisons with 
unspecified others, whereas ability scores would be ranked 
with reference to classmates. It follows, therefore, that 
attention should be confined to the pupil condition, but 
since ability tests were only taken once, this reduces the 
sample to 8. 
The six items relating to perceived ability were summed into 
a single score, because alone, each could range from 1 to 7, 
but since pupils tended to have highly positive opinions of 
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themselves, the actual ranges were much smaller. For 
example, "I'm quick at things" (item 27) had a mean of 1.87 
plus or minus 1.3, and correlations between such tightly 
skewed measures and the wide ranging ability scores were 
unlikely to prove meaningful. 
Spearman's rho between overall self-concept of ability and 
actual ability measures is given in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3 
Test 
CHES 1 . 24 
2 -. 06 
3 -. 11 
BAS 1 . 36 
2 . 40 
3 -. 23 
(. 04) 
4 . 36 
:ý 
Results were unremarkable - and again there is little point 
in discussing them further because of the small sample size 
and powerful sources of error that have already been 
me9tioned, although it is worth noting that the more 
traditional BAS again were more promising. To leave 
statistics, however, it was interesting that the boy whose 
self-assessment was highest, invariably scored most-on the 
ability measures. On the other hand, the two girls 
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consistently underestimated themselves, which seemed the 
major reason for the low co blations. This brings to mind 
the arguments (in the previous chapter) that the emotional 
aspect of self attitudes is important and can determine 
self-assessments whatever the more "external" criteria. 
Finally, (if it does not smack too much of sour grapes) the 
present approach questions somewhat the usefulness of 
correlational studies between self-concept of ability and 
achievement. Since correlations are insensitive to absolute 
values, an improvement in the former, which might be 
achieved by providing an opportunity for intragroup 
comparisons, does not predict any effect on the latter. 
Perhaps then, more attention should be directed towards 
changes in self-concept which might accompany better 
performances. Paradoxically, this might involve a lower 
self-assessment of ability as salience shifts to personal 
rather than social identifications. 
To conclude, this aspect provided no significant evidence to 
support the. idea that performances would be better in the 
personal condition, but served its exploratory purpose in 
suggesting that further research is worthwhile. 
Multidimensional Data 
Intuitively, factor, analysis seems an appropriate tool for 
exploring self-concept, or more accurately, self-image, 
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because it could reveal a hierachy of dimensions along which 
self-assessments are made. However,. since the present study 
is only exploratory, no detailed predictions were made 
beyond the broad hypothesis that different constellations or 
"gestalts" of self-descriptive elements might characterise 
personal and pupil identifications. For example, 
(unidimensional) self-concept of ability, according to the 
present viewpoint, depends on the strategies adopted for 
self-assessment, whereas, at the multidimensional level, the 
notion of ability might account for more variance in 
individuals whose retardate social identification is 
salient, irrespective of actual scores on specific items. 
In a sense, this approach suggests that factor analysing 
class data for the personal condition might not be 
meaningful, because, in this case, subjects are hypothesised 
to have idiosyncratic self-images, which might be based on 
individualised semantic hierachies. In other-words, results 
from this condition are probably only valid for-comparative 
purposes, and accordingly, too much emphasis will not be 
laid on them. 
Separate-factor analyses were performed on subjects self 
descriptions in personal and pupil conditions. Results are 
given below, and plainly, both structure and content of the 
factors differ, which is exciting when it is remembered that 
these represent self images of exactly the same children. 
It means that there is preliminary statistical evidence 
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consistent with the idea that the structure of self-images 
changes according to the situational salience of personal or 
social ientification. However, it must be remembered that 
numbers are small and therefore, too much should not be read 
into results. 
mulm 5.1*. 
Ull t%diaensional self concepts of a class of special school children 
Personal condition 
FACTOR 1(20.2% variance) 
I'm cleverer than parents think 
people want me around 
I can manage by myself 
my family is proud. of me 
I think clearly 
I try hard 
I'm clever 
people know what I'm saying 
my group &I feel the same 
in my class we help eachother 
people know what I'll do 
I'm the same as my group 
I like looking after myself 
I know a lot 
people arent frightened of me 
people in my class like eachother 
I know why I'm-at this school 
FACTOR 2(15.1% variance) 
looking after me's easy 
I'm good at saying what I mean 
I'm adult 
I'm a help to my family 
my teacher understands me 
I decide what I do 
I never fall over things 
my parents understand me 
I don't break things 
I trust people easily 
kids on the street understand me 
this school is great 
FACTOR 3(10.2% variance) 
I'm a friendly person 
people like being with me 
things don' bother me 
I like my classmates 
Pupil condition 
FACTOR 1(24.9% variance) 
. 88 I'm quick at things . 87 
. 83 I'm good at schoolwork . 81 
. 80 I'm good at sports . 79 
. 78 people like me . 75 
. 74 1 know a lot 
. 76 
. 74 I'm cleverer than teacher thinks . 72 
. 68 I'm the same as my group . 67 
. 66 I try hard . 
61 
-. 58 kids on the street like me . 59 
-. 58 I'm cleverer than parents think . 58 







FACTOR 2(11.7% variance) 
. 85 my group understands me . 
92 
. 81 I can concentrate . 
77 
. 80 people arent frightened of me . 75 
-. 79 my teachers like me . 73 
. 77 kids on the street understand me . 
66 
. 71 my teacher understands me . 
55 
. 71 if a classmate's upset we all are -. 
53 
. 70 I'm nice . 
52 
. 68 I know a lot . 
51 
. 59 kids on the street like me . 
49 
. 43 my group likes me . 
47 
. 42 I'm good at saying what 
I mean . 43 
FACTOR 3(10.7% variance) 
. 80 in my class we help eachother . 88 
. 79 my group &I feel 
the same . 80 
. 71 my family is proud of me . 76 
. 70 people in my class 
like eachother . 75 
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my group likes me 
people in my class like eachother 
I'm not moody 
I decide what I do 
my group &I feel the same 
people like me 
FACTOR 4(9.2% variance) 
I can be trusted 
I'm quick at things 
kids on the street understand me 
I'm good at PT & dancing 
I know a lot 
my group understands me 
I'm good at schoolwork 
I trust people easily 
I'm good at sports 
my other school was good 
FACTOR 5(8.6% variance) 
my parents like me 
I like to join in with others 
I"m easy to get on with 
my teachers like me 
I know why I'm at this school 
I can concentrate 
I'm not moody 
I like my classmates 
people like me 
FACT R 6(7.5% variance) 
I stay calm 
I'm cleverer than teacher thinks 
I know how to behave with people 
I'm good at schoolwork 
I never fall over things 
I don't break things 
my group 6I feel the same 
I'm the same as my group 
I think clearly 
I can concentrate 
FACTOR 7(6.2% variance) 
I'm good looking 
I'm good at sports 
I mind if I can't do something 
I like looking after myself 
I'm the same as my group 
. 70 I like to be me . 74 
. 63 people want me around . 56 
. 58 I'm a friendly person . 48 
. 48 people know what I'll do -, 44 
. 44 kids on the street like me . 43 
. 43 I'm nice . 43 
FACTOR 4(8.2% variance) 
. 89 my parents understand me . 88 
. 89 looking after me's easy . 84 
. 75 I'm adult . 80 
. 70 my group likes me . 61 
. 61 I'm good at schoolwork . 47 





FACMR 5(7.8% variance) 
. 78 I mind if I can't do something . 75 
. 72 things don' bother me . 72 
. 63 I'm not moody . 72 
. 58 I like to join in with others . 65 
. 57 I can be trusted . 62 
. 54 I'm nice . 52 
. 45 I like to be me . 50 
. 44 people want me around 47 
. 40 I'm good looking . 46 
if a classmate's upset we all are -. 45 
I can concentrate . 44 
people like me . 41 
I can manage by myself . 41 
FACTOR 6(7.0% variance) 
. 81 I know how to behave with people . 86 
. 77 I'm easy to get on with . 79 
. 76 I decide what I do . 
78 
. 67 I'm clever . 72 
. 47 I never fall over things . 
68 
. 46 1 can manage by myself . 53 
-. 46 I'm the same as my group . 49 
-. 43 1 trust people easily -. 42 
. 43 kids on the street understand me -. 40 
. 42 
FACTOR 7(6.5% variance) 
. 77 people like being with me . 85 
. 69 I'm nice to live with . 83 
. 67 I like my classmates . 63 
-. 61 this school is great , 54 
-. 45 1 like looking after myself . 43 
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"1 
FACTOR 8(5.8% variance) 
kids on the street like me 
this school is great 
I'm nice to live with 
people know what I'll do 
I'm nice 
my teacher understands me 
I like to be me 
people arent frightened of me 
people Me me 
FACTOR 8(5.2% variance) 
. 72 people know what I'm saying 
. 68 I think clearly 
. 64 I'm a friendly person 
. 50 I don't break things 
-. 46 I know why I'm at this school 




FACTOR 9(3% variance) 
my parents like me 
I know why I'm at this school 
I stay calm 
I'm clever 
this school is great 
I never fall over things 
I decide what I do 
I'm clever 
I never fall over things 
I can manage by myself 
I'm the same as my group 
I trust people easily 
kids on the street understand me 
The content of Factor 1 in the pupil condition, which 
accounts for almost a quarter of the variance is exciting, 
because it seems primarily concerned with ability, 
specifically school ability, which covaries with an item 
representing the "hallmarks of group belongness" (i. e. "I'm 
the same as my group" (item 51)) and which is consistent 
with the idea that higher self-assessments of ability 
co-incide with salient social identity (and therefore, 
intragroup comparisons). Other items do not fit easily into 
this interpretation: among the lower loading, are "people 
like me" (item 8), "kids on. the street understand me", (item 
22) and "people want me around" (item 38), which were 
intended to represent outgroup processes, and therefore 
i 
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their presence might be more understood if they had negative 
loadings. On the other hand, the vagueness of these items 
has already been mentioned, and perhaps, within this context 
they simply reflect that self-assessed social acceptability 
varies with ability. 
Factor 1 when subjects were in the personal condition, seems 
long and diffuse, which by contrast, adds significance to 
its relative clarity in the pupil condition, and which might 
indeed indicate that factor analysing data based on various 
personal identifications is, as already mentioned, 
theoretically unsound. However, on close inspection, it 
becomes fascinating. Again it centres on ability, but of a 
very different nature to that of the Pupil condition. It 
seems to refer to competence and independence in the home 
and what is most interesting is the presence of 3 items 
relating to intragroup cohesiveness with negative -loadings 
(my group and I feel the same, (item 14); in my class, we 
help each other, (item 9) and people in my class like each 
other, (item 58)) which suggest that (personal) competence 
at home covaries with rejection of the special class social 
identification. These negative loadings seem to some extent 
to validate treatments, and in addition, they suggest that 
ability ratings bolstered by intragroup comparisons. under 
conditions of salient social identification, might be 
confined to academic ability, i. e. 
area. 
to the most relevant 
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Factor 2 in the pupil condition seems to concern intragroup 
cohesiveness, and secondly, ability. The presence of 
"people aren't frightened of me" (item 49) which was 
originally intended to refer to the outgroup seems to refer, 
as previously suspected, to classmates. The same seems true 
of "kids on the street like me" (item 10) (and teachers). 
Finally, the negative loading on "if a classmate's upset, we 
all are" (item 26) suggests, as suspected, that the item was 
unsuitable to represent intragroup empathy. The primary 
theme of Factor 3 also seems intragroup cohesiveness, this 
time with undertones of affiliation as well as empathy. 
For the personal group, Factor 2 seems to focus primarily on 
family, competence and maturity, perhaps representing self 
evaluation in the home context, and the notion of group per 
se, is conspicuous by its absence. Factor 3, in contrast, 
apparently relates to likeability, and is interesting, 
because although items relating to intragroup liking are 
present, within this context, they seem to refer to 
(interpersonal) liking, because only one low loading item 
concerns perceived intragroup similarity. Reference to 
Table 5. '' shows that the personal emphasis seems similarly 
sustained throughout the remaining factors. Again, in 
Factor 6, items relating to ability seem to be 
"disconnected" from intragroup processes by the negative 
loadings of "my group and "I feel the same" (item 14) and 
"I'm the same as my group" (item 51). 
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Finally, in the pupil condition, Factors 4 onwards make 
interesting browsing, but perhaps there is a danger of 
reading too much into them, in speculating that they might 
relate to stereotypic traits. Factor 4 might concern 
dependency, because without the items relating'to autonomy 
and helping others that appeared in Factor 2 in the personal 
condition, it seems passive in tone. Factor 5 seems fairly 
directly concerned with frustration, 6 with social 
competence and 8 with social-acceptability. 
To summarise, this aspect of the study seems to indicate 
that further, research would be rewarding, -since it offers 
more than a hint that-the hypothesised changes in current 
self-image that reflect cultural beliefs actually occur, and 
might be measured using factor analytic techniques. 
Concluding remade 
Although this exploratory study was always "noisy" 
(statistically and literally! ), and often inconclusive, it 
has been valuable in a number of ways. First, it follows 
Gibbons (1981) in demonstrating again that experimentation 
with retarded subjects is entirely possible. -Second, and 
most important, evidence . in. support of 
the main hypothesis 
that emphasis on special class membership enhances the 
salience of a shared social identification, although-only 
sometimes individually significant, seemed strong overall. 
Thus, the study served its purposes in indicating 
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preliminary support of the social approach to the 
development of mental retardation and suggesting directions 
further research might take in the search for harder 
evidence. .A few obvious points are that dependent measures 
relevant to social and personal identification together with 
treatments were derived a priori and both might be vastly 
improved through empirical development. Similarly, beyond 
questionnaire responses, no link between behaviour and 
(hypothesised) personal and social identifications was 
demonstrated. In that dependent measures were insensitive, 
testing conditions were chaotic and there were only 8 
subjects ranging from so-called severely subnormal with 
aggressive behaviour to low normal in each condition of a 
completely randomised design, it would have been 
astonishing, or more likely, worryingly indicative of 
experimenter bias if such a link had been found. Clearly, 
more research is needed in which these difficulties are 
overcome. 
The present paradigm could be extended into different areas, 
for example, the attribution studies of Severance and 
Gasstrom (1977) and Gibbons (1981) suggest children's 
reasons for their success and failure might interact with 
identifications. Indeed, following Hoffman and Weiner 
(1978), this should determine effort on subsequent tasks. 
An improved version of the present self-image instrument 
could be used (without experimental manipulations) in a 
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range of special schools and institutions, since 
it not only seems to offer a better method of assessing the 
effect of placement on the self-concept than self-esteem 
measures, but also might be used to grade schools and 
hopeful, correlations between King and Raynes' scale 
(institution vs. person oriented) might be established. 
One naively black and white thought was that placement is 
"bad" since it probably provides children with the 
additional handicap of a negative social identification, 
whatever. the advantages of tailor made education and 
intragroup comparisons. Needless to say, this area is full 
of shades of grey and it seems possible that the present 
approach might provide a means to cheat, as it were, 
placement of some of its disadvantages. Simple emphases on 
personal identities and social identifications that cut 
across ESN/Normal boundaries should all help to reduce the 
salience hence any power of special school social 
identifications. Similarly, a subtle change to-an interest 
in personal rather than school attainment might avert much 
handicap in. employment situations. In addition, attempts 
could be made to establish positive criterial attributes 
associated with special schools, -for example 
through 
charitable commmunity work. 
Finally, the subjective experience of running the study, of 
becoming a part of Florence Brown School, was also 
invaluable, in providing alarming confrontations with my own 
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stereotypic expectations and their subsequent dissolution in 
human contact. For example, I was first relieved at the 
normal appearance of the class, then worried at the clamour 
of the first break, when kettles were boiled and coffes made 
- inches from my ear. Next, reassured by their competence 
and my safety from scalds, I was surprised again when some 
of my pilot items simply were not understood. 
Amid the clamour of the classroom and the nexus of new 
acquaintances, it seemed impossible that the behaviour of 
this riotous handful of problem teenagers could ever be 
encompassed within a single conceptual paradigm, and a- 
convic tion that they might be better helped by a trip to 
the zoo than a study on social identification began to grow. 
That is why the glimmer of some results consistent. with the 
present approach are exponentially welcome. Of course, they 
represent a couple of faltering steps in an extensive, wide 
open field,. but they do suggest that social identity theory 
and its descendants might ultimately become invaluable and 
practical allies. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Summary and concluding comments 
The purpooe of the present work has been to suggest a social 
psychological orientation towards mental retardation, in 
which it is not "all over" for the retardate who cannot be 
cured in the conventional sense. It rests on a 
transactional model of development that stresses the 
existence of potential for change throughout life and the 
role of ongoing mutual transactions between the individual 
and his environment in producing such changes. (e. g. 
Lerner and Busch-Rossnagel, 1981). Accordingly, it rejects 
the notion of developmental fixity and the conception of the 
individual as a passive recipient of genetic or 
environmental determinants. 
In order to articulate the present approach, 
Bronfenbrenner's (1979) view of "environment" was first 
adopted. Thus, the individual is seen as embedded in a 
hierachical, socially constructed context. At the first 
level, the microsystem consists of the individual and the 
objects and people he responds to as he experiences them. At 
the second, the mesosystem refers to the relationship 
between microsystems, like the child's school and his home. 
The third level, the exoaystem describes settings that the 
child never enters, which nevertheless effect his 
development, for example, a brother's school or parents' 
place of work. Finally, the macrosystew refers to 
organisational structures within cultures and subcultures 
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and their underlying ideologies. 
The present approach then began (in Chapter 2) with a 
consideration of macrosystem influences,. the area 
Bronfenbrenner complains is most often neglected. Based on 
Mercer's (1973; 1977) social model, it was argued that the 
understanding of mental retardation and consequently, who is 
labelled retarded, is not only a function of 
intra-organismic pathology, but also a matter of 
interpretation, which depends on the normative expectations 
of the prevailing social system (i. e. macrosystem 
influences). At the same time, a link was drawn to the 
inductive aspect of Tajfel's (1972) categorisation theory to 
argue that normative expectations evolve together with the 
interests and purposes of social groups. 
Evidence was sought in an attempt to relate cross-cultural 
and historical views of mental retardation to prevailing 
interests and circumstances. Subsequently, many attitudinal 
studies no longer seemed "confusing and contradictory" 
(Gottlieb, 1975a), since differences were attributed to 
differences in normative structures, not ignorance or deceit 
on the part of subjects or methodological error on the part 
of experimenters. Finally, empirical support was provided 
by an ecological experiment (Bronfenbrenner, 1979) in which 
the beliefs of members of different social systems (lay 
people with and without personal experience of retardates, 
and in subsidiary aspects, psychologists and teachers) were 
contrasted. Differences were attributed to shared group 
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memberships rather than averaged individual characteristics 
of group members. For example, lay people without personal 
contact evaluated retardates more negatively than those 
with: - the individualistic explanation that the former 
were unsympathetic people, each of whom would be changed and 
enlightened by contact with a retardate, was rejected, and 
indeed, closer examination yielded evidence that beliefs 
were influenced by the normative interests and purposes of 
different social systems, since those of subjects without 
contact concerned the negative implications of deviant 
appearance and behaviour, while those of subjects with 
contact seemed to concern giving care to retarded human 
beings. 
The subtle, and optimistic conclusion was that the change to 
accepting attitudes within a social system is not a 
"bottom-up" matter of providing pleasant personal 
experiences for the majority of its members, but a 
"top-down" matter of changing normative beliefs. The latter 
might be achieved by a change in public policy, or what is 
highly relevant both to current attempts at integration in 
schools under the Warnock Report (1978) and community 
integration programs, by a change in public practice. In 
other words, the macrosystem, attitudes and the status quo 
need not be an immutable block to integration: they are 
determined by, as well as determinants of public practice. 
I 
The main lesson to be drawn from Chapter 2 is that mental 
retardation does not simply correspond to pathology in the 
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individual. It is also a handicap, dependent on prevailing 
social norms, which reflect the interests and purposes of 
social groups. Thus, its amelioration need no longer wait 
for scientific breakthroughs in the prevention and treatment 
of impairment, but may begin now, with a change in the 
beliefs of others and public policy. 
Chapter 3 went on to identify the deductive aspect of 
Tajfel's approach to categorisation as a mechanism whereby 
macrosystems influence the perception, and by extrapolation, 
the treatment and hence the development of retardates. 
Following Tajfel's lead, it was argued that stereotypic 
perception (enhanced perceived intragroup similarity and 
intergroup dissimilarity along relevant dimensions) would be 
mediated by the label "mentally retarded". Its precise 
effect, however, would depend on the information it holds 
for perceivers (macrosystem influences), its usefulness 
(which depends on the perceived attributes of the person 
about to be labelled) and the judgements which are to be 
made. Subsequently, these three principles enabled apparent 
inconsistencies in the literature to be resolved. 
Study 2 predicted and found that the labels "normal" and 
"mental retarded" mediated stereotypic perception in 
judgements made about (slides of) 4 normal and 4 subnormal 
children. As expected, the strength of the phenomenon was 
greatest on dimensions most closely associated with the 
normal/subnormal dichotomy and its biassing effect on the 
perception of individual targets was strängest where the 
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label carried most information - in other words, on 
borderline cases. 
By extrapolation, labels are likely to influence not only 
the perception of retardates in real life, but also, the 
perception of so-called normals. Thus, Study 2 has 
implications in the field of education, and again, this is 
highly relevant to the notion of integration under the 
Warnock Report. For example, one argument against 
delabelling was the notion that retarded children would be 
stripped of special tolerances, but the present approach 
suggests these are an aspect of a wider stereotypic belief 
that retardates are not responsible for anything. Similarly, 
while expectations about children at the lowest ends of 
perceived subnormality and normality continua might be 
improved by categorising them, a heavy price would be paid 
by those at the highest ends. Indeed, because of the 
previously mentioned stings in the tails of special 
tolerances and the effect of evaluative bias, improvements 
are likely to be niggardly, and the cost, too high. 
Study 2 also suggested that delabelling is unlikely to work 
without further back-up, for the simple reason that an 
explicit label is not necessary to trigger stereotypic 
perception, since following the inductive aspect of Tajfel's 
theory, perceivers are more than likely to infer one for 
themselves. Such back-up could include programs designed to 
change beliefs and the evaluative gradient associated with 
the label; undermining its usefulness by emphasing its lack 
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of correlation with the characteristics of real individuals 
or by basing administrative groupings on criteria that cut 
across cognitive ability. Clearly, educating educators with 
the effects of social categorisation would be invaluable. 
Chapters 2 and 3, in a sense, identified the sociological 
and mechanistic psychological building blocks of the present 
approch. In Chapters 4 and 5, its heart was reached in an 
attempt to identify a social psychological pathway, 
consistent with a transactional orientation, whereby macro--, 
exo-, meso- and micro- systems might influence retardates' 
development. 
Chapter 4 concentrated - like an overheard telephone 
conversation - not on the retardate himself, but on others 
in his environment. Turner's (1981,1981a, 1982) referent 
informational influence (self-stereotyping), provided the 
mechanism whereby individuals would conform to and hence, 
mediate, normative expectations. (In other words, referent 
informational influence is a formal expression of the 
"top-down" mechanism of Chapter 2). Thus, it was argued 
that macrosystem influences depend on individuals' 
self-definitions as group members, their social 
identifications, and subsequent intergroup behaviour 
(Tajfel, 1974), rather than on personal traits, experience 
or training that group members, on average, share. 
Two experiments supported this argument: Study 3 suggested 
that expectations associated with social-identifications 
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(roles) were sufficiently detailed to include beliefs about 
retardates, appropriate for individuals occupying them. 
However, results might not have been generalisable because 
subjects, for the most part, were unlikely to have detailed 
knowledge of the norms in question, and therefore, were 
unlikely to represent normative behaviour of people in real 
life. Study 4, on the other hand, unconfounded salient 
social identification and actual group membership: opinions 
and perceptions characteristic of medics were shown by 
medics who received a treatment to ensure their clinical 
self-definition was salient, but not by medics who received 
a treatment designed to make them think of themselves as 
individuals . 
The conclusion from Chapter 4 was that the handicapping 
effects of beliefs about retardates are not inevitable, but 
dependent on perceivers' conceptualising interactions in 
intergroup, not interpersonal terms. This has immediate and 
important implications for practice since 
client/professional interactions, it was noted, are 
intergroup by definition. Thus, the trappings of 
"professionaldom", for example, clinical settings, 
scientific terminology, white coats and even the self-esteem 
derived from being a doctor, are likely to contribute to 
salient medical social identifications, biassed perception 
and perhaps iatrogenic mental retardation. 
In addition, the present approach suggests a strategy which 
might prove fruitful if applied to residential staff: the 
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quick reversion to the status quo at the end of intervention 
projects has recently been mentioned (Barrett, 1984; Coles 
and Blunden, 1978). However, if staff are actively involved 
and given responsibilities, improvements do not appear to 
fade when experimenters depart, (Coles and Blunden, 1978). 
This fits exactly the present framework: in the first case, 
co-operation with experimenters may be seen as compliance 
(Kelman, 1961), which depends on their presence to mete out 
rewards in the form of approval and encouragement. Active 
involvement and retraining, on the other hand, may result in 
a new self-definition and hence, new behaviours mediated by 
referent informational influence which do not require the 
presence of others for their continuance. Alternatively, 
normalising the self-concepts of those in the caring 
professions might be the first step to normalising those in 
their care. 
Finally, in Chapter 5, an attempt was made to introduce the 
principal actor, the retardate, into the scene. Turner's 
referent informational influence (self-stereotyping) was 
reconsidered in more detail and introduced as a mechanism 
whereby salient social identifications (self-definitions as 
retarded) could mediate retarded behaviour that is role 
determined. This extends the notion of role implied in 
Mercer's social model of retardation: rather than a set of 
expectations that others socialise the individual into 
according to the social system in which he finds himself, it 
is seen as a set of expectations (as he perceives them) that 
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he conforms to as a result of an act of self-definition. In 
this way, gelt-generated handicap in addition to handicap 
dictated by external social demands contributes to mental 
retardation. 
It was argued, and hopefully illustrated that 
institutionalisation in particular, together with special 
placements and intergroup rather than interpersonal level 
interactions (perhaps triggered by others' self-definitions) 
are likely to legitimate and enhance retarded social 
identifications and hence retarded behaviour. However, the 
curtain did not fall at this point because the final and 
most important act was yet to come: until then, the notion 
of self generation had been something of a misnomer, since 
it approximated more than anything, to an internalisation of 
and conformity to prevailing norms. Thus, social creativity 
(e. g. Tajfel and Turner, 1979) was introduced as a set of 
strategies whereby the individual can resist or avoid 
self-definition as retarded and so emancipate himself from 
(self -generated) handicap. 
The literature provided anecdotal evidence in support of 
these ideas, most strikingly in the form of studies in which 
personalisation mediated greater improvements in adaptive 
behaviour than training designed directly to improve it. 
The latter, it was argued, could be counter productive since 
it was predicated on a retardate social identification. 
In Study 5 an informal and preliminary attempt was made to 
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manipulate the salient self-images of a class of ESN school 
children. Emphasis on their social identification as 6 
special school pupils as opposed to their personal 
identities, seemed associated with increa. s ed intragroup 
cohesiveness, liking and perceived similarity, and, though 
less clearly, a changed self-image structure. Concommitant 
behavioural effects as indexed by ability measures, however, 
were not pinned down and the field was left wide-open for 
further research: more sensitive measures more rigorously 
applied, it was hypothesised, would reveal deficits in test 
scores when children's self-definitions as special pupils 
are salient. Furthermore, the relationship between such 
hypothesised deficits and increased self-concept of ability 
based on intragroup comparisons, in particular, needed 
futher theoretical consideration and experimentation. 
Nevertheless, it was concluded that self-concept measures 
designed to show whether self-images are personalised or 
based on membership of special schools or institutions, 
might provide a means to index the handicapping (or 
otherwise) effects of such placements, both directly and in 
employment and other situations. 
Chapter 5, in being particularly informal and attempting to 
extend the present principles to self-concept of ability and 
ability measures (an area that requires a thesis on 
its 
own), highlights the preliminary, exploratory methodological 
status of the present work, which throughout has tried to 
find a conceptual fit between a transactional view of 
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development and social identity theory and to Ibegin to apply 
the resultant synthesis in the field of mental retardation. 
Little direct guidance was found in the literature. Brehm, 
Kasein and Gibbons (1981) argue that theirs is the first 
comprehensive presentation of efforts to integrate social 
and developmental psychology. Futhermore, Bronfenbrenner 
(1979) notes the unconventional nature of his conception of 
the individual's environment and Lerner and Busch-Rossnagel 
(1981) cite the recentness of the emergence of the 
transactional view of development, together with its 
theoretical pluralism. Finally, social identity theory is 
still very much in the course of its development (e. g. 
Turner, 1981a, 1984), and indeed, the present approach has 
suggested that the effects on behaviour (as well as on 
self-esteem) particularly of a negative social 
identification, might be one useful direction for future 
consideration. Given this background, it is not surprising 
that the present work is predominantly heuristic, not 
confirmatory (Everitt and Dunn, 1983). 
A great advantage of the present approach, on the other 
hand, is its inherent optimism, since in addition to public 
and professional beliefs, handicap might be alleviated by 
intervention directed at the retardate himself. I agree 
with the Gunzburgs (1973) and zigler (1966), that we 
simply do not know what improvements might arise if they 
experienced a more normal environment and history. Thus, 
perhaps the most important contribution Js that a normal 
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environment, at least in part, cal be conceptualised as a 
psychological state within the individual. It need not wait 
for changes at the macrosystem level, in public policy, 
ideology, or building work to permeate the beliefs of 
others, professional roles or interactions. Rather, a 
normal environment may begin with an emphasis on 
idiosyncratic personal identities as opposed to shared 
social identifications. In this sense, the present approach 
offers a theoretical vehicle for the principles of 
normalisation and personalisation (e. g. Gunzburg and 
Gunzburg, 1973). Furthermore, implementation of present 
ideas do not require extensive financial investment in new 
buildings, increased staffing levels or materials. 
Another advantage in the present approach is its wide 
potential use in other fields and a plethora of exciting 
possiblities for research is envisaged. Informally to name 
just three areas of personal interest, Emler (1984) 
emphasises the importance ofsoduLpsychological (as opposed to 
dispositional factors or mob instincts), in understanding 
deliquency, which he suggests, might be mediated by behaving 
consistently with a reputation. Clearly, this is very close 
to the present approach in which delinquency might represent 
conformity to a social identification. Indeed, a recent BBC 
Nationwide program detailed the success of a scheme being 
piloted in Sheffield, which involves facing young offenders 
with their victims, to whom they have to explain themselves 
and make restitution. In the present view, it is not that 
.0 
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this punishment is more severe than conventional methods 
that deters further crimes, so much as the shift from 
intergroup (criminal-victim) to interpersonal interactions. 
Successful rehabilitation of hardened criminals in last 
resort special units with no bars on the windows, no attempt 
to lock-up potentially dangerous implements and first name 
relations with staff (N. B. the opposite to Zimbardo's 
regime) clearly suggest the present social psychological 
framework might be a source of fascinating research and 
useful application in penology. 
A second, more harrowing area in which the present approach 
might prove fruitful is cancer research and research into 
physical handicap, illness and mental illness in general. 
While methodological and more especially, ethical 
considerations might preclude some investigations, 
particularly in the first area, on a personal note I have 
known 2 people who have died of cancer, one within weeks and 
the other, within months of diagnosis and treatment, and I 
found it impossible not to be struck by the possibility that 
a resultant social identification as a doomed cancer victim 
hastened their deaths. On the other side of the coin, the 
present ideas, linked with medical research, offer 
facinating, exciting and potentially valuable possibilities. 
In very general terms, the discovery of encephalins produced 
in accordance with subjects' beliefs, suggests that changes 
in self-images can perhaps produce chemical effects in the 
human body. Research could reveal whether correlations 
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exist between beliefs and, for example, certain recovery 
rates. If found, the possibility of changing beliefs to aid 
recovery could be explored. Similarly, in the light of both 
academic and popular publications (e. g. Rosenhan, 1969; 
Kesey, 1973) it is interesting to hypothesise that much 
insane behaviour is role determined, legitimated by 
institutionalisation and sometimes even maintained or 
I 
triggered by depersonalised intergroup behaviour of staff. 
Ageing is a third area in which the present approach might 
be fruitful. Schaie and LaBouvie-Vief (1974), for example, 
present serious challenges to the notion of a generalised 
intellectual decline in the elderly, which they demonstrated 
was frequently an artefact of cross-sectional measurement, 
indicative of generational rather than ontogenetic change. 
Within the present framework, behaviour deficits might occur 
with age as a result of an ageing self-definition, rather 
than the ageing process per se. Indeed, in a geriatric unit 
in a Bristol hospital, the primary problem for a number of 
residents was constipation, exacerbated by inactivity. The 
"treatment" was frequently sympathy from relatives, together 
with the advice that they could not expect to feel well at 
their age, and should take it easy (Perry, 1979). 
Clearly, with earlier retirement and longer life expectancy, 
research into psychological as opposed to physical ageing is 
vital, and the present approach might prove invaluable. 
As these examples suggest, the range of application for the 
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present approach is enormous. It could be applied to sex 
differences in behaviour or any instance of what 
Bronfenbrenner calls an ecological transition, for example, 
entering school, marriage, having a baby and so on. Indeed, 
the conceptual distinction between adults and children that 
was mentioned in Chapter 1, might itself be responsible for 
much childish behaviour, and it would be fascinating to 
examine expectations about children, together with their 
self-concepts and behaviour in other cultures. 
At first sight, perhaps this example seems to go too far: 
it is difficult to imagine that children behave childishly 
for any reason other than the fact that they are children, a 
thought which introduces the final, self-referentia. l point 
(which was also one of the first points raised in Chapter 
1) : the pursuit of science itself in many respects 
exemplifies the present framework, the choice of subject 
matter and the interpretation of data depending not on 
objective reality so much as on prevailing world views and 
professional allegiance (Kuhn, 1974). Thus f it is hoped 
that in addition to suggesting a social psychological 
pathway whereby mental retardation might be alleviated, the 
present work has also stressed the socially contructed and 
hence the permeable nature of "scientific fact". 
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For all the coming appendices, raw data and complete 
computer outputs are available. 
2.1 The item pool 
awareness of stigma 
being different 
childlike emotions 
difficulty in communicating 
suffer in institutions 
a social problem 
sometimes shy 
may feel inferior 
extrovert 
outcasts 
can't stand frustration 
must be treated firmly 
discriminated against 
an important part of society 
clinging 
generally happy 
tendency to frustration 
might feel unwanted 
less attractive than normal 






not as clever as normal- 




uncorumun icat Lye 
often set apart in institutions 
might feel rejected 
need loving 
low intelligence 




difficult to employ 
inequality 
treated as aliens 
make me pity 
arouse sympathy 
fits of excitement 
strange 
show a certain innocence 
happy in their own way 
very strong 
can be affectionate 
mentally subnormal. 




need careful looking after 
have feelings 
they like friends 
slow witted 
happy when treated nicely 
awkward 
odd eyes 
treat as equals 
incongrous facial expressions 
numeracy poor 
smile too much 
can be lovable 
craving for love 
misfits 
are people 
a bit trying to parents 
socially unacceptable 
backward 
nice to know 
may be inhibited 
may be one ahead 
lonely 







difficult to provide for 
dependent on other people 
frightening 
group that disconcerts others 
people are afraid 
have exaggerated expressions 
have sparse hair growth 
often withdrawn 
are very loving 
in a class of their own 
socially inept 
scarey 
must be lonely 
should be disciplined 
unpredictable 
normally happy 




might feel backward 
lumbering 
make me feel uneasy 
should go to special schools 
emotionally labile 
tend to be childlike 
are misunderstood 
need a lot of compassion 
need a lot of attention 
look funny 
are ugly 
a danger to society 
surprising if good looking 
can be spiteful 
diff icult to relate to 
might feel self-conscious 
placed in old hospitals 
trying 
probably feel happy 
clean 
sometimes appear morose 
often underestimated 
costly to parents 
are outcasts 
make people uneasy 
need specialised care 
loud 
extremes of mood 
often too sheltered 
more likely to be exploited 
sometimes look very strange 
subject of social taboos 
appear odd 
embarrassing 
can be overpowering 
helpless 
appearance is slightly unusual 
sad 
still human beings 
hard to accept 
isolated 
tend to become introverted 
very trusting 
low general knowledge 
are happy 
gets depressed 






wear old clothes 
can respond to other people 
make me feel self conscious 
helpers must be saints 
want to live like normal people 
bit frightening 
try to be helpful 
may be ignored 




often look unusual 
often rejected by parents 










seem to be overweight 
different 
not as intelligent as normal people 
don't seem to feel self-conscious 
enjoy eachothers company 
helpful 
friendly 
might be friendless 
quiet 
look slow and stupid 
often have low self-esteem 
suffer a lot 
beautiful 
low mental age 
harmless 




clever in their own special way 
gullible 
get over excited 
usually appear dirty 




all look fairly similar 
stand out from others 







lack of concentration 
upset by society's rejection 
react to kindness 
hidden away 
reduced potential for learning 
cannot communicate coherently 
vacant 
try but don't always understand 
tend to shout or talk loudly 
are sometimes uncontrollable 




often with childlike way of life 
difficulty in following arguments 
often bewildered and hurt by others reaction 
can lead a normal life for capabilities 
have to be well looked after 
get frustrated because they can't express needs 
can interpret emotions if not too retarded 
less able to cope with social and intellectual life 
find it hard to adjust to society 
probably register more than we realise 
are people and need to be treated as such 
not able to particpate in normal society 
should be in a home environment where possible 
perhaps feel insecure because have to rely on others 
can find a place to fit in and do a useful job 
need people with a lot of patience 
feeling of inadequacy in self as should do more for them 
often felt they should be locked away 
difficult to assess how aware they are 
bring them into ordinary work as much as possible 
usually feel lonely as many don't take notice of them 
should be treated as normally as possible 
have to rely on other people 
might appear frightening to others 
couldn't live with someone like that 
slower to respond in most situations 
not discriminating in their relationships 
not equipped with normal social skills 
I feel sorry for them because I have more intelligence 
show them you have affection as with any child 
communicate more by physical contact than normal 
liable to abuse, physical or mental 
not able to work things out for themselves 
are demanding on their families 
never forget they're human beings 
they are humans no matter how they look 
should not be swept under the social carpet 
for many, hospital is the only place 
often used in describing children 
unawareness of other people 
alarming to meet for first time 
may still be very bright and should not be humiliated 
can hurt people when they grab them but don't realise 
have childish simplicity in reasoning 
sometimes frightening to younger people 
some have no control over their actions 
can be happy in a secure environment 
if severe, unable to live in the9 community 
might have no control over their actions 
make people feel guilty 
society has a responsibility to them 
often see things more clearly than we do 
it's important to train them to integrate 
great strain to parents unless family is united and 
like to join clubs and meet friends 
physically identical to normal people 
often their physical appearance puts people of f 
need a great deal of contact and security 
let them mix with other children under supervision 
have problems with social relationships 
unaware of someone else's feelings 
inability to cope with normal classroom situaton 
can often tell by physical appearance that they are 
simple but genuine in their affection 
shouldn't be trained but left to develop in whatever 
have own personality like anyone else 
difficult to understand their speech 
given company, retarded child likely to get better 
may have difficulty in communicating 
poor conceptual knowledge on entering school 
never thought of as growing old 
if I met one, I would try to be friendly 
slow development in relation to normal 
stopped developing earlier than usual 
they like to do things for themselves 
keep the same mental age groups together 
sometimes appear likely to freak out 
have more to offer than most realise 
more integration so normal people meet them 
often have poor motor coordination 
can be intelligent but not in some ways 
found embarrassing by normal people 
appearance probably normal except a little untidy 
car ing 
retarded 
way they can 
often have a lot of love for people willing to be friendly 
feel very upset about how they differ from others 
respond lovingly by grabbing your hand 
may not be able to look after themselves completely 
hidden in special schools, when integration into the 
community would help 
would be able to run about the same'as normal people 
have few concepts of good and bad 
may show socially inappropriate reactions 
to be able to get on with things in their own way 
happier than a lot of ordinary people 
susceptible to exploitation e. g. prostitution 
haven't got as much intelligence as us 
often stronger than normal people 
if I met one, I would make them feel happy 
can't really enjoy the things we enjoy 
have not found success as measured by exams 
send to special schools if badly retarded 
-iv- 
usually stand out from others 
criminal tendencies, kublic should be 
one feels they show more contentment 
mostly look happy as they don't know 
safeguarded 
with life at times 




Poor text in the original 
thesis. 
Some text bound close to 
the spine. 
Some images distorted 
1 CC JPATIOIV AGE SEX 
narr 1 1n ý. ý 







friendly ; s s unfriendly 
healthy unhealthy 
valuable worthless 
relaxing to be with : s upsetting to be with 
loving cold 
over-estimated under-estimated 
ugly s s good-looking 
speech clear s s : : speech unclear or impeded 
dependent s independent 
frustrated s contented 
active ss : s p. )ssive 
unable to cope ss s s s s able to cope 
good at concentrating bad at concentrating 
lonely not lonely 
moody even-tempered 
easy to relate to difficult to relate to 
family's pride ss :, 
_ _: s s 
family's shame 
unemployable s s S employable 
predictable behaviour t unpredictable behaviour 
self-content 
,: _ tý s s S would 
like to be different 
welt dressed 
_ _ __ __" 
badly dressed 
childlike ss t s s mature 
frequently ill ss s s s resistant to illness 
quick SS S S i ! slow 
over-protected ss ; s undet-protected 
understood misunderstood 
embarrassing s: s : s soothing 
strong s : s weak 
nod. at exp essin meaning or desires s s s 
bad at ex r s. i meaning or 
edesizgces 
sad s s : happy 
attractive friend unattractive friend 
introvert extrovert 




1'velopmettt dr_rtertni, ne ý development. shaped by f roan ýý rt i env] rc men 
. vim 
like others in the APPENDIX 77707ont. II C uýý, - 
same social group the same social group 
asset to society hurdom to society 
confident ;s hesitant. 
low intelligence high int. elligence 
sexually permissive sexually restrained 
sensitive to others in sensitive to others 
excitable calm 
high self -e em 1 ow self -est: eern 
repulsive lovable 
cheering depres ri. l 
confused thinker clear thinker 
ich family hackiround poor family hackcjround 
knowin7 rightW om Vot ýnowinq right from 
I simple s : ___": complicated 
aggressive ssss not aggressive 
.0 , pod. at concentrating s easily distracted 
nice s nasty 
accident prone always careful/never hurt 
wanted ss unwanted 
vulnerable tough 
aide general knowledge ssss limited general knowled(je 
aliacceptable neighbour ss: acceptable neighbour 
well treated ss:: s hard done by 
untidy tidy 
socially skilled ss 
____s ss socially 
inept 
unusual appearance ssss normal appearance 
wanting to join in preferring to be alone 




fine facial features coarse facial features 
controlled by others controlled by self 
or Fate 
" popular friendless 
dangerous safe 
strain for family tonic for family 
nasty to live with nice to live with 
predictable personality unpredictable personality 
helpless capable 
unhelpful helpful 
demanding ; undo mandin"7 
"Chankyou for co-operating. ploase check that you have rnoL missed any items. 
, 
Finally, please indicate if you are personally acquainted iLh any Member Iof the target group. YES 
} NO 
APPENDIX 2.3 
Instructions for completing 
the semantic differential 
. INSTRUCTIONS 
The purpose of this study is to measure the meaning of certain things by getting 
various people to judge them against a series of descriptive scales. 
You will be given a list of scales and a target word to be judged on each of the 
scales in order. Please judge what the target MEANS TO YOU PERSONALLY, AND NOT 
what you think it ought to m9an, or what MIGHT BE MORE TRUE OR ACCURATE. 
Don't puzzle over scales because your first impressions are wanted - On the 
other hand please don't be careless, since it's important to have a true picture 
of your beliefs. 
Make each scale a separate item, uninfluenced by any others. Don't try to 
remember how you checked similar scales earlier. Don't look back and forth 
through the scales. 
Here is how to use the scales: 
If you feel the word you are given is very closely related to one end of the 
scale, place your check mark so: 
fair X: 00 : unfair 
or so 
fair s: X: unfair 
ý, ý. 
If you feel the word is somewhat related to one end of the scale, place your 
check mark so: 
fair :X:: unfair 
or so 
fair X: unfair 
If you feel the word is neutral on the scale, (equally related to both sides) 
or altogether unrelated to the scale, place your checkmark in the middle space, 
fair X=: unfair 
ý-ýa ,. r 
IMPORTANT 
Place your checkmarks in the middle of spaces, not on boundaries. 
2. Be sure to check every scale. 
3. Never put more than one checkmark on a single scale. 
4. Make sure you have filled in your name, age, sex and occupation before 
starting. 
2.4a One ? actor completely randomised ANOVA 
was appropyciate to test whether mean differences in beliefs 
between groups along individual semantic differential items 
were due to sampling error or likely to indicate that the 
groups came from different populations. BMDP7D provided the 
relevant statistical package. 
The theoretical justification for using parametric 
statistics to assess intensity of beliefs as opposed to 
evaluation was discussed in sections 7.2.1 and 7.4 of 
Chapter 2. In addition, data should satisfy 3 assumptions: 
1. groups should have homogeneous variances, although 
McCall (1970) states that moderate violations of this 
assumption have little impact. P7D, however, automatically 
compares variances and offers an adjustment if they are 
unequal. 2. groups should be independent - which was 
achieved by random sampling and using different subjects for 
each. 3. distributions of data should be normal for each 
group. According to McCall (1970) and Siegel (1956) only 
severe violations of this assumption affect results, 
although as Siegel points out, there is no agreement as to 
what constitutes "serious". Hence parametric analyses were 
used unless there was a theoretical reason to expect 
departures from normality. Many such analyses were 
performed, for example, to test the effects of acquaintance 
for lay subjects, psychologists and teachers or (with six 
levels), the effect of age. Only 1 summary table showing 
the effect of contact for lay subjects on item 77 
"nice/nasty to live with" is given below. 
/ 
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2.4b The Sign Test 
Overall differences in evaluation between groups (or in 
later analyses, conditions) are assessed using the Sign 
Test, which rests on the single assumptiön that the variable 
of interest (evaluation) is continuously distributed. This 
is appropriate because, as discussed in sections 7.2.1 and 
7.4 of chapter 2, semantic differential scores are not 
hypothesised to load equally on evaluation. That is, a 
score of 1 might be twice as "intense" as 2 on "happy/sad" 
but not necessarily twice as "good" -- it being possible to 
say that it is better, but not how much better. Greenbaum 
and Wang (1965) also used the Sign Test in this way. 
The Sign Test examines the directional difference between 
scores on matched pairs in two conditions, for example 
between scores on the same semantic differential item, given 
by unacquainted and acquainted lay subjects. In this case, 
the relevant (1 tailed) null hypothesis is that the 
probability that the score for acquainted subjects is 
smaller (i. e. more positive) - 1/2 on any item. This may 
be tested using the binomial theorem, or when the number of 
pairs is greater than 25, the normal approximation to the 
binomial distribution, in which z=x- .5 -1/2N divided by 
1/2 toot N (where x is the number of smaller acquainted 
scores, N the number of pairs and .5 the correction 
for 
continuity, subtracted because x is greater than 1/2 N. See 
Siegel, 1956). Many such analyses were performed: for 
example, using the data from Table 2.1, page 86, where 
-x- 
acquainted subjects Iare more positive on 71/81 items, z= 
5.5 and according to normal distribution tables, the 
probability of such an extreme score is (. 0001. 
-xi -- 
2.4c Factor Analysis 
In addition to differences in intensity on individual items 
and overall evaluation, it was thought that beliefs might be 
underpinned by different, higher-order dimensions. For 
example, a medical perspective might underpin psychologists' 
beliefs on a number of variables. R type factor analysis 
(based on correlations between pairs of variables rather 
than subjects) was appropriate to explore this idea, since 
it assumes the existence of a set of variates, or factors, 
which are sufficient to account for the interrelation 
between observered variables, (e. g. Maxwell, 1977; Everitt 
and Dunn, 1983; Kim and Mueller, 1978; Van de Geer, 1971; 
Morrison, 1967; Kerlinger, 1969; Gorsuch, 1983). 
Futhermore, as discussed in section 7.2.2 of Chapter 2, its 
use with the semantic differential has been extensive. 
However, it must be stressed from the onset that its use in 
the present context is merely preliminary i. e. to see 
whether factor solutions can add meaning and richness to the 
primary (unidimensional) analyses, and hence, whether they 
are worth persuing in future research. 
BMDP4M provided a suitable statistical program, however, 
since the present work load has been heavy, time has only 
permitted familiarisation with the conceptual bases of the 
technique together with the first principles of matrix 
algebra and factor extraction rather than with calculating 
algorithms, which even the experts (e. g. Gorsuch, 1983) 
describe as formidably complex. Indeed,. consultation of the 
cited works transformed use of the powerful factor analysis 
-xii- 
package into a subjective experience that must parallel that 
of the Sorcerer's Apprentice. For these reasons, the method 
advocated by the BMDP programmers, which is also that 
recommended by Gorsuch (1983) for preliminary exploratory 
analyses, has been adopted. Thus, initial factors were 
extracted using principal components analysis. This makes 
no assumptions regarding data structure, and is not based on 
an underlying factor model, the parameters of which are to 
be estimated. Rather, it is a mathematical technique for 
reducing the dimensionality of observed data. In practical 
terms, this means that the variance--covariance matrices to 
be factored are unadjusted and therefore have diagonal 
elements that are unity, that is, self correlations which 
are equivalent to variances. It is, however, worth noting 
Gorsuch's (1983) remark that with 30 variables or more " as 
is the case in all present analyses - this model differs 
little from others, because diagonal elements form a smaller 
proportion of the matrix so whether or not they are adjusted 
has less impact. 
At this point, a note on terminology is helpful: "factor 
analysis" refers to the class of techniques concerned with 
discovering latent factor variates which account for 
observed variation in (a larger number) of responses. 
Writers like Gorsuch, (1983) describe principal components 
analysis (PCA) as based on a full-component as opposed to a 
common factor model of factor analysis and indeed, the 
arrangement of the BMDP package reflects this hierachical 
-xiii- 
conception. Confusion arised because different experts 
(e. g. Maxwell, 1978; Chatfield and Collins, 1980) employ 
different terminology, conceptualising PCA as distinct from 
factor analysis. The latter term, they reserve for the more 
complex technique of estimating the parameters of underlying 
factors assumed to account for the correlation between 
observed variables. In short, confusion is avoided if it is 
remembered that "factor analysis" in this thesis is used in 
its general sense and specifically refers to principal 
components. 
The method derives a first component (or factor) which is a 
linear combination of variables, accounting for more 
variance than any other combination. The second component 
accounts for as much as possible of the residual variance 
and so on. 
Although an underlying factor structure produces a unique 
pattern of correlations, the reverse is not the case (Kim 
and Mueller, 1978) and many statistically equivalent 
solutions may be derived from the same variance-covariance 
matrix. In order to obtain a simpler solution, therefore, 
Varimax (orthogonal) rotation was performed, which is an 
entirely empirical method of maximising (and minimising) the 
loading of variables on the derived components. Being 
orthogonal, this had the advantage of being less costly in 
computer time, easier to interpret and more important, it is 
appropriate to semantic differential scores, which were 
originally hypothesised to represent loci in terms of 
-xiv- 
uncorrelated cognitive dimensions (see Chapter 2, part 7.2.2 
and Osgood et al, 1957). 
BMDP automatically yields components or factors with 
eigenvalues of aVleast 1 (which ensures they account for 
atlleast as much variance as a single variable). However, in 
the interests of clarity, rotated solutions were examined to 
determine the minimum number of components accounting most 
meaningfully for the bulk of variance. Following Gorsuch 
(1983), 75% was taken as a useful cutoff, particularly when 
additional factors (components) explained little more 
variance. In addition, a rough intuitive scree test was 
performed, in that eigenvalues (ranked according to size) 
were visually scrutinised for a cutpoint below which 
decreases were compar&tively small. New eigenvalues were 
then specified to yield this number of factors in terminal 
solutions, which were computed in the way described above. 
At this point, since studies 4 and 5 have more variables than 
-Sub je. cks ,a note on sample size is appropriate: writers 
like Lawley and Maxwell (1971,1973) for example, suggest as 
a rule of thumb, that the number of subjects should be at 
least the number of variables F 51. Similarly, Gorsuch, 
(1983) suggests a ratio of 5 to 10 subjects per variable, 
although he remarks that there is no generally recognised 
criterion. More generally speaking, the number of variables 
should be less than the number of subjects for multivariate 
techniques, and indeed, Cattell, (1978) describes this point 
as the "extreme indeterminancy". It must however, be 
-xv- 
stressed that these comments apply to "classical" factor 
analyses (i. e. the common factor model) and not to 
principal components analysis, as used here: In the course 
of a technical exposition of the underlying matrix algebra, 
Chatfield and Collins, (1980) explain that the reason for 
having more subjects than variables is to avoid 
singularities. This, however, is not relevant to PCA since 
Lk does not involve matrix inversion. To illustrate, they 
write : 
As another example of the use of PCA in reducing 
dimensionality, one of the authors recently attempted a 
discriminant analysis where data consisted of two 
groups of ten observations on 28 highly correlated 
variables. As the number of observations is less than 
the number of variables, there will be unpleasant 
singularity problems unless the dimensionality is 
drastically reduced. A PCA revealed two important 
dimensions and an effective discriminant function was 
constructed using these two new variables rather than 
the original 28. 
1980, p. 76. 
Furthermore, they also suggest the use of PCA to reduce the 
number of variables for "classical" factor analysis. In 
other words, PCA is simply a mathematical method for 
reducing the dimensionality of observed data. 
In addition, PCA does not involve assuming the existence of 
an underlying model and estimating its parameters. For this 
reason too, it is appropriate with smaller samples. Third, 
Gorsuch (1983) remarks that the strength of the phenomenon 
determines the replicability of factors, and primary 
analyses suggested the effects of social identification were 
indeed strong. Furthermore, the PCA's actually carried out 
-xvi- 
were often consistent iwith these, and therefore, 
cross-validated to some extent, and sometimes, they were 
also theoretically enlightening. Finally, in personal 
consultation, Bristol University Computer Centre's 
Statistical Advisor suggested that the real justification of 
PCA on the sample sizes actually used, is in the sense and 
fruitfulness of results. 
Because factor analysis was desired for exploratory rather 
than confirmatory purposes, derivation of the underlying 
variates was the end and further analyses were not 
undertaken. More exacting use including perhaps that of Q 
techniques and common factor models, must await future 
theoretical development of the present approach together 
with greater personal mathematical expertise. 
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2.4d Two factor ANOVA 
was used to examine directly the relationship between 
occupation (with 3 levels) and personal contact (2 levels), 
to see whether the mean differences in beliefs between 
psychologists, lay subjects and teachers, already implied by 
the previous analyses, represented population differences or 
sampling error, and whether occupation and contact 
interacted as hypothesised. BMDP2V provided the appropriate 
statistical program, and the assumptions underlying its use 
are the same as for one factor anova (discussed in appendix 
2.4a) with the addition that factors are assumed to be 
fixed, not random. By definition, contact has 2 fixed 
levels and the occupations were designated that is, "fixed" 
rather than randomly selected (see McCall, 1970). One 
summary table, for item 1 "trusting/wary" is presented. 
AgOVA S2ntctt: 4 fa-6(e- 8'6 Wt nq I Wn scri 4f +'c 1J k Ma ;n £4 th cud- 
I f*m4ti on 
occ aJlon anon tont-ckU on ifem 1w S(v 1. 
SOuRC-6 SUM OF DEGREES OF 
SQUARES FREEDOM 
1314.2 8611 
O, r-" 1 $Op4 12.61533 
wPTACT 4.09377 
1ora1tAt'ttoN 3.76836 

















- O. 194Ä 0.78 '0.4611; 
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2.4e T teste 
Where two factor ANOVA indicated a eignýNficant difference 
between occupational groups, it was desir able to test 
whether (as hypothesised) this was due to the psychologists. 
Thus T tests, which are specifically designed to test for 
differences between two means, were run on each item between 
each possible pair of groups. The assumptions are the same 
as those underlying one factor ANOVA (appendix 2.4a) and 
BMDP3D provided the appropriate program. Just one example 
table is given - that for psychologists versus lay people on 
"relaxing/upsetting to be with". 
T test neon. s, 9nZpea 4Wexnct JddQan M4Ao (o3c'SNS a^d1 (a !' °i- 
on Zlem M Sh. 4 1. 
************ * X(10) * VARIABLE tJUMBER 10 ************ i:. e, rroýsio. b(o. qý 





0.42 0.6 737 70.4 
0.38 0.7075 449 
4.37 0.0371 1* 449 
GROUP 1 PROF 
M) 
3 LAY 
MEAN 4.9231 4.8445 
STD DEV 1.2342 1.4409 
S. E. M. 0.1712 0.0721 
SAMPLE SIZE 52 399 
MAXIMUM 7.0000 7.0000 
MINIMUM 1.0000 1.0000 
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2.4f Chi Square 
The Chi-square test makes no assumptions regarding the 
nature of data, except that observations are independent. 
It is used to test whether a significant difference exists 
between the number of responses falling into various 
categories and the numbers expected on the basis of a null 
hypothesis. Chi square is simply the sum of the square of 
each difference between the observed and expected value, 
divided by the expected value. The known sampling 
distribution of chi-square is then consulted with degrees of 
freedom given by the number of categories minus 1 to obtain 
the (2 tailed) probability of any computed value. (Siegel, 
1956). 
For example, using the data on page 132, chi square was used 
to test whether the number of most positive responses 
falling into each of the 6 age groups differs from the 
number expected by chance (i. e. one sixth). Chi-square = 
26.6 with d. f = 5, p <. 0001. 
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APPENDIX 3.0 
The CHES Questionnaire 
based on the semantic 
differential for Study 1 
Two sets of scales or profiles are provided. Please complete the first profile in accordance with your own 
concept of an average l1 year old child attending an ordinary school and of the same sex as the study child. 
Work. at fairly high speed through these scales. Do not worry or puzzle over individual items. It is your first 
impressions, your immediate "feelings" about the items that we want. On the other hand, try not to be 
superficial, because we want your true impressions. We realise that it may be difficult to picture an `average' 
child. However, it is your impressions that we are interested in. Please fill in the scales as best as you can. 
PROFILE OF AVERAGE CHILD OF 11 YEARS 
sensitive to others 
obstructive 
strain for family 




badly dressed, unkempt 
accident prone 
aggressive 





popular with peers 
sad 
persevering 
good at expressing self 
very immature 
predictable 
easy to relate to 

























_. _ " _. _.. __.. ___: ___ 
...... 
.... _. -. _. -. -. _.. _ 
...... 
.. " _. a.. _..... _.: ý:.. __: ___ .. a 
.. 
.... 
insensitive to others 
helpful 
easy for family 
preferring not to join in 
physically attractive 
socially inept 
not easily distractable 
well dressed, tidy 
always careful 
not aggressive 





unpopular with peers 
happy 
unpersevering 
bad at expressing self 
mature 
unpredictable 
difficult to relate to 
bad at concentrating 
not easily frustrated 
independent 
speech unclear or impeded 
lazy 
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Semantic differential for 
Study 2 
SLIDE NO. 






over dependent, helpless 
frustrated 
good at concentrating 
physically handicapped 
family's pride 
easy to relate to 
predictable 





good at expressing self 
sad "' ' " " 





: " " 
low intelligence _ __ _ _ _ 
excitable 
high self esteem 
confused thinker : ý_ 





_: _"_"_"_"_"_ socially skilled for age 
strange facial appearance 
wanting to join in 
strain for family ý'ý" "r" " "ý 
nasty to live with , _ 
_ _" 
" " ^"ý 
obstructive __ _ _ 
normal 
sensitive to others :" : ý: ý: 






prone to illness 
speech unclear or impeded 
wants to take care of self 
contented 
bad at concentrating, 
physically normal 
family's shame 
difficult to relate to 
unpredictable 





bad at expressing self 
happy 
distractable 






low self esteem 
clear thinker 
unaware of right and wrong 
not aggressive 
always careful, never hurt 
unwanted 
tidy 
socially inept for age 
normal facial appearance 
preferring not to join in 
easy for family 
nice to live with 
helpful, well meaning 
abnormal 
insensitive to others, living in 'own 
little world' 
welcome to live next door 
3.3a One factor ; 
omployed 
ompletely randomised analysis of variance 
using BMDP7D was to test whether (1) mean perceived 
intergroup differences on each variable between subjects in 
labelled and unlabelled conditions and (2) labelling effects 
on each variable for each target were due to chance factors. 
Since the situation is analogous to that described in 
Appendix 2.4a, further justification will not be undertaken. 
3.3b Two factor completely randomised analysis of variance 
was used to examine the effect of personal contact and 
condition on intergroup differences in a manner analogous to 
Appendix 2.4d. 
3.3c Two factor analysis of variance including a repeated measure 
was appropriate to analyse intraclass differences. The 
first factor was between subjects with 2 levels: label vs 
no label. The second, target type, also had two levels 
(normal vs subnormal) but was within subjects - i. e. a 
repeated measure, each subject yielding a score for both. 
3.3d Three factor ANOVA including a repeated measure 
was appropriate simultaneously to examine the effect of 
personal contact on intraclass differences, and was added to 
the foregoing design. BMDP2V performed the appropriate 
calculations and an example summary table for each type 
follows. 
Analyses for the subsidiary experiment followed exactly the 
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a. MFýli"Aý Di4 ýý1OJ AU' c; uifJR'IA ITY - OPIN I1rtJ, Sýan QuT RFTAPr, 4TFc 
poorly co-ordinataIJl : _: _: _: _: _ graceful, agile quieto uuncommunic, 3tive4+_: _: _: 
: 
_: _: _ noisyf chatty 
secuureu : _: ": _: _: _ 
insecure 




_: _; _: 
; 
_; _ prone 
to illness 
speech clears : _: _: _: 
: 
_: _ speech unclear or 
impedes 
dependent, helolessö: : 
_: _: _: _: _ 
independento can care of self 
frust ratedd_: _: _: _: _: _: _ 
yooJ at con cen trat inj Gi : _: _"_: _: 1: _ 
physically handicapped : _: 
f 
fam i ly's_ prilec3_: _: _: 
; 
_; _; _ 
easy to relate toG_: _: : _: _: 
: 
_ predi ctab e3 : _: 
: 
_: _: _: _ 
chi l"ili ke`V, 
= quick learners :__: _: _: _: v 
contented 
bad at concentrat iny. di stractable 
physically normal 
family's shame 




protected an. i provided for by not protected and provided for by 




ý.. '= well understooJ(poorly understood 
embarrassingý? : ; _; _; _; _: _ soothing '. º good at expressing self ý: _: _: _; _; _: _ 
bad at expressing self 
.,. ýý sad4 : _: _: 
: 
_: _; _ 
happy 
{ attractive as a friend7_: _: not attractive as a 
friend 
dirty 
Kfriyhteniny4 : _; ; 
_; 
_; _; _ not 
frightening 
development was fixed by birth : _: _" 
development shaped by environment 
asset to societyburden to society 
^ _"low intellijence6_: 
': 
_: _: _: _: _ 
high intelligence 
"; - rather alike4l_: 
2x exci tabLe4 : _; _; 
: 
_: _: _ high self esteem4 : _: 
: 
_: _: _ confused thinker6 
knowing right from wron. _: _: _: 
/: 
_: _: _ 
agyre ssivad_: _: _: 
: 
_: _: _ 
-'accident orone7_: _: __. __: _: _: _ 
very different to eachother 
calm, stable 
low self esteem 
clear thinker 
unaware of right and wrong 
not aggressive 
always careful, never hurt 
wantecil "_" "" unwanted 
unacceptable neijhboür : _: 
; 
_; _: _; _ acceptable neighbour badly iressed, unkemipt3_: _: _: _: 
: 
_: _ well 
dressed, tidy 
"=ý socially skille,: O_: _: _: : 
: 
_: _ socially 
inept 
abnor r1 faci at appearance5_: _: _: _, "_: _: _ \. /wanting to join inL: _: _; _: _: _: _ 
menta Ltyi LL'_" "_: ýý: _; _"_ 
strain for familyCc: : _: _: _: _: _ nýisty to live with : _; _; 
; 
_: _; _ k obst ructi v« : _: _; '': _: _: _ 
sensitive to others4: _: _: 
: 
_: _: _ 
normal facial appearance 
preferring not to join in 
mentally stable, sane 
easy for family member 
nice to live with 
helpful. well meaning 
abnormal 
insensitive to others 
Should he in special clshould be taught in normal classes 
please give your name, aJe, sex ---- ------ 
do you know any retardates ----ýýý---- 
5c2ý+cP ýa ý' ý, výcicýccj ;, j; ýj 4i .- Ut 10 AO 
APPENDIX 4.1 
Semantic differential for 
Studies 3 and 4 
ICA 
4.2a Three factor ANOVA including a repeated measure 
tested the effects of personal acquaintance (2 levels, 
between subjects), sex (2 levels, between subjects) and 
predicted social identification (3 levelp, within subjects) 
in a manner analogous to that described in Appendix 3.3c. 
An example summary table is given below. The effect of 
actual contact on predictions was similarly examined. 
4.2b, 4.2c and 4.2d 
One factor completely randomised ANOVA tested the effects of 
personal contact on subjects' own beliefs, exactly as in 
Appendix 2.4a, and factor analysis explored the hypothesis 
that expectations about social identifications prevailed at 
multidimensional levels, as descrbed in Appendix 2.4c. Once 
Hare, sign tests assessed overall differences in evaluation. 
room fiJk skowl d sg, ca tL M6i C#ect of -Pre dý cko( socA dt 
.'cxC. onýG. 
t i nkM eh OE Lo n ýk, 46 "3l4ktoll sko J( not 6Q. err specti dt c ues 
ýouRCý I SUMM OF DEGREES OF MEAN F TAIL 
SQUARES FREEDOM SQUARE PROBABILIT 
2026.33346 1 2026.33846 419.91 0.0000 
s5ý 4.59487 1 4.59487 0.95 0.3382 
e41JTAC'T' 5.39259 1 5.39259 1.12 0.3002 
sxC 25.01652 1 25.01652 5.18 0.0313 
9XILPt 125.46667 26 4.82564 
IOEPT. 45.74676 2 22.87338 8.11 0.0009 
»x5 3.77753 2 1.88877 0.67 0.5163 
lpxC 3.76614 2 1.88307 0.67 0.5173 
sPxSxt 8.98323 2 4.49162 
1.59 0.2132 
EpQ L 46.68571 52 2.82088 
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4.4a Sensitivity (area) measures 
were computed using a program in Bristol University's 
Psychology Department statistical library. An example is 
given below. 
Roti calaýorýes ro. z t {tom ,. cý, rFaýn4ý reh cl¢ý" - 
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J THERE- ARE--6- R4TING CATEGORIES FOR--"THIS DATA- SET 
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Mann Whitney's U 
tested whether subjects in medical and personal conditions 
differed in their ability to distinguish retarded from 
normal targets (2 tailed test) and whether those in the 
former condition were more biassed towards classifying 
targets retarded when in doubt (1 tailed). This test was 
appropriate because it makes no assumptions respecting the 
distribution of scores, which need only be at an ordinal 
level of measurement. The null hypotheses were simply the 
probability that (1) sensitivity scores in one condition are 
higher than those in the other - 1/2 and (2) response bias 
scores in the medical condition are smaller (more biassed) 
1/2. 
To find U in each case, scores from both conditions were 
ranked in order of size, and U is the total number of times 
a score in the medical condition is preceded by a score in 
the personal. (See Siegel, (1956). The normal 
approximation to the sampling distribution of U gives the 
probability for the occurance of the computed U under the 
null hypothesis. For convenience, caculations were 
performed with the help of BMDP3S and relevant figures were 
given in section 8.3 of chapter 4" page 294. 
4.4c Sign Tests 
assessed overall differences in evaluation between 
conditions and males and females, and (4.4d) 2 factor 
completely andomised ANOVA assessed the effects of condition 
(medical vs. personal, 2 levels, between subjects) and 
method of testing (group vs. individual, 2 levels between 
-xxxz- 
subjects) and the significance of sex and contact effects 
within conditions in a manner analogous to that described in 
Appendix 2.4b and 2.4d. 
4.4e Variance ratios 
were examined using F distribution tables to see whether 
conformity was greater in medical as opposed to personal 
conditions. However, statistical variance was found to be 
inappropriate as a measure of behavioural conformity, as 
discussed in section 8.4 of chapter 4 p. 310 and section 
4.4 of chapter 5, p. 416. 
4.4f and 4.4g 
Chi square tested whether condition and method of testing 
were independent in their effects on overall evaluation as 
described in Appendix 2.4f. Factor analysis explored 
multi-dimensional structure of beliefs in medical as opposed 
to personal conditions. 
- x+ý ýº- 
5.1 Preliminary treatment questionnaires 
The Personal Treatment 
I'm finding out all about different people, and I'd like you to 
help with these questions. 
My name is ........................ 
I am ............. years old. My date of birth is ........................... 
I have ............. brothers and ............... sisters. My favourite pop group is ................................. 
My favourite TV programme is .............................. I live in .............................. My hobby is ............................................... I sometimes go: 
skating to the disco to the pictures 
to club to church to scouts or guides or, b9ys 
to the library 
I ................ listening to records My father's job is ...................... When I leave school I would like to be ................... 
The Pupil Treatment 
I'm finding out about people at Florence Brown school and about 
people in your group. I'd like you to help with these questions. 
I have been at Florence Brown School for .......................... 
I am in ................... 's group 
I came to Florence Brown School because ..................... Here's a list of the people in your group. We'll read them 
tonether and I want you to tell .re. who you Like- best. 
Here's your group's timetable 
My group likes .......................... best My group does craft on ................. My group thinks the good thing about being in S7 
is ................... 
5.2 Semantic Differential Instructions 
The next questions all look the same. 
This is how they work 
A question about how happy you feel would look like this: 
I am happy -' '- -=-=-ý- 
I am sad 
If you don't know if you're a happy or a sad person, you'd make a 
cross in the middle: 
I am happy -=--: --x: --: --: -- 
I am sad 
If you are usually a happy person, you would make a mark towards 
the happy end and if you are usually a sad person, you would make 
a mark in a box towards the sad end. 
If you are always very happy, your mark would look like this: 
I am happy I am sad 
If you are always very sad, your mark would look like this : 
I am happy -=- -'-=-=-ý--X 
I am sad 
If you are nearly always happy, you'd make a mark like this: 
-xxxii 
i- 
I am happy I am sad 
If you are nearly always sad, you'd make a mark like this: 
I am happy I am sad 
If you are usually quite happy, you'd make a mark like this 
I am happy I am sad 
If you are usually a bit sad , you'd make a mark like this I am happy -'- -: --:.. 
ä: 
--: - 
I am sad 
5.3 A note on the self-image instrument 
No published self-concept measure seemed relevant to the 
present interest in retardate social identification, so 
reluctantly, one had to be devised. In its development, 
however, the benefit of the present theoretical approach was 
reaped. 
Self-concept was defined as the total of an individual's 
thoughts about himself, and conceptualised in the form of a 
constellation of attitudes, (see chapter 3.2). As an aside, 
it seems impossible that a single instrument could ever 
encompass this for an individual, let alone a group or 
society but fortunately, present intentions were less 
ambitious, confined to whether experimental treatments could 
enhance a retardate, or more specifically, special school 
social identification. Thus, the present instrument needed 
only to concern relevant aspects of self-image at the time 
of testing. 
A semantic differential format was chosen and the search for 
items began. 
1. Items with mean scores >5<3 and s. d. <1.3 were chosen 
from Study 1 as being most relevant, apart from three 
-xxxiv- 
relating to employment prospects, neuroticiem and 
abnormalityywhich were of little interest. 
2. Most important, items relating to "group belongingness". 
- perceived intragroup similarity, empathy and liking were 
added. 
The next stage was to translate the items into a 
counterbalanced semantic differential-type self image 
measure, that was suitable for ESN children. Intuition was 
freely used, and help was gleaned from published 
instruments, which, incidentally, seemed to be covered by 
the present item pool, with the exception of self -esteem, 
about which 3 items were added. 
At this stage, I was asked to help devise an instrument as 
part of a large research program, directed by Dr. Pomeroy 
at Bristol University's Department of Child Health and 
hence, the item pool was the basis for the Avon School 
Leavers Pupil Questionnaire, (Appendix. 5.5). 
The prototype semantic differential and its instructions 
were piloted on a handful of pupils at Florence Brown 
school. Osgood et al (1957) had recommended only 5 s. d. 
categories for use with retardates, but 7 apeared to be 
suitable. Much phraseology needed simplifying - an 
operation in which the teachers proved invaluable, and a 
couple of items they were interested in, were added. 
Similarly, their help was instrumental in constructing and 
piloting experimental treatments. 
_x xxv_ 
A second pilot was run before the final form as confirmed. 
Before leaving this note, two points need brief discussion. 
First, validity concerns the ability of a test to measure 
what it purports. In the present case, criteria of face and 
content validity and, to some extent, concurrent validity 
against a variety of other instruments are met a priori. 
Predictive and construct validity for the time being, remain 
somewhat circular, since if the predicted results support 
the expected relation between theoretical constructs, this 
is as much a validation of the theory as the instrument. 
Second, reliability, which concerns consistency and accuracy 
of an instrument, is not strictly relevant for present 
purposes. Indeed, stable results on a test designed to 
capture changes in self image, would indicate invalidity. 
Given more resources, of course, it might be possible to 
attempt to reconstruct the same testing conditions and look 
for correlations between test results, although intra 
individual changes in coping strategies, for example, could 
never be eliminated. Similarly, no alternative form of 
the present test exists, and there is no clear unitary 
underlying construct to accommodate split half reliability. 
_mvý 
5.4 Tbc Sc«. -b»ge kuüwncw d 
I'm easy to got on with _.; . _; __; - 
I'm hard to pot on with 
my group doesn't understand me - my group understands me 
my family is proud of me __J --.. º - my 
family Isn't proud of me 
sometimes I Just do things . _.: - pooplo always 
know 
without thinking what I'm going to do 
I'm childish ... j 
I'm adult 
my other school was awful my other school was good 
people like me people don't like me 
people In my class don't help _; 
people in my class help 
oachothor oachothor 
kids on the street don't kids on the street 
like me like me 
I'm clever I'm not Wovor 
I trust people easily _; 
I don't trust people easily 
I'm good at things like - 
I'm clumsy at things like 
dancing or P. E. dancing or P. E. 
my group &I fool the same __; __j 
_- wo don't fool the same 
about a lot of things about a lot of things 
I'm cleverer than my parents _ 
I'm not as clever as my parositz 
think I am think I am 
I am good looking _; _; .JJJJ-f am not good 
looking 
my group doesn't like me -: _, _; j my group 
likos me 
people know what I'm saying people don't know what I'm saying 
I like people looking after I like looking aftor 
MO myself 
I'm moody __' __. _. _ 
I'm not moody 
I don't know why Im at this ___j _j 
I do know why I'm at this 
school school 
kids on the street don't kids on the street do 
understand me understand me 
l got angry ff ! can't do ;;;;; I don't mind It I can't do 
something something 
(for example, If a piece of work Is too hard , or if Pm not allowed out) 
can manage things myself __; _; _; _; _j_I need 
holp with things 
I can't concentrate ; _. _; _; 
I can concentrate 
if someone In class Is upset if someone In class Is upset 
wo all fool upset wo don't all fool upsot 
I'm quick at doing things I'm slow at doing things 
my teachers understand me my teachers don't understand me 
I'm good at saying _; _; _.; - 
I'm bad at saying 
what I moan what I moan 
people like boing with me _. people 
don't like boing with me 
rm not as clover as I'm clovoror than 
my teacher thinks I am my teacher thinks I am 
My parents don't like ma my parents like me 
I got excited a lot I stay calm 
I like people in my Glas _. j __.: j-I 
don't like people in my class 
I think clearly _; _, _; _. ; _; -I 
got mixed up when I think 
Ym nice _,. _; _..; _; 
Fm nasty 
I break a lot of things I don't break things 
(for example when Pm washing. up) 
people want me around nobody wants ma arround 
I got upset at home or school things don't bothor me 
I know a lot about things I don't know a 
lot about things 
-(xXvI- 
I don't know how to bohavo 
ý. ; _; 
I know how to bohavo 
with pooplo with pooplo 
I liko to bo alono I l/ko to Join In with othors 
I can bo trustod 1 can't bo trustod 
othor pooplo docido what I do I docido what I do 
I'm a troublo to my family --j _"_"- 
1'm a holp to my family 
Pm good at sports Im bad at sports 
! 'm good at school work Pm bad at school work 
my toachors liko mo _..; _; _.; _; - my 
toachors don't I/ko mo 
poop/o aro frlghtonod of mo - pooplo aron't frlghtonod of mo 
! 'm always falling ovor things -I Wovor 
fall ovor things 
I am difforont to my group -I am 
tho samo as my group 
I try hard 
-I glvo up oaaily 
I'm nasty to livo with _ 
I'm n/co to 1No with 
looking aftor mo Is hard work _; - 
looking altar mo Is no bothor 
pooplo In my class liko _. t - pooplo 
In my class don't liko 
oachothor oachothor 
this school Is groat _; _; - 
this school Is tortiblo 
I liko to bo mo _; _,; _; ,_j_; ,I wish 
1 was somoono oleo 
- xxvil- 
Examples of ability measures 
a. CHES Pictorial Language 
Page Number 2 
Comprehension Test 
Score sheet for the Ches Pictorial Language Comprehension Test 
= 1. elephant 
4r 
C 
=. 2. playground 
3, plus ý ný(ý 
- - 
r 



















 13. wardrob. w now r 
was WON Nos Now 13 c ci 2 WAW 14. hyena 
c) c Now now 
1r 
now ýo -' TOTAL. ZEROS _ 
27. reptile 









(0' 41. detritus 




APPENDIX 5.5 (Cont) 
b. BAS 
WORD DEFINITIONS 
The words used in this scale appear on the following answer form. 
LET'S SEE HOW MANY WORDS YOU KNOW. I SHALL SAY A WORD AND 
I WANT YOU TO TELL ME WHAT IT MEANS. 
In turn, read out each word on the list. 
. ... 91 
WHAT DOES ....... MEAN? 66 
Please write the child's answer or answers verbatim on the following three pages. It 
is important that everything the child says should be recorded (whether correct or 
otherwise). 
a. If the child merely repeats the indicated word when trying to define 
it, this is 
incorrect and the child should be asked, without giving-any further clues: 
TELL ME MORE or WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY .....? 
b. If the response is ambiguous or on the right lines but not fully correct, use 
non"directional questioning such as: YES? or TELL ME A BIT MORE or CAN 
YOU THINK OF ANYTHING ELSE? 
c. All responses, correct or incorrect, should be greeted with mild encouragement, 
such as YES or GOOD! 
d. If the child's response on the first item is incorrect, the incorrect response(s) 
should be written down and the child should then be told what would 
be the 
correct responses. (Correct responses: any games such as- football, racing or 
similar diversions. Incorrect responses: School sports, snakes and ladders. 
) 
Note: This help is given only with the first item and not with any subsequent items. 
Use your judgment to decide when the child has failed to give correct or partly correct 
definitions of four successive words. If you are sure that there have been four 
successive incorrect definitions, move on to the next scale (recall of digits). 
ý. Sport .......... ....................................................................................... 
............................................................. 
z, Travel .................... . .............................................................. 
................................................................ 
41. Alacrity ................................................................................................. 
4-2. Hirsute ................................................................................................. 
SCHOOL LEAVERS STUDY AVON 
PUPIL QUESITIONNAIRE 
APPENDIX 5.6 
Excerpt from Avon School 
Leavers' Questionnaire 
Always Often Sometimes Never 
rItý 
22. 1 am interesting 
ED El 11 1: 1 COL 42 u 
Q 
23. 1 worry 
Q Q Q El (OL 43 
24. I hate fighting Q 
Q Q Q COL 44 
Q 
2S I am calm 
Q Q Q Q COL 45 
Q 
. 
26. 1 can concentrate on things 
Q Q Q Q COL 46 
0 
27. People dislike me 
Q Q Q Q COL47 
Q 
28. I am a good person 
Q Q Q Q COL 480 
Q 
29. 1 feel bad about things I have done 
Q Q Q Q COL49 
30. I am different from other people 
Q Q Q Q COL 50 
Q 
Q 
31. 1 am friendly 
Q Q Q Q COL 5t 
32. 1 think bad thoughts Q Q Q Q COL s2 
Q 
33. 1 like the way I am 
Q Q Q Q COL s3 
0 
34. 1 feel I am an important person 
Q Q Q Q COL 54 
Q 
35. People can depend on me 
Q Q Q Q rot, ss 
Q 
36. 1 feel unsure of myself 
Q Q Q Q COL 56 
0 
37. 1 like winning 
Q Q Q Q COL 577 
38. 1 like helping other people 
Q Q Q Q COL se 
Q 
Q 
39. I am moody 
[3 Q ED E3 COL 59 
0 
40. I think life is hard 
Q Q Q Q COL 60 
Q 
41. I have a poor memory 
Q Q Q Q COL 61 
Q 
42. 1 wish I was someone else 
Q Q Q Q COL 62 
3 
S 
5.7a One factor ANOVA with a repeated measure 
examined whether aubjeete' self-images differed between 
personal and pupil conditions. An example summary table in 
given below. 
'utL L (Af-Skt*) s1Lo0 A. s3wº j, 'ca, 4 , L, eCt for i da.. 9L'ca. koA 
. 
ýý2CE 
SUM OF DEGREES OF MEAN 














5.7b One factor completely randomised ANOMA 
was used in a manner like that described in Appendix 2.4a to 
assess differences in ability between pupil and personal 
conditions. 
0 
5.7c Spearman's rho 
was calculated as a measure of association between self 
concept of ability and ability scores. This teat makes no 
assumption regarding the nature of each distribution, except 
that at least ordinal measurment has been achieved, which 
was most appropriate because the self-concept of ability 
score was simply the sum of scores on items selected because 
they concerned ability, the extent to which cacti loaded on 
the dimension being unknown. (Although, if loadings varied 
widely it is possible that even this assumption was not 
met). Rho is amply derived from the d if f ererices in rank 
between an individual's scores on each variable, and the 
distribution of critical values is consulted to assess its 
probability (Siegel, 1956). In the present case, however, 
calculations and assessment of probability were conveniently 
performed using BMDP3S. 
5.7d Factor analysis 
was used to see if the structure of self-images differed 
between pupil and personal conditions. 
FUNIvERCi'i'y 
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